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thesis explores the ways in which the factory 
workers of Petrograd struggled between February 1917 and 
June 1918 to improve their position as workers and to demo- 
cratise relations within the factories. It begins by 
examining the sociology of the factory workforce and posits 
the centrality of the division between a fully proletarianised 
minority of skilled, literate, male workers and the majority 
of low-paid, unskilled, peasant and women workers. These 
two groups had a different relationship to the labour movement 
during the revolution of 1917. Chapter 2 examines the position 
of workers within the tsarist factory, and chapter 3 the ways 
in which this position changed as a result of the overthrow 
of the autocracy in February 1917. Chapter 4 looks at the 
creation of the factory committees, their political complexion, 
and their activities.*in spheres as diverse as law and order, 
labour discipline and the campaign against drunkenness. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the political coloration of the 
trade unions, and the extent to which the two organisations 
were genuinely democratic. Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the 
battle by the factory committees for workers' control of prod^r; 
uction, challenging the Western interpretation of this 
battle as being inspired by anarcho-syndicalism, and inter- 
preting it instead as an attempt to stem disorder in the 
economy and to preserve jobs. The debates about workers' 
control are surveyed, and chapter 10 shows how the terms 
of the debate about the roles of the factory committees 
and trade unions changed as a re.ult of the .bolshevik
f
seizure of power* Within the space of a few weeks, the movement
farmworkers' control of production developed into a mo"remBnt
for workers' self-management and for the nationalisation
of industry. In a context of mounting economic chaos, mammoth
redundancies and plummeting labour discipline, the Bolshevik x.'
government decided that workers' self-management conflicted
with the priority of raising productivity in industry.
June 1918 saw a move to nationalise industry, but the end of
the democratic experiment in workers' management.
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INTRODUCTION
This work aims to explore the impact of the Russian Revolution 
on factory life in Petrograd in 1917 and the early months of 1918. 
Originally, the aim was to explore the way in which the whole gamut 
of changes associated with the revolution - political, economic, 
social and cultural - affected the lives and consciousness of the 
Petrograd working class, and it was on this basis that most of the 
research was done. It became clear, however, that to do this 
satisfactorily would necessitate writing a work at least twice the 
length of the present one. It was therefore decided to concentrate 
on the 'economic 1 changes of 1917-18, and on the ways in which 
these affected the working lives of workers,pushing them into 
struggles around work and production.
It should be said at once that this work is, in no sense, an 
attempt to write history 'with the politics left out', to use 
Trevelyan's unfortunate description of social history. The Russian 
Revolution was centrally about politics - about the overthrow of 
the tsarist regime, about 'dual power' and about the experiment in 
popular soviet government. It is thus quite proper that both Soviet 
and Western historians should have focussed on the political dev- 
elopments of 1917. At the same time, they have necessarily tended 
towards an over-political history of the Russian Revolution, which 
does not give due place to changes in the economy, society and 
culture of Russia in these crucial years. The aim of the present 
work is not to write an 'economic 1 history, by separating economics 
from politics - a theoretically dubious exercise at the best of 
times - but to explore the inter-relationship of these two levels
11
of the social formation. Deliberately however, this account seeks 
to foreground the economic level, in order to set political develop- 
ments in a new perspective. Thus the events and political parties 
and personages which dominate standard accounts of the Russian 
Revolution, recede into the background in the present work.
At the centre of our picture are the economic crisis, which first 
became manifest in the summer of 1917, and the 'economic 1 struggles 
of the working class. It is important not to fall into the trap 
of simply equating 'economic 1 struggles with struggles about wages 
and conditions. Within the capitalist factory capital dominates 
labour in two ways: firstly, it exploits labour because of its 
ownership of the means of production; secondly, it enforces the 'real 
subordination' of labour within the process of production, i.e. 
it constructs a system of power relations which can enforce the 
discipline of the labour process and thus ensure the creation of 
surplus value. Roughly speaking, to each of these types of domination 
there corresponds a specific type of working-class struggle: firstly, 
there are struggles around exploitation - sometimes called by Marx 
"struggles over the appropriation of the product" - which, in 1917, 
included the struggles led by the trade unions for higher wages; 
secondly, there are struggles around capitalist control of the pro- 
cess of production - sometimes called by Marx "struggles over the 
appropriation of nature" - which, in 1917, included the struggle 
for workers' control of production led by the factory committee. 
It is misleading, in fact, to call these struggles "economic", 
for it tends to reinforce a dichotomy between 'economic 1 and 'political
1. Marx, K., Capital, vol. 1, ch. 7, London: Penguin, 1976;
Stedman Jones, G., 'Class Struggles in the Industrial Revolution 1 , 
New Left Review, 90, March-April 1975, p.55.
m2 
struggles, such as Lenin proposed in What Is To Be Done? (1902).
The whole experience of 1917 suggests the impossibility of positing 
such a dichotomy: one of the themes of the present work is to show 
how, in the course of a fight to preserve jobs and living standards, 
workers 'spontaneously 1 come to see the revolutionary political 
options offered by the Bolsheviks as the 'natural 1 solution to 
their immediate economic problems, as well as to the wider problems 
of war, governmental ineptitude and rural poverty. The relationship 
of workers to the different political parties is not examined, 
except in terms of the relationship of these parties to the factory 
committees and trade unions. The policies of the parties on 
'economic' matters are analysed, but an attempt has been made to
avoid duplicating the comprehensive accounts already available in
3 English by P. Avrich, R. Devlin and E.H, Carr. Moreover an attempt
has been made to avoid a detailed description of the role of
factory workers in the major events of 1917 - the February Revolution,
the July Days, the Kornilov rebellion and the October seizure of
power - since excellent accounts are now available in the works
4 
of A. Rabinowitch, M. Ferro and J. Keep.
2. Lenin, V.I., What Is To Be Done? Selected Horks in two volumes, 
vol. 1, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947.
3. Avrich, P., The Russian Revolution and the Factory Committees, 
Columbia University, Ph.D., 1962; Devlin, R.J., Petrograd workers 
and workers' factory committees, SUNY, Binghampton, Ph.D., 1976; 
Carr, E.H., The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 2, London, 1952 (Pelican 
edn. 1966).
4. Rabinowitch, A., Prelude to Revolution, Indiana University Press, 
1968. Rabinowitch, A., The Bolsheviks Come to Power, New York, 
1976. Ferro, M., The Russian Revolution of February 1917, 
London: Routledge, 1972.Ferro, M., October 1917, London: Routledge, 
1980. Keep, J.H.L., The Russian Revolution: a study in mass 
mobilisation, London: Weidenfeld, 1976.
TV
The present work focusses exclusively on the factory workers 
of Petrograd, since they comprised a majority of the city's labour 
force and since they constituted the base of the revolutionary 
movement. Non-factory workers such as railway workers, construction 
workers, shop workers, workers in public organisations, artisans 
etc. have been excluded from the scope of analysis. However, 
workers in railway repair shops are included, as are printers, in
view of the fact that the average print works in Petrograd employed
5 240 workers, and the biggest ones some several thousand employees.
Because the Petrograd proletariat has been mythologised in Soviet 
ideology in order to legitimate the social and political order of 
the Soviet Union, it is important to re-establish its historicity. 
He thus begin by trying to reconstruct in its complexity the his- 
torical and sociological specificity of the factory workforce of the 
capital on the eve of 1917.
My original hope, when commencing this research, was to study 
the archives of the major factories of Petrograd in depth. Although 
I was given permission by the Soviet authorities to work in the 
Leningrad archives in 1977, I was not allowed access to those 
factory archives which I wished to see, and was thus unable to make 
archival sources the main evidential base of this work. Most of my 
source material is drawn from an exhaustive reading of the socialist 
and trade-union press for 1917-18. The fine collections of archival 
and documentary material which have been published by Soviet scholars 
are used extensively, as are a wide range of secondary works by Soviet
5. Spisok fabrichno-zavodskikh predpriyatii Petrograda, Pg., 1918, 
pp. 7-16.
historians. I wish to record my indebtedness to these scholars. 
I have called the capital of Russia by its historic name of 
'Petersburg 1 when referring to the period before 18 August 1914. 
On that date, the tsarist government, in a fit of anti-German 
fervour, changed the name of the city to the less German-sounding 
'Petrograd 1 . The Bolshevik party refused to go along with this 
chauvinism and continued to call its metropolitan organisation the 
Petersburg Committee in 1917. I have done likewise. Throughout 
this work I have used the old-style date of the Julian calendar, 
which was thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar. To avoid 
confusion, I have continued to use old-style dates even after 14 
February 1918, when the new calendar was introduced. Finally, I 
have translated all Russian measures of weight into metric units.
1. A PROFILE OF THE PETROGRAD WORKING CLASS ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION
A. PETROGRAD: THE CITY AND ITS INDUSTRY
Petrograd was a city of striking contrasts. It was the political, 
economic and cultural capital of Russia and yet in many ways a most 
unRussian city - more like Paris than Moscow. It was at once a 
symbol of tsarist power and of popular revolution. Here the Imperial 
Court headed an army of 70,000 civil servants; here in 1905 the 
first Soviet had headed a general strike. Along the avenues and 
canals of the city centre stood palaces, splendid emporia, banks and 
company offices. Across the river stood bleak tenements and teeming 
factories. Not a stone's throw from the University and the Academy 
of Sciences there lived thousands of people in appalling ignorance 
and misery. Petrograd was home to rich and poor, to a thriving 
revolutionary underground and to the Holy Synod, to the liberal 
opposition and to the Black Hundreds. Here in February 1917 a revol- 
ution erupted which was to have world-shattering implications.
In 1917 Petrograd had a population of 2.4 millions. It was by 
far the largest city in a country where less than a fifth of the pop- 
ulation lived in towns. It was the only city, apart from Moscow,
2 
with a population in excess of one million. Between 1897 and 1914
1. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue I, Pg. 1920, p.lO. 
Estimates vary from 2.3 million (Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie 
rabochego klassa Rossii, M. 1958, p.354) to 2.7 million (Strumilin, 
S.G., 'Obshchii obzor Severnoi oblasti 1 , Materialy po statistike 
truda Severnoi oblasti, issue I, Pg. 1918, p.17.
2. Rashin, A.G., Naselenie Rossii za sto let, M. 1956, pp. 25 and 97.
the population of the capital had grown from 1.26 million to 2.21
million - a very high rate of growth compared to the average for the
3 Empire as a whole. By 1917 Russia had 182 million inhabitants,
4 about 1|% of whom lived in the capital.
Although the birth rate in Russia had declined since the middle 
of the nineteenth century, Russia still had one of the highest rates
in Europe on the eve of the First World War, with 44 births per
5thousand of population. In Petrograd the rate was much lower, aver- 
aging 28.7 births per thousand of the population, but compared to most 
other capital cities in Europe this was a very high rate indeed. 
The relatively low birth rate in Petrograd compared to the national 
average reflected the lower marriage rate, the economic need to 
regulate family size in the towns and the general cultural pressures 
of urban life. During the war the birth rate in Petrograd, and in
o
Russia as a whole, fell sharply, as it did in most belligerent countries.
The death rate in Russia had fallen steadily since the mid-nine- 
teenth century, when it averaged 35.9 per thousand of the population, 
to 28.5 in 1909-17. Nevertheless on the eve of the war Russia still 
had a far higher mortality than elsewhere in Europe, owing to the 
agrarian character of the society and the exceptionally high level of
3. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue I, p.10.
4. Strumilin, S.G., loc. cit.
5. Rashin, A.G., Naselenie, p.224.
6. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue I, pp. 10 and 17.
7. Not surprisingly the rate of illegitimate births was much higher 
	in Petrograd than in the country as a whole, ibid., p.21.
8. ibid., p.19.
g infant mortality. In Petrograd in the five-year period up to 1914
the death rate was 23.2, a figure considerably lower than the 
national average. Yet this was deceptive, for in almost every 
age-group,mortality was higher than the national average; but the 
preponderance of young adults in the population, together with the 
low proportion of children and elderly, depressed the overall death 
rate of the capital. Notwithstanding this, mortality in Petrograd 
was far higher than in other European cities. About a quarter of 
all babies born in the capital died before the age of one; and for 
those who survived childhood the biggest killers were tuberculosis, 
pneumonia, epidemics of typhoid, spotted fever and smallpox, and 
stomach and intestinal diseases. As one would expect, the death 
rate was much higher in the poorer districts of the capital than in 
the wealthier ones. Whereas in 1915 the death rate per thousand in 
the working-class areas of Vyborg, Narva and Kolomenskoe was, respec- 
tively, 24.8, 22.8 and 26.3,' in the aristocratic districts of
Admiralteiskii, Liteinyi and Kazan it was, respectively, 8.7, 11.2
12 
and 11.7. During the war the death rate in Petrograd rose from
21.5 in 1914 to 25.2 in 1917, in spite of a fall in the number of 
infant deaths. This increase was due partly to the numbers of wounded
and diseased soldiers who were transferred to the capital from the
c ^ 13 Front.
In view of the lowish birth rate and the high death rate in
9. Rashin, A.G., Naselenie, pp. 5 and 225.
10. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue I, p.23.
11 . ibid., p.33.
12. Statisticheskie dannye Petrograda, Pg., 1916, p.11.
13. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue I, p.10.
Petrograd the rapid growth in the city's population after 1897 
may seem puzzling, but it was almost entirely due to immigration
from the countryside. In 1910 68% of the inhabitants of Petersburg
14 had been born outside the city. The census of that year analysed
the city's population by social estate (soslovie) as follows: 69% 
were classified as "peasants" (this category included industrial
workers); 16% were "lower middle class" (meshchane) and 12% were
15 hereditary or personal nobility, honorary citizens or merchants.
The huge proportion of peasant migrants in the capital gave the 
city's population certain peculiar demographic features. Firstly, 
there was a numerical preponderance of men over women, which reflected 
the fact that more men than women left the countryside in search of
work. The number of women migrants to Petrograd increased dramatically
Ut
between 1900 and 1910, (there were still only 897 women to every 
thousand men in the city's population in 1915. Secondly, the 
proportion of children and teenagers in Petrograd was unusually low. 
According to the 1910 census, children under ten comprised 17% of 
the city's population, compared to 27% of the population of Russia 
as a whole. Young people aged ten to nineteen comprised 18.4% of 
the population as against 21.4% in the country as a whole. However 
the proportion of the Petrograd population in the age group 20 to 29 
was higher than the national average - at 26% against 16%. Thirdly,
14. Statisticheskie dannye Petrograda, p.9.
15. ibid., p.8.
16. ibid. In 1900 there were 578 female 'peasants' in Petrograd
for every thousand males. Shuster, N.A., Peterburgskie
rabochie v 1905-07gg. L. 1976, p.31.
17. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue I, p.25.
the immigrant character of the capital's population meant that single 
people outnumbered married. In 1910 58% of men were single and 39%
were married; and 56% of women were single, 33% married and 11%
18 
widowed. On the eve of the war the marriage rate was only 6.2
per thousand of the population - a very low rate compared to other
19 European capitals. The low rate was due partly to the fact that
peasant migrants preferred to marry in their native villages; 
partly, to the stil1-restricted possibilities for female employment 
in industry; and, largely, to the economic impossibility for most
male workers of supporting a family. Those who did marry, married
20 late. Only 38% of men who married were under the age of 25.
All in all, the demographic patterns of Petrograd's population 
were highly distinctive, compared to both the national pattern and 
to that of capital cities in Western Europe. A majority of the 
population were peasants who had migrated from the countryside, most 
being single men in their twenties. It was they who boosted the 
city's population so dramatically in the decade before 1914.
Petrograd as an Economic Centre
Industrialisation had made impressive progress in Russia since 
"take-off" in the 1890 f s. Gerschenkron estimates that industrial
output was growing by 7|% per annum between 1905 and 1914. By that
21 date Russia stood fifth in the league table of industrial nations.
18. Statisticheskie dannye Petrograda, p.9.
19. Materialy po statist!ke Petrograda, issue I, pp. 11-12.
20. ibid., p.16. This compared to 68% in the country as a whole. 
Rashin, A.G., Naselenie, p.174.
21. Gerschenkron, A., 'Problems and Patterns of Russian Economic
Development' in Black, C.E., The Transformation of Russian Society, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960, p.54.
As yet, however, she was far from being a fully industrialised 
country. In terms of volume of industrial output, France produced 
2.5 times as much as Russia in 1914; Britain 4.6 times as much; 
Germany six times as much and the USA 14.3 times as much. 22 Per 
capita real income in Russia was only half that of Germany and a 
third that of the USA and Britain. Agriculture still employed 
two-thirds of the population and accounted for 45% of national income,
whereas manufacture and mining accounted for not more than one fifth
04 
of national income and employed about 3.3 million people in 1913.
In view of this, it is difficult to concur with Soviet historians 
that Russia had reached the "highest", imperialist stage of capitalist 
development by the time of the First World War. Nevertheless capit- 
alism in Russia was remarkable for the manner in which it combined 
primitive forms of capitalist production, such as rural commodity 
production, manufacture and small factory production, with the most 
modern forms of monopoly and state-capitalist production. And it 
was above all in Petrograd that the most advanced forms of capitalist 
production were to be found.
Petrograd was first and foremost a banking and financial centre. 
As Russia's citadel of finance capital it controlled the metal and 
coal industries of the South, the oil industry of Baku, Urals 
copper, Siberian gold, South-Western sugar, Turkestan cotton and
22. Lyashchenko, P.I., History of the National Economy of Russia, 
Herman, L.M,, transl., New York: Macmillan, 1949, p.674.
23. Crisp, 0., Studies in the Russian Economy before 1914, London: 
Macmillan, 1976, p.5.
24. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.171.
25Volga steamships. The major banks in Petrograd were the Russian- 
Asiatic bank, which financed 21 metal, engineering and tobacco 
companies; the Discount and Loan bank, which financed the Noblessner 
engineering group, the American-Russian rubber company and the 
Skorokhod shoe company; the International bank, which financed the
electrical syndicates Elektroprovod and Semaphore, and the Azov-Don
P/- 
bank. By April 1917 the assets of the private commercial banks
of Petrograd amounted to 11 milliard rubles, or three-quarters of
27 the entire assets of Russia's private banks. In addition, the
State Bank, which had some 200 offices throughout the Empire and was
28 the only bank to issue currency, had its headquarters in the capital.
As much as two-thirds of the assets of the commercial banks 
were foreign-owned, and in industry, too, foreign capital played a
significant part, with about a third of corporate and debenture in-
29 
vestments owned by foreign companies. The bulk of this foreign
capital was invested in mining (90% of total capital investment),
30 
metallurgy (42%) and chemicals (50%). France controlled about a
third of total foreign investments in both banking and industry; 
Britain 23%; Germany 20%; Belgium 14% and the USA 16%. 31 During the 
war, foreign control of Petrograd industry was slightly reduced when
25. Volobuev, P.V., Proletariat I burzhuaziya Rossii v 1917g., M. 1964, 
p.47.
26. Valk, S.N. et al., ed., Oktyabr'skoe Vooruzhennoe Vosstanie, 
Vol. I, L. 1967, pp. 419^27:
27. ibid., p.392.
28. ibid., p.415-
29. Lyashchenko, P.I., op. cit., p.714.
30. ibid., p.716.
31. Falkus, M.E., The Industrialisation of Russia, 1700-1914, 
London: Macmillan, 1972, p.71.
8seven joint-stock companies, with a fixed capital of over 80 million 
rubles, were sequestered by the government because of their German 
connections. By 1917 fifteen Petrograd companies, with a fixed
00
capital of 70 million rubles, were completely foreign-owned. This 
does not represent a foreign strangle-hold, however, when considered
against the total of 2242 million rubles of foreign capital invested
33 in Russian banking and industry at this time. More important than
foreign capital in the wartime industry of Petrograd was the role 
played by the state.
With the outbreak of war in 1914 Petrograd became the major centre 
of armaments production. Its industry was drastically revamped to 
meet two-thirds of the nation's defence requirements. Industrial 
output in the capital doubled between 1914 and 1917, and in 1916 alone 
its factories carried out military orders worth 1.5 million rubles.
In the metalworking industry 81% of enterprises and 98% of the work-
34 force worked exclusively on war orders. This boom in production
engendered a transformation in the organisation of Petrograd industry. 
From the time of the industrial crisis of 1900-03 monopoly organisation 
had been developing in Petrograd industry. These monopolies, unlike 
the German cartels, were syndicates concerned with marketing rather 
than larger, more concentrated units of production. By 1914 there
32. Oktyabr'skoe Vooruzhennoe Vosstanie, vol. I, p.423.
33. This is the figure calculated by P. 01' and is probably on 
the high side. Falkus, M.E., op. cit., p.71.
34. Valk, S.N., et al., ed., Istoriya rabochikh Leningrada, vol. I, 
L. 1972, p.463; OTaterialy po statist!ke truda Severnof oblasti, 
issue I, Pg. 1918, p.18.
were over 150 such syndicates in Russia, covering mainly the mining
and metallurgical sectors and some branches of light industry such
35 
as cotton textiles. The First World War gave a boost to this
process of monopolisation, creating a tight nexus between monopolies, 
finance capital and state orders. By 1917 sixty of the largest firms 
in Petrograd were organised into syndicates and trusts. The Russian- 
Asiatic bank organised a War Industries syndicate which contracted 
orders with the Baranovskii engineering company, the Russian Optical 
Company and the Russian Company for the Manufacture of Shells and 
Military Supplies. The Discount and Loan bank sponsored a syndicate 
under the name of Noblessner, which embraced the Nobel, United 
Cable, Phoenix and Atlas companies. Snaryadosoyuz was a private 
syndicate, comprising six firms, which produced shells directly for 
the Artillery Department. The transport engineering syndicates 
Prodparovoz and Prodvagon were treated by the Ministry of Communications 
more or less as official government contractors. And S.N. Vankov 
headed a state-capitalist organisation which produced three-inch 
shells directly for the Artillery Department by sub-contracting orders
oc
to four large companies in Petrograd.
While the government farmed out orders for shells, fuses and 
certain types of Ordnance to private firms, it procur ed most of its 
cartridges, revolvers, machine-guns and other kinds of ordnance from 
state factories. From its foundation St. Petersburg had been a major 
centre of government-sponsored industry. By 1917 there were 31 state-
35. Falkus, M.E., op. cit., pp. 77-8.
36. Oktyabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie, pp. 403-5.
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owned or state-controlled enterprises in Petrograd, compared to only
37 
one in Moscow. These state factories employed a total of 134,464
workers in January 1917, i.e. over a third of the workforce of the 
capital. Ten of the state enterprises were run by the Artillery 
Administration and employed a total workforce of 53,000. The largest 
of these was the Pipe (Trubochnyi) Works) which had a workforce of 
20,547 in January 1917, making time-fuses, percussion caps and ex- 
plosives, and the Cartridge (Patronnyi) Works, which employed over 
10,000 workers making rifle and revolver cartridges. Five state 
enterprises were run by the Naval Ministry and employed a total of 
36,000 workers. Of these the largest was the Obukhov steel works 
which employed 12,954 workers at the beginning of 1917. It produced 
cast-iron, steel and copper mouldings, shells, mines and types of 
artillery which were beyond the means of the state gun factory in 
Perm. The Baltic shipyard - also under the Naval Ministry - em- 
ployed 7,645 workers at the beginning of 1917 and produced battle- 
ships, submarines, mine-layers etc. A third category of state enter- 
prises were the railway engineering and repair shops. The largest 
of these were the repair shop on the North-Western railway and the
carriage and steam-engine shops on the Nikolaev line, which each
38 
employed over 2,000 workers. In addition to these state-owned
factories there were a number of companies which were state-controlled, 
though not state-owned. In February 1916 the government had sequestered 
the Putilov works, with its massive workforce of around 30,000, and
37. G aponenko, L.S., Rabochii Klass Rossii v 1917g., M. 1970, p.51.
38. Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1961, no. 5, pp. 158-165; Spisok Fabrichno- 
zavodskikh predpriyatii Petrograda, Pg., 1918.
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the Nevskii shipbuilding works. The government appointed new boards 
to both companies but both continued to be privately owned (Putilov 
share prices were quoted on the stock exchange index) and both con- 
tinued to receive credit from the Russian-Asiatic bank. In a less 
dramatic move, the Ministry of Trade and Industry took a 35% share
in the German-owned Siemens company in order to control its operations
39 
more effectively.
A further feature of Petrograd industry was its advanced tech- 
nology. From the beginning of industrial "take-off" in the 1890's 
most branches of industry in Petrograd were heavily mechanised. 
This was probably a response to the relatively high labour-unit costs 
of Russian industry, due not to high wages but to the high cost of
raw materials and marketing and to the relatively restricted market
40for sales. During the boom of 1907 to 1913 considerable technol- 
ogical innovation and concentration of production took place in the 
metal industries of the capital, as demand for industrial and agri- 
cultural equipment increased. Government-sponsored shipbuilding 
replaced the railways as an outlet for Petrograd's engineering
products. Between 1908 and 1912 the output of engineering works in
41 Russia increased by 54%. By 1914 Petrograd industry had attained
a high level of technological sophistication. Its largest firms 
lagged little behind those of Western Europe and many exchanged
39. Oktyabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie, pp. 408-9.
40. Crisp, 0., 'Labour and Industrialisation in Russia 1 , Cambridge
Economic History of Europe, Vol. VII, part 2, Cambridge University 
Press, 1978, p. 4-04.
41. Gerschenkron, A., Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard U.P., 1962, pp. 135-8; Rozenfeld, Ya. S., 
and Klimenko, K.I., Istoriya mashinostroeniya SSSR, M. 1961, p.96.
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technical information and patents with companies in the West.
Putilov, for example, had agreements with the Schneider company,
42 Armstrong-Whitworth, Paul Girault and A.G. Duisburg. However,
there was considerable variation in technological level between 
industries. Machine-tool construction and general machine-construc- 
tion were somewhat backward technically compared to the electro- 
technical and engine-building industries which were extremely up-to- 
date. This variation extended to individual factories. Contemp- 
oraries noted the contrast between two neighbouring metal works on 
Vyborg Side. The Phoenix works, whose director was English, was the 
first specialised machine-tool works in Russia, producing steam- 
engine, lathes, planing and mortising machines, while next door the
Rozenkrantz works mixed copper-zinc alloys in extremely primitive
44 fashion.
The technical efficiency of Petrograd industry was put to strin-
45 gent test by the war and on the whole was not found wanting.
Enterprises were reorganised and re-equipped and massive amounts of 
capital were injected into them. Mass production techniques were 
introduced in the armaments factories and in some machine-construction 
plants. The conversion of private factories to production of shells, 
hand grenades, detonators, mortars etc. was very successful. Pro- 
duction of guns was less successful but adequate. Most engineering
42. Kruze, E.E., Polozhenie rabochego Klassa Rossii v 1900-14 gg., 
L. 1976, p.127.
43. Rozenfeld, Ya. S., op. cit., pp. 102, 105, 109.
44. Vyborgskaya Storona, L. 1957, p.4.
45. Grinevetskii, V.I., Poslevoennye perspektivy russkoi promyshlennosti 
M. 1918, p.46.
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industries coped well but could not always meet demand. Production 
of engines increased and simple machine-tool production expanded both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Production of automobiles and
aircraft began, although production of precision instruments remained
46 
weakly developed. In spite of some weaknesses, Petrograd factories
managed to satiate the voracious appetite of the war machine until 
the second half of 1916, when they began to find it increasingly hard
to maintain output in the teeth of declining supplies of fuel and
47 
raw materials and growing disorganisation in the transport system.
Nevertheless in the spring of 1917 Petrograd was still producing 22%
48 of Russia's total industrial output.
On the eve of the Russian Revolution, therefore, the structure 
of industry in Petrograd was altogether remarkable, unparalleled except 
in Germany. Petrograd represented an island of technologically- 
sophisticated state-monopoly capitalism in a country whose mode of 
production still consisted in the main of rudimentary capitalist and 
pre-capitalist forms, albeit under the overall dominance of large 
capital. The economy of the city was being convulsed by a colossal 
boom which was entirely a consequence of the slaughter daily 
taking place on the Eastern Front. Yet war could not go on for ever: 
  this was an economy living off borrowed time. As soon as the 
mighty powers had glutted themselves with carnage and destruction, 
the economy of Petrograd would deflate like a pricked balloon. No end 
to the war was as yet in sight, but already the signs of imminent 
collapse were unmistakeable.
46. Rozenfeld, Ya. S., op. cit., pp. 116, 123.
47. Lyashchenko, P.I., op. cit., p. 762.
48. Istoriya rabochego klassa Leningrada, vol. I, p.462.
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B. THE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKFORCE IN 1917
i. Distribution by Industry
Between 1862 and 1913 the factory workforce of St. Petersburg 
multiplied by a factor of 6.5. In 1890 there were 73,200 factory 
workers in the capital; in 1902 already 137,400; in 1908 158,152
4.Q
and by 1914, 242,600. Between 1914 and 1917 the city's industrial 
workforce grew by 150,000 (60%) to reach 392,800, or 417,000 if one 
includes the factories situated on the outskirts of the city. 
This wartime increase in the size of the workforce was far greater 
than the growth of the industrial workforce in Russia as a whole,
which equalled 16%. 51 By 1917 about 12% of Russia's 3.4 million
52 industrial workers toiled in the factories of Petrograd. During
the first half of 1917 the number of workers in the capital continued 
to grow - possibly by as much as 10% - as production for the war
continued. As the economic crisis set in, however, in the summer of
53 1917, the workforce began to contract.
The huge expansion of the Petrograd workforce between 1914 and 
1917 took place almost entirely in industries producing for the war 
effort. In the metal industry the workforce grew by 135%; in chemicals
49. Rashin, A.G., Formirovam'e, p.196.
50. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i
provdeniya oktyabr'skogo'vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, M.L. 1965, 
pp. 25-26.
51. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.82.
52. Rabochii klass i rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v 1917g., M. 1964, p.75
53. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.83.
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by 99% and in clothing by 44%. In textiles the workforce remained
constant in size, and in the food, printing and paper industries the
54
workforce shrank. By 1917 the distribution of the Petrograd work- 
force by industry was as follows:
Table 1







































Source: Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki j
provedeniya OktyaBV'skogo Vooruzhennogo Vosstam'ya M.L. 1965, 
p.29.(Based on data in Spisok fabrichno-zavodskikh 
predpriyatii Petrograda, Pg. 1918.)—————————
The most striking feature of this table is the extraordinary para-
mountcy of metalworkers. Whereas metalworkers had comprised only
one third of the workforce in 1908, nine years later they comprised
r r
almost two-thirds. In the same period textileworkers grew in
54. Rabochii Klass i rabochee dvizhenie, p.76.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































number but as a proportion of the workforce dwindled from 22% to
n%. 56
Russia was renowned for its large factories. The large scale
of production units reflected the high level of technological and
monopoly-capitalist development of its industry. In 1914 54% of
Russian workers were employed in factories of over 500 workers,
57 
compared to 32.5% of workers in the USA. In Petrograd the degree
of concentration of workers was much higher. By 1917 there was an 
average of 409 workers in each enterprise (including the suburbs) - 
40% more than the average for Russian factories in general. No 
less than 70% of workers in Petrograd were employed in factories
with workforces of over 1000, two-thirds of their number working in
59 38 large enterprises of more than 2000 workers each. It is apparent
from Table 2 that the trend towards concentration of plant size was a 
long-term trend which was merely intensified by the war. In the metal 
industry concentration of workers was especially high, averaging 2404 
workers per enterprise. In state enterprises the average workforce was 
5131 workers. Textile production was smaller in scale, yet in
Petrograd in 1917, 78% of textile workers worked in 25 mills with an
fil 
average workforce of 1372 workers. This suggests that concentration
56. Davidenko, A.I., 'K voprosu o chislennosti i sostave proletariata 
Peterburga v nachale XX veka 1 , Istoriya rabochego klassa Leningrada, 
issue II, L. 1963, p.97; Kruze, E.E., Peterburgskie, p.69.
57. Gaponenko, L.S., op. cit., p.88.





in large units may not be the key factor explaining the greater 
militancy of metalworkers relative to textileworkers in 1917.
Petrograd was quite unique in the world at this time in having 
so large a proportion of its workforce concentrated in such vast 
enterprises. It was also unique in Russian terms in that the majority 
of its workers were actually factory workers. Although the working 
population of Petrograd totalled well over half a million by 1917 
(taking into account workers in the transport, construction and retail
CO
sectors and in small workshops) a majority were employed in factories. 
In Moscow, in contrast, only 46% of the city's working population 
worked in factories, and in spite of the fact that half the factory 
workforce worked in factories with more than 500 workers, the size of
CO
the median factory was only 51. In Kiev and the other major cities
of Russia a majority of wage workers still worked in artisanal enter-
64 prises. Petrograd was thus a striking exception to the national
pattern.
ii. Spatial Distribution of the Working Class
86% of the workforce of Petrograd province lived in the city or
its suburbs, which meant that the working class of this North-Western
65 region was unusually urban by Russian standards. Most of the city's
62. Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue I, Pg. 1918,
_rr
63. Koenker, D-, Moscow Workers in 1917, vols I and II, University 
of Michigan, Ph.D., 1976, p.24; Grunt, A. Ya., Moskva - 1917: 
revolyutsiya i kontrrevolyutsiya, M. 1976, pp. 32-33.
64. Naumov, G., Byudzhety rabochikh goroda Kieva, Kiev 1914.
65. Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue I, p.11. 
Only 51% of the workforce in Moscow province lived in the city 
itself.
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workers lived in the proletarian districts which encircled the central 
part of the city - on Vyborg Side, in the Narva, Nevskii and Moscow 
districts, on Vasilevski i Island and on Petrograd Side. Following 
the police classification of city districts, one can pinpoint the 
proletarian areas of the capital as being: Vyborg, Narva, Peterhof 
(where the Putilov works was situated), Alexsandrovskii (Nevskaya 
Zastava), Okhta, Novoderevenskii, Lesnoi and Polyuostrovskii. Just 
outside the city were the factory villages of Shlissel'burg, Kolpino 
and Sestroretsk. On the whole, the proletarian districts were fairly 
close to one another, for Petrograd was a compact city, 
In the central part of the city - along Nevskii 
Prospekt, the river Neva and the Moika and Fontanka canals - 
the wealthy classes lived and government offices, banks and 
companies had their headquarters. In social terms, the proletarian 
and aristocratic districts were worlds apart, but in terms of dis- 
tance they were very close to one another. One only had to cross the 
Alexander II bridge (Liteinyi bridge) from Vyborg Side to arrive at 
the Central Law Courts, and from there it was but a stone's throw to 
Nevskii Prospekt. On Vasilevskii Island the poor inhabitants of the 
Gavan' and of Malyi and Srednyi Prospekts lived cheek-by-jowl with 
the officials and intelligentsia of Bolshoi Prospekt. The shocking 
contrast between the living conditions of the well-to-do and the 
poor, coupled to their close proximity, was striking testimony to the 
reality of class division in Petrograd society. The social visibility 
of this division was almost certainly a factor promoting class con- 
sciousness on the part of the working masses.
20
Conditions in the working-class districts were sordid and 
filthy. In 1920 42% of homes in Petrograd were without a water 
supply or sewage system. Needless to say, these were mainly in the 
Nevskii, Moscow, Peterhof and Vyborg districts. Rubbish in the 
streets and open cesspools were a constant health hazard. Such water 
supply as there was was frequently contaminated by ordure and in- 
dustrial pollution (the river Neva was heavily polluted): cholera 
and typhus were the inevitable result. No proper roads or pavements 
existed in working-class areas, which meant that public thoroughfares 
turned into quagmires of mud during winter. Street lighting was 
extremely bad or non-existent. Housing was squalid. Open spaces 
were few. Overcrowding was rife. The chairman of the Vyborg district 
duma sanitation committee claimed that local residents had less space
fi7than those buried in the nearby cemetery. Population density in 
the proletarian areas was two to four times that in inner-city areas. 
Around the Putilov works there sprawled a fetid slum. Here an average 
of 4.1 people lived in each rented room; in the third sub-district 
of Aleksandro-Nevskii area the corresponding figure was 4.6. In 
1900 a survey of 23,000 people living in shared accommodation showed
that an average of 5.6 people lived in each room and that a fifth
59 of such rooms were damp and a quarter inadequately ventilated.
According to S.N. Prokopovich's survey of 1908, only a quarter 
of workers could afford to rent a flat of one or two rooms, and those 
who could, usually sub-let a part of it. About 70% of single workers
67. Vyborgskaya Storona, p.11.
68. Semanov, S.N., Peterburgskie rabochie nakanune pervoi russkoi 
revolyutsii, M.L. 1966, p.152."
69. ibid., p.161.
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and 40% of workers with families lived in shared rooms. Many single 
workers made do with just a bunk, which they shared with workers 
on other shifts. In 1912 150,000 people lived in shared rooms 
and during the war the number increased. In Petrograd only a 
small proportion of workers lived in barracks accommodation or on
factory premises (7% in 1918); this was in contrast to factories
72 in rural areas, where such .accommodation was common.
Although the standard of rented accommodation was frightful, it 
was by no means cheap. Rents in Petrograd were amongst the highest 
in Europe. Around the turn of the century it cost between 100 and 
300 rubles a month to rent a flat; a room cost six to eight rubles
a months and a bunk cost one-and-a-half to four rubles a month
73 (proportionately much more than a room). In the decade up to 1914
rents rose by 30% on average and then during the war they spiralled - 
doubling and trebling in less than three years. Rents were high 
owing to the desperate shortage of accommodation in the city, caused 
not so much by too little building (land speculation and a construc- 
tion boom were transforming the face of the city in the decade prior 
to the war) as by massive immigration into the capital.
70. Prokopovich, S.N., Byudzhety peterburgskikh rabochikh, Pbg., 
1909, p.10.
71. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.58.
72. ibid., p.59.
73. Semanov, S.N., op. cit., pp. 154-5, 163.
74. Istoriya rabochego klassa Leningrada, vol. I, p.409; Stepanov, 
Z.V., op. cit., p.59.
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C. THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE PETROGRAD WORKING CLASS
i) Peasant Workers and "Cadre" Workers
The industrial labour force in Russia was recruited overwhelmingly 
from the countryside. The working class thus had a peculiar 
'peasant 1 character which distinguished it from most West European 
working classes whose roots were more urban and artisanal. Whether 
one can even speak of a 'working class 1 in the Russian context prior 
to the revolution is a controversial question, and one that has been 
a bone of contention among historians since the time of the Narodniks.
Basically, within the working class there were two broad social 
groups. The first consisted of peasants who had been driven from the 
land by poverty, who had come to work in the factories and who still 
retained strong ties with the countryside. The second consisted of 
what Soviet historians like to call 'cadre 1 (Kadrovye) workers who 
lived solely by wage work in industry and who were fully socialised 
into factory life; these workers were either peasants who had 
become proletarianised by severing their links with agriculture and 
by serving many years in the factory or else they were hereditary 
workers who had been born into working class families.
The historical controversy in essence revolves around two related 
problems: firstly, what was the relative weight of each of these 
groups within the labour force (did peasant workers outnumber "cadres"?); 
secondly, was a process of proletarianisation underway, whereby peas- 
ants were loosening their ties with the land and becoming conscious 
members of the working class. What follows is an attempt to explore 
these questions in relation to the Petrograd working class between
23
1900 and 1917.
Hundreds of thousands of peasants migrated to Petrograd 
between the 1861 Emancipation Act and the 1917 Revolution. They 
were forced from the land by overpopulation, land scarcity, 
indebtedness and general poverty. Landless and poor peasants com- 
prised a majority of migrants, but many middling and some well-to-do 
peasants joined them. Few left their villages with the intention 
of cutting their ties with the land for good. The aim was to find 
off-farm work which would provide enough money to make the family 
farm financially viable. Most migrants tried to find work in agri- 
culture, forestry, construction etc. since this was more congenial 
than factory work. Many ended up, inevitably, in factories. 
Factory work did not necessarily "proletarianise" these peasant 
migrants. Many stayed in the factories only during the winter months, 
returning to their native villages in the summer to help with the 
harvest. Others stayed for several years but then returned to their 
families in the countryside. In some areas such as Tula and Moscow
factory work had the paradoxical effect of preserving peasant society
75 by providing money to keep family farms intact.
Peasants who migrated to Petrograd came from provinces distant 
from the capital, whereas in Moscow they came from provinces close 
by. Most came from the non-black-earth central provinces and from 
the North-Western provinces, particularly from Tver, Pskov, Vitebsk, 
Novgorod, Smolensk, Kostroma, Vilna, Yaroslavl 1 and Ryazan 1 . Only
7fi
about 8% came from Petrograd province itself. It was common for
75. Munting, R., 'Outside Earnings in the Russian Peasant Farm: the 
case of Tula province, 1900-17', Journal of Peasant Studies, 1976, 
no.3, p.444; Johnston, R.E., Peasant and Proletarian, Leicester 
University Press, 1979.
76. Shuster, N.A., Peterburgskie rabochie v 1905-7gg., L. 1976, p.18; 
Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p ————————
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peasants from the same locality to work in the same factory, for it 
was difficult to get taken on in a factory unless one had inside 
connections (zemlyaki). At the Baltic works, for example, many 
workers came from Tver province and in the boat shop most came 
from Staritskii uezd within that province,since the foreman was a 
native of the area. At the Triangle Works there were large numbers 
of workers from Vasilevskii volost 1 in Tver uezd, Tver province.
For administrative purposes all the common people were classified 
as "peasants", according to the traditional system of social estates 
(soslovie). In 1900 908,800 "peasants" lived in St. Petersburg, but 
21% had been born there and a further 28%, who had migrated from the 
countryside, had lived there for ten or more years. By 1910, 25%
of Petersburg's 1.3 million "peasants" had been born in the capital
7R 
and a further 25% had lived there for ten or more years. Thus
only about half of these "peasants" were recent migrants from the land 
Strictly speaking, the "peasant worker" was a distinct social type 
occupying a contradictory class position which straddles two modes 
of production. In this sense, only those factory workers who derived 
material benefit from farming land in the countryside were "peasant 
workers". In practice, however, it was not easy to isolate the 
peasant worker, since ties to the land could take a multitude of forms 
It was common, for example, for a peasant to migrate to the factory 
but leave behind his family (wife and children or parents and 
extended family) to farm the family plot of land. Even if the family
77. Shuster, N.A., op. cit., p.21.
78. My calculations based on Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.129; 
Ivanov, L.M., 'Preemstvennost 1 fabrichno - zavodskogo truda J 
formirovanie proletariata v Rossii', Rabochii klass i rabochee 
dvizhenie v Rossii 1861-1917, M. 1966, pp. 112-3; Shuster, N.A., 
op. cit., p.17.
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derived most of its income from the migrant's off-farm earnings, the 
migrant might still feel that his plot of land was of prime importance 
and do his utmost to maintain it. Many migrants, however, soon 
found that it was impossible to work in industry and to farm land 
in the countryside. Many retained ownership of a plot of land in 
their native villages but made little effort to cultivate it. Some 
would sell their land or rent it in perpetuity if the opportunity 
arose. Yet even those who divested themselves of land often had 
parents, ageing relatives or children to whom they were obliged to 
send money; or they might simply feel a strong spiritual bond to their 
native village, never quite adjusting to the alien urban environment. 
Many 'cadre 1 workers would have such familial or spiritual ties to 
the countryside. For purposes of analytical clarity, therc^o^, it is 
best to try to confine the term "peasant worker" to those who had 
strong economic ties to agriculture, i.e. to those who owned and 
farmed land in the countryside.
There are no statistics on the number of peasant workers in St. 
Petersburg, but we can gain some sense of their proportion in the 
workforce by examining the patchy data on workers' ownership of land. 
A survey of cotton-workers in Petersburg in 1900-02 showed that 65% 
of those classified as "peasants" owned land in the countryside but 
only 5% left industry during the summer months to farm it. At the
Baltic shipyard in December 1901 54% of "peasants" owned land in the
79 countryside. One of the most ambitious attempts to analyse land-
79. Shuster, N.A., op. cit., p.30.
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holding of workers in Petersburg was undertaken by the economist 
S.N. Prokopovich in 1908. His survey of 570 mainly skilled workers 
disclosed that 12% of married workers and 32% of single workers took 
part in farming land; a further 21% of married workers and 18% of 
single workers owned but did not farm land. A larger number, however, 
sent money to relatives in the countryside, viz. 42% of married
on
workers and 67% of single workers.
Sending money to relatives was not in itself evidence of close 
bonds to the countryside. Many young workers who went to the towns 
in search of work had no choice. One youth explained that he sent 
money regularly to his family "so that my father will not summon me 
back to the countryside". Another explained that when he did not
send enough money to his parents they used to write to him saying,
81 
"Watch out, or we'll confiscate your passport". A survey in 1912
of Petersburg textileworkers revealed that single women sent 6.5% of 
their earnings to kinsfolk in the countryside; single men sent
but married workers whose families lived in the village sent 28% of
., . .82 their earnings.
It is difficult to generalise from such exiguous data about the 
proportion of peasant workers in the labour force prior to the war, but 
it is clear that only a minority of Petersburg workers - less perhaps 
than a third - had real economic ties to the land. A much larger
80. Prokopovich, S.N., op. cit., p.7.
81. Shuster, N.A., op. cit., p.30, Anyone born in the countryside was
registered for passport and taxation pr^Doses in his native village. 
A passport could only be issued to a peasant if the head of the 
household agreed. All taxes for which a peasant was liable were 
recorded in his passport. If he was in debt,permission to migrate 
was required from the mir. If he failed to pay his taxes a passport 
could be revoked. Once a peasant ceased to hold land in the village 
his obligation to pay taxes lapsed.
82. Davidovich, M., Peterburgskii tekstil'nyi rabochii v ego byudzhetakh, 
Pbg. 1912, p.8. "~-
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proportion had rural origins and rural connections but they were not 
"peasant workers" in the sense defined above.
Was the proportion of peasant workers in the labour force of the 
capital expanding or declining through time? Disregarding the some- 
what aberrant period from 1914 to 1917 the evidence strongly suggests 
that land ownership was on the wane. The fullest source on this 
question is the 1929 survey of textileworkers and metalworkers in 
Leningrad. This showed clearly that the more recently a worker had 
entered industry, the less likely was he to own land (see Table 3):
Table 3 
Relationship between land ownership and year of entry into industry
% of workers who owned land














Source: Rashin, A.G., Sostav Fabrichno-Zavodskogo proletariata, M. 1930, 
p.23.
The declining proportion of workers who owned land through time is 
further illustrated by collating data from the censuses of 1918, 1926 
and 1929 - all of which covered workers in Petrograd.
Exactly what proportion of workers in 1917 owned land is difficult 
to estimate. The 1918 industrial census is the source closest to that 
year but it covers only 107,262 workers in Petrograd - less than a 
third of the 1917 workforce. This was because by the time the census
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Table 4 
Proportion of workers who owned and farmed land in Leningrad
% of total % of total % with no land 
who owned land who farmed land
1918 16.7% (17. 2) 1 9.5% (10.8) 83.2% (82.8) 
1926 11. 8%2 4.4% 88.2%
o1Q9Q Q Q°/ Ql 9°/ I JL.J y . O/o 3 \ . C/o
Sources:
1. Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, XXVI, II, pp. 118-119. 
My calculations. The figures in brackets are those in Drobizhev, 
V.Z., Sokolov, A.K. and Ustinov, V.A., Rabochii klass Sovetskoi 
Rossii v pervyi god proletarskoi diktatury, M. 1975, p. 97.
2. Krasil 'nikov, S., 'Svyaz 1 Leningradskogo rabochego s zemlyei ' , 
Statisticheskoe Obozrenie, 4, April 1929, pp. 107-108. This is 
my recalculation of the figures for single and married workers.
3. Rashin, A.G., op. cit., p. 25. This is my recalculation of the 
figures for the proportion of textileworkers and metalworkers 
with land (4.4% and 12.4% respectively).
was taken, factory closures, together with the promise of land in the 
countryside, had led to a gigantic exodus of workers out of the capital 
Consequently, the figures from the 1918 census should be treated with 
caution, since it is reasonable to assume that those workers who did 
have land in the countryside in 1917 would have gone back to it before 
the census was taken. Those workers surveyed by the census were asked 
not only whether they still owned land, but also whether or not they 
had owned land prior to the October Revolution. 16.5% of the working 
class said that they had held land prior to October 1917, and 7.
oo
had actually farmed it.
83. Ts. S.U., Trudy, vol. XXVI, issue II, pp. 118-9.
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This was considerably lower than the average for Russia as a whole 
(31% of workers owned land) but was almost certainly an accurate 
reflection of the greater degree of proletarianisation of the workforce 
of Petrograd. Notwithstanding the fact that the census almost 
certainly underestimates the proportion of workers owning land, it 
is unlikely to be wildly misleading if one considers that the cen- 
suses of 1926 and 1929 - both undertaken when the workforce of Lenin- 
grad was more stable - give even smaller figures for the proportion 
of landholding workers, thus testifying to the continued decline after 
1917 of the proportion of peasant workers. The 1926 census divides 
workers into married and single categories and it is thus interesting 
to compare its findings with those of Prokopovich's survey of eighteen 
years previously. The comparison brings out dramatically the very 








1 . Prokopovich, S.N
% of workers who owned land
workers who: % married workers who:
farmed land owned land farmed land
32% 33% 12% 
7.3% 13.7% 6.6% 
6.6% 8.8% 3.7%
., Byudzhety Peterburgskikh rabochikh, Pbg. 1908,
2. Drobizhev, V.Z., Sokolov, A.K. and Ustinov, V.A., op. cit., p.95.
3. Krasil'nikov, S., op. cit., p.97.
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The censuses of 1918, 1926 and 1929 give some information on the 
proportion of land-owners in each branch of industry which again 
suggests that there was a constant decline in the proportion of 
workers owning land in the two major branches of industry in Petrograd:
Table 6
% of total workforce who owned land
metalworkers textileworkers
1918 1 18.7% 18.6%
1926 2 10.2% 11.6%
19293 12.4% 4.4%
Sources:
1. Drobizhev, V.Z., Sokolov, A.K. and Ustinov, V.A., op. cit., p.98.
2. Krasil'nikov, S., op. cit., p.108.
3. Rashin, A.G., op. cit., p.30.
These figures proved embarrassing to the Stalin government since they 
disclosed that there were more land-owners among metalworkers -regar- 
ded as the vanguard of the proletariat - than among texti1eworkers. 
A second and even more interesting finding emerged from this same 
census. Figures showed that the proportion of landowners was highest 
among groups with the longest service in industry:
Table 7 
% of workers owning land who began work:
Leningrad textileworkers Leningrad metalworkers
prior to 1905 8.0% 17.5%
between 1905 and 1913 4.6% 14.6%
between 1914 and 1917 3.6% 12.3%
Source: Rashin, A.G., op. cit., p.30.
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It is clear from this table that while the proportion of workers who 
owned land declined through time in both industries - a sure sign of 
increasing proletarianisation, long service in industry did not 
necessarily erode the tie with the countryside. Yet workers who had 
served in industry for twenty-five years or more were obviously 
proletarian regardless of whether or not they owned land. This sug- 
gests that by itself land ownership is not an adequate index of 
proletarianisation. This inference is supported by a further finding 
from the 1929 census which showed that a quarter of workers who owned
land had actually been born into working-class rather than peasant
84 families. Thus if we are to assess the extent to which a process
of proletarianisation was underway we must turn to data other than 
those on landownership.
Two sources can shed further light on this problem: the first con- 
sists of data on the numbers of hereditary workers, i.e. workers of 
whom one or both parents were themselves workers; the second consists 
of data on length of service in industry. The 1900-02 survey of 
Petersburg cotton workers revealed that 16% (21% of women workers)
or
had at least one parent who was a worker. By 1918 24.8% of textile- 
workers in Petrograd were hereditary proletarians (the highest pro-
OC
portion of any industrial group) compared to 20% of metalworkers.
The 1929 census correlated the social origin of Leningrad metalworkers
84. Rashin, A.G., Sostav, pp. 25, 35.
85. Shuster, N.A., op. cit., p.23.
86. Drobizhev, V.Z., Sokolov, A.K. and Ustinov, V.A., Rabochii klass
Sovetskoi Rossii v pervyi god proletarskoi diktatury, M. 1975, 
_____
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and textileworkers with the year of their entry into industry. The 
results were as follows:
Table 8










































Source: Rashin, A.G., op. cit., pp. 19 and 21.
Whilst these data are scanty they point clearly to an increase over 
time in the proportion of workers in Petrograd born into working- 
class families and a corresponding decline in the proportion born 
into peasant families.
The data on length of service in industry is even sparser and 
more difficult to interpret. Soviet historians usually assert that 
it took about five years for a worker new to industry to become a 
fully-fledged proletarian. Discussing this question in 1922, however,
87. One should not interpret these figures, as does L.M. Ivanov 
(op. cit.), to mean that by 1914 the working class itself had 
become the main source of recruits to industry, rather than the 
peasantry. For it is likely that many peasants who came to 
industry in the pre-1917 period left during the upheavals of the 
Civil War and were no longer working in industry by the time of 
the 1929 census.
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Lenin argued: "We must ... define the term worker in such a way as 
to include only those who have acquired a proleterian mentality from 
their very conditions of life. But this is impossible unless the 
persons concerned have worked in a factory for many years." He 
proposed that only workers who had worked for ten or more years in 
industry should undergo the minimum probationary period for party
oo
membership of six months. It is, of course, impossible to estimate 
with scientific precision the length of time which it took a peasant 
to become socialised into factory life. It may have taken as long as 
ten years for a peasant to overcome his rustic habits of work, the
instinctive rhythm of hard and slack work, the dislike of close
89 
routine and his longing for the freedom of the outdoors. For a
young worker, however, it certainly would have taken far less time. 
One must therefore be cautious in interpreting the data.
In 1900-02 about two-thirds of cotton workers had worked in
industry for under five years. Four years later a survey of the
90 Baltic ship works showed about the same proportion of new workers.
However there was some variation between factories. At the Triangle 
works no less than 46% of the workforce had worked for ten or more 
years at the factory, compared to 25% at Putilov. L.M. Ivanov cites
a figure of 48% of women workers in Petersburg with industrial exper-
91 ience of ten or more years. In 1908 a survey of metalworkers showed
Lenin, V.I., Collected Works, vol. 33, pp. 254, 256.
89. Thompson, E.P., 'Time, work-discipline and industrial capitalism 1 , 
Past and Present, vol. 38, 1967.
90. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.502.
91. Ivanov, L.M., op. cit., p.81.
34
that 28% had worked less than two years in industry; 34% between two 
and five years and 39% five or more years. In the large factories
with a workforce of more than a thousand, however, the proportion of
92 
workers with five or more years of service rose to 53%. These
figures suggest that a majority of workers were new to industry, yet 
this need not mean that the labour force was obviously "peasant" in 
character. We know that it took very little time for some peasants 
to submit to the cultural pressures of town life and factory work. 
As early as the 1880's contemporaries had noted the speed with which 
peasants underwent a change of cultural identity as a result of 
migration. A health inspector observed of the districts from which 
there was migration to the capital that "clothes are much cleaner, 
smarter and more hygienic. The children are kept cleaner and ... 
skin diseases are not so frequent." In the villages of Simbirsk, 
from which there was migration, a contemporary noted that "houses, 
clothes, habits and amusements remind one more of town life than of 
the village." In Yaroslavl 1 province "public opinion dubs a bumpkin 
to the end of his days anyone who has not lived in Petersburg or
elsewhere but has engaged in agriculture or some handicraft; such a
93 
man finds it hard to get a wife." In view of this, Soviet historians
may well be right to allow only five years as the average period it 
would take a worker to become acculturated to industrial and urban life, 
but since the problem is very under-researched, I do not draw any firm 
conclusions from the data on length of service in industry.
92. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.504.
93. The quotations are all cited by Lenin, V.I., The Development of 
Capitalis m in Russia, Collected Works, vol. 3, pp. 576-578.
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The above review of the evidence on land ownership and ties with 
the land in general, on second-generation workers and on length of 
service in industry clearly reveals the process of proletarianisation 
that was taking place among Petersburg workers in the period from 
the turn of the century. The proportion of "cadre" workers in the 
workforce was thus increasing, reflected in the decay of ties with 
the land and the growing number of hereditary workers. However it 
is far more difficult to estimate the ratio of cadre workers to new 
workers on the eve of the war. Above, it was suggested that less 
than a third of the workforce had economic links with the country- 
side by 1914, but in addition to these workers, there were workers 
new to industry who were not yet fully proletarianised. In the five 
years prior to 1914 the factory workforce of Petersburg grew by 53%
from 158,152 to 242,600. Thus in 1914 about a third of the total
94 
workforce had entered industry within the previous five years.
Allowing for the fact that this third of the workforce must have 
overlapped to a significant degree with the third of the workforce 
whom I designated as authentic peasant workers one can crudely 
estimate the proportion of not fully proletarianised workers at 40% 
to 50% in 1914. This more or less tallies with the prudent calcul- 
ations of the Soviet historian E.E. Kruze, who reckoned the propor-
95 tion of 'cadre 1 workers in 1914 to be around 60%. Petersburg was
probably unusual by Russian standards in having a majority of 'cadre 1 
workers within its labour force at this time.
94. Kruze, E.E., Peterburgskie, p.75.
95. ibid., pp. 76-7.
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The war led to a decline in the proportion of 'cadre 1 workers 
in the industrial workforce of the capital. This was caused partly 
by conscription and partly by the massive influx of new workers into 
the factories. Throughout Russian industry as a whole about 400,000 
to 500,000 - or 20% to 25% of the whole workforce of 1914 - were 
conscripted into the army. In Petrograd, however, the proportion 
was much less, since workers there were needed to produce for the war
effort. Leiberov and Shkaratan estimate that about 40,000 industrial
97 
workers in Petrograd were conscripted - or 17% of the 1914 workforce.
Those conscripted,according to the same authors, were mainly young 
workers without a great deal of experience of industry. Fully- 
proletarianised 'cadre' wrokers usually had some skill and were 
little affected, since their skills were in short supply. In later 
mobilisations, however, known militants and strike leaders were 
drafted into the army as punishment for participation in industrial
and political protest. Leiberov and Shkaratan estimate that as
98 
many as 6,000 workers may have been conscripted on these grounds.
They conclude nevertheless that the 'cadre 1 proletariat was preserved 
during the war.
The proportion of 'cadres' within the workforce was reduced not 
so much by conscription as by the influx of new workers caused by 
the wartime expansion of production. Between 1914 and 1917 the 
workforce in Petrograd grew by 150,000, and making allowance for the 
40,000 who were conscripted, at the very least 190,000 workers must
96. Volobuev, P.V., op. cit., p.20.
97. Leiberov, I.P. and Shkaratan, O.I., 'K voprosu o sostave
petrogradskikh promyshlennykh rabochikh v 1917g', Voprosy Istorii, 
1961, no. 1, p.52.
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have entered industry. These comprised four major groups: 
peasants; women and youths; urban petit-bourgeois and evacuees.
We know that 77,100 women and youths entered industry during the
99 
war, which means that 113,000 were adult males. If one estimates
the number of evacuees and urban petit-bourgeois who entered in- 
dustry at 20,000 each, then over 70,000 men entered industry who must 
have come overwhelmingly from the countryside. When one takes into 
account that a large number of women and youths also came from the 
countryside, then the peasantry clearly provided the chief source of 
wartime recruits to industry.
Peasants flooded into the factories of Petrograd, not just because 
of rural poverty, but also because of a desire to avoid military 
service. Quite how they came to evade conscription is unclear, though 
some were probably too old.
Unfortunately, there are no figures on the size, composition and 
distribution of this infusion of peasants. We know that at the
Obukhov works nearly 5,000 peasants were hired during the war; at the
102 Sestroretsk arms factory 1,875 male peasants were taken on. Data
from Moscow suggest that there was an increase in the numbers of 
middling and wealthy peasants who sought work in industry, for in 
1915, 80% of those looking for work through the Moscow Labour Exchange
99. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.36.
100. These are my own rough calculations designed to disprove the
claim of Ivanov, L.M., op. cit., p.76 and Rashin, A.G., Sostav, 
p.30, that more wartime recruits came from the working class 
than from the peasantry.
101. Volobuev, P.V., op. cit., p.24.
102. Leiberov, I.P. and Shkaratan, O.I., op. cit., p.44.
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103 had land in the countryside. Some of these 'peasant' recruits
may actually have been rural kustari (artisans) with experience of 
artisanal craft production.
The second major source of recruits were women and youths. By
1917 there were 68,200 more women and 8,900 more youths working in
104 the factories of Petrograd than there had been in 1914. One
should not assume that all these women came from the countryside; 
many must have come from working-class families where the male bread- 
winner - brother, husband or father - was fighting at the Front and 
thus no longer able to support the family.
The third source of recruits consisted of urban petit-bourgeois. 
When the war broke out many small traders, shopkeepers, landlords, 
porters, domestic servants, artists and others took jobs in munitions ' 
factories in order to escape conscription. A check on reservists at 
the Putilov works in August 1917 led to the "voluntary" departure
of 2,000 workers described as "book-keepers, shop-owners, tailors,
105 artists, jewellers, corn-chandlers, coopers, landlords and cafe-owners."
Leiberov and Shkaratan estimate that such elements comprised 5% to 7% 
of the factory workforce in Petrograd.
A final source of recruits was provided by workers evacuated 
from the Baltic provinces and Western parts of Russia. Some 20 
factories were evacuated from Riga, with a workforce of over 6,000, and 
about 25 factories from Lithuania. In addition, there were many 
Polish workers - some 5,000 at Putilov in 1917. Relatively few Chinese
103. Volobuev, P.V., op. cit., p.24.
104. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.36
105. Krasnaya Letopis', 1932, no. 3, p.169.
106. Leiberov, I.P. and Shkaratan, O.I., op. cit., p.47.
107. Rabochii Klass i rabochee duizhenie v 1917g, p.82.
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Korean, Central Asian or Persian workers came to Petrograd, although 
scores of thousands were drafted into the mines of the Donbass,
Urals and Siberia, but there were several hundred in the state enter-
1 Oft prises of the capital. If the 1918 industrial census is reliable
for 1917, then 15.8% of the factory labour force in Petrograd were 
non-Russians in 1917, though by no means all of these had come during 
the war. The largest group were Poles (who comprised 5.8% of the
total labour force), followed by Latvians and Lithuanians (2.6%),
109 Finns (2.3%), Germans (0.5%), Jews (0.3%) and so on.
Leiberov and Shkaratan conclude that if one substracts the 
190,000 workers who came into industry during the war from the total 
factory workforce in 1917 (392,800), one is left with the number of 
'cadre' workers - between 200,000 and 220,000, allowing for the fact 
that most evacuees were probably 'cadre 1 . This leads them to con- 
clude that a majority of the factory workforce in Petrograd in 1917 - 
50% to 60% - were 'cadres'. But this assumes that by 1917 all those 
workers who had been working in industry in 1914 were 'cadres'. This 
seems an unwarranted assumption, in view of the fact that at least 40% 
of the workforce in 1914 had either less than five years' experience 
in industry or were peasant workers. Making some allowance for this, 
therefore, it is likely that by 1917 'cadres' no longer comprised a 
majority of the workforce of Petrograd as they had done in 1914 but
108. Gilbert, M.I., 'K voprosu o sostave promyshlennykh rabochikh 
SSSR v gody grazhdanskoi voiny', Istoriya proletariata SSSR, 
1934, no. 3 (19), pp. 214-5; Payalin, N.P., Zavod imeni Lenina, 
1857-1918, M.L. 1933, p.313.
109. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.42.
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constituted between 40% and 50% of the factory labour force.
ii) Women Workers and Young Workers
Petrograd was unusual in that the largest portion of its women 
workers were employed in factories. By January 1917 129,800 women 
worked in the factories of the capital. This compared to 83,000
domestic servants, mostly women, who worked in dire conditions for
112 
shockingly low wages; perhaps 50,000 women who worked in offices
and similar establishments and perhaps a similar number who worked
113 in shops and in the wholesale and retail trade. Other women
worked in the clothing trade and in various kinds of workshops and
sweat shops. The opportunities for women to do factory work in
Petrograd had come about largely as a consequence of the war. The
proportion of women in the factory labour force rose from 25.7% in
114 1913 to 33.3% in 1917. This was, however, a smaller increase
than the national average; during the war the proportion of women
115 in Russian industry as a whole soared from 26.6% to 43.2%.
110. Stepanov (ibid, pp. 43-4) concludes that 'the figure of 50% 
for new recruits to the working class of Petrograd during the 
war years can scarcely be considered an underestimate' and 
L.M. Kleinbort, Istoriya bezrabotitsy v Rossii, 1857-1919gg, 
M. 1925, p.272, says, without citing a source, that at the 
beginning of 1918 Narkomtrud reckoned that half the workers of 
Petrograd were either tied to the land or inexperienced wartime 
recruits.
111. Karpetskaya, N.D., Rabotnitsy i Velikii Oktyabr', L. 1974, p.19.
112. Golos Rabotnitsy, no. 5-6, 17 June 1917, p.14. A perusal of the 
job vacancies column of Petrogradskaya Gazeta in 1917 shows that 
the rural girl with no male acquaintances and prepared to work 
hard was the type most sought after as a domestic servant.
113. Strumilin, S.G., 'Sostav proletariata Sovetskoi Rossii v 1917-19gg', 
Dva goda diktatury proletariata, M. 1919, p.15.
114. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.34.
115. Shlyapnikov, A., Semadtsatyi God, vol. I, M.L. 1923, pp. 8-11.
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The textile industry was the factory industry in which women 
constituted the highest proportion of the workforce. As early as 
1900 women comprised 56% of the textile labour force in Petersburg; 
by 1913 the proportion had risen to 68%. 116 After 1905 the mill- 
owners had begun to introduce women into the mills in earnest. In 
1906 the annual factory inspectors' report noted that:
Factory owners are everywhere replacing men with 
women, not only among adult workers but among 
youths, because they consider that women are more 
peaceful and steady; moreover ... female labour 
is cheaper than male.
A year later the factory inspectors again noted:
The increase in the application of female labour 
is particularly sharply reflected in the cotton-weaving 
industry, where women weavers have ousted men. The 
reasons for this are as before: greater industry, 
attentiveness and abstinence (they do not drink or 
smoke), their compliance and greater reasonableness 
in respect of pay. 117
The war further increased the percentage of women in the Petrograd 
textile industry so that by 1917 69% of the workforce were adult
I 1 O
women and a further 10% were teenage girls.
The textile workforce was composed mainly of young single women 
A survey of 7,000 textileworkers in Petrograd in 1918 revealed that 
18% were aged 17 or under; 17% aged 18 to 20; 28% aged 21 to 30; 18% 
aged 31 to 40 and 19% aged 41 and over. 69% of women were under the
116. Semanov, S.N., op. cit., p.44; Kruze, E.E., Peterburgskie, pp. 78-9
117. Cited in Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, pp. 235-6.
118. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.34.
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age of 30 compared to 39% of men, most of the latter being boys under
119 17. Amongst the male textileworkers (who comprised only 13% of
the total) 70% were married, 2% widowed and 28% single. Amongst the 
women, however, only 33% were married, 11% widowed and 56% single. 
This reflected the large share of young girls in the industry and 
also the fact that the marriage rate had gone down as a consequence 
of the war. This was particularly striking among women textileworkers
aged 20 to 30. In 1909 74% of this group had been married, but
120 
nine years later only 49%.
The older men in the textile industry occupied almost all the 
most skilled jobs: they spun the finest yarns and wove the more 
complex patterns. They were the overlookers and mechanics. Young 
boys worked as bobbin-tenders, heddlers or twisters, as did many 
young girls. The majority of women were concentrated in the semi- 
skilled and unskilled jobs, as jenny-tenders, fly-frame tenders, 
twisters, doffers or machine-loom operators.
By 1917 more women in Petrograd worked in the metal industries 
than in textiles (approximately 48,000 as against 30,000), but they
comprised a minority of the workforce, albeit one which had rocketed
121 from 2.7% in 1913 to 20.3% in 1917. These women worked in mass
production factories producing cartridges, shells, shrapnel etc. 
Some 18,000 women worked in the 'chemicals' industry, of whom over 
10,000 were employed at a single plant - the giant Triangle rubber 
works, which produced everything from galoshes to gas masks. A further
119. Vestnik Professional'nykh Soyuzov, no. 2, 15 July 1918, p.7
120. ibid., p.9.
121. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.34.
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10,000 women were employed in the food and tobacco industries where 
they comprised a majority of the workforce. Finally about 5,000 
worked in the leather industry, including 3,000 at the Skorokhod shoe 
factory which made boots for soldiers. All these jobs had one thing 
in common, they were unskilled and badly-paid. This reflected the 
way in which the sexual division of labour within the patriarchal 
peasant household, still the major unit of production at this time, 
had been transposed into the factory.
The position of the women worker was crucially influenced by her 
role within the family. All married women and many young single 
women were obliged to perform unpaid domestic labour within the 
family, thus making them economically dependent upon the incoming 
wages of the male bread-winner. Even when women worked outside the 
home, wage work was considered secondary to their role as wives, 
mothers and housekeepers. It is thus necessary to look briefly at 
the role of the women within the working-class family in order to 
understand the position of the woman worker in full.
It is difficult to distinguish a 'working-class 1 family from 
the dominant peasant model. Among male workers, peasant workers 
were more likely than proletarianised workers to be married, for they 
could leave their wives and children to subsist on the family plot
of land in the countryside, whereas only proletarianised workers
122 
who earned good wages could afford to support a family in the town.
A survey of metalworkers in 1908 showed that 46% of those earning
less than lr.50k a day were single, compared to 21% of those earning
123 
more than 2r.50k. a day. Since earnings of young workers tended
122. Bernshtein-Kogan, S., Chislennost', sostav i polozhenie peter- 
burgskikh rabochikh, Pbg., 1910, pp. 51, 54.~~
123. Kruze, E.E., Peterburgskie, p.86.
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to be low, most workers were forced to wait until their late 
twenties before getting married. By 1918 60% of industrial workers
in Russia were married or widowed, compared to 63% of male metalworkers
124 and 46% of female in Petrograd in the same year. 71% of all
married workers lived with their families - an important indication 
of the extent to which workers had broken their ties with the country- 
side. In 1897 only 30% of married metalworkers had lived with their
families; in 1918 three-quarters of skilled fitters in Petrograd did
125 
so. The size of working-class families in the towns tended to be
smaller than the peasant family. In 1897 the average Russian family
consisted of 4-53 persons but in Petrograd in 1918 married/workers on
1 p/r
average had 2.4 dependents ^ xoi/wh skilled fitters had 3.7.
•J
Among women workers the evidence cited above suggested that 
perhaps a slight majority were young single women. Many of these
would have come from the countryside, and factory work could have
127 brought them a measure of economic independence. The majority of
married women workers were from working-class families and they 
faced dual responsibilities as housewives as well as workers. One 
Soviet anthropologist has suggested that women had a higher status 
in the working-class family than in the peasant family and that 
there was a more equal division of labour within the former than 
within the latter. She cites as evidence the opinion of M. Davidovich, 
surveyor of St. Petersburg textileworkers, who wrote in 1909:
124. Metallist, no. 6, 18 June 1918, p.10; Ts. S.U., Trudy, XXVI, 
issue II, pp. 110-11.
125. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy ekonomiki truda, Izbrannye Proizvedeniya, 
vol. 3, M. 1964, pp. 69-71.
126. ibid, and Bernshtein-Kogan, S., op. cit., p.54.
127. Compare Dublin, T., 'Women, Work and Protest in the Early 
Lowell Mills', Labor History, vol. 16, no. 1, Winter 1975.
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While the women hurries straight home from the 
factory to the children, the husband goes off 
to market and to the shops to buy provisions 
for supper and next day's dinner...in his spare
time the husband must always look after the 
childrenJ28
Yet there is a good deal of other evidence to suggest that domestic 
labour remained as much the responsibility of the woman in the 
'proletarian 1 family, as it was in its peasant counterpart. A. 
Il'ina, writing in the journal of the textileworkers, Tkach, gives 
this agonising description of the lot of the working mother:
Having finished work at the factory, the woman 
worker is still not free. While the male worker 
goes off to a meeting, or just takes a walk or 
plays billiards with his mates, she has to cope 
with the housework - to cook, to wash and so on... 
she is seldom helped by her husband. Unfortunately, 
one has to admit that male workers are still very 
prejudiced. They think that it is humiliating for 
a man to do 'woman's' work (bab'yu rabotu). They 
would sooner their sick, worn-out wife did the 
household chores (barshchinu) by herself. They 
would rather tolerate her remaining completely 
without leisure - illiterate and ignorant - than 
condescend to help her do the housework. And on 
top of all these yokes and burdens, the woman worker 
has still the heavy load of motherhood... Today, 
for a working class woman, having a baby is no 
joy - it's a burden, which at times gets quite un- 
bearable J 29
That the latter quotation typifies the lot of the working woman more 
closely than the former, is suggested by data on the burden of domestic 
labour. In 1922 a survey of 76 urban families was conducted, which 
revealed the staggering amount of time spent in domestic labour. 
Strumilin calculated that if this labour were socialised, 7,235,000 
people, working an eight-hour day, would be required to service the
128. Krupyanskaya, V. Yu., 'Evolyutsiya semeino-bytovogo uklada
rabochikh 1 , Rossiiskii proletariat - oblik, bor'ba, gegomoniya, 
M. 1970, p.277:
129. Tkach, 1917, no. 2, p.7.
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needs of 20 million people. In the towns this would mean 360 eight- 
hour man-days of domestic labour for every thousand of the popul- 
ation per day - and even more in the countryside. At 1913 prices
130 this would cost the state no less than 1,302 million rubles per year.
Even if women were given some help from men in doing this vast job 
gratis, it cannot have done much to attenuate their general condition 
of domestic slavery.
Prior to the war the prevalence of large-scale industry in 
Petersburg probably meant that the employment of children was less 
widespread in the capital than in Russian industry generally. On the 
eve of the war abour 8% of the workforce under the Factory Inspectorate 
in Petersburg consisted of youths aged 15 to 17. In addition, about
2,000 children aged 12 to 15 were employed in porcelain and glass
131 factories, print shops and other small enterprises. In the course
of the war the number of young workers in Petrograd grew, but less 
than the national average. The number of under-17's rose from 22,900
to 31,800, but their proportion within the factory labour force re-
132 
mained about the same. The proportion of young workers was highest
in the textiles (12.7%), food (11.8%), leather (10.7%), metal (6.6%) 
and chemical industires (6.5%). Young workers were most numerous in 
the metal industries and it was this industry which constituted the 
base of the youth movement in Petrograd in 1917.
130. Strumilin, S.G., 'Byudzhet vremeni russkogo rabochego 1 , 
Voprosy Truda, 1923, no. 3-4.
131. Kruze, E.E., Peterburgskie, p.80.
132. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.36.
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The Russian labour force was remarkable for the very low 
proportion of middle-aged workers, and almost complete absence of 
elderly workers, within its ranks. In 1900 in Petersburg 23% of
the factory workforce were aged 16 to 20; 52% were aged 21 to 40
133 
and only 12% were older than 40. The First World War significantly
changed this age balance. Conscription meant that the percentage
of Petrograd workers aged 21 to 40 shrank from 52% to 47% (nationally
this shrinkage was far more dramatic). These workers were replaced
by workers over 40, whose share of the workforce shot up from 12%
134 to 31%. Even in 1917, however, the Petrograd working class was
marked by its significant youthful ness compared to the longer-estab- 
lished working classes of Western Europe.
iii) Skilled Workers and Unskilled Workers
Although the major social division within the Russian working 
class in 1917 was between 'cadres' and workers-in-Formation (peasant 
workers and new workers), this division was beginning to lose its 
salience, as the working class itself grew in importance, relative 
to the peasantry, as a source of recruits for industry. As this 
happened, skill tended to become the major basis of structural dif- 
ferentiation within the working class.
The definition of 'skill 1 is a thorny problem. Skill refers to 
the quality of work: a skilled job demands greater precision, dexterity 
and mental exertion than an unskilled job. Skill differences are
133. Kruze, E.E., Peterburgskie, p.80.
134. Gaponenko, L.S., op. cit., p.72; Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.38.
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rooted in the labour process - in the physical and intellectual 
requirements of particular operations within a specific labour 
process. Some writers have argued that it is possible to measure
skill by comparing the length of training necessary for different
135 jobs. The problem is, however, that while skills do have real
existence in the requirements of a job and in the capabilities of 
the worker, they are also partially determined by class struggle. 
Workers' organisations can 'artificially 1 create skills, by restric- 
ting access to particular jobs; they can control the institutions
1 oc
and practices whereby skills are acquired, transmitted and recognised. 
Because skill determination is a site of class struggle the useful- 
ness of criteria such as length of apprenticeship or relative wage 
levels as 'objective 1 measures of skill must be fairly limited.
In the long term the general tendency of development of the 
capitalist mode of production has been towards the destruction of all- 
round skills. As early as the manufacturing phase of capitalism 
the organisation of labour was transformed so that the traditional 
work of the craftsman, involving the production of a commodity from 
its inception to its completion, was sub-divided into its constituent 
tasks and performed in series by detail workers. With the rise of 
mechanised factory production the general tendency was towards chan- 
ging the instruments of production. The tools of labour were removed
135. Freysinnet, M., Le processus de dgqualification - surquali- 
fication de la force de travail, Paris, 1974, pp. 121-2.
136. Gorz, A., 'Technology, technicians and class struggle 1 , in
Gorz, A. ed., The division of labour, Brighton: Harvester, 1976; 
Lee, D., 'Skill, craft and class: a theoretical critique and a 
critical case', Sociology, Feb. 1981 (forthcoming); H.A. Turner 
in his classic study went so far as to argue that workers are 
skilled or unskilled "according to whether or not entry to 
their occupations is deliberately restricted and not, in the 
first place, according to the nature of the occupation itself." 
Turner, H.A., Trade Union Structure and Growth, London: George 
Alien & Unwin, 1962, p.182.
49
from the craftsman's hand and placed in the grip of a mechanism: 
power was transmitted to the tool which then acted upon the materials 
to achieve the desired result. In the past fifty years the 
'scientific and technical revolution' has mechanised and automated 
all aspects of the labour process - from labour power to the instruments 
and materials of labour. The drive for ever-greater productivity 
has thus tended towards the incorporation by management (not without 
resistance) of more efficient methods and machinery into the labour
process, so as to transform it from a process conducted by the worker
137 into a process conducted by management. The major industry of
Petrograd, the metalworking industry, was still dependent on the 
skilled craftsmen at the beginning of this century. Engineering 
firms were relatively unspecialised, making a large range of pro- 
ducts and thus the all-round skills of craftsmen played a crucial 
role. At the same time, however, the metalworking and metallurgical 
industries of the capital, from the 1890's onwards, were machine-based 
and fairly advanced in technology. Thus, although heavily dependent 
on skilled craftsmen, they nevertheless were quite different from, 
for example, the British engineering industry of the mid-19th century, 
which relied predominantly on manual labour. In his study of the 
Renault works the sociologist Alain Touraine distinguished three 
phases in the organisation of work. The first was the old system 
which relied on craftsmanship and required only universal mechanics, 
such as lathes, not limited to the production of a single product. 
The second phase saw the break-up of a job into its component parts,
137. Braverman, H., Labor and Monopoly Capital, New York Monthly 
Review Press, 1974, p.169.
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the development of mechanisation and the feeding of machines by unskil­ 
led workers. The third phase is the phase of automation, where direct
1 productive work by human beings is eliminated. In the decade or so
before 1917, the Petrograd metal working industries were in a process 
of transition from the first to the second of Touraine's phases. The 
boom of 1909-13 saw the introduction of assembly lines, standardised 
calibres and inter-changeable parts. The First World War gave a huge 
boost to this process.
The skilled metalworkers of Petrograd, who were to play such 
a central role in the events of 1917, were far removed from the 
labour aristocrats one associates with the 'model' unions of
mid-19th century Britain. Yet they were also far removed from the
139 mass production' workers of the Taylorised or Fordist enterprise.
As men whose manual and intellectual skills were respected, who 
exercised some degree of control over their jobs and who were used 
to taking decisions in their work, the skilled metalworkers of 
Petrograd were not unlike their counterparts at Armstrong-Whitworth, 
the Schwarzkopf works in Berlin or at Fiat-Centro in Turin. In 
other respects, however, they were rather different. The traditions
of the Russian metalworkers were those of the peasant rather than of
140 the artisan, though a significant number were from Kustar' families.
They worked in an industry which had not grown organically out of 
small workshop productions, but which had had an advanced division 
of labour from its birth. In contrast to their British counterparts,
138. Touraine, A., L'Evolution du travail ouvrier aux usines Renault, 
Paris, 1955.
139. Bologna, S., 'Class composition and theory of the party at the 
origin of the workers councils movement', Labour Process and 
Class Strategies, CSE pamphlet no. 1, 1976.
140. Shkaratan, O.I., Problemy sotsial'noi struktury rabochego klassa, M. 1970, p.197. ———————————————————————————-———
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skilled engineers in Russia did not serve a formal five- or seven- 
year apprenticeship and were not organised into exclusive craft 
unions, capable of controlling entry to the trade, of imposing 
standard pay and conditions and of regulating workshop matters 
through "custom and practice".
In 19th century Russia factory workers had been divided into
two categories - masterovye and rabochie, literally, 'craftsmen'
142 and 'workers'. The Rules of Hire for the Naval Ministry Ports
explained the difference as follows:
Masterovye are those appointed to jobs and duties 
which require preliminary training and special 
knowledge. Rabochie are those appointed to jobs 
and duties which do not require preliminary 
training and special knowledge. 143
An irritatingly vague definition, but then the terms themselves were 
vaguely used. Masterovoi indicated a worker who was skilled, able 
and commanded respect. It was still in use in 1917 to denote a 
skilled craftsman, but had been gradually falling out of usage from 
about the turn of the century. Instead the word rabochii which 
had connoted inferior, unskilled workers, broadened in meaning to 
include all workers, skilled and unskilled. Unskilled factory workers 
were distinguished by the term chernorabochie (literally, 'black
141. Watson, W.F., Machines and Men, London: Alien & Unwin, 1935.
142. This word is not to be confused with the word master. Dal'
defined a master as either "an artisan doing some trade, craft 
or handiwork, well-versed or skilful in his work", or as "the 
senior person in a workshop or part of a factory, who supervises 
the podmaster'ya (journeymen) and the workers". Dal', V., 
Tolkovyi Slovar' Zhivogo Velikorusskogo Yazyka, Pbg., 1903. It 
was in the latter sense - of 'foreman 1 - that the term was used 
in the factories of our period.
143. Cited in Shuster, N.A., op. cit., p.34.' '
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workers') which, until the 1900's had been used mainly of unskilled 
workers outside factories, usually of labourers in the construction
and haulage industries, but by the turn of the century had come to
144 include unskilled factory workers.
The masterovye of the metal industries included highly skilled 
workers such as instrument-makers, millwrights, pattern-makers, 
electricians, platers and engravers who performed complex precision 
work, working independently from technical drawings and using sop­ 
histicated measuring instruments. Beneath them were many skilled 
but less specialised workers who were fully trained, who could work 
from technical drawings but whose work was not especially complex. 
These included most kinds of fitters (slesari) and turners (tokari), 
electricians, mechanics, planers, mortise-makers, etc. These men 
(there were no women in these trades) were distinguished by their 
craft consciousness, as many worker-memoirists recall. A.M. Buiko, 
who worked at the Putilov works at the turn of the century, recalls:
In those days it was felt that if a worker 
did not master his trade, did not become a 
good craftsman, then he was not a proper 
fellow. This point of view had its roots in 
the days of kustarshchina, when old craftsmen 
regarded unskilled workers as a casual element 
in their midst. A worker who had not mastered 
his trade was scornfully called a "master at 
earning his bread" (masterovym po khlebu)... 
If a young man began a conversation with an 
older skilled fitter or turner he would be 
told: "Learn first how to hold a hammer and 
use a chisel and a knife, then you can begin 
to argue like a man who has something to teach 
others". For many years we had to put up with 
this. If you wanted to be an organiser, then 
you had to know your job. If you did, then 
they would say of you - "he's not a bad lad - 
he works well and he's qot a smart brain when 
it comes to politics". 1 ^5
144. DaT, V., op. cit.; Shuster, N.A., op. cit., p.24; Bernshtein-Kogan, 
S., op. cit., p.23.
145. Buiko, A.M., Put' rabochego: zapiski staroga bol'shevika, M. 1934, p.30
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A. Buzinov, who worked at the Nevskii works as a foundryman, remembers
Every branch of production, and even each 
craft (tsekh), infects the worked with pro- 
fessional or craft patriotism. He sings the 
virtues of his own trade (remeslo) and spits 
on all the rest. Metalow^kers felt themselves 
to be aristocrats among the rest of the working 
class. Their profession demanded more training 
and so they looked down on weavers and others, 
as though they were inferior bumpkins - today 
they are at the mi 11, tomorrow they go off to 
plough the land. Everyone recognised the 
superiority of metalworkers, with all the 
advantages that that implied... The oddness of 
the textileworkers hit me in the eyes. Many of 
them still wore peasant clothes. They looked 
as though they had wandered into the town by 
mistake and tomorrow would find their way back 
to their native villages. Women predominated 
among them and one never lost an opportunity to 
pour scorn on them. Alongside the textile- 
workers, the metalworkers appeared to be a race 
apart, accus<6m/0ed to life in the capital and 
more independent... The more I grew into the 
factory family (zavodskuyu sem'yu), the more 
it became clear just how much variety there 
was even within one factory. Soon I began 
to feel that the workers in the engineering 
shop - fitters and turners - looked down on 
me. Later I realised that workers in the 
furnace shops - the foundry, the rolling-mill 
and the forge - had a low status. For the 
first time I saw that the people there were 
heavy and awkward in speech and gait. In each 
face, through the deep tan of the furnace, 
coarse features were clearly visible, which 
seemed to say that strength, not wit, was what 
was required in their work. I soon realised 
that next to the most experienced foundryman, 
even a poor fitter seemed an educated, think­ 
ing man. The fitter held his head higher and 
was sharper and quicker in tongue. He could 
tease you with a dozen words in the time it 
took the founder to say a simple yes or no. 
I was drawn automatically into talking about 
things in general with the fitter, rather than 
just about wages. In a nutshell, the worker 
from the engineering shop was not just part of 
the raw materials of the foundry or forge, he 
was a product of the precision tools and 
machines... And I did not wish to be worse 
than they. 146
146. Buzinov, A., Za Nevskoi Zastavoi, M.L. 1930, pp. 20-1.
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The Bolshevik, M.I. Kalinin, recalled in 1940:
I remember how in the underground a dispute 
arose among us: was a worker-revolutionary 
obliged to work as well as he was able... 
Some said, we cannot, we are organically 
incapable of letting a bad piece of work 
out of our hands - it would sicken us and 
demean our dignity. Others argued against 
them that it was not for us to worry about 
the quality of our work. It was the job -,47 
of the capitalist. We only worked for them.
In these three passages one sees the classic elements of craft 
ideology. The pride of craftsmen in the mastery of their trade; the 
esteem which they enjoyed because of their knowledge of processes and 
materials and their manual dexterity; their condescension towards 
labourers and unskilled workers; their disdain for the peasants and 
their boorish way-of-life; their scorn of callow youth; their 
measuring a person's moral integrity - and, indeed, their political 
credibility - in terms of their mastery of their trade; the mutual 
respect felt by craftsmen and employers, which did not necessarily 
preclude an awareness of exploitation on the part of the craftsmen; 
the oppressive attitudes towards women, etc. In the decade before 
1917, however, this craft pride was to take a severe knock as the 
position of these skilled workers was undermined by technological 
change. It was not until the First World War that this became fully 
apparent.
The colossal demands placed on the Petrograd metal industries 
by the war gave a big boost to the transformation of work processes 
and work organisation. The whole-scale introduction of mass production
147. Cited by Shkaratan, O.I. and Vakzer, A.Z., 'Razvitie
sotsialisticheskogo otnosheniya k trudu: rabochie Leningrada 
v 1917-24gg', Uchenye Zapiski Len. Go's. Pe'df. Tns't. im. Gertsena, vol. 165, 1958, p.108.—————————————————————————
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techniques substantially changed the skill profile of the metal 
workforce, greatly expanding the ranks of semi-skilled workers. The 
influx of women and peasants into semi-skilled jobs as machine- 
operators posed a threat to the position of the skilled masterovye. 
Yu. Milonov, a leader of the metalworkers' union, described the process 
thus:
The technology of production during the war 
was characterised by the broad application of 
automatic machines. The whole of war production 
was done on them... This caused sharp changes in 
the professional make-up of workers in the metal- 
working industry. Alongside a reduction in the 
number of skilled, specialist masterovye, as a 
result of the numerous mobilisations, the number 
of rabochie operating machines increased. And 
so the metalworkers' unions which arose after the 
February Revolution differed in their occupational 
make-up from the unions of the pre-war period. 
No longer did masterovye predominate in them, 
but the unqualified rabochie. 14°
Petrograd metalworkers were experiencing what in the British 
context was termed 'dilution 1 i.e. the introduction of semi-ski lied 
workers into jobs formerly done by skilled male workers. James Hinton 
has shown that in the British engineering industry craftsmen whose 
status and privileges were still intact when war broke out - mainly
those on the Clyde and in Sheffield - led a class-wide offensive
149 against 'dilution'. Chris Goodey has suggested that in Petrograd
'dilution and de-skill ing were almost as much at issue as on the
148. Materialy po istorii professional 'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii, 
sb. I, M. 1925, pp. 16-17.
149. Hinton, J., The First Shop Stewards' Movement, London: Alien & 
Unwin, 1973.
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150 Clydeside 1 . Yet what is surprising about the Russian experience
is precisely the absence of any militant opposition from the 
masterovye. Gordienko, who worked as a moulder at the Lessner works, 
writes:
During the time of my short absence, big 
changes took place. The turning shop was 
filled with machines - mechanical assembly 
lines and vices - and new workers, including 
many women, youths and the sons of those who 
could afford to buy them out of the army. -.r-i 
The mood of the cadre workers was indifferent.
This indifference to 'dilution' was probably the product of several 
factors. Firstly, the extent of 'dilution' should not be exaggerated 
Some rather doubtful calculations by S.G. Strumilin purport to show 
that the average skill level in the Petrograd metal industry fell by 
17% during the war. Among fitters and turners it fell by 12%, 
although the quality of these workers deteriorated, as men without
adequate training were promoted to skilled jobs in a way which would
152 have been unthinkable prior to the war. Secondly, it is unlikely
that skilled metalworkers were directly displaced by semi-skilled
150. Goodey, C., 'Factory Committees and the Dictatorship of the 
the Proletariat 1 , Critique no. 3, Autumn 1974, p.31.
151. Gordienko, I., Iz boevpgo proshlogo, 1914-18gg., M. 1957, p.34. 
My emphasis. To say that the mood of skilled workers was "in­ 
different is not to say that there was not a certain latent 
hostility to the new wartime recruits. The syndicalist leader 
of the metalworkers' union, A. Gastev, wrote: "Even in Russia, 
where craft consciousness (tsekhovshdiina) has not built as 
strong a nest for itself as in the West, in the factories, among 
both management and workers, there is a suspicion of all newcomers 
who are not connected with factory professions. Among turners 
and fitters one still finds a scornful attitude towards the 
"shoe-makers" and "bakers" who are joining the ranks of the 
factory chernorabochie in their hundreds". Gastev, A., 'Novaya 
Industriya', Vestnik Metal!ista, 1918, no. 2, p.10.
152. Strumilin, S.G., Zarabotnaya plata i proizvoditel'nost 1 truda 
v russkoi promyshlennosti, 1913-22gq, M. 1923, p.15. 
His method was to examine~wage levels in different industries
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women; the latter probably went into new sectors of production, and 
the massive expansion of production generally may actually have in­ 
creased opportunities for traditional craftsmen. This may connect 
with a third factor, which is that, although working conditions in 
the metal industry deteriorated during the war, real wages increased. 
This may further have inhibited opposition to 'dilution'.
In spite of wartime de-ski 11 ing, the proportion of skilled workers 
in the metal industry in 1917 was higher than in other industries. 
The only data on skill composition relate to 1918 not 1917 and must 
thus be treated with caution in view of the tremendous changes which had 
taKen place in the previous year as a result of the demobilisation 
of industry. In August 1918 Strumilin undertook a survey of the 
metalworkers still working in the capital. Classifying the 21,792 
workers in enterprises of more than 500 workers according to the 
skill categories used by the metalworkers' union, Strumilin discovered
that 22.7% were highly skilled; 23.1% skilled; 21.1% semi-skilled
153 and 29% unskilled. Even after the war-time changes the most
numerous occupational category in the industry remained that of 
'fitter', a relatively unspecialised craftsman who could turn his 
hand to several jobs.
between June 1914 and June 1916 and to translate the wages of 
all categories of worker into ratios of the wages of an adult 
male chernorabochii (=100). By determining the change in these 
ratios during the war, Strumilin obtained an indirect index of 
de-ski 11 ing. It seems to me, however, that there are problems 
with this method. Firstly, it assumes that the "skill" of a 
chernorabochii is constant across industry and across time. 
Secondly, wages may not be a good indicator of skill in a period 
of rapid inflation.
153. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy ekonomiki truda, p.57. This skill
profile does not differ dramatically from that of the factory work­ 
force as a whole. Drobizhev, V.Z., et al., op. cit., p.84, cal­ 
culated from the 1918 Industrial Census that 34% of the working 
class were skilled; 34% semi-skilled, 27% unskilled and 5% unknown 
However they do not explain their criteria of classification.
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The skill structure of the textile workforce was very different 
from that of the metal industry, having a far smaller proportion of 
skilled workers, a far larger proportion of semi-skilled workers and 
a smaller proportion of unskilled. The textile industry was a 
highly specialised industry with a complex division of labour based 
entirely on machine production. Skilled workers comprised only 6% 
of the workforce and were mainly men. Women were the majority of 
semi-skilled workers who constituted 72% of the total workforce. 
About 20% of the workforce were classified as unskilled and comprised 
mainly young girls and boys as well as some ponalichnie or workers
'on hand 1 to fill the places of absent workers for less than the
+ 154 going rate.
In 1917 there were 19,400 workers employed in the printing 
industry of Petrograd - about 6% of the industrial labour force. 
During the war the number of printers had declined by over 3,000
but the proportion of women in the industry had increased from 23%
156 to 35%. By 1917 all large and many medium-sized print works were
mechanised, but they were still dependent, along with small print 
shops, on manual skill. Linotype machinery was rare and most type­ 
setting was done by hand. Type-setters, who were the most numerous 
category in the trade, fell into several kinds, including the 
aktsident nye, who did specialised and complex compositing, the 
strochnye, who type-set books and those who type-set newspapers.
154. Drobizhev, V.Z. et al., op. cit., p.84; Shuster, N.A., op. cit., 
p.37.
155. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.83.
156. Materially k uchetu rabochego sostaya i rabochego rynka, Pg., 1916, 
p.128; Siderov, K., 'Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v gody imper- 
ialisticheskoi voiny 1914-17gg', in Pokrovskii, M.N., ed., 
Ocherki po istorii oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, vol. I, M.L. 1927.
157. Shuster, N.A., op. cit., p.38.
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The skills and wages of type-setters varied considerably, but en bloc 
they enjoyed the status of "commanders of the leaden army" and were 
considered superior to less skilled printers, such as binders, 
pressers, machinists, etc. The e*lite of type-setters constituted 
a labour aristocracy within the print trade. These compositors would 
often work in a Kompaniya, or exclusive artel', formed to execute a 
particular job as quickly as possible. They would organise the work 
among themselves and appoint a starosta (steward) to supervise 
discipline, hours and wages. The Kompaniya thus enjoyed a high degree 
of job control, not being subject to close management supervision. 
The wages which could be earned by the members of a Kompaniya were 
high - 150 r. a month in 1916 compared to 50 r. earned by an ordinary 
printer. It was not high wages per se however which made the 
Kompaniya type-setters labour aristocrats, but rather their position 
within the authority structure of the enterprise and the distinct 
cultural world which they inhabited. According to the printers' leader, 
Tikhanov, "the Kompaniya was a state within a state; no-one knew what 
it did and it did not wish to know about anyone else". These men 
addressed one another as "colleague" and looked down on ordinary 
printers, whom they called "toilers" (truzheniki). In turn, they 
were addressed by management as "Mister" and always in the polite 
form. They enjoyed close personal relations with their employers, 
who encouraged this by paternalist strategies such as giving long- 
service medals and civic honours to loyal employees. Tikhanov recalls
158. Tikhanov, A., 'Rabochie-pechatniki v gody voiny 1 , Materialy 
po istorii professional'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii, sb. 3, M. 1925, p.117.———————————————————
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how his boss at Eastertime used to parade around the shop in full
regimental uniform, dripping with medals, and embrace each worker
159 three times, saluting him with the words "Christ has risen!".
The print trade was one of the few industries in which there 
was a socially visible labour aristocracy. As we have seen, this 
was characterised not so much by high wages as by its strategic 
position within the enterprise hierarchy, its closeness to manage­ 
ment and its distinctive values and social practices. The extent 
to which skilled workers in other industries constituted such aristo­ 
cracies is difficult to determine. The main source of evidence are 
wage tables, yet high wages by themselves cannot be considered proof 
of aristocratic status. In 1915 when the average wage in Petrograd 
province was 46.7 rubles a month, there were small groups of workers 
in the war industries who were earning exceptionally high wages of 
240 rubles to 300 rubles a month. These comprised 4% of the workforce
I £ A
at the New Lessner works, 3% at Westinghouse, 7% on the railways. 
In the Baku oil industry and some of the Southern metallurgical 
industries such groups of extremely well-paid workers were slightly 
bigger. Foremen (mastera) who engaged in manual work were, in many 
instances, part of a labour aristocracy, in view of their supervisory 
functions and their high wages. In the shipyards of the capital it 
was still common for a middleman to contract with management to do a 
job and then organise an artel' to carry it out; the middleman would 
normally earn two to three times the wage of the members of the artel'
159. ibid., p.122.
160. Shkaratan, O.I., Problemy, p.215.
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Such sub-contracting was widespread in the Riga region and in the
1 c -I
construction industry generally. These sub-contractors can be 
regarded as a labour aristocracy. Nevertheless, throughout Russian 
industry as a whole, a labour aristocracy comprised only a tiny 
stratum and played a far less significant role in the labour movement 
than it did in Britain. The majority of skilled workers, even if 
highly paid, cannot be considered as labour aristocrats in any 
meaningful sense of the term.
The 1897 census revealed that only 21% of the total population 
of European Russia was literate. This was mainly because of the
appallingly low level of literacy in the countryside - 17% compared
1 fi? 
to 45% in the towns. The spread of schooling in the next two
decades helped boost the rate of literacy so that by 1920 a third 
of the population was literate, including 42% of men and 25.5% of
I c O
women. In Petersburg the rate of literacy was the highest in 
the country. As early as 1900 70% of the population aged six or
I rn
over was literate and by 1920 this had risen to at least 80%.
Working-class literacy was higher than the average for the 
population as a whole. By 1918 in Petrograd 89% of male workers and 
65% of females were literate, compared to 79% and 44%, respectively,
161. Netesin, Yu. N., 'K voprosu o sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh
kornyakh i osobennostyakh "rabochei aristokratii" v Rossii 1 , 
in Bol'shevistskaya pechat' i rabochii klass v Rossii, M. 1965, 
p.307:
162. Rashin, A.G., 'Gramotnost' i Narodnoe Obrazovanie v Rossii v
XIXv. i nachale XXv.', Istoricheskie Zapiski, vol. 37, 1951, p.37
163. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.595.
164. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue IV, 1921, p.23.
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165 of workers in the country as a whole. Working-class literacy
was heavily influenced by sex, age and occupation. A survey of 
3,998 textileworkers in Petrograd in 1918 showed that only 50% were 
literate, but of these 74% of men were literate compared to 45% 
of women. Younger women, however, were more literate than older 
women:
Table 9 


























Source: Vestnik P, Soyuzov, no. 2, 1918, p. 9.
A survey of 12,000 metalworkers in Petrograd in the same year 
revealed that overall literacy was 88% - 92% among men and 70% among 
women. 81% of women under 20 could read and write, compared to 48% 
of women aged 40 to 50 and 26% of women over 50. Only a quarter of 
metalworkers aged 55 or over were literate. A survey of 724 skilled
fitters at Putilov showed that literacy was as high as 94.7%.
In the boiler-plate shop at the Baltic ship works in April 1917 twelve
165. Stepanov, Z.V., op. cit., p.44.
166. Vestnik Professional'nykh Soyuzov, 1918, no. 2, p.9.
167. Metallist, 1918, no. 6, p.8.
168. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy, p.61. There is a comprehensive com­ 
parison of working-class literacy by age, sex and industry for 
^ TQIQ ibid., p.495.
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out of 93 masterovye (13%) marked a petition, demanding the removal 
of the shop director, with a cross instead of their signature, which 
suggests that literacy among skilled fitters at Putilov may have 
been exceptionally high.
A majority of workers in Petrograd in 1917 had probably had some 
kind of schooling. Primary education made great strides in Russia 
in the decades prior to the war, but in 1911 still only a third of 
Russian boys aged 7 to 14 and 14% of girls of the same age were 
attending school. In Petersburg primary education was more wide­ 
spread and between 1906 and 1916 the number of primary school pupils 
doubled to reach 62,418, while the number of secondary school pupils 
rose to 10,480. Although most working-class boys and some 
working-class girls attended school at some time, only a tiny
minority ever completed their primary education. In 1914 a mere 22%
1 72 of children in Petersburg stayed the full course of primary school.
Strumilin estimated that on average most factory workers had three to
173 four years schooling but most women would have had less. Parents
were under great economic pressure to send their children out to work, 
and once children were set on at the factory, it was difficult for 
them to continue their education. Even where they worked a six-
169. LGIA, f.416, op. 5, d. 24, 1. 21.
170. Rashin, Formirovanie, p.583.
171. Statisticheskie dannye Petrograda, 1916, p.24. In 1911 there 
were 701 factory schools in Russia with 99,100 pupils. One of 
the best of them was at the Baltic shipyard, where far-sighted 
employers early realised the advantages of providing schooling 
for the offspring of their employees. Ivanov, L.M., 'Samoderz- 
haviya, Burzhuaziya i Rabochie 1 , Voprosy Istorii, 1971, no. 1, 
p.84; Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie, p.610.
172. Statisticheskie dannye Petrograda, 1916, p.24.
173. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy, p.63.
64
hour day, and where some provision was made for evening classes, few 
children had the stamina to begin studying after a hard day sorting 
or cleaning cotton.
Although the ability to read and write was an important pre­ 
requisite for becoming a skilled worker, inadequate schooling was not. 
There was only a slight correlation between length of schooling and 
level of skills. Factory training was far more important. 67% of 
a sample of 947 fitters at the Putilov works in 1918 had been appren­ 
tices and 32% assistants (podruchnye) to skilled workers. Apprentice­ 
ship from a young age was the most likely way to become a highly 
skilled worker, but one had to acquire a skilled position before the
age of 25. Getting into the factory as young as possible, rather than
174 staying on at school was thus the key to getting a skilled job.
Conclusion
In spite of conventional images of the proletariat in 1917, the 
working class which made the Russian Revolution was neither socially 
nor politically monolithic. In Petrograd the working class was based 
on the factories though it also embraced workers on trams and 
railways, on construction sites, in wholesale and retail and in small 
workshops. Within the factory workforce there were important social 
divisions according to degree of proletarianisation, skill, sex and 
age. Social differentiation within the industrial working class of 
Russia was probably greater than within the working classes of Western 
Europe, which were longer established and which reproduced themselves. 
Probably the most important social cleavage within the Russian working
174. ibid., pp. 63-69; Rashin, A.G., Sostav, pp. 118-9.
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class was between peasant workers/workers new-to-Industry and so- 
called 'cadre 1 workers. In Petrograd this division may have been 
fading in importance in the decade up to 1914 but the influx of 
peasants into the workforce during the war reinforced its salience. 
Overlaying this division were divisions between unskilled and skilled 
workers, female and male workers, young/inexperienced and older 
workers in their twenties and thirties. These skill, sexual and 
age divisions within the working class each had their own autonomy and 
in specific conjunctures of the revolutionary process of 1917 could 
and did become over-determined. It is not too misleading 
to think of the working class in Petrograd in 1917 as roughly 
divided - say 60:40 - between, on the one hand, peasant workers, 
young workers new to industry and women workers, and, on the other, 
proletarianised, skilled,male workers over the age of twenty. 
Crudely speaking, these two broad groups had a different relationship 
to the organised labour movement and to politics in 1917. A majority 
of both groups developed a revolutionary consciousness in 1917 but 
each developed it at different paces and in different forms. Later 
chapters of this work attempt to explore some of the ways in which 
the two halves of the working class interacted in 1917.
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2,. THE TSARIST FACTORY
A. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE TSARIST FACTORY
Unlike the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe, the 
tsarist autocracy's power did not rest on its ability to maintain 
hegemony among the Russian people. Unable to procure the consent 
of the governed, it was compelled to rule by force and fear. This 
was nowhere more apparent than in the sphere of industrial relations. 
Up to the 1890's the government had refused to believe in the existence 
of a "labour problem", preferring to entreat employers to show greater 
solicitude for their employees, and workers to show greater obedience 
to their masters. Where labour unrest occurred, it was seen as a 
direct subversion of the peace and was dealt with accordingly by the 
police or troops. As worker militancy increased in the 1890's, how­ 
ever, the government came to realise in a faltering fashion that 
repression alone could no longer guarantee industrial peace. Mor­ 
tally afraid of any independent working-class activity, it began to 
oscillate between the deployment of force and a cautious, groping 
policy of ameliorative measures, such as the 1886 Law, the Factory 
Inspectorate and experiments in police socialism. This vacillation 
continued after 1905. The gains made by the labour movement in 
that year were quickly retracted, as the regime reverted from its 
unhappy liberal mode to the more homely repressive variety. Strikes
1. Rimlinger, G. von, 'Autocracy and factory order in early Russian 
industrialisation', Journal of Economic History, vol. 20, 1960; 
Schneiderman, J., Sergei Zubatov and revolutionary Marxism, Ithaca, New York, T976~:—————————————————————
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and unions became once again unlawful and workers brave enough to 
participate in them risked the knout, jail or exile. At the same 
time, the reformist project was not completely abandoned. The Third 
Duma engaged in tortured deliberations concerning workers' social
insurance, which reached a rather despoiled fruition in 1912, when
2 a restricted law granting accident and sickness benefit was enacted.
The vacillations in government policy percolated down to in­ 
dustrial relations at factory level. Employers relied mainly on the 
stick rather than the carrot to run their enterprises. In all 
countries repressive methods of labour discipline had been typical 
of the first phase of industrialisation, when labour was only for­ 
mally subordinated to capital. In Russia, however, real subordination 
had, by and large, been achieved by 1905, yet arbitrary and draconian
forms of discipline continued to be the norm. This reflected less
3 the requirements of capital than the political culture of Russia.
2. Hosking, G., The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government 
and Duma, 1907-14, Cambridge University Press, 1973.
3. Marx argued that under capitalist relations of production labour 
discipline is necessary, firstly, because "all combined labour 
on a large scale requires...a directing authority in order to 
secure the harmonious working of the individual activities"; and 
secondly, because "the directing motive of capitalist production 
is to extract the greatest amount of surplus value and thus to 
exploit labour power to the greatest possible extent". (Marx, 
K.,Capital, vol. I, London: Penguin, 1976, p.549) Under capitalism, 
however, it is the latter type of discipline - discipline designed 
to further exploitation - which dominates the former. Once cap­ 
ital both owns and possesses the means of production, the labour 
process becomes subordinated to the requirements of capital. The 
social division of labour thus dominates the technical division 
of labour and this relationship is expressed in the specific or­ 
ganisation of capitalist labour which Marx called the "despotism 
of the factory". See Poulantzas, N., Classes in Contemporary 
Capital ism, London: New Left Books, 1975, pp. 224-30.
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The violent exercise of autocratic power within the factory mirrored 
the violent exercise of autocratic power outside.
In 1893 a law had made it obligatory for every factory to have 
a code of written rules and for these to be printed in the wage book 
of each worker. These rules covered every aspect of factory life. 
Some were designed to combat labour turnover, absenteeism and lateness, 
such as rules at the Obukhov works which prescribed that four whistles 
would blow at fifteen minute intervals up to 6 am and that all workers
should be into work by the third whistle or be considered late and
4 be fined. Other rules were designed to create a docile workforce
which would not offer any collective resistance to management. At 
the New Cotton-Weaving Mill the rules stated: "Workers must not 
express demands whilst in the shops nor go in a crowd to complain
at the office. Each worker must go personally with his complaint
5 to the manager." At the nearby Northern Cotton Mill, paragraph 25
of the factory rules laid down that workers might not meet together 
in the shops, leave work before time, shout or fight, show dis­ 
obedience or disrespect to management, play games or read newspapers, 
bring in or take out items without the director's special permission, 
bring in vodka or alcohol, smoke in unauthorised places, go near or 
touch machines in .operation, go through the boiler room or engine 
room, or send apprentices or other workers to buy things without the 
permission of the manager. Infringement of factory rules usually 
entailed a fine deducted from one's wages, but occasionally a beating 
or even dismissal.
4. Pazhitnov, K.A., Polozhenie rabochego Klassa v Rossii, vol. II, 
L., 1924, p.176.
5. Semanov, S.N., Peterburgskie rabochie nakanune pervoi russkgi 
revolyutsii, M.L., 1966, p.110.
6. ibid.
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After 1905 some employers in Petrograd tried to modify the system 
of coercion by introducing certain incentive schemes. A bonus 
system based on time-and-motion study - the so-called "American 
system" - was in operation in sixteen factories by 1908, though 
in themselves bonus systems were not new in Russia. The searching 
of workers as they left the factory - a ritual of degradation much 
resented by workers - declined in frequency. Fines remained wide­ 
spread, but whereas in the past they had tended to be exacted for 
absenteeism and general rule-breaking, by 1914 75% to 80% were exacted
o
for bad workmanship. The size of fines tended to decrease. Not too 
much should be made of this liberalisation, however. Right down to 
1917 industrial relations remained 'feudal' for the most part, and 
the fact that fines, beatings and searches remained prevalent gives 
one an indication of how far behind Western European factories 
Russian factories still were.
The tsarist enterprise was administered in a strictly hier­ 
archical fashion, with a board of directors at the summit, followed, 
in descending order, by manages, shop-managers and assistant managers, 
technical personnel, office-workers, foremen and assistant foremen
and, finally, workers. In the decade up to the war the larger enter-
> 
prises of Petrograd were moving towards a more bureaucratic system
7. Istoriya rabochikh Leningrada, vol. I, L., 1972, p.347.
8. Crisp, 0., Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. VII, part 2 
Cambridge University Press, 19/8, p.382.
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of administration, characterised by detailed centralised planning, 
special communications-processing departments and the proliferation 
of white-collar and supervisory personnel. In the majority of enter­ 
prises, however, the system of administration remained largely what 
one might term a 'craft 1 system, i.e. a decentralised system in which 
skilled workers and foremen made and carried out most technical and
Q
economic decisions at shop-floor level. Up to 1914 it was the fore­ 
man who played the major role in the running of most of Petrograd's 
factories. He had a wide range of functions of both a technical and 
administrative kind. He distributed work within the shop and arranged 
its execution; he set up the machines and materials; he supervised 
the carrying-out of the job; he checked quality; he fixed piece rates, 
which at this time made up three-quarters of a worker's earnings 
on average; in many factories he was also responsible for hiring 
and firing workers. The shift to a more bureaucratic system of 
administration - particularly during the war with the extension of 
mass production - led to a reduction in the functions of the foreman 
and a more specialised division of labour. The foreman's job be­ 
came largely supervisory; his more technical functions passed to 
draughtsmen and mechanics, to instructors, inspectors and sorters. 
This shift is reflected in the big increase in the number of sluzhashchie 
in Russian industry.
Sluzhashchie were an extermely heterogeneous social category. 
The term is best translated as 'salaried employees', since it em­ 
braced clerical and technical staff in industrial and commercial 
enterprises and also in government and other public institutions.
9. See Stinchcombe, A., 'Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of 
Production 1 , Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 4, 1959-60.
10. Gastev, A., 'Novaya Industriya 1 , Vestnik Metallista, 1918, no. 2, 
p.22; Grinevetskii, V.I., Posleyge'nnye perspektivy russkoi 
oroiwshlennasti, M., 1918, p.151.
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However, the term had a broader application since it also referred 
to non-productive workers in the service sector (such as shop workers) 
and in transport. Rashin estimated that in 1917 there were 250,000 
sluzhashchie employed in the factories of Russia, but we do not know 
how many of these were in Petrograd. We know that in 1910 the
number of sluzhashchie of all types in the capital was 128,000 or
l ? 15% of the total number of wage workers. And in 1918 in Petrograd
sluzhashchie in industrial enterprises comprised a quarter of all 
sluzhashchie. If this proportion holds good for 1910, then in that
year there must have been 32,000 sluzhashchie in the factories of the
13 capital. During the next seven years, however, the number almost
certainly increased, for whereas nationally in 1913 there was one 
sluzhashchii for every 12.3 workers in industry, by 1920 this had 
risen to one for every 6.6. In 1917, therefore, there may have been 
as many as 50,000 sluchashchie in Petrograd industry. These were 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the metalworking, chemicals and 
electrical industries, where the ratio of sluzhashchie to workers
in 1918 was 6.6, 4.3 and 2.4, respectively, compared to 25 in the
15 textile industry.
Sluzhashchie in industrial enterprises embraced office-workers, 
technicians and low-level supervisory personnel. Although foremen 
were often manual workers, they tended to be seen by workers as part 
of this same category. Middle and senior management were classified
11. Rashin, A.G., Formirovanie rabochego Klassa Rossii, M., 1958, p.63.
12. Strumilin, S.G., 'Sostav proletariata Sovetskoi Rossii v 1917-19gg', 
Dva goda diktatury proletariata, M., 1919, p.15.
13. ibid.
14. Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, 1921, no. 5, pp. 143, 146. Figures cal- 
culated by me.
15. Materialy po statistike Petrograda, issue 2, Pg., 1920, p.44.
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separately as 'the administration 1 . Sluzhashchie occupied a contra­ 
dictory class location. In many ways they were similar to manual 
workers, since they sold their labour-power, often for wages below 
those of skilled workers, and had little real power in the enter­ 
prise. Some, such as draughtsmen, were close to the skilled workers 
by virtue of the work which they did. Yet although they may have 
been 'objectively' close to manual workers, subjectively, sluzhashchie 
did not feel themselves close. They were at the bottom of the ad­ 
ministrative hierarchy, but they depended on that hierarchy for 
their livelihood; and although they were separated by an enormous 
distance from senior management, they never lost hope of rising to their 
exalted position. They preferred to try to improve their lot by 
seeking promotion rather than by organised defence of their collec­ 
tive interests. Furthermore, because they frequently performed 
semi-administrative functions, they tended to adopt a management 
rather than working-class viewpoint. Management actively encouraged 
sluzhashchie to be antagonistic towards the workforce. One super-
16. It took eight years training to become a fully proficient 
draughtsman and, according to a survey of large Petersburg 
firms in 1912-14, the average draughtsman was likely to be 
single, aged about 24, with lower technical education and five 
years practical training. A draughtsman's copyist was likely 
to be single, aged about 19, with full primary education and 
two-and-a-half years practical training. Draughtsmen were well- 
paid - in 1912-14 they earned 55r a month and worked a 7|-hour 
day. A copyist earned half the salary and worked the same hours 
Golos Chertezhnika, 3, 1 October 1917, pp. 6-7.
17. In 1917 M. Kapitsa wrote in the newspaper of the SR's: "Along 
with their immediate duties (clerical, technical or accounting), 
sluzhashchie took on duties of a police-administrative character, 
which placed them squarely on the side of management and which 
encouraged a benighted class consciousness and a stubbornness 
which can only be considered as unfortunate, in view of their 
lack of organisation." Delo Naroda, 124, 11 August 1917, p.l.
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visor described his relation to the workers as follows: "Abuse and 
rudeness, when dealing with workers, are considered an obligatory
condition of service. If one didn't do it, one would get the sack
1 ft at once." The worker Vasenko recalls that at the Nevskaya paper
mill in 1913 a foreman was fined five rubles by management because he
19was caught shaking hands with a worker. It thus comes as no sur­ 
prise to discover that in general there was no love lost between 
workers and sluzhashchie.
Conflict between workers and sluzhashchie, particularly between 
workers and foremen, was endemic prior to 1917. In 1912 at the New
Lessner works workers struck for 102 days to get a foreman removed
20 and failed. In the spring of 1915 workers in the gun shop at
21 Putilov struck because an engineer hit a worker. On 15 April 1916
at the new shell shop at the Nevskii ship-building works 180 workers 
demanded the removal of a foreman who had banned twenty-two of their
18. In fairness, it should be pointed out that the supervisor was 
talking about industrial relations in the notorious Lena gold- 
fields to the commission of inquiry into the massacre which took 
place there in 1912. Such attitudes, however, were character­ 
istic of many lower administrative personnel. Vitko, I., 
'Polozhenie lenskikh rabochikh nakanune zabastovki 1912g', 
Istoriya proletariata, 1932, no. 10, p.163.
19. Vasenko, A., Za sto let, 1840-1940: k stoletiyu Leningradskoi 
gos. bumazhnoi fabriki im. Volodarskogo, L., 1940, p.99.
20. Payalin, N.P., Zavud im. Lenina, 1857-1918, M.L., 1933, p.325. 
Demands to be treated with dignity were central to many strikes 
prior to 1917. In 1917 workers continued to be sensitive to 
matters affecting both their personal dignity and class^honour. 
At the Triangle works, for example, the conciliation"'wayin­ 
structed to investigate disagreements between management and 
workers "relating to questions of honour, morality and personal 
dignity"; and "chambers of honour "(Kamery chesti) existed at the 
Shchetinin aeronautics works, the State Papers print works and 
elsewhere. See Baklanova, I.A., Rabochie Petrograda v period 
mirnogo razvitiya revolyutsii (mart-iyun 1 1917g), L. 1978, p.75.
21. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets na putyakh k oktyabryu, M.L., 1933, p.17.
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number from the factory for two weeks. After four days on strike 
the administration sacked all 180 workers. Immediately, 5,700 out 
of 6,300 workers at the factory came out on strike. They demanded 
the removal of the foreman, a 50% wage increase, the reinstatement 
of those who had been dismissed and a shop stewards committee (sovet 
starost). The director, N.N. Kalabin, agreed to the transfer of 
the foreman to another shop, but this did not satisfy the strikers. 
On 26 April the director declared a lockout. Sluzhashchie attem­ 
pted to keep production going by manning machines. Production re­ 
started on 10 May, but only after 600 workers had been fired and
172 conscripted into the army. The workers gained a partial wage
22 increase, but at huge cost. Such strikes against foremen and
administrators and such strike-breaking by sluzhashchie were common­ 
place. For the workers on the shop-floor, it was not so much the 
tyranny of the directors which was resented as the petty despotism 
of the lower ranks of the management hierarchy. The foremen, 
supervisors, engineers all exercised their power in the same ar­ 
bitrary way, untrammelled by any notions of workers' rights. It 
is thus not surprising that workers who lacked any broad conception 
of the social system should have identified their main enemy not as 
the factory owner but as the low-level administrators who were the 
bane of their everyday working lives.
22. Leiberov, I.P., 'Petrogradskii proletariat v gody pervoi 
mirovoi voiny', Istoriya rabochikh Leningrada, vol. I, L., 
1972, p.499 (henceforth abbreviated as: Leiberov, 1st, rab. 
Len.); Payalin, op. cit., p.325.
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B. CONDITIONS OF WORK
Conditions of work in Petrograd's factories before 1917 were 
exceedingly miserable. Employers paid little heed to standards 
of safety and hygiene and provided few facilities for their work­ 
forces. There were decent factories, such as the foreign-owned 
Parviainen and Siemens-Schuckert works, but these exceptions merely 
underlined the general awfulness of conditions elsewhere. Con­ 
ditions were notoriously bad at the three factories subject to the 
Naval Ministry in the Okhta district. In December 1912 an explosion 
occurred at the Okhta explosives factory which killed five workers 
and injured more than fifty. The director, General Somov, did 
his best to prevent the Social Democratic deputies in the Duma 
from undertaking an investigation into the accident. "Such 
accidents do happen", he argued, "and will go on happening,and I
for one never enter the factory without first making the sign of
23 the cross". He proved to be correct in his forecast, for in
April 1915 a further explosion occurred in the melinite shop of
the explosives works, which blew up two workshops and eight houses
24 killing 110 people and injuring 220. A woman described conditions
in the melinite shop, where 3,000 women worked: "In the part where 
they do the washing and spraying, the air is so suffocating and 
poisonous that someone unused to it could not stand it for more than
23. Badaev, A.E., The Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma, London, 1932.




five or ten minutes. Your whole body becomes poisoned by it. 
On 31 March 1917 yet another explosion occurred at the Okhta ex­ 
plosives works which killed four workers and injured two. A few 
days later a worker from the factory told the conference of repre­ 
sentatives from factories under the Artillery Department: "We are 
working on top of a volcano. The whole factory is overloaded with 
explosives, bombs and shells...but the administration says it's 
not their responsibility and refers us to the Artillery Department." 
Conditions at the Okhta works were notoriously bad - women who 
worked there could be identified by their yellow skins - but 
were not exceptional. At the Putilov works there was no
ventilation in the gun shop or galvanising shop, where workers
27 handling acid were given no protective clothing. In the gunpowder
department of the Admiralty Works, noxious fumes, lead and 
antimony dust caused vomiting and pulmonary disease among the workers. 
The manager of the department described conditions thus: "great 
congestion, a mass of machines, burning oil, night work, poor diet 
and the excessive intensity of work caused by piece rates have
resulted in general exhaustion, acute anaemia and a huge number of
28 lung and heart diseases".
Conditions were especially bad at factories employing large 
numbers of women. The women who made cartridge cases at the Cartridge
25. Rabotnitsa, no. 1-2, 10 May 1917, p.12.
26. Pravda, 32, 14 April 1917, p.4. As far as I can ascertain, the 
three Okhta factories were still subject to the Naval Ministry 
rather than Artillery Department in 1917.
27. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i




Works stood on wet, cold floors and suffered permanently from colds 
and influenza. At the Nevskaya spinning mill women carried heavy 
basins of wet yarn up to the fifth floor but were not provided 
with overalls. The women who worked in the chalk shops of the
Triangle rubber works constantly breathed in lead dust with woeful
29 longterm consequences. Conditions were expecially dire too in
small factories and workshops. One of the fifty workers at the 
Petrovskii engineering works complained:
Our factory makes field kitchens. Working con­ 
ditions are intolerable. The workshops are 
stone huts in which the temperature falls as 
low as 20° of frost. The premises are dark and 
filthy. Colds and chills are the norm, yet we 
have no insurance against sickness. When there 
are plenty of orders and materials there are two 
shifts and we are forced by the boss to work 
long and exhausting overtime. When there is a 
lack of orders, which is very often, we are thrown 
onto the streets, where we spend weeks hungry and 
out of work. On top of this, you should remember 
that our pay is miserable and that the boss be­ 
haves like some Pharaoh."30
Petrograd had the highest industrial accident rate of any region 
in Russia. In 1913 there were 14,300 accidents reported to the
Factory Inspectorate and rates were highest in the metalworking
31 industry, especially in state factories, and in textiles. During
the war the accident rate increased. At the Putilov works up to 
September 1914 there was an average of fifteen accidents per month;
thereafter this increased to twenty-one. At the Lessner works
32 there were 180 accidents in 1914 but 312 in 1915. This increase
29. Rabotnitsa, no. 1-2, p.12.
30. Rabochaya Gazeta, 13, 21 March 1917, p.3.
31. Istoriya rabochikh Leningrada, vol. I, pp. 348, 407.
32. Fleer, M.G., Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v gody imperialisticheskoi 
voiny, L., 1926, pp. 65-6.
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in the rate of industrial accidents was linked to a general increase 
in the rate of illness among factory workers caused by more over­ 
time, greater utilisation of female and child labour, speed-ups, in­ 
sanitary conditions and worsening diet. Between 1913 and 1917 the
rate of sickness and injury in Petrograd factories increased by
33 between one-and-a-half and two times. In 1914 the number of cases
of sickness and injury at the Metal Works was 60.3 per 100 workers; 
by 1915 it had risen to 118.4; at the Putilov works the corresponding 
figures were 64.3 and 98.2. 34
The 1912 Insurance Law provided sickness benefit, but not in­ 
validity or unemployment benefit for about a fifth of all industrial
35 workers. In Petrograd medical funds (bol'nichnye kassy) were quickly
set up to administer the distribution of sickness benefits. These 
funds were jointly run by workers' and employers' representatives. 
The Bolsheviks played an active part in these funds, using them
O£J
partly as a front behind which to organise working-class resistance. 
Workers donated 2% of their wages into the fund and the employers 
paid a sum equal to two-thirds of the total contribution made by 
workers. The size of benefit paid was half to two-thirds of the
normal wage for a married man and a quarter to a half of that of a
37 single worker. Given soaring inflation this was not a great deal.
In addition to distributing sickness benefits, nineteen of the better
33. Leiberov, 1st, rab. Len., p.472.
34. Stepanov, op. cit., p.62.
35. The law did not cover workers in state enterprises or factories 
of under twenty workers, or workers on railways and waterways, 
in construction and agriculture, in commercial enterprises or 
domestic service, in Siberia or Turkestan.
36. Milligan, S., 'The Petrograd Bolsheviks and Social Insurance, 
1914-17, Soviet Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, January 1969, p.372.
37. ibid., p.370; Leiberov, I.P., Na shturm samoderzhaviya, M. 1979, 
pp. 52-60.
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38 organised funds set up four district clinics during the war. By
1917 there were 80 medical funds in operation in Petrograd, with a
39 membership of 176,000, mainly in the metalworking industry.
As late as 1914 Russian workers still worked significantly 
longer hours than their Western Europe counterparts. The 1905 
Revolution had reduced hours noticeably, in spite of the fact that it 
had been defeated precisely at the moment when the demand was raised 
for the immediate introduction of an eight-hour day. In 1905-6 
the average working day in Russia was ten hours, or sixty hours a
week, but this figure does not include overtime, which was wide-
40 spread. During the Years of Reaction, although pressure for a
shorter working day declined, the average working day appears to have 
shrunk slightly. By 1913 Russian workers worked an average of 9.7
hours a day, excluding overtime; in Petrograd the average stood
41 at 9.54 hours. There was considerable variation by industry however,
In 1906 in Peterburg province 66% of textileworkers worked a 60| hour 
week; 15% worked 63| hours; 11% worked 51 to 55| hours and 8% worked 
59 to 60 hours a week. Metalworkers worked about half an hour less 
on average each day. In the same year, 63% of Petersburg metalworkers
between fourteen to sixteen hours a day and baking workers toiled
43 for sixteen or more hours. On the eve of the war most factory
38. Leiberov, Na shturm, p.58. In 1917 there were 17 hospitals run 
by the Petrograd City Duma and about 40 free doctors. In addition 
there were seven factory hospitals. Baklanova, op. cit., p.53.
39. Rabochie dvizhenie v Retrograde v 1912-17gg., L. 1958, pp. 425-6.
40. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy ekonomiki truda, Izbrannye proizvediniya, 
vol. 3, M. 1964, p.479.
41. ibid.; Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue 2, 
FgTT 1919, p.14.
42. Balabanov, M., Of 1905g. k 1917 godu, M.L., 1927, p.14.
43. Istoriya rabochikh Leningrada, p.405.
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workers in Petrograd worked about ten hours each day during the week 
and seven hours on Saturdays. This does not take into account over­ 
time.
Although the working week in Russia was gruellingly long by 
Western European standards, the working year was paradoxically shorter. 
This was due to the large number of holidays enjoyed by Russian 
workers. In 1913, according to Strumilin, 270 days were worked each 
year throughout Russian industry - twenty to thirty less than were 
worked in Britain, the USA or Germany. The average number of hours 
worked was 2574 per annum - roughly the same as the average in the 
West. 44
It is difficult to determine the movement of working hours 
during the war. Soviet historians argue unanimously that working 
hours increased in length as a result of the extensive application 
of overtime. Using official Factory Inspectorate data, however, 
which may well underestimate the amount of overtime worked, Strumilin 
calculated that the average working day in Russian industry was 3% 
shorter in 1914 and 1915 than in 1913 and 1% shorter in 1916. In 
1916 he calculated the average working day to be 9.9 hours, including
overtime, and the average working year to be 2550 hours compared to
45 2574 in 1913. In Petrograd, however, the official data show a
lengthening of the average working day. By January 1917 it was 10.1
46 hours, and longer in the metalworking, textile and leather industries.
This testifies to the big increase in overtime working in industries 
working for the war effort.
44. Strumilin, S.G., Zarabotnaya plata i proizvoditel'nost| truda
v promyshlennosti, M., 1923, p.44; Grinevetskii, op. cit., p.1591
45. Strumilin, Zarabotnaya plata, p.49.
46. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 2, 1919, pp. 14-15.
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C. WAGES DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
On the eve of the First World War wages in Russian industry
47 were significantly lower than those in Western industry.
Strumilin estimated that in 1913 the average Russian factory worker 
earned 283 rubles per annum, but that when one took into account
wages received in kind - as welfare provision, housing etc. - this
48 rose to 295r, or about 25r a month. In Petersburg,in the same
year, cash wages were about 40% higher than the national average,
but the cost of living in the capital, particularly the cost of
49 accommodation, was higher. In human terms, these wages spelt
chronic poverty. Prokopovich had estimated that one needed about 
three times the average annual wage to support a family in the city. 
How therefore did workers manage?
The largest portion of a working-class budget was spent on food.
In 1908 49% of a married worker's income and 37% of a single worker's
51 income was spent on food. Among textile workers in 1912,
families where the mother worked outside the home spent 52% of
47. Gordon, M., Workers before and after Lenin, New York, 1941, p.71 
cites a study by the British Board of Trade which reckoned that 
in 1905-8 the family income of Russian workers was half that of 
German workers, 37% that of English workers and 27% that of 
American workers.
48. Strumilin, Problemy, pp. 453, 474.
49. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, Pg. 1919, p.54- Payment 
in kind was less widespread in Petersburg than in Russia as a 
whole; far less was spent on accommodation by employers and the 
truck system was less prevalent. (Bernshtein-Kogan, S., Chislennost 1 , 
sostav i polozhenie peterburgskikh rabochikh, Pbg., 1910, pp. 120-22).




their income as food, compared to 60% where the mother worked in
the home. In poorer textile-worker families, as much as two-thirds
52 of income was spent on food. A survey of the budgets of members
of the works committee at the Baltic shipyard in 1917 showed that
53 60% of income was spent on food and lighting. The second largest
item of expenditure for working-class families was on accommodation, 
Prokopovich's survey revealed that the majority of workers lived
in partitioned rooms. Single workers spent 15% of their income on
54rented accommodation and married workers 21%. Among textile- 
workers single women spent 16% of their income on accommodation com­ 
pared to only 8% spent by single men. Families where the mother
was at home spent 19% of their income on accommodation, compared to
55 12% spent by families where the mother worked outside the home.
In 1917 members of the Baltic works committee spent 14% of their
56 income on accommodation. The third largest item of working-class
expenditure was on clothing. Workers dressed poorly. Men wore a 
dark shirt or blouse, with a standing collar buttoned to the side, 
a coarse woollen jacket and trousers tucked inside high boots. In 
winter they wore very heavy coarse cloth coats, a dark cap with a 
patent leather visor or a fur hat. Shirts and ties were unknown,
52. Davidovich, M., Peterburgskii tekstil'nyi rabochii v ego 
byudzhetakh, Pbg., 1912, p.14.
53. Rabochaya Gazeta, 59, 18 May 1917, p.3.
54. Prokopovich, op. cit., p.9.
55. Davidovich, op. cit., p.10.
56. Rabochaya Gazeta, 59, 18 May 1917, p.3.
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except among skilled workers who wished to look respectable. Women 
wore a long skirt, a cotton blouse, a cotton kerchief, or in winter 
a woollen one, but no hat. 57 According to Prokopovich's survey, single 
workers spent 14% and married workers 12% of their income on clothing. 58 
Single male textile workers spent 10% of their income on clothing 
and single females 17%. In textileworker families 15% or 16% of the 
budget was spent on clothing. 59 In 1917 Baltic works committee 
members spent 12% of their income on clothing. 60
The outbreak of war unleashed rampant inflation. It is very 
difficult to produce an index of the rise in prices, partly because 
of regional variations and partly because of the discrepancy between 
official prices and market prices. M.P. Kokhn produced what is 
probably the most reliable national price index for the war years. 
He estimated that if one takes the level of prices in 1913 as being 
equal to 100,then at the end of 1916 it equalled 221 and at the end 
of 1917,512. There is no comprehensive price index for Petrograd, 
but patchy data suggest that prices in the capital followed the 
national pattern, starting to rise as soon as war broke out and then 
rocketing from the second half of 1916 right through 1917 and into 
1918. Officially, food prices rose by 50% between July 1914 and 
December 1915 and by 150% between July 1914 and summer of 1916. 62 
In the autumn of 1916 prices in the capital began to soar. By
57. Gordon, op. cit., pp. 217-8.
58. Prokopovich, op. cit., p.9.
59. Davidovich, op. cit., pp. 11, 13.
60. Rabochaya Gazeta, 59, 18 May 1917, p.3.
61. Kokhn, M.P., Russkie indeksy tsen, M.L., 1926, p.18.
62. Statisticheskie dannve Petrograda. Pg., 1916, p.38; Sidorov, 
K., 'Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v gody imperialisticheskoi 
yoiny, 1914-17gg', in Pokrovskii, M.N., ed., Qcherki po 
istorii oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, vol. I, M.L., 1927, p.233.
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November 1916 the prices of staple commodities had risen since 
November 1914 as follows: black bread - 125%; milk - 150%; white 
bread and cheese - 500%; meat and sausage - 200%; fish - 400%; 
shoes - 300%; overcoats - 300%; trousers, dresses and fabrics - 500%;
CO
kerosene - 200%; firewood - 500%. Thus the prices of basic items 
of subsistence were,by the end of 1916,between two and three times 
higher than before the war? and by the middle of 1917 between three 
and four times higher.
Wages rose rapidly during the war, partly due to the rise in 
the cost of living and partly to the fact that more overtime was 
being worked. The national average wage in enterprises subject to 
the Factory Inspectorate rose from 257 rubles in 1913 to 322r in
1915 to 478r in 1916. In defence enterprises the average annual wage
64 rose from 393r in 1913 to 594r in 1915 to 9124 in 1916. According
to data from the 1918 Industrial Census the average wage in Petrograd
65 doubled between 1914 and 1916 from 405r to 809r per annum. Given
the rising cost of living what did these wage increases mean in 
real terms?
There seems little doubt that nationally real wages fell during 
the war - very slowly during 1914 and 1915 and then increasingly 
rapidly as 1916 wore on. Strumilin estimates that in enterprises 
subject to the Factory Inspectorate real wages were 82% of the 1914
63. Sidorov, op. cit., p.242. These figures were compiled by the 
Okhrana and correspond roughly to price rises in the shop at 
the Nevskii shipyard (Payalin, op. cit., p.327).
64. Strumilin, Problemy, p.334.
65. Leiberov, 1st. rab. Len., p.477.
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level by 1916. The 1918 Industrial Census shows a much more modest 
fall of 3% during the same period, but this is because it included 
state enterprises, which did not come under the auspices of the 
Factory Inspectorate; real wages in state enterprises
cr
actually rose rather than fell during this period. The crucial 
importance of defence industries in the capital meant that Petrograd 
was probably the only area in Russia where average real wages rose 
throughout industry until the winter of 1916 (see Table 10):
Table 10 




















A commodity ruble is a measure based on the value of goods 
which could be purchased for one ruble in 1913.
Source: Anskii, A., ed., Professional'noe Dvizhenie v ———— 1917g., L. 1928, "pTR"————————————————
During the winter of 1916-17 real wages began to fall rapidly in 
Petrograd and by the time of the February Revolution were probably 
15% to 20% below the level of 1913. 67
There were enormous variations in the wage movements of different 
industries and different categories of workers as the following 
Table 11 makes clear:
66. Strumilin, Problemy, p.334.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































As this Table 11 reveals, real wages grew between 1913 and 1916 
in only two Petrograd industries - metalworking and chemicals. In 
all other industries they fell - a fall that was particularly 
dramatic in the case of printers, formerly the highest-paid industry. 
This meant that compared to other industrial groups, metalworkers 
were better off in 1916 than in 1913. In 1913 the average wage in 
the Petrograd metal industry was 63% higher than in textiles, 49% 
higher than in food and 42% higher than in chemicals. In 1917 the 
ratios were respectively 106%, 109% and 51%. This pattern holds
CO
true for Russian industry as a whole. The 30% of the Petrograd 
labour force who worked in textiles, printing, food, woodworking, 
leather and minerals were thus not only worse off in real terms 
as a result of the war, but also relative to the high-wage metal 
industries. Given that no less than 60% of the workforce of 
Petrograd worked in this high-wage industry, can we infer that an 
absolute majority of workers in Petrograd improved their wages 
during the war?
It is extremely difficult to determine how the wages of different 
categories of workers in the metal industry were affected by war. 
Firstly, there were almost 300 different occupations within the 
metalworking industry, and secondly, wage levels varied considerably 
between factories - even for the same job. , In spite 
of the fact that wages in state enterprises were higher on average 
than those in private industry, within the metalworking industry wages
68. Strumilin, Zarabotnaya plata, p.7.
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in private factories fulfilling war orders were higher than in state 
factories. In August 1916 the average monthly wage at private metal
factories in the capital was 127r.50k., compared to 114r.27k. in
69state metal works. In January 1917 average wages in two enter­ 
prises run by the Naval Ministry differed as follows. The average 
monthly wage at the Obukhov works was 171 r, compared to only 86r, at 
the Baltic ship-building works. Bearing these difficulties in mind, 
is it possible to generalise about the movement of wages of skilled, 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the metal industry during 
the war?
It was possible for a layer of very skilled workers in strategic 
positions within the war industries to earn extremely high wages 
between 1914 and 1917. Because of this,it is almost certainly the 
case that the differential between the highest and lowest wages in 
the metalworking industries widened during the war. By the beginning 
of 1917 a first-class fitter or turner could earn fifteen to eighteen 
rubles a day compared to the two to three rubles earned by an un­ 
skilled labourer (chernorabochii). It is more difficult to say 
whether the differential between skilled and unskilled wages, generally, 
increased. Strumilin believed that the real wages of chernorabochie 
in Petrograd rose more during the war than did the average wage in
69. Anskii, A., ed., Professional'rue Dvizhenie v Retrograde v 1917g, 
L., 1928, p.13. The survey from which these figures are drawn 
showed the wide variation in wages of workers in the same 
occupation. 3% of fitters and 5% of turners earned over 200r 
a month; 39% of fitters and 45% of turners earned between 125r 
and 200r; 20% and 13%, respectively, earned between lOOr and 
125r and 39% and 37%, respectively, earned less than lOOr a month
70. Stepanov, op. cit., p.52.
71. Baklanova, op. cit., p.23.
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industry. He calculated that the average daily earnings of 
chernorabochie in all industries in May 1916 were 275% higher than 
in 1914, whereas the average wage in industry was about twice as 
high. He concluded that in spite of inflation, chernorabochie 
were better off in real terms, calculating that whereas they had
spent 44% of their income on food in 1914, they spent only 29% in
72 1916. He argued that the same held true for chernorabochie in
the metal industry. In a study of the private Parviainen metal 
works Strumilin showed that the average wage of a turner rose by 
326% between June 1914 and January 1917 and that of a chernorabochii
by 375%. The ratio of these two wages thus diminished from 2.2:1
73 to 1.91:1. It is not clear, however, that Strumilin is correct
to suppose that the Parviainen works was necessarily typical of the 
metalworking industry as a whole, for wages and conditions at the 
factory were amongst the best in Petrograd. Exiguous data from 
other factories tell a different story. At the Putilov works, for 
example, the differential in the wages of turners and chernorabochie
increased, so that by!916 a turner was earning 168% more than an
74 unskilled man and 227% more than an unskilled woman. At the Obukhov
works an elite of skilled workers succeeded in gaining very high
*~™\ 
wages during the war, but the wages of unskilled labourers at the
factory fell by 21% between 1914 and 1915. At the Metal works 
differentials between skilled and unskilled workers also widened 
during the war. The picture is further complicated by the fact that
72. Strumilin, Problemy, pp. 337, 340.
73. Strumilin, Zarabotnaya plata, pp. 11-12.
74. Vestnik Metallista, 1917, no. 1, p.13.
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semi-skilled workers on machines could often earn more than skilled 
workers because of piece rates. Generalising from this rather con­ 
tradictory evidence, one can perhaps conclude that until the winter 
of 1916-17 a majority of workers in the metal industry succeeded 
in improving their real wages, except in certain factories where 
unskilled workers failed to keep their wages in line with inflation. 
This would mean that probably an absolute majority of the workforce 
of Petrograd managed to improve their wages during the war by working 
more overtime, by war bonuses and by piece rates. From the winter 
of 1916-17, however, a sudden acceleration in price rises led to 
a sharp fall in the real wages of all workers, and this was an 
important cause of the February Revolution.
One final point needs to be made about the position of the low- 
paid in Petrograd^who consisted in the main of women. In 1914 adult 
female wages were on average half those of adult males; teenage boys
earned about 40% of the adult male wage and teenage girls earned
75 about a third. In spite of the increased demand for female labour
during the war, women's wages fell in relation to those of men. 
Between 1914 and the beginning of 1917 the ratio of men's wages to 
women's wages throughout Russian industry increased from 1.96:1 to 
2.34:1. In Petrograd certain women who worked in armaments 
factories on piece rates may have earned tolerable wages,but in 1916 
the overall wage of women in the metal industry was only 40r. a
75. Strumilin, Problemy, pp. 337, 340.
76. Baklanova, op. cit., p.23.
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month, compared to the average wage of 105r. In the textile 
industry a woman classified as 'skilled 1 , such as a jenny-operator, 
earned 49.3r a month in January 1917, which represented 90% of her 
real wage in July 1914; she now spent 63% of this on food compared 
to 57% prior to the war. Most women in textiles,however, were
far worse-paid than this. In the printing industry women earned
78 a pittance of 20 to 25r. a month. For these women therefore, the
war brought them from poverty to the brink of destitution.
To conclude, one can say that from the outbreak of war until 
the winter of 1916-17 the wages of a majority of workers in Petrograd 
improved, although this improvement came about largely as a result 
of increased labour intensity and a deterioration in working conditions 
For a large minority however - at least a third - the already low 
wages of 1914 failed to keep pace with the rise in prices and by 
February 1917 they were teetering on the verge of starvation.
D. THE STRIKE MOVEMENT DURING THE WAR
The wartime wage increases in Petrograd were not granted by the 
employers out of the kindness of their hearts; they had to be fought 
for. Although it is not the purpose of the present work to describe 
the labour movement during the war, a short account of the wartime 
strike movement must be given,both to provide background to the
76. Baklanova, op. cit., p.23.
77. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 3, Pg., 1919, p.28.
78. Baklanova, op. cit., p.23.
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preceding analysis of wage movements and as a preface to the next 
chapter, which describes the response of Petrograd's factories 
to the February Revolution.
The following tables provide a comprehensive breakdown of 
strikes in Petrograd during the war. They are based on I.P. 
Leiberov's statistics, which supersede those of M.G. Fleer and 
I.I. Krylova, since they cover not only large and small factories
but also public institutions and artisanal enterprises in both the
79 city and suburbs of Petrograd. Leiberov follows the Factory
Inspectorate and Okhranain classifying strikes as either 'economic 1 
or 'political', but this classification should be treated with 
caution. The bulk of strikes in each category are unproblematic: 
most 'economic' strikes concerned wages, hours or conditions; and 
'political 1 strikes took place on occasions such as the anniversary 
of Bloody Sunday or to protest against government plans for the 
militarisation of labour, the threatened execution of Kronstadt 
sailors or the arrest of the Workers Group of the War Industries 
Committee. Some strikes involved both economic and political demands, 
however. Leiberov classifies these as political, so there is a bias 
in the tables towards overstating the number of political strikes.
79. Leiberov, I.P., 'Stachechnaya bor'ba petrogradskogo proletariata 
v period mirovoi roiny 1 , Istoriya rabochego Klassa Leningrada, 
issue 2, L. 1963, pp. 166, 177, 183; Fleer, M.G., Peterburgskii 
Komitet bol'shevikov v gody imperialisticheskoi voiny, 1914-17gg, 
L. 1927; Krylova, 1.1., 'K voprosu o statistike stachek 
petrogradskikh rabochikh v gody pervoi mirovoi voiny', Iz 
istorii imperializma v Rossii, M.L., 1959.
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Finally, one should remember that the economic/political distinction 
refers to the demands of the strikers rather than to the strikers' 
motives. It might have taken a certain level of political con­ 
sciousness to go on any kind of strike during the war, at a time 
when the press, public opinion and even socialists like Plekhanov 
considered strike action to be treasonous. One thus cannot impute 
types of consciousness to workers on the basis of these tables.
The three tables show unambiguously that the outbreak of war 
in August 1914 defused the insurrectionary mood which had been 
building up in the working-class areas of Petrograd during the 
preceding six months. A wave of patriotic support for the war, 
combined with repression by the authorities, led to the virtual 
disappearance of strikes until July 1915. The few small, badly 
organised strikes which did occur, were provoked by management 
attempts to cut wage rates. The few political strikes during the 
first year of the war - to protest against Bloody Sunday and the 
trial of the Bolshevik Duma deputies - were organised by socialists
on
but involved tiny numbers of workers. The tide began to turn in 
July 1915 when a successful wage strike by New Lessner workers took 
place which prompted similar strikes in other metal works on Vyborg 
Side. News of the massacre of striking textileworkers in Ivanovo- 
Voznesensk led to political strikes in August, again based on 
militant metalworking factories on Vyborg Side such as Lessner, Aivaz, 
Baranovskii, Nobel and Parviainen. These strikes,, bcq 
protests against rising food prices,' so alarmed the police
80. Leiberov, 1st. rab. Len., p.476.
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that sweeping arrests of worker-activists were made between 29 
August and 2 September 1915. This repression provoked protest 
strikes among metalworkers on Vyborg Side, at Putilov and in other 
districts, mostly under leftist slogans, but some pledging support
O]
to the Duma and calling on the creation of a responsible Ministry.
Between August 1915 and August 1916 there was a big increase in 
the number of strikes. Many workers celebrated the anniversary of 
Bloody Sunday in January 1916 and February witnessed the largest 
number of economic strikes of any month during the war. Unrest 
centred on the Putilov workers, where demands for a 70% wage in­ 
crease became widespread; in spite of a lockout at the factory and 
the drafting of 2000 militants into the army, significant wage 
rises were achieved. Some 70,000 workers at the beginning of March 
came out in support of the Putilovtsy and a strong anti-war mood 
developed. The cms "King of these strikes led to a decline in the 
movement during the summer of 1916.
In the autumn of 1916 the strike movement exploded on a scale 
unprecedented since June 1914. Three-quarters of the strikes 
between September 1916 and February 1917 raised political demands, 
although the roots of unrest lay in the acute food shortages and 
rising prices. Economic grievances, however, led into growing 
criticism of the autocracy and the war. On 17 October workers on 
Vyborg Side marched to the Finland station singing the Marseillaise. 
Significantly, they were joined by soldiers from the 181st infantry 
regiment,who were quartered in the area and who had been the target 
of Left SR and Bolshevik propaganda. The arrest of the insurgent
81. ibid., pp. 483-5.
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soldiers spread the strike and caused the authorities to bring 
Cossacks and mounted police into the proletarian areas. After 
news came through of the threat to execute revolutionary sailors 
in Kronstadt, more factories went on strike^so that by 28 October 
77 factories had stopped work for clearly political reasons. A 
lockout was imposed at fifteen factories and 106 militants were 
arrested, but the interruption of supplies to the Front forced the
op
government to climb down for the first time since war broke out.
In the first six weeks of 1917 stoppages, go-slows and strikes 
occurred in response to plummeting real wages and shortages of 
bread. The increased failure rate of the economic strikes (Table 14) 
reflects the fact that workers in small enterprises were entering 
into struggle for the first time. On January 9, 132 enterprises 
struck to commemorate Bloody Sunday. The success of this demonstration 
encouraged the Workers Group of the War Industries Committee to 
redouble its efforts to persuade workers to put pressure on the 
Progressive Bloc in the Duma. The authorities reacted by arresting 
eleven of the sixteen members of the Workers Group on 27 January. 
On February 14, 58 factories obeyed the summons of the Defencist 
labour leaders to strike. Within the next week a large strike broke 
out at Putilov in support of wage increases, which provoked a 
lockout on February 22. This proved to be an important step in
the immediate run-up to the general strike which precipitated the
83 overthrow of the autocracy.
82. ibid., pp. 502-4-
83. ibid., p. 511.
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3. THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION - A NEW DISPENSATION IN THE FACTORIES
A. WORKERS IN THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION
At the beginning of 1917 Petrograd was gripped by a bread 
shortage. Queues extended the length and breadth of the city. 
Shopkeepers were running out of basic foodstuffs and arbitrarily 
raising prices on their remaining stocks. Haunted by the prospect 
of starvation, women began to raid food shops, smash windows and 
even to beat up crooked tradesmen. Unrest mounted as International 
Women's Day drew near. February 23 arrived and thousands of angry 
housewives and factory women surged into the streets, ignoring pleas 
from labour leaders to stay calm. "The gates of the Sampsonievskii 
cotton mill were flung wide open. Masses of militant women filled 
the alley. Those who saw us began to wave, shouting 'Come out!' 
'Stop work! 1 They threw snowballs through the windows (of the Nobel 
factory, SAS). We decided to join in their demonstration." The 
women marched noisily around Vyborg Side, bringing out metalworkers 
from the Baranovskii, Cartridge and Erikson works in support of their 
demand for an increase in the bread ration. Workers at the Metal Works 
were holding a general meeting in the factory yard when women from 
the Havana cigar factory rushed up, waving red banners. One woman
climbed onto the tribune and bellowed: "Comrades, we have had enough
2 meetings. Get onto the streets and demand bread and freedom!"
1. Gordienko, I., Iz boevogo proshlogo, 1914-18gg., M., 1957, p.57.
2. Karpetskaya, N.D., Rabotnitsy i velikii oktyabr', L., 1974, p.33.
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In other districts of the city, hoarse, bedraggled working women 
and soldiers' wives harangued groups of workers and passers-by to 
join in the day of protest. Little did they realise that this day 
of protest was about to turn into a general strike.
By the next day, 200,000 workers had downed tools. By 25 
February huge armies of demonstrators were clashing with troops and 
a revolution had commeaced. On 27 February the critical point was 
reached: whole regiments of soldiers began to desert to the insurgents- 
in stark contrast to 1905 when they had remained loyal to the regime. 
The same day, the worthy members of the Duma refused to obey an order 
from the tsar to disperse and instead set up a Provisional Govern­ 
ment. Three days later it was all over: the tsar had abdicated and 
Russia was free.
Both Soviet and Western historians have made much of the apparent 
'spontaneity' of the February Revolution. W.H. Chamberlin called it
"one of the most leaderless, spontaneous and anonymous revolutions
3 of all time." In so far as the overthrow of the autocracy was
sudden, unexpected and uncoordinated by any political grouping, the 
term 'spontaneity' captures something of its quintessential quality.
As George Katkov has observed, /"the theory of 'spontaneity' only
4 serves to cover up our ignorance." It occludes rather than reveals
the processes whereby the general strike and mutiny of the garrison 
were organised, and it must be emphasised that the 'spontaneity 1 of 
the February Revolution did not preclude organisation or leadership.
3. Chamberlin, W.H., The Russian Revolution, vol. I, New York: 
Universal Library, edn., 1965, p.73.
4. Katkov, G., Russia, 1917: the February Revolution, London, 1967, p.418
5. Compare Gramsci's remarks: '... pure spontaneity does not exist
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Although no political party directed the strikes or street mani­ 
festations, there was a whole layer of experienced working-class 
militants ('sub-elites', in Hasegawa's parlance) who helped to 
organise these initiatives and to set up popular organisations. 
The role of these militants in creating factory committees shall be 
examined below.
The February Revolution brought into existence an extraordinary 
situation of 'dual power 1 , in which power was divided between the 
official Provisional Government, under Prince L'vov, and the Petrograd 
Soviet of workers' and soldiers' deputies, which enjoyed the support 
of the people. On 5 March - two days after the abdication of 
Nicholas II - the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet summoned 
workers to return to work, on the grounds that "the onslaught on the 
old order by the insurgent people has been successful" and that "a 
continuation of the strike threatens to disrupt to an alarming degree
in history; it would have to coincide with pure mechanical action. 
In the most spontaneous movements the elements of 'conscious 
direction' are simply uncontrollable; they have left behind no 
documentary proof of their existence. One could say therefore 
that the element of 'spontaneity' is characteristic of the history 
of the subaltern class, and even more of its most marginal and 
peripheral elements... There exists a multiplicity of elements 
of conscious direction in these movements, but none of them is 
predominant or goes beyond the level of 'popular science 1 of 
particular social stratum, beyond 'common sense', or beyond the 
stratum's traditional conception of the world.' Gramsci, A., 
Passato e Presente, Quaderni del Carcere, 6, Turin: Einaudi, 1966, 
pp. 55-6.
6. Hasegawa, T., 'The problem of power in the February Revolution of 
1917', Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. 24, no. 4, Winter 1972, 
pp. 611-33.
102
the economic forces of the country, which already have been under­ 
mined by the old regime." This resolution, the Menshevik and 
Socialist-Revolutionary (SR) provenance of which is clearly 
detectible, was passed by a plenary session of the Soviet by 1170 
votes to 30. The dissenting votes came from a few Bolshevik-minded 
workers - the official line of the party was to support the
o
call for a return to work. In spite of this overwhelming unanimity 
however, the decision of the EC was not at all popular with workers 
at the grass roots, a large number of whom thought that there should 
be no end to the general strike until their aims had been achieved 
in full. Only 59 out of 102 large factories went back to work between 
March 6 and 8, and then not out of any enthusiasm for the Soviet 
decision. A general meeting at the Baranovskii works passed a 
radical resolution which was typical of the general attitude:- 
"Condemning the decision of the Soviet of workers and soldiers deputies 
to call for a return to work, and bearing in mind that the struggle 
against tsarism is still not over and that the tsar and a whole 
host of his minions are not yet isolated, and that the martyrs of 
the struggle are not yet even buried, we consider the decision to be 
premature. Not wishing to bring disorganisation into the ranks of 
democracy, however, we will submit to the decision and return to work 
tomorrow (7 March) but will be ready to move into action at the first
7. Shlyapnikov, A., Semnadtsatyi god, vol. II, L.M., 1925, p.122.
8. On 6 March the Petersburg Committee of the Bolshevik party turned 
down a proposal from its Vyborg district committee to call a 
demonstration against the Soviet decision. 'Protokoly Peterburgskogo 
komiteta RSDRP (b)'> Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya, 1927, no. 3, 
p.338; see also Longley, D., 'Divisions in the Bolshevik party 
in March 1917', Soviet Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, July 1972.
9. Baklanova, I.A., Rabochie Petrograda v period mirnogo razvitiya 
revolyutsii, L., 1978, p.11.
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signal. In addition, we advise the Soviet to tell the whole world 
about the overturn which has taken place here and we call on all 
nations to join together to end the bloody slaughter, on the basis 
of brotherhood, love and equality. We also demand that the Soviet 
enact a decree introducing an eight-hour day." Similar resolutions, 
expressing disapproval of the call for a return to work but agreeing 
to abide by it, were passed by workers at the Admiralty, Sestroretsk, 
Military-Medications, Duflon, Izhorsk and New Lessner works and by 
2,000 workers at a meeting on Vyborg Side. The latter group 
demanded that "in future...all serious matters should be put to general
factory meetings which will take definite decisions and then inform
12 the Soviet through their representatives." Most of these resolutions
stated that the Soviet should work indefatiguably to achieve an 
eight-hour day, a democratic republic, the confiscation of all land 
and its transfer to the peasantry, an end to the war and a just 
peace without annexations or contributions.
A handful of factories, such as the Old Parviainen works and the 
Dynamo works, outrightly refused to end their strike. The resolution 
of the Dynamo workers bears all the hallmarks of having been jobbed 
together by the workers themselves:
"We will not submit to the Soviet, because...the wave of 
revolution has not as yet swept the whole of Russia. In other words, 
the old power (vlast 1 ) is not yet destroyed, and until there is
10. Shlyapnikov, op. cit., pp. 286-7.
11. ibid., pp. 124-5; Pravda, 4, 9 March 1917, p.3.
12. Pravda, 3, 8 March, p.2.
13. See for example the resolution passed by the workers of the 
Izhorsk works - a stronghold, incidentally, of the SR's. 
Pravda, 7, 12 March, p.3.
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victory over the enemy, there cannot be any talk of liquidating 
the strike. Yet the Soviet has already decided to liquidate the 
strike for defencist motives. Instead of making an immediate call 
to the German people to end the slaughter, it summons us to make 
shells in order to continue the bloodshed... The people and the army 
did not come out onto the streets in order to replace one government 
by another, but in order to bring our slogans to life. These slogans 
are: freedom (svoboda), equality, land and liberty (volya) and an end 
to the bloody slaughter which nobody needs - at least, no-one among 
the have-nots.
This will only come about once the house of the vampire Romanovs 
is cast from the throne for ever. Yet we see that although Romanov 
has abdicated, he still goes free. We say that we are stil] not 
guaranteed against this vampire trying to stage a come-back into our 
lives. You will probably say that such an attempt would get nowhere. 
We know that, but we also know that such an attempt would nevertheless 
cost dozens or possibly hundreds and thousands of lives. To be
absolutely guaranteed against this, therefore we demand the immediate
14 arrest of the vampire and his family..."
This resolution draws on many elements of populist discourse 
characteristic of the time_r not merely in its traditional appeals 
to land and liberty, its hatred of central government, its deep 
loathing of the tsar and his family, but also in its pacifist oppos­ 
ition to the war (which does not preclude a hint that the Germans 
are the chief aggressors) and in its imagery of revolution as a mighty
14. Shlyapnikov, op. cit., p.286.
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15 wave sweeping through society. The fact that this resolution,
which encapsulates so much of popular consciousness at the time of 
the February Revolution, comes from the Dynamo works makes it 
doubly interesting^for the Dynamo workers, like most workers at this 
time, were strong supporters of the Mensheviks and SR's. Their 
resolution shows that support for the two 'conciliationist 1 parties 
was quite compatible with full-blooded revolutionary convictions 
at this stage of the revolution. We shall see in due course that 
many of the leaders of these two parties at factory level were far 
to the left of their comrades on the EC of the Soviet.
Finally, the two resolutions which have been quoted - examples 
of many which could be reproduced - suggest that workers had 
developed a revolutionary political consciousness, exemplified in 
their posing of, or support for, demands for an end to the imperialist 
war, for a democratic republic and for a land distribution. Marc 
Ferro is undoubtedly correct to argue that this was not a socialist 
consciousness, but his claim that workers were less interested in 
political issues than in issues relating to their condition as 
workers is not borne out by the example of Petrograd.
B. DEMOCRATISING THE FACTORY ORDER
The toppling of the Romanov dynasty inspired most sections of 
society with elation and political optimism. When workers returned
15. For the concept of a 'popular-democratic discourse 1 , see 
Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London 
New Left Books, 1977, pp. 100-103.
16. Ferro, M., The Russian Revolution of February 1917, London: Routledge, 1972, p.121.———————————————
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to the factories in the second week of March they determined that 
I just as the ancien regime had been swept aside in society at large, 
so it should be swept aside in the factory. They resolved to create 
in the place of the old 'absolutist 1 order a new 'constitutional' 
order within the enterprise. They set to work at once by tearing 
up the old contracts of hire and the old factory rule books, with 
their punitive fines, humiliating searches and vicious blacklists,
and drew up new sets of internal regulations. And just as all the
y 
agents of the autocracy had been driven from the police-stations
and government offices, so workers decided that all those who were 
most closely identified with the repressive administration of the 
factory should be driven out of their jobs.
Throughout the factories of Petrograd workers began to clamour 
for the removal of all members of the management hierarchy who had 
made their lives miserable under the ancien regime, who had behaved 
tyrannically, who had abused their authority, who had taken bribes 
or acted as police informers. Sometimes administrators were 
removed peacefully, sometimes by force. At the Putilov works the 
director and his aide were killed by workers and their bodies were
thrown in the Obvodnyi canal; some forty members of management were
18expelled during the first three 'days of freedom'. In the engine- 
assembly shop, Puzanov, quondam chief of the factory's Black Hundreds, 
was tossed in a wheelbarrow, red lead mixed with machine oil was
17. Lists of police agents were published in early March in the 
working-class press after police stations had been ransacked. 
See, for example, Pravda, 7, 12 March 1917, p.4. As late as May, 
police spies were sti11 being uncovered, cf. the exposure of 
Roman Berthold, editor of the anarchist newspaper, Kommuna, Rabo- 
chaya Gazeta, 49, 6 May 1917, p.2.
18. Krasnaya Letopis', 1932, no. 3, p.172.
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poured over his head and he was ignominiously carted out of the 
factory and dumped in the street. In the brickyard of the same 
plant, A.V. Spasskii, the foreman, was deprived of his duties by 
workers for:
*i) rude treatment of workers
ii) forced overtime, as a result of which such things had 
happened as when the worker, S. Skinder, having worked 
overtime, collapsed at midniqht of exhaustion and had 
to be taken to hospital ..." .'9
Such incidents were paralleled in other state enterprises. At the 
Baltic shipyard at least sixty members of the administration were
either demoted, transferred or carted out of the factory in wheel -
20 barrows. At the Cartridge works up to 80% of technical staff
were expelled and the factory committee refused them leave to appeal
21 to a conciliation chamber. At the Admiralty, New Admiralty and
Galernyi Island shipyards, 49 technical employees were expelled by 
general meetings of the workers. Management insisted that each
employee had the right to appeal to a conciliation chamber, but the
22 latter was forced to recognise the fait accompli . At the Pipe
Works the director and fourteen senior managers were temporarily
23 relieved of their duties by the factory soviet.
Such cleansing of the Augean stables extended to private fac­
tories. At the Thornton textile mill women workers chased 30
24 factory police from the premises. At the Baranovskii engineering
19. Mitel'man, M.I., 1917 god na Putilovskom zavode, L., 1959, p.33; 
Rabochii Kontrol 1 v promyshlennykh predpriyatiyakh Petrograda, 
1917-18gg., vol. I, L., 1947, p.45, henceforward, Rabochii KontroT
20. LGIA, f. 416, op. t, A. 30, 1.24.
21. Anskii, A., ed., Professional'noe dvizhenie v Petrograde v 1917g, 
L., 1928, (henceforward Prof, dvizh.), p.82^————————————-
22. ibid., p.81.
23. Rabochii KontroT, p.50.
24. Perazich, V., Tekstili Leningrada v 1917g., L, 1927, p.19.
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works 25 members of the administration were fired by the workers,
eighteen of them being carted from the factory for acting like
25"hangmen" in the past. After long disputes, 12 members of manage­ 
ment at the Skorokhod shoe factory and 16 at the Tentelevskii
chemical works were dismissed at the insistance of the respective
?fi 
workforces. The reasons why workers compelled the removal of
administration were multifarious. At the Triangle works on March 5 
a general meeting of shop stewards had agreed that "all foremen who 
are disorganising production by hiding tools, etc. must not be allowed
into work. We ask comrades to inform the soviet of workers' deputies
27 of this". At the Nevskii shipyard a list was drawn up of foremen
and apprentices who had insulted workers in the past. The Menshevik- 
dominated factory committee forbade the expulsion of these people 
until their cases had been examined by a conciliation chamber. In 
only one shop - the boiler room - did the workers refuse to accept 
the factory committee decision. "We have no wish to come to terms 
with those who banished us. They used to throw us out by the dozen -
po
now it's our turn to throw them out". On 30 March the factory 
committee allowed those threatened with dismissal to return to the 
factory pending appeal. One case which came before the conciliation 
chamber concerned the manager of the metallurgical section, who had 
come to the Nevskii works in 1908 as a foreman. He had openly boasted 
that he would "sweep out of the workshop all the sedition remaining 
from 1905", he had collected information on the politics of the
25. Krasnaya Letopis', 1932, no. 5-6, pp. 189-190.
26. Prof. Dvizh., p.93.
27. Freidlin, V.M., Ocherki istorii rabochego dvizheniya v Rossii 
v 1917g., M., 1967, p.129.
28. Payalin, N.P., Zavod im Lenina, 1857-1918, M.L., 1957, pp. 363,366.
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workers, established a network of informers and forced the workers 
to work unpaid overtime. The conciliation committee found that 
there was no case to answer against him, but so great was the hatred
felt by the workers towards him that the chamber was powerless to
29 make them take the foreman back. The inability of conciliation
chambers to settle cases of expulsion by peaceful arbitration was 
a general phenomenon. At the Kersten knitwear factory the concil­ 
iation committee recommended the reinstatement of all but one of the 
administrators expelled by the workers. On 16 March, for example, 
it announced:
We are convinced that V.V. Zhuchaevich is a 
nervous irascible character who cannot restrain 
himself in the way that moral tact dictates. 
However we consider that the charges made against 
him of contemptuous cruelty, of humiliating 
workers and, in particular, of giving promotion 
only to his fellow Poles, are totally without 
foundation."
The chamber found in relation to another worker that "the charge
of rude, shameless abuse of women workers is not supported by the
30 testimony of witnesses and therefore we consider it unproven".
In neither of these cases was the committee able to overcome the 
opposition of workers and secure the reinstatement of these personnel
29. ibid., p.368.
30. LGIA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 84, 1. 6-21. One should not assume 
that workers expelled administrators solely out of revenge. 
On the railways, for instance, hundreds of administrators were 
removed from their posts by the railwayworkers, but N.V. 
Nekrasov, the Kadet Minister of Communications in the first 
Provisional Government, remarked that 'in 90 out of 100 cases 
the removals were quite necessary 1 . Volobuev, V.P., Proletariat 
i burzhuaziya Rossii v 1917g., M., 1964, p.178.
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Carting administrators out of the factory in a wheelbarrow was 
a well-established form of protest in the Russian labour movement. 
Prior to 1917 the working class had had precious few institutional 
means at its disposal with which to defend its interests. In the 
absence of formal means of defensive organisation, workers devised 
other informal ways of defending themselves. One of these was to 
dump a particularly hated administrator in a wheelbarrow and cart 
him out of the factory. To contemporary leaders of the organised 
labour movement this form of action was seen as little more than an 
expression of blind rage, but it had a deeper symbolism. 'Carting 
out 1 was a symbolic affirmation by workers of their dignity as 
human beings and a ritual humiliation of those who had deprived them 
of this dignity in their day-to-day working lives. Ironically, it 
was the employers' newspaper, Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta, which 
came closest to recognising this symbolic dimension when it commented
that 'carting out 1 had the same significance in the factory as did
31 tearing off an officer's stripes in the army.
The expulsion of the old administration was but the negative 
side of democratising factory life; the positive, and far more 
important side consisted in creating factory committees to represent 
the interests of the workforce. Factory committees sprang up 
mushroom-like in the vertiginous days of the revolution. The es­ 
tablishment of the Soviet on 27 February led to general meetings 
being called to elect deputies to the soviet. These meetings, 
particularly those in state enterprises, elected factory committees
31. Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 124, 14 June 1917, p.l.
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at the same time. On 28 February a general meeting at the Obukhov 
works elected deputies to the Soviet who declared themselves the
nucleus of a works committee, to be supplemented by delegates
32elected from each shop. At the Thornton woollen mill, where three- 
quarters of the workforce were women, the workers joined in the 
general strike only on 25 February, when they set up a strike 
committee of thirty to forty people. Two days later they held a 
general meeting to elect three deputies to the Soviet, but the 
women were reluctant to stand for election since they feared that 
events might yet take a turn for the worse. Finally, they agreed 
that the three most active members of the strike committee - all men - 
should be sent to the Soviet and that the strike committee should be 
transformed into a permanent factory committee. At the Sampsonievskii 
cotton mill a general meeting on 28 February elected an office clerk, 
who was a member of the SR party, and a journeyman weaver to both 
the Soviet and the factory committee. A further seven workers were 
elected to the latter - none of them with any clearcut political
affiliations - and they were later joined by stewards (starosty)
33 elected from each shop.
The apparent 'spontaneity 1 with which factory committees sprang 
up* throughout Petrograd is something of an optical illusion, for 
there was a strong tradition within the Russian working class of 
electing stewards (starosty) to represent shop-floor workers before 
management. This tradition had its origins in the countryside where
32. Freidlin, op. cit., p.17.
33. Perazich, op. cit., p.19.
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many villages were accustomed to electing a headman to represent
34 them. In 1903, in a vain effort to palliate working-class anger
at government refusal to countenance formal, durable trade-union 
organisation, the government attempted to institutionalise a 
rudimentary type of labour representation in the shape of starosty. 
The law of 1905 was significant, not because it initiated the habit 
among Russian workers of electing representatives, but because it 
reflected the anxiety of the autocracy to contain a practice of 
representation which was already wel1-developed. It permitted workers 
to propose candidates for the job of starosta, from whom management 
would then make a final choice. The powers of the starosta were
strictly circumscribed, for he could not seek to modify the contract
35 of hire and he enjoyed no legal protection. Workers disliked the
law, for starosty were rarely able to give decisive leadership in 
working-class struggles since they were too vulnerable to victimis­ 
ation by employers and by the state.
It was the 1905 Revolution which signalled the immense possibili­ 
ties of shop-floor organisation. As the general strike swept across 
Russia, starosty and strike committees developed dramatically, as 
organs of working class self-activity and self-expression. 'Factory 
commissions' proliferated from autumn 1905, adumbrating the factory 
committees of twelve years later. These commissions began to take
34. This tradition was still very much alive. After the death of 
Sverdlov in March 1919, M.I. Kalinin was made Chairman of the 
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and was projected 
by the media as 'All-Russian Starosta 1 in an effort to win the 
confidence of the peasantry. Rigby, T.H., Lenin's Government: 
Sovnarkom, 1917-22, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p.174.
35. For the text of the law on starosty see Pankratova, A.M.,
Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsialisticheskuyu fabriku, M., 1925, 
pp. 343-5.
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responsibility for all matters concerning the internal life of the 
factory, for supervising the hiring and firing of workers and for 
the elaboration of collective agreements on wages. The trade union 
journal, Professional'nyi Soyuz, in its April 1906 number, noted that: 
"factory commissions have greatly facilitated the coordination of 
activity by the working masses and, as agents of workers' self-
or
administration, have gone beyond the limits of narrow factory life". 
However, neither factory commissions nor starosty were to survive 
the Years of Reaction, except in isolated pockets. In a context of 
generalised repression it was difficult for workers to maintain any 
representative institutions.
The invigorating experience of 1905 was not forgotten by working- 
class militants. From time to time individual factories after 1910 
attempted to re-elect starosty. And a resurgence of strike committees 
occurred in the turbulent years of 1912-14. During the First World 
War workers elected representatives under the guise of delegates to 
the board of medical funds (bol'nichnie kassy), though attempts by 
the Menshevik-led Workers' Group of the War Industries Committee to 
revive the institution of starosty came to grief. In short, class- 
conscious workers kept alive the tradition of electing shopfloor 
delegates to represent their interests during the grim years between 
the two revolutions. It was on the basis of this tradition that 
factory committees were formed in 1917.
Once the police apparatus of tsarism had been smashed, working- 
class militants, with experience garnered during desperate struggles
36. Cited in Sviridov, A.A., 'Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety kak 
forma organizatsii piterskikh rabochikh v 1917g', Uchenye 
zapiski Leningradskogo gos. ped. in-ta, vol. 298, 1971, p.72.
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under the anclen regime, set about building on the traditions of 
organisation and struggle with which they were familiar.
The new factory committees were the offspring of older elective 
institutions. In many enterprises the committees were initially 
called 'sovety starost 1 (stewards' committees), though they later 
changed their names to 'factory committee' (fabrichnyi komitet) or 
'works committee' (zavodskoi komitet). In some factories, 
like the Pipe Works or Siemens-Halske works, both a stewards'
committee and a factory committee existed side by side and it is
37 not always clear what distinguished them. At the Triangle rubber
works, with its 15,000 workforce, no less than three organisations 
existed - a works committee, a stewards' committee and a factory 
'soviet 1 of workers' deputies: again it is unclear what division
00
of labour existed between them. At the New Admiralty works the 
works committee had the job of overseeing general factory management,
whereas stewards had to mediate between the workforce and adminis-
39 tration and settle conflicts which arose. In general, factory
committees appear to have been elected by general meetings and to have 
had general responsibilities of 'control 1 and inspection throughout 
the enterprise, whereas stewards' committees consisted of those 
elected from individual shops to represent the workers of that shop
37. Prof, dvizh., pp. 276-7; Novyi Put', no. 1/2, 15 October 1917, 
p.15.
38. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i
provedeniya oktyabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, M.L., 1965, 
p.121.
39. Fabrichno-zavodskie Komitety Petrograda v 1917g Protokoly, ed., 
I.I. Mints, M. 1979, pp. 112-3 (henceforward Fab. zav. Kom.)
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40 before management.
In the next chapter we shall examine the structure and functions 
of the factory committees, but first it is necessary to examine the 
other struggles which arose in the factories in the immediate after­ 
math of the February Revolution.
C. THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY
Having failed to achieve an eight-hour day in 1905, the workers 
returned to the factories in the second week of March determined 
that this time things would be different. The demand for the 
immediate introduction of an eight-hour working day was top of the 
agenda for workers at the Putilov Works, the Metal Works, Cable 
Works, New Lessner, Skorokhod and many other factories. Most of 
these factories implemented the eight-hour day immediately, often 
without the formal agreement of the employers. The workers argued 
that the eight-hour day was necessary not merely to attenuate their
exploitation but also to create time for trade-union organisation,
41education and involvement in public affairs. Many workers ex­ 
pressed doubts, however, lest a reduction in the working day adversely 
affect production for the war effort. At the Cartridge Works the 
workers agreed: "to recognise the eight-hour day as basic...but in
40. At the Metal Works the shop-stewards' committee had far greater 
influence than the works committee. Sergeev, N.S., Metallisty: 
istoriya Leningradskogo Metallicheskugo zavoda im. XXII s"ezda 
KPSS, vol. I, L. 1979, p.375.
41. Gaponenko, L.S., Rabochii klass Rossii v 1917g, M., 1970, p.345
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view of the imminent danger, to try by all means to support our
brothers at the Front and to work more than eight hours without
42 question - up to twelve hours or more - if necessary". At the
Nevskii ship-building works the factory soviet of workers deputies, 
which comprised two Mensheviks, two Bolsheviks and one SR, met with 
the director on March 6 to discuss the eight-hour day. The director 
argued that it was impossible to introduce an eight-hour day in the 
foundries and engineering shops for technical reasons, and that it 
was practicable only for mechanised shell production. The soviet 
agreed that "any disruption of the existing technical system at the 
factory will involve a decrease intaroductivity and so we must begin
work at the normal time, but take the eight-hour day as basic and
43 consider any hours worked over that to be overtime." Although
the stewards' committee took exception to the 'tactlessness 1 of the
soviet in deciding this question without consulting them, they
44 affirmed its correctness. Most factories took a similar position
at this time: they introduced an eight-hour day but were prepared to 
work overtime in support of the war effort.
Employers naturally were reluctant to agree to the eight-hour 
day and in some areas put up a good deal of resistance to it. In 
Petrograd most employers were in a more conciliatory frame of mind, 
but it was the clamour of the workers which pushed them into making 
this concession so speedily. The Menshevik and SR leaders of the
42. Volobuev, op. cit., p.153.
43. Rabochaya Gazeta, 2, 8 March 1917, p.4.
44. Payalin, op. cit., p.349.
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Soviet believed that the political gains of the revolution should 
be consolidated before economic demands were put forward, but they 
were ignored by the workers. As soon as workers began to implement 
the eight-hour day unilaterally, the Society of Factory and Works 
Owners (SFWO), the Petrograd employers' organisation, entered into 
negotiations with the Soviet concerning a reduction in working 
hours. On March 10 the two sides agreed to the eight-hour day, the
recognition of factory committees and the establishment of conciliation
45 chambers in the factories. On March 14 the SFWO sent a circular to
its members calling on them to recognise the eight-hour day as an 
"historically necessary measure", "capable of ensuring the future 
spiritual development of the working class by providing time for 
self-education and trade-union organisation, the aim of which should 
be the establishment of correct lawful relations between labour and
•4. Ill 46capital .
The introduction of the eight-hour day led to a diminution of
the average working day in the Petrograd area from 10.2 hours to 8.4
47 hours. In the metal industry it decreased from 10.4 hours to 8.6
hours; in chemicals from 9.6 to 9.1 hours; in textiles from 9.5 to 
8 hours; in the paper industry from 11.6 to 9.8 hours; in wood­ 
working from 9.8 to 8.2 hours and in the food industry from 10.2 to
48 8.6 hours. In non-factory industries, particularly in shops and
small workplaces, the standard working day continued to be well in 
excess of nine or ten hours, owing to the poor organisation of the 
employees and to the fact that an eight-hour day was not legally binding
45. Volobuey, op. cit., pp. 105-8.
46. LGIA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 183, 1.29.
47. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy ekonomiki truda, Izbrannye proizvedeniya, 
vol. 3, M. 1964, p.4.
48. Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue I, Pg. 1918, p.56.
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49 on employers.
The above figures testify to the fact that overtime working con­ 
tinued to be widespread after February. In almost all factories, 
however, labour organisations insisted on their right to control the 
operation of overtime working. At the 1886 Electric Light Company
the factory committee agreed to overtime working only in case of
50 accidents, urgent repair work or the absence of key personnel.
Elsewhere factory committees pressured management to take on extra
workers instead of extending overtime working. From the first,
there were a few factories which refused to work overtime on principle,
regardless of the war. At the Nevskaya footwear factory the factory
51 agreed at its very first meeting to abolish overtime "for ever".
At the Promet armaments factory the Menshevik-dominated factory 
committee voted 20 against 12 in favour of continuing overtime, but
a general meeting of 3,000 workers overwhelmingly overrode its
52 decision. Women workers, in particular, were adamant that an
eight-hour day meant precisely that. A complete ban on overtime was
called for by women in Moscow district of the capital on 7 March and
53 by laundrywomen on 19 March. At the Vyborg spinning mill the
average number of hours worked by male workers fell from 11.4 hours 
in January 1917 to 8.7 hours in July - including one hour's overtime.
49. Stepanov, op. cit., p.75. See, for example, the complaints 
of hairdressers about their long hours of work (Znamya Truda, 
1, 23 August 1917, p.3 and Znamya Truda, 8, 31 August 1917, p.2.)
50. Rabochii Kontrol', pp. 52-3. The same was true at the 1835 Gas 
Light Company (LGIA, f. 1477, op. 3, d. 1, 1.4).
51. LGIA, f. 1182, op. 1, d. 96, 1.1.
52. Pravda, 11, 17 March 1917, p.4; Rabochaya Gazeta, 10, 17 March, 1917, p.2
53. Reyglyutsionnoe Dvizhenie posle sverzheniya samoderzhaviya, M., 
1957, p.470; Pravda, 17, 25 March 1917, p.4.
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The hours worked by women workers, however, fell from 10 hours to
54 7.8 hours, with almost no overtime. Women's refusal to work
overtime sprang from the fact that domestic labour consumed so 
large a proportion of the time not spent at the factory.
As the first signs of economic crisis appeared later in the 
year, the labour leaders took up the fight against overtime. At 
the Third Conference of Trade Unions in June, the Bolshevik leader 
of the metalworkers union, V. Schmidt, urged:
At the present time, the eight-hour day is only 
a norm of payment and has not actually been put 
into practice. Overtime is done everywhere, but 
it must be allowed only in exceptional circum­ 
stances with the agreement of the unions.55
The woodturners' union tried to limit the amount of overtime, but
56 not always without opposition from its low-paid members. The
same was true of the printers' union which took a firm stand against
overtime working because of the worrying level of unemployment in
57 the print trade. This policy had considerable success later in
the year as closures and redundancies increased. By October there 
was very little overtime working anywhere in Petrograd.
54. Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue, 3, 
Pg. 1919, p.20.
55. Reported in Delo Naroda, 82, June 23, 1917, p.4.
56. Ekho derevoobdelochm'ka, 3, 12 December 1917, p.14.
57. Tikhanov, A., 'Rabochie-pechatniki v 1917g', Materialy po istorii 
professional'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii, vol. 4, M., 1925, p.180. 
At the Polish typography the owners tried to set on more workers, 
but the workers objected to this and offered to work more over­ 
time until the union intervened.
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D. WAGE STRUGGLES
In addition to a significant reduction in working hours, workers 
also gained large wage increases as a consequence of the February 
Revolution. They returned to the factories in March determined that 
the overthrow of tsarism should signal a dramatic change in their 
working lives. A deputy from the Narvoi district told the Petrograd 
Soviet on March 5: "Surely political freedoms are meant to help 
workers live like human beings. They should guarantee the minimum 
conditions of human existence - the eight-hour day and the minimum 
wage. Freedoms are useless if the old conditions persist." He 
was undoubtedly expressing a general opinion, for everywhere workers 
began to raise demands for large wage rises, payment for the days 
spent toppling the Romanov dynasty, a minimum wage etc. Although 
the demands raised by different factories tended to be the same, 
the struggle to achieve them was conducted on an extremely localised 
basis. In the absence of trade unions at this stage of the revolution, 
it was the factory committees which led the wages battles, but in 
some factories there was very little organisation - merely a free- 
for-all, in which workers unused to traditions of organised wage 
negotiation sought to improve their wages by the only method they 
knew viz. direct action. The result was considerable variation 
between factories both in the mode of struggle and in the level of 
achievement of these struggles.
At the Skorokhod shoe factory, which employed 1508 men, 2687 
women and 705 young people, workers engaged in a militant, but
58. Sobolev, G.L., Revolyutsionnoe soznanie rabochikh i soldat 
Petrograda v 1917g., L., 1973, p.58.
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relatively organised, battle for better wages. Through the fac­ 
tory committee they demanded on 9 March:management recognition of 
the committee; an eight-hour working day; a dinner break of one-and- 
a-half hours; a minimum wage of 5 rubles for men, 2r.50k. for women 
and 2r. for youths; the continuation of a 70% war bonus introduced 
in 1905; the abolition of payment for one's own materials; double 
pay for overtime; a joint commission to examine wage rates; payment
for the February Days; payment for deputies to the Soviet; the
59 dismissal of undesirable elements and control of hiring and firing.
Management refused to countenance a 47-hour week, but agreed to 48 
hours; it resisted with particular stubbornness the demands concer­ 
ning minimum wages, at first agreeing only to a 20% increase; it 
agreed to overtime only at time-and-a-half; it refused to abolish 
fines and insisted on the retention of the system whereby workers 
bought their own ancillary materials; it agreed only to the factory 
committee's right to be informed of hiring and firing and to its 
right to request the removal of an administrator. Management refused 
to pay members of elected organisations but offered 300,000 rubles 
towards the cost of a canteen. Almost immediately, it was forced to 
backtrack on hours, fines and payment of elected representatives 
when it became clear what was happening in other factories. The 
wage demands were referred to a conciliation chamber which recommended 
a 40% increase in the minimum wage. The director, A.K. Hartwell, 
agreed to this and promised the leatherworkers' union 10,000 rubles. 
The workers' representatives in the conciliation chamber expressed
59. Prof, dvizh., p.136.
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satisfaction with this magnanimity, but they had not reckoned with 
workers on the shop floor. On March 20 the latter stopped work and 
a crowd began to shout abuse at the director. After some ugly 
negotiations, he made some amazing concessions including a minimum 
wage of ten rubles for men and the abolition of piece rates.
In the textile industry the revolution gave vent to a rash of 
wage demands, some of which were pursued through explosive, violent 
confrontations with management, others through patient, even resigned, 
negotiation. At the two Nevskaya spinning mills women comprised 
81% and 90%, respectively, of the two workforces. No factory com­ 
mittee existed at either mill until the end of March, and women drew 
up extremely moderate lists of 'requests' which they put to 
management on a shop-by-shop basis. The most comprehensive list 
was that drawn up by women in the scutching room at the Koenig mill 
who requested of the English director, Harvey, that they be not 
asked to sweep the floor after they had finished work (refused); 
that machines be stopped for an hour each day for cleaning and 
oiling (refused); that new workers be put on the same rate as older 
ones ("What will the older women say?", the director replied); that 
women be paid six weeks' maternity leave (referred to medical fund); 
equal pay with men for equal work; retirement and injury pensions
c i
(no reply). The plaintive tone of the Koenig women's entreaty was 
not typical of the majority of workers, nor was the obtuse intran­ 
sigence of the English management typical of employers as a whole.
60. Istoriya Leningradskogo obuvnoi fabriki, Skorokhod, im. Ya. 
Kalinina, L., 1969, pp. 136-7.The size of these concessions 
caused great consternation among members of the SFWO, who felt 
that a dangerous precedent had been set.
61. Linko, G., 'Rabochee dvizhenie na fabrike Kenig V 1917g.', 
Krasnyi Arkhiv, 58, 1933, pp. 136-7.
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The month of March saw a plethora of small-scale, short-lived, 
often sectional struggles for higher wages. The most effective were 
those which were organised by factory committees, but 'spontaneous 1 
outbursts of direct action were by no means ineffective in this 
period. Most employers were prepared to make far-reaching concessions 
under pressure, so very few disputes developed into strikes proper. 
At the Osipov leather works a strike broke out on March 8 and at 
the Cable Works a strike took place from March 16 to March 21, a
comparatively long time by the standards of this period - but such
fi? strikes were exceptional. The result was considerable variation
in the level of wage increases achieved by different factories, 
industries and occupational categories. This makes it very difficult 
to generalise about the overall level of wage rises in the spring 
of 1917.
Already in the month of March monthly earnings rose on average
r^
by 35% to 50% and they continued to rise over the next two months. 
At the Putilov works average monthly earnings in June were 120% to
180% above the January 1917 level and hourly earnings some 240%
64 above. At the Parviainen works hourly earnings rose by 92% between
65 February and May. By July monthly earnings as a percentage of
earnings in January were, respectively, 270% at the Osipov leather 
works, 320% at the Paramonov leather works, 270% at the Triangle
62. Baklanova, op. cit., p.21.
63. ibid., p.20.
64. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets v trekh revolyntsiyakh, L., 1933, pp. 327-8. 
The percentage rises for hourly rates are much larger than the 
corresponding rises for monthly earnings, owing to the fact that 
fewer hours were being worked per month after February.
65. Strumilin, S.G., Zarabotnaya plata i proizvoditel'nost' truda 
v promyshlennosti, M., 1923, pp. 13-14.
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rubber works and 300% at the Nevskaya paper mill. In the absence 
of global data, one can speculate that nominal earnings doubled or 
trebled in the first six months of 1917. It is far more difficult 
to say what happened to real earnings. It seems likely that one 
would have had to double one's earnings to keep abreast of inflation, 
so those workers who managed to more than double their earnings 
would have been better off in real terms by summer 1917, whereas 
those who did not would have been worse off than in January of that 
year.
How did the wage rises of spring 1917 affect the relative positions 
of skilled and unskilled, male and female workers? The Soviet 
historian, I.A. Baklanova, has produced the following breakdown of 
monthly earnings of workers aged over 18 at four Petrograd factories 
in January and June 1917 (Table 15). This table suggests that the 
wages of the low-paid rose proportionately more than did those of 
the better-paid. This is borne out by evidence from other factories. 
At the Parviainen works the hourly rate of a turner rose by 59% 
between February and May compared to a 125% rise in the rate of an
C~J
unskilled worker. At the thirty paper mills of Petrograd male 
wages rose by 214% in the first half-year of 1917, compared to 234% 
for female wages and 261% for young people's wages. At the Nevskii 
shipyard the hourly rate of a steel-moulder rose by 173% compared to
283% in the rate of a hammer-smith, thus decreasing the differential
69 in their wages from 2.15 to 1.31. The diminution in wage differentials
66. Baklanova, op. cit., p.33.
67. Strumilin, Zarabotnaya, pp. 13-14.
68. Pischebumazhnik, 1, 16 September 1917, p.12.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































between highly-paid and low-paid workers was the result of 
conscious policy on the part of factory committees to try to im­ 
prove the dire situation of unskilled workers, women workers and 
youth. However this improvement in the relative earnings of the 
low-paid was not true of all factories. From Table 15 it would 
appear that at the Nevka spinning mill men's wages increased more 
than those of women. And at the Vyborg spinning mill the average 
hourly rates of male workers rose by 368% between January and July, 
compared to 327% for adult women, 335% for male youths and 321% for 
female youths. Moreover better-paid workers of both sexes achieved 
proportionately bigger increases than the poorer-paid. This 
suggests that in factories where workers were not wel1-organised, 
groups fought for themselves on a sectional basis. This meant that 
women textile workers, who did not have the same bargaining power 
as men in the industry, were unable by their own efforts to secure 
wage increases as large as those achieved in factories where the 
workers collectively fought to improve the relative position of the 
low-paid.
The demand for a minimum wage for the low-paid was valiantly 
fought for by workers' organisations. At the Metal Works negotiations 
between the works committee and management over a minimum wage became 
deadlocked and a skilled worker on the works committee proposed that 
skilled workers should supplement the wages of the unskilled out 
of their own pay-packets until the matter was settled. "...We 
must show our true mettle. Are we the same as the exploiting 
bourgeois, or are we just a bit more aware and willing to help the
70. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 3, p. 7, p. 14.
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chernorabochle? Let us the masterovye lend a hand to our starving, 
ragged comrades." At the Putilov shipyard management and workers
agreed to assign 20% of the annual wages bill to help the lowest-
72 paid, pending a settlement of the minimum wage. The workers'
section of the Soviet took up the pressing question of a minimum 
wage at its meetings of 18 March and 20 March. Representatives from 
fifty of the largest enterprises described the sorry plight of the 
poorly paid which had come about as a result of inflation. One 
speaker said:
The abnormal conditions in which the working class 
found itself up to now were maintained only with 
the aid of the bayonet. The bayonet has fallen, 
the autocracy is overthrown, but the conditions of 
the working class remain the same.73
The Menshevik, V.O. Bogdanov, complained about the number of partial, 
sectional conflicts in the factories and the "continued misunder­ 
standing" between capital and labour, to which the delegate from the 
Putilov works retorted angrily:
It is the duty of the Soviet to examine our 
position to look at all rates and standards, 
to revise them and create a tolerable existence for 
us, and not be surprised that we raise demands... 
When the workers arose from their toiling slumber, 
they demanded just wages, they put forward just 
demands, but the employers cried: 'Guards 1 They 
are robbing us!'74
71. Sobolev, op. cit., p.67.
72. Pravda, 15, 22 March 1917, p.4.
73. Cited in Baklanova, op. cit., p.24.
74. Rabochaya Gazeta, 13, 21 March 1917, p.2; Sobolev, op. cit., p.68
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The workers' deputies in the Soviet agreed that a minimum wage of 
five or six rubles a day should be made legally binding on
employers, but the SFWO proposed a minimum of 3r. 20k for men and
75 2r.50k for women. The matter was then referred to the Central
Conciliation Chamber, at which the workers' representatives argued 
for a daily minimum of five rubles for men and four for women. 
The employers' representatives at first resisted this, but then 
conceded it, recognising that "from the political point of view, 
we are now living through a time when strength lies with the workers". 
This minimum was formally announced on April 22, but the announcement 
sent few workers into raptures. It was clear that this minimum was 
already inadequate in the face of soaring prices.
E. MANAGEMENT STRATEGY AFTER THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION
In the tsarist era the capitalist class in Russia was characterised 
by economic strength combined with social and political weakness. 
This arose from the fact that large capital achieved dominance in the 
economy in the 1890's, not by challenging the political power of the 
landowning elite, but by relying on the economic and political protec­ 
tion of the autocratic state. The industrial and commercial bourgeoisie 
thus never really developed into a political force capable of 
challenging the old order. It was to prove a far less dynamic social
75. Pankratova, A., Fabzavkomy i profsoyuzy v 1917g., M.L., 1927, 
p.39; Baklanova, op. cit., p.25.
76. Baklanova, op. cit., p.25.
77. Rabochaya Gazeta, 39, 25 April 1917, p.3. It compared badly to 
the minimums achieved by militant action at Skorokhod (lOr.) and 
the Triangle works (7r, for men and 5r, for women). Baklanova, 
op. cit., p.22.
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class than the proletariat, and this social weakness was mirrored 
in its internal divisions and in its underdeveloped sense of class 
identity.
The capitalist class in Russia was not monolithic. Several 
fractions can be distinguished within it, according to industrial 
and regional base, degree of dependence on foreign capital, degree 
of dependence on the state, differences in industrial and commercial 
policy and differences in political outlook. The biggest fraction 
of the capitalist class was also the most genuinely Russian section 
and consisted of those entrepreneurs of the Moscow region, whose 
wealth derived from textiles and other light industries, independent
yo
of foreign and government finance. The Moscow entrepreneurs tended 
to pursue a conservative economic policy but a liberal policy in
the political arena, playing a minor role in the opposition move-
79 ment of the Third Duma and supporting the Progressive Bloc. This
political liberalism sharply distinguished the Muscovites from the 
more reactionary fractions of capitalists, such as the mineowners 
of the Donbass and Krivoi Rog, the semi-feudal bourgeoisie of the 
Urals metallurgical industry and the oil magnates of Baku, all of
on
whom depended heavily on foreign capital. In this respect, they 
were similar to the strongest fraction of the capitalist class - the 
industrialists and financiers of Petersburg. They derived their
78. Gindin, I.F., 'Russkaya burzhuaziya v period kapitalizma;
ee razvitiya i osobennosti', Istoriya SSSR, 1963, no. 2, pp. 60-65 
and no. 3, p.57; White, J.D., 'Moscow, Petersburg and the Russian 
Industrialists', Soviet Studies, January 1973.
79. Hosking, G., The Russian Constitutional Experiment, 1907-14, 
Cambridge University Press, 1973.
80. Volobuev, op. cit., pp. 45-6.
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wealth from banking and the metalworking industries and were 
heavily dependent on state orders as well as on foreign investment. 
Because of this dependence on the government, the Petersburg 
bourgeoisie was far less active in the social and political arena 
than its Moscow counterpart.
Although the Petersburg capitalists were positively servile in 
their attitude to the government prior to 1914, the war put their 
loyalty to severe strain. It was the Moscow industrialists who held 
the upper hand in the War Industries Committees, set up to take 
responsibility for military supplies after the defeat of the army 
in the summer of 1915, but many entrepreneurs in Petrograd became 
increasingly sympathetic to it and to the propaganda of the 
Progressive Bloc. Alienated by its inept pursuit of the war and by 
the scandalous intrigues of the Rasputin clique, most entrepreneurs 
in Petrograd were not sorry to see the passing of the Imperial 
government in February 1917.
The mood of a majority of industrialists after the February 
Revolution was one of anxious hope. They were confident that the 
Provisional Government would establish a liberal parliamentary regime 
which would represent their interests, but they were also acutely 
aware that the ancien regime had been liquidated only by means of 
a popular movement, which, they feared, could easily get out of hand 
and thus endanger the objective of a liberal capitalist system. 
The paradoxical character of the February Revolution - a 'bourgeois 1 
revolution, undertaken by workers and soldiers - brutally exposed 
the social weakness of the bourgeoisie, once the crutch of the tsarist 
state had been knocked from under it. At a national level, the
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bourgeoisie was weak in numbers, internally divided, lacking in class 
consciousness, politically inexperienced and badly organised. The 
prime task for the capitalist class, therefore, was to organise to 
promote its interests more effectively and to exert pressure on the 
new government.
In Petrograd the main employers' organisation was the Society 
of Factory and Works Owners (SFWO). This had been founded in 1897 
and represented all the major firms in the capital. By 1917 it 
represented 450 enterprises, mainly large factories, employing a total 
workforce of 280,000. It had seven sections - for metalworking and
engineering, chemicals, textiles, paper, wood, printing and
81 miscellaneous. The first number of the SFWO journal in 1917
defined the Society's tasks as 'to search for new ways to develop 
Russian industry within the framework of capitalism' and to ensure
that 'free citizen industrialists and free citizen workers find a
82common language 1 . In April a new council and presidium were est­ 
ablished and city district sections were set up, but these did not 
prove successful and in summer the SFWO was reorganised along
oo
industrial lines. The weakness of the SFWO was due not so much 
to defective organisation, as to the inherent difficulties in en­ 
forcing a common policy on all members. In spite of the fact that 
firms who went against SFWO policy risked heavy fines, there were
81. Ganelin, R. Sh., and Shepelev, I.E., 'Predprinimatel'skie
organizatsii v Retrograde v 1917g.', Oktyabr'skoe vooruzhennoe 
vosstanie v Retrograde, sb. stat., M.L., 1965, p.265.
82. Vestnik obshchestya zavodchikov i fabrikantoy, no. 1, 1 June 1917 
Note the use of 'citizenship' as an interpellative structure. 
(See Laclau, op. cit., pp. 100-03).
83. Prof. Dvizh., p.102.
132
often good business reasons why firms should break ranks. In view 
of the failure to create a unified employers' organisation even in 
Petrograd, it is not surprising that attempts to create a national 
organisation came to grief, and that a host of sectional organisations
proliferated, each representing different fractions of industry and
84 commerce.
In terms of its industrial relations policy, management in 
Petrograd factories was faced with a choice of two strategies after 
the February Revolution. On the one hand, lacking moral authority 
in the eyes of the working class and inured to a quasi-feudal system 
of industrial relations, it could attempt to suppress labour unrest 
and restore the status quo ante. This was the strategy chosen by 
employers in the Urals and Donbass. On the other hand, deprived of 
the support of the autocracy and confronted by a labour force in 
ferment, management could make real concessions in the hope of in­ 
augurating a system of Western-style labour relations. In Petrograd 
they chose the latter - not so surprisingly perhaps, since there had
oc
been moves in the capital in this direction ever since 1905. They 
committed themselves, therefore, to dismantling the system of in­ 
dustrial relations based on coercion, in favour of one based on 
mutual recognition, negotiation and collective bargaining. A circular 
from the SFWO to its members on March 15 reads:
84. Volobuev, op. cit., pp. 83-4.
85. In Moscow, too, where employers traditionally had pursued a
reactionary industrial relations policy because of tight profit 
margins, the factory-owners resolved to 'renounce the idea of 
running our enterprises on pre-revolutionary lines'. This did 
not stop them opposing the eight-hour day, initially. Volobuev, 
op. cit., pp. 269-70.
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Relations between employers and workers have 
changed radically; speedy, energetic work is 
needed to initiate a new order in the factories 
and to re-establish normal work on defence as 
rapidly as possible.86
In practical terms, this meant making four key concessions. Firstly, 
immediate and sizeable wage increases; secondly, the eight-hour 
day; thirdly, recognition of factory committees and trade unions, 
and, fourthly, the establishment of conciliation chambers.
This programme coincided, felicitously, with that of the 
Provisional Government. The latter set up a Department of Labour 
within the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which was headed by 
Konovalov. He declared that the government's aim was to "establish 
proper relations between labour and capital, based on law and justice". 
On March 29 he announced the priority reforms of the government in 
the sphere of labour as being, firstly, the development of trade unions; 
secondly, the creation of conciliation chambers, factory committees
and labour exchanges; thirdly, legislation on labour protection,
87 working hours and social insurance. This programme had the backing
of the SFWO but it was considered dangerously socialistic by the 
mineowners of the Urals. Once opposition to it began to build up, the 
government's zeal for reform proved surprisingly half-hearted. It 
refused, for example, to enact a law on the eight-hour day, setting 
up a commission to study the 'complexity' of the problem instead.
86. ibid., p.175.
87. Browder, R.P., and Kerensky, A.F., eds., The Russian Provisional 
Government 1917, vol. I, Stan ford, 1971, p.710.
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This was a portent of the paralysis which was soon to overcome the 
labour policy of the Provisional Government.
Conciliation chambers were the centrepiece of the system of 
'constitutional 1 industrial relations to which both the SFWO and the 
Provisional Government aspired. Conciliation chambers had first 
appeared in the years 1905 to 1907, particularly in the printing 
and construction industries. They died out during the Years of 
Reaction and did not emerge again until the end of 1915, when they 
were revived by the progressive wing of Moscow industrialists and 
by the Workers' Group of the War Industries Committee. Conciliation 
chambers were strongly resisted at this time by industrialists in 
Petrograd, who considered them to be fetters on their freedom of
oo
action. The February Revolution soon changed their minds and they 
became staunch advocates of arbitration in disputes.
The Menshevik and SR leaders of the Petrograd Soviet were as 
anxious as the SFWO to set up machinery for arbitration and for the 
avoidance of unofficial action by rank-and-file workers, such as 
wildcat strikes. In the agreement between the two bodies on March 10, 
it was agreed that conciliation chambers should be set up "for the 
purpose of settling all misunderstandings arising out of labour- 
management relations". They were to consist of an equal number of
elected representatives from both workers and management and were to
89 reach decisions by joint agreement. In the event of agreement not
being reached, the dispute was to be referred to a Central Conciliation 
Chamber. Izvestiya, the paper of the 'conciliationist 1 leadership 
of the Petrograd Soviet, explained the significance of this agreement
. Kats, A., 'K istorii primiritel'nykh kamer v Rossii 1 , Vestnik 
truda, 1923, no. 10, pp. 186-7.
89. This distinguished 'conciliation chambers' (primiritel'nye
kamery) from 'arbitration courts' (treteiskie sudyj in whfch an 
independent chairman had a casting vote.
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on conciliation as follows:
The wartime situation and the revolution force 
both sides to exercise extreme caution in util­ 
ising the sharper weapons of class struggle such 
as strikes and lockouts. These circumstances 
make it necessary to settle all disputes by means 
of negotiation and agreement, rather than by open 
conflict. Conciliation chambers serve this purpose.
In the early months of the revolution the conciliation chambers 
were very busy. Trade unions had not yet begun to operate effectively 
and so the wages battle of March and April was largely spontaneous 
and atomised. The conciliation chambers played an important role in
mediating in wages negotiations, but as the unions began to con-
91 solidate themselves, the significance of the chambers waned. From
the first, many workers regarded the conciliation chambers with 
suspicion, since they appeared to repress the reality of class 
struggle and to compete with the factory committees. The general 
situation was not favourable to the harmonious resolution of dis­ 
agreements between workers and employers, and where class tension 
was acute, the conciliation chambers tended to be impotent. The 
most striking example of this was the general failure of conciliation
committees to achieve the reinstatement of managers and foremen ex-
92 pel led from their jobs by the workers. It is thus not surprising
that as early as March, dissenting voices should have been heard at
90. Izvestiya, 33, 6 April 1917, p.2.
91. By the summer of 1917 conciliation chambers existed in most state 
factories and in 90 private factories of Petrograd. Baklanova, 
op. cit., p.74.
92. The success rate of the conciliation chambers can be judged by
the following figures on the number of cases successfully resolved 
between April and August: at the Baltic works, 12 out of 160 cases 
heard; at the Izhorsk works, 7 out of 50; at New Admiralty, 3 out 
of 29; at Obukhov, 3 out of 20. Baklanova, op. cit., pp. 80-1.
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a Convention of factory-owners on Vyborg Side, warning that "the 
conciliation chambers cannot justify the hopes placed in them, since
they do not enjoy the necessary confidence of the workers and lack a
93 firm foundation".
It is now barely possible to understand why employers should have 
conceived the factory committees to be part of their scheme for a 
'constitutional' system of industrial relations. At the time, however, 
there seemed good grounds for thinking that factory committees would 
encourage order in the factories, by acting as safety-valves for the 
explosive build-up of shop-floor grievances. It is clear from the 
agreement made between the SFWO and the Soviet on March 10 that 
industrialists saw the factory committees as an updated version of 
starosty. In a circular interpreting the agreement, the SFWO em­ 
phasised the need for workers to make a "careful choice of people
94 who are able to maintain good relations between the two sides".
A week later a further circular was sent out informing employers 
that "working hours spent by these people (i.e. deputies, starosty,
members of the factory committee and so on), in fulfilling the duties
95 laid down, must be paid at the normal, i.e. average, daily rate".
Until the autumn most employers seem to have financed their factory
96 committees almost totally. In return for supporting the committees,
93. Cited by Freidlin, op. cit., p.138.
94. Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune velikoi oktyabr'skoi 
sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii, part I, M.L., 1957, p.512 
(henceforward Ek. pol.).
95. Selitskii V.I., Massy v bor'be za rabochii kontrol': mart - iyun' 
1917g., M., 1971, p.161.
96. In Moscow, according to A.G. Egorova's calculations, members of 
factory committees were paid by the owners in 67% of enterprises 
in summer 1917; by the workers in 20% and were not paid at all 
in 12%. Cited by Volobuev, op. cit., p.183.
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the employers expected to see them operate in a manner that was 
acceptable. The SFHO therefore put pressure on the Provisional 
Government to define the powers of the factory committees by law. 
The labour department of the Ministry of Trade and Industry agreed 
to set up a commission under Professor M.V. Bernatskii to draft 
such a law. The commission received submissions from both the labour 
department of the Petrograd Soviet and from the SFWO and tried to 
find a compromise between the two. It resisted pressure from the 
SFWO to give employers the right to remove members of the factory 
committees, specifying that this might only be done by a conciliation 
committee. The final law followed the proposals of the Petrograd 
Soviet fairly closely, though it did not make factory committees
responsible for safety or deferments of conscription as the Soviet
97 had suggested. On April 23 the law was promulgated by the
Provisional Government. It provided for the setting up of factory 
committees: to represent workers' interests vis-a-vis management on 
questions such as pay and hours; to settle disputes between workers;
to represent workers before the government and public institutions
98 and to engage in educational and cultural work. The law thus
defined the functions of the factory committees narrowly: it made 
no mention of 'control 1 , whether of hiring and firing or of any 
aspect of production. The aim of the government, as in the legislation 
on conciliation committees, was not to stifle the factory committees, 
so much as institutionalise them and quell their potential extremism
97. Amosov et a]_. eds., Oktyabr'skaya Revolyntsiya i Fabzavkomy,
vol. I, M., 1927, pp. 25-6 (henceforward Okt. Rev. i Fabzavkom.).
98. Browder, R.P. and Kerensky, A.F., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 718-20.
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by legitimising them as representative organs designed to mediate
99 between employers and workers on the shop floor. Some employers
were disgruntled with what they saw as the excessive liberalism of 
the legislation, but most tried to put it into operation. Workers, 
however, were not prepared to have their hands tied by the new law. 
Most factory committees were already operating on a much broader 
mandate than that allowed for by the law and so they simply ignored 
it. At the Nevskii shoe factory, management at the beginning of June 
sent the committee of starostas a copy of the new law, hoping that 
this would have a "sobering influence". The committee replied 
ironically that they considered the law unsatisfactory "since those 
ministers who enacted the law are no longer with us (there was now 
a Coalition government, SAS). We now have new ministers and so we 
should have a new law. The decree which you sent us has already dis­ 
integrated in our pockets, so we are asking if you've got anything 
new to offer. If you have, then send it to us, it will be very 
satisfactory and we'll be very glad to receive it." So much for 
the effort to institutionalise class struggle through the factory 
committees 1
It is easy in retrospect to mock the guarded optimism of the 
employers in March and April, but at the time it was not unreasonable 
to hope that with the granting of substantial concessions, working- 
class unrest would subside. For some time in April things really 
did look hopeful. The industrialists' own newspaper could report at 
the end of April:
99. See the excellent analysis in Volobuev, op. cit., pp. 326-8,
100. Ek. pol., vol. I, p.545.
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According to information received from the 
Ministry of Industry, during the period 
April 7 to April 14, work went on normally 
at the majority of enterprises of Petrograd, 
and order has more or less been restored.^
Only two weeks later, however, the paper had changed its tune:
In many industrial enterprises workers and 
employees are putting forward wage demands 
which go significantly beyond the level es­ 
tablished by the conciliation chambers. At 
some factories these demands are accompanied 
by violent actions towards managers J02
Thus, by May the signs were there that the policy of compromise, 
favoured as much by the Soviet EC as by employers, was going to 
prove as bankrupt in the sphere of industrial relations as it would 
in the sphere of politics.
101. Torgovo - Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 86, 27 April, p.3.
102. Torgovo - Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 98, 13 May, p.2.
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THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEES
Organisations similar to the Russian factory committees arose 
in several of the countries involved in the First World War. In 
the British engineering industry, particularly on Clydeside and in 
Sheffield, a powerful movement of shop stewards emerged to combat 
'dilution 1 and the militarisation of industry engendered by the war. 
In the metalworking industries of Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, Halle 
and elsewhere in Germany the revolutionary shop stewards (Obleute) 
led struggles against the class-collaborationist policies of the 
leaders of the Free Unions, which spilled over into anti-war demon­ 
strations, support for the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) and 
finally into the workers' and soldiers' councils (Rate) of the German 
Revolution. In the Revolution of 1918-19 it was young, semi-skilled 
workers in the large metal enterprises of the Ruhr and of Halle who 
were most active, although some skilled craftsmen played a prominent 
role in the iron and steel industries of older industrial areas
such as Remscheid and Solingen, which were threatened by new tech-
2 nology. In Italy in the metal and engineering industries of Milan
and Turin 'internal commissions' (commissioni interni) evolved from 
organs of arbitration into defenders of shopfloor autonomy against 
the reformist bureaucracy of the metalworkers' federation (FIOM),
and, finally, into mighty workers' councils which led the factory
3 occupations of the 'Biennio Rosso 1 of 1919-20. All these movements
1. Hinton, J., The First Shop Stewards' Movement, London 1973.
2. Geary, D., 'Radicalism and the Worker: metalworkers and revolution, 
1914-33', Evans, R., ed., Society and Politics in Wilhelmine 
Germany, London, 1978.
3. Williams, G.A., Proletarian Order, London: Pluto Press, 1975;
Spriano, P., The Occupation of the Factories, London: Pluto, 1975.
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were similar to the Russian factory committees in that they were 
shopfloor organisations, firmly based in the metalworking and 
armaments industries. In other respects, however, they were rather 
different. 'Dilution' was less of an issue in Russia than in 
Britain, and so it cannot be considered a key cause of the emergence 
of the factory committees. Moreover, in Germany and Italy much of 
the momentum behind the council movement came initially from the 
struggle by rank-and-file workers against the sclerotic trade-union 
bureaucracy, but in Russia this clearly was not a factor, since 
trade unions were virtually illegal, and since there had never existed 
within tsarist society the economic and political space for a 
successful reformist strategy to be pursued by an oligarchical trade 
union leadership.
Factory committees did not spring out of thin air in Russia in 
1917, their roots lay in the tradition of electing starosty. Factory 
committees were established in the course of the February Revolution 
as the means of creating a new democratic order in the factories and 
as the expression of workers' desire to have a say in the running 
of the enterprise. In the in-mediate aftermath of the Revolution 
there was a further practical reason why factory committees were 
hurriedly brought into existence.
Factory committees established themselves most quickly in 
state enterprises in March 1917. For when workers returned to state 
factories after the overthrow of the tsar they discovered that most 
members of the administration and many technical personnel had fled, 
fearing that, as appointees of the hated tsarist regime, they might 
face vengeance from the workers. In the absence of management,
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therefore, and anxious to continue production for the war effort, 
workers set up factory committees to run the state enterprises.
At the Okhta explosives works the factory committee simply declared
4 itself the new administration. At the Cartridge Works a collective
administration was formed, comprising workers and technical staff. 
At the Gun (Orudiinyi) Works a temporary Executive Committee was 
established on 3 March which consisted of 68 people-mainly workers. 
At the Pipe Works an administrative committee, comprising five members 
of the factory soviet and four members of the administration, was 
set up to take charge of production, wages and the security of the 
factory. On March 16 a council of management, composed of equal 
numbers of elected representatives of management and workers, was 
created at the Military-Medications works to "temporarily take on 
the rights and duties of managing the whole factory and to take full 
responsibility for the future state of affairs at the factory". 
At the Radiotelegraph factory the factory committee confined itself 
to negotiating wage demands and revising the internal rules of the
o
factory. What this meant,was that in practice a form of workers' 
management was established in many state enterprises immediately
4. Reporting on its early weeks of activity, the Okhta works committee 
noted: 'Because of the novelty of things, the committee got lost 
in its business for a certain time. The immediate tasks of the 
factory committee were unclear, so the committee took on not only 
the task of controlling the factory administration, but the duties 
of the latter. 1 Rabochii Kontrol' i natsionalizatsiya promyshlennykh 
predpriyatii Petrograda v 1917-19gg., vol. I, L., 1947, pp. 178-9 
(henceforward Rabochii Kontrol').
5. Selitskii, V.I., Massy v bor'be za rabochii Kontrol', M., 1971, p.38.
6. Rabochii Kontrol', p.44.
7. Revolyutsionnoe Dvizhenie posie sverzheniya samoderzhaviya, sb. 
dok., M., 1957, p.507.
8. Rabochii Kontrol 1 , p.41.
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after the February Revolution. As chapters 7 and 8 will go on to 
show, such workers' management developed only slowly in Petrograd in 
the autumn of 1917, but in state enterprises it existed for a brief 
period as early as March. This was the almost unintentional result 
of the desire of workers in state enterprises to, firstly, overhaul 
the repressive authority structure of the enterprises, and, secondly, 
to maintain output of war material in the absence of the old manage­ 
ment. Thus for a few weeks, workers found themselves virtually running 
state enterprises. This did not last, but the experience was crucial 
in giving birth to the idea of workers' 'control 1 .
On March 13 the largest factories subject to the Artillery 
Department in Petrograd met to discuss what demands they should put 
on the Department. They agreed to demand an eight-hour day, payment 
for the days they had spent toppling the ancien regime and a minimum 
wage. Most of the conference was spent discussing the role of the 
factory committees. Some delegates, like the one from the Cartridge
Horks, argued that the aim should be "self-management by workers on
9 the broadest possible scale". The majority of delegates, however,
whilst cursing the "ancient fetters which have bound the workers in 
state enterprises so tightly to the military authorities by means of 
military discipline", had no wish to see the complete removal of 
official administration. In their resolution the delegates declared: 
"Until such time as full socialisation of the national economy, both 
state and private, shall occur, workers shall not take responsibility 
for the technical and administrative-economic organisation of pro­ 
duction and shall refuse to take part in the organisation of
9. ibid., p.48.
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production". The functions of the factory committees were specified 
as the "defence of the interests of labour vis-a-vis the factory 
administration and control over the activity of the latter". 
Significantly, the conference resolved that "workers, through their 
factory representatives, have the right to object (otvod) to those 
members of the administration who cannot guarantee normal relations 
with the workers, regardless of their technical or administrative
capacities". The precise character and scope of the "control"
12 to be exercised over management was left conveniently imprecise,
partly because many of the leaders of the factory committees under 
the Artillery Department were radicals, who were prepared to leave 
the matter to the initiative of rank-and-file workers.
To English ears, this talk of 'control 1 suggests that workers 
in state enterprises were aiming to displace management and take over 
the running of the factories themselves. In Russian, however, the 
word 'control' has the weaker sense of 'supervision' or 'inspection' 
and at the Artillery Administration conference delegates were basically 
talking about supervising management activity. Nevertheless the 
fact that many, whether intentionally or not, were actually participating 
in the running of state enterprises at this time made it imperative 
to define more closely the boundaries of 'control 1 .
At the beginning of April a meeting of leaders from committees 
in factories subject to the Naval Department took place, attended by 
28 delegates. G.E. Breido, a Menshevik-Defencist and former member 
of the Workers' Group of the War Industries Committee, now a member
10. Amosov, P.N., et al., ed., Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya i Fabzavkomy, 
vol. I, M., 1927, pp. 29-30 (henceforward, Okt. Rev, i FaFT)^
11. ibid., p.30.
12. The concept of 'workers' control of production 1 is discussed in 
chapter 7.
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of the EC of the Soviet, denounced attempts by factory committees 
to run state enterprises by themselves. He stressed that factory 
committees should confine themselves to 'controlling 1 the activities 
of management, and though no-one disagreed with this in principle, 
a heated discussion took place as to the precise boundaries of this 
'control'. The factory committee at the Obukhov works merely 
reserved to itself the right to make enquiries of management and to 
inspect accounts, and at the Izhorsk works the committee had simply 
set up a commission to improve the technical side of production. 
'Control 1 had gone furthest at the Baltic shipyard where the works 
committee actually kept the financial accounts of the company. 
Breido severely criticised the Baltic arrangement, expressing a 
preference for the minimalist programme of the Obukhov works 
committee.
On April 12 representatives from both the state factories under 
the Artillery Department and the Naval Department met to further 
clarify the role of the factory committees. The resolution passed 
by the conference was imbued with a spirit of democracy and self- 
activity. It emphasised firstly the 'trade union' tasks of the 
factory committees, viz. their responsibilities for questions such 
as pay, hours, employment practices and holidays. Secondly, it 
repeated the demand that factory committees in state enterprises 
should have the right to object to members of the administration who 
could not guarantee normal relations with the workers. Thirdly, it 
went some way towards clarifying the notion of 'control 1 , by explain­ 
ing that the factory committee should elect representatives onto 
all administrative, business and technical organs, whilst accepting
13. LGIA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 3669, 11. 51-2.
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no responsibility for any decisions made. Furthermore, it demanded 
that the committee be informed of management decisions and that its 
consent be sought before notices were circulated among the workforce. 
Finally, it called on factory committees in state enterprises to
elect representatives onto a Principal Committee of Representatives
14 from Factory Committees in State Enterprises.
By mid-April the Artillery Administration and Naval Department 
had appointed new administrators to all state enterprises and so 
the factory committees ceased to play a direct part in running them. 
Nevertheless workers were represented on all organs of administration 
and a considerable degree of workers' control continued to operate, 
which was not matched in private enterprises until the autumn of 1917.
Since factory committees came into existence in a completely 
unplanned way, it is not surprising that they were frequently 
unwieldy in size and that there was little uniformity in the ratio 
of factory committee members to the total number of workers. The 
conference of representatives from state enterprises recommended 
that in a factory of 500 to 1,000 workers, the committee should com­ 
prise 11 to 13 members; in one of 3,000 to 6,000, 13 to 15 members
15 and so on. These norms of representation were ratified by the Second
1 fi 
Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees in August. However,
the actual size of factory committees rarely conformed to this pattern. 
At the Admiralty shipyard 800 workers elected a committee of 24 
members. At the Obukhov works, 12,900 workers had a committee of 12




members, supplemented by 40 starosty. At the Baltic shipyard the 
works committee originally consisted of 103 members, but proved so 
elephantine that it had to be cut down to 40.
In large enterprises the volume of business was so enormous, 
that it became necessary to set up a structure of committees at 
shop level, of which the works committee became the apex. The 
Putilov works was one of the first enterprises to do this. Strangely, 
the Putilov works, the largest enterprise in Petrograd, had been 
late in establishing a factory committee. This seems to have been 
due to the fact that the giant enterprise so dominated the life of 
the Narva-Peterhof district of Petrograd, that the local soviet of
workers' and soldiers' deputies at first functioned as a committee
18 of the Putilov works. In addition it seems that the non-party and
Menshevik majority of the Narva soviet were hostile to the idea of
a separate works committee at Putilov, feeling that it might
19 operate as a rival centre of power. However elections to a works
committee were eventually held between April 10 and 14. On April 
24 the new works committee issued detailed instructions on the 
setting up of shop committees, which were prefaced by the following 
remarks:
In view of the fact that the practical business 
of organising shop committees is a new affair, it 
is necessary that these committees, which look 
after life at the grass roots, should display as 
much independence and initiative as possible.
17. Novyi Put', no. 1-2, 15 October 1917, p.T5.
18. Mitel'man, M.I., 1917 god na Putilovskom zavode, L., 1939, p.33.
19. Raionnye sovety Petrograda v 1917g., vol. II, M.L., 1965, p.122.
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The success of the labour organisations in 
the factories fully depends on this. By 
becoming accustomed to self-management 
(samoupravlenie), the workers are preparing 
for that time when private ownership of 
factories and works will be abolished, and 
the means of production, together with the 
buildings erected by the workers' hands, will 
pass into the hands of the working class as 
a whole. Thus, whilst doing the small things, 
we must constantly bear in mind the great, 
overriding objective towards which the working 
people (rabochii narod) is striving.20
This passage, which is typical of working class discourse of the time, 
cannot be interpreted as reflecting a spirit of shop sectarianism, 
it rather expresses a commitment to grass roots democracy and to 
self-activity which is characteristic of the time. Nor can it be 
viewed as a concession to rank-and-file pressure for shop autonomy. 
The rest of the declaration makes clear that much of the motive 
for setting up shop committees is practical, i.e. the works committee 
cannot deal with the huge volume of business facing it and is thus 
farming out all business concerning individual shops to the shop 
committees. There is no intention of encouraging federalism - still
less, anarchy: the declaration spells out unequivocally that shop
21 committees are subordinate to the works committee.
Nearly forty shop committees were set up at the Putilov works. 
Their tasks were defined as being to defend the workers of the shop; 
to observe and organise internal order; to see that regulations were 
being followed; to control hiring and firing of workers; to resolve 
conflicts over wage rates; to keep a close eye on working conditions;
20. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets v trekh revolyutsiyakh, L., 1933, p.333.
21. 'Every decision of the shop committee must be minuted and sent 
to the committee for ratification', ibid., p.335.
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to check whether the military conscription of individual workers had
22 been deferred, etc. At the Baltic shipyard, the functions of the
shop committees were similarly defined. They were to consider all 
socio-economic matters and demands aimed at improving the workers' 
lot, although final decisions on such matters rested with the works 
committee; they were empowered to warn people, including management, 
if they were violating factory regulations or working carelessly 
or unconscientiously; they were to represent workers before manage­ 
ment; they were to suggest ways of increasing production and working 
conditions; they had the right to request from management all 
memoranda and information concerning their shop; they were to settle 
conflicts between workers or between the workers and the shop
management; they were to carry out the decisions of the labour or-
23 ganisations and ensure that all wage agreements were implemented.
Factory committees in private and state enterprises quickly 
developed an enormous volume of business and were forced from the 
first to create subcommittees, or 'commissions', to deal with specific 
areas of work. At the 1886 Electric Light Company the new committee 
set up three commissions on March 2: a commission of internal order, 
which received notices from management saying what needed to be 
done and then organised the execution of this work; a food commission 
and a militia commission. On April 26 a further two commissions
were created, namely an education commission and a commission of in-
24 quiry into disputes between workers. The works committee at the
22. ibid., pp. 333-5.
23. LGIA, f., 1304, op. 1, d. 3669, 1.23.
24. Okt. Rev. i Fab., vol. I, pp. 47-8.
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Nevskii shipyard had six commissions, including a militia commission 
responsible for the security of the factory; a food commission; a 
commission of culture and enlightenment; a technical-economic commission 
responsible for wages, safety, first-aid and internal order; a 
reception commission responsible for the hiring and firing of 
workers and, finally, a special commission which dealt with the 
clerical business of the committee. At the Baltic shipyard the works
committee had seven commissions, and at the Izhorsk works ten
25 commissions operated. At the Petrograd Metal Works no less than
28 different commissions came into existence, involving some 200
p/r
workers, apart from the sixty shop stewards.
Factory committees dealt with every aspect of life, as an 
examination of the minutes of any factory committee will reveal. In 
the first two weeks of its existence the committee at the 1886 
Electric Light Company dealt with matters as diverse as food
supplies, the factory militia, arbitration of disputes, lunch
27 breaks, overtime and the factory club. In a typical week the
committee of the gun shop at Putilov might deal with the hiring of 
workers, wear-and-tear of machinery, wage-fixing, financial help to
individual workers and the experiments of a worker-inventor trying
28 to invent a new kind of shell. Much factory committee business
was of a fairly trivial kind. On 28 July the Baltic works committee 
discussed what to do with a consignment of rotting fish. On 29
25. Sviridov, A.A., 'Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety kak forma
organizatsii piterskikh rabochikh v 1917g., Uchenye zapiski 
Leningradskogo gos. ped. in-t, vol. 298, 1971, p.78.
26. Tseitlin, D.A., 'Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety Petrograda v
fevralye-oktyabre 1917g', Voprosy Istorii, 1956, no. 11, p.86.
27. Freidlin, B.M., Ocherki istorii rabochego dvizheniya v Rossii 
v 1917g., M., 1967, p.129.
28. Fleer, M., 'Putilovskii zavod v 1917-18gg.', Bor'ba klassov, 
no. 1-2, 1924, pp. 288-99. "
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September the New Admiralty works committee discussed whether or not
29 to buy scented soap for use in the factory. Precisely because of
this concern with the detail of everyday life at the factory,
however, the committees were considered by the workers to be 'their 1
(/ 
institutions - far closer to them than the unions or the Soviets,
and, consequently, far more popular. Workers did not hesitate to 
turn to the committee for help and advice. The wife of a worker at 
the Sestroretsk arms works turned to the works committee when her
husband threw her out, although the committee was unable to do much
30 in this case. Rather than attempt to describe the work of the
committees in all its breadth, the next section deals with 
six of the areas in which most factory committees were 
active.
Control of hiring and firing
Having purged the old administration, factory committees asserted 
their right to ensure that managers and technical personnel hence­ 
forward behaved in a respectful way towards the workers. Ceremonies 
were held in the workshops at which managers and foremen confessed 
their past misdeeds and resolved to mend their ways. A woman textile- 
worker recalled:
The journeymen came to us to beg forgiveness. The 
first knelt down and said 'Women (baby) forgive us 1. 1 
The others followed in turn. Even Filip, the guard, 
came up and said 'As I have served the old order, 
so shall I serve you.'31
29. Fabrichno - zayodskie komitety Petrograda v 1917g.: Protokoly, 
M., 1979, pp. 307, 317 (henceforward Fab, zav. kom.).
30. ibid., p.595.
31. Leningradskie tekstilya, 1927, no. 6-7, p.7.
152
At the Osipov leather works a foreman publicly proclaimed: "I
express most sincere repentance for my past deeds. I am deeply
32 conscious of my guilt and ask you to forgive everything." Factory
committees made it clear that they would not tolerate managers who 
trampled on the dignity of the workers. At the Skorokhod shoe 
factory on 17 May a workers' delegation went to see the director, 
Hartwell, about the possibility of selling shoes to workers at a 
30% discount. Hartwell roundly abused the delegates, who then 
reported it to a general meeting. The workers discussed his past 
record of collaboration with the Okhrana and his general abusiveness. 
It was said that he had recently told a group of workers to "go 
jump in the Neva". Hartwell was summoned to the meeting to explain 
himself but denied any misconduct. This so angered the workers that 
they forced the director to sign a statement of resignation: "By 
order of a general meeting of workers at the Skorokhod factory, I 
resign my post as director and pledge to vacate my office within 
three days."
Ill-treatment of workers was by no means the only reason why 
factory committees expressed objection to, or insisted on the removal 
of members of the administration. On May 30 the Triangle works
committee demanded the removal of a foreman because he was ignorant
34 of his job. Technical incompetence was also the reason given by
factory committees at the Vulcan engineering works and the Voronin, 
Lyutsh and Cheshire textile mill for requesting the removal of
32. Go!os kozhevnika, 1, 1 August 1917, p.15.
33. Pravda, 26 May 1917, p.4.
34. Selitskii, op. cit., p.125.
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35 specialists.
Such attempts by factory committees to remove administrative 
and technical personnel may seem like a swinging assault on the right 
of management to manage, but they were part and parcel of a general 
attempt by the committees to control hiring and firing policy 
which, in its initial stages at least, was motivated more by a 
concern with basic job security than with dismantling management's 
authority. The right to know the number of workers being hired 
or fired was one of the first rights claimed by the committees. The 
shop stewards' committee at the Phoenix engineering works insisted 
that no worker be hired without the knowledge of the committee "in 
view of the fact that undesirable elements may get in, such as 
looters, former servants of the old regime or people convicted of
Or
theft and other unworthy deeds". At the Okhta explosives works 
the committee established control of hiring and firing "so that
there'll be no patronage and people will be recruited according to
37 a worked-out plan, and not fired at the whim of an individual".
At the Tentelevskii chemical works the committee proposed to manage­ 
ment that "as a general rule, no worker may be hired, dismissed or
transferred from one job to another without preliminary consultation
38 with the factory committee". At the Putilov works, the Baltic
35. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i
provedeniya oktyabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, M.L., 1965, 
pp. 155-6.
36. Rabochii Kontrol', pp. 58-9.
37. ibid., p.180.
38. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v iyule: iyul'skii krizis, M., 1959, 
p.383.
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works, the Admiralty works and many other enterprises the factory
committees succeeded in getting workers, who had been fired for
39 strike and antiwar activity prior to 1917, reinstated in their jobs.
The fact that a prime motive behind the control of hiring and firing 
may have been job security did not lessen the hostility of employers 
towards it. For them it represented the wedge which would crack 
the unitary authority of management within the enterprise and open 
the way to some terrifying form of 'dual power 1 . They thus resisted 
it ferociously.
One of the forms which the right to control hiring and firing 
took was peculiar to war-time. Some one-and-a-half million workers
and si gzhashchie had been granted exemption from conscription to
40work in the war industries. Prior to 1917 employers were respon­ 
sible for checking that their employees had genuinely had their 
military service deferred. After the February Revolution the factory 
committees took on this job. They established special 'registration' 
(uchetnye) commissions to check the exemption papers of the so-called 
belobiletniki (i.e. white-ticket holders). These commissions were 
not necessarily an expression of defencist support for the war, for 
they were set up in the most radical of factories. They were, in 
part, a response to pressure from soldiers, who were convinced that
there were many in the factories who were not there "to earn their
41 daily bread but to hide from service in the army". The result was
that hundreds of the urban petit-bourgeois who had come to the 
factories in 1914 were dismissed at the insistance of the committees.
39. Fab, zav. kom., passim; Leiberov, I.P. and Shkaratan, O.I., 
Voprosy Istorii, 1961, no. 1, p.56.
40. Selitskii, op. cit., p.19.
41. This was the view of the soldiers who sat on the registration 
commission at Okhta works, Rabochii Kontrol', p.180.
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At the Russo-Baltic works - a radical factory whose workers were 
among the first to denounce the Liberty Loan launched by the Pro­ 
visional Government as a means of raising finance for the war - 
a worker named Weinberg, "the owner of a tea-shop and cafe...who
only came to the factory to avoid conscription" was sacked on May
42 31. At the Baltic works, as late as summer, when the resentment
felt by soldiers towards the 'privileged' workers had died down, 
the mainly Menshevik and SR committee continued to make regular 
checks of exemption papers and did not hesitate to dismiss 'yard- 
keepers' (dvorniki) and other, thought to be merely trying to escape
conscription, or even those whose exemption papers were simply no
43 longer in order. Even when the war had become the object of
venomous hatred to most workers, factory committees continued to
check exemption papers since this was felt to be only fair to the
44 millions who had lost their lives fighting for their country.
Factory militias and Red Guards
The February Revolution witnessed the whole-scale dismantling 
of the repressive apparatuses of the tsarist state. Police stations 
and prisons were burnt to the ground and on 27 February workers 
and soldiers invaded the Arsenal, the Chief Artillery Department and 
the Peter-Paul Fortress, confiscating up to 40,000 rifles and 30,000
42. Pravda, 29, 11 April 1917, p.3; Pravda, 80, 13 June 1917, p.4.
43. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 269, 360.
44. See report on conference attended by 500 factory delegates on 
Vyborg Side on 22 August to discuss conscription. Delo Naroda, 
134, 23 August 1917, p.4.
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45 revolvers. The same day, the Soviet EC agreed to arm one worker
46 in ten. The overturned police force was replaced by two rival
militias - a civil militia, organised into district and sub-district 
commissariats, and a workers' militia, brought into being by groups 
of factory workers. Between February 28 and March 1 workers of
Rozenkrantz, the Metal Works, Phoenix^Arsenal and other factories
47 formed the I Vyborg commissariat of the workers' militia. In the
Gavan 1 district of Vasilevskii Island the Cable Works committee at 
its first meeting on March 1 agreed to set up a militia, "for now 
the people itself must protect the locality". It asked for 270
volunteers over the age of 18, including women, to serve in the
48 militia. Throughout the factories of Petrograd workers were
elected or volunteered to serve in these militias in order to main­ 
tain law and order in the locality, protect life and property and
49 register inhabitants. The factory committees established militia
commissions and appointed commissars to oversee the militiamen. 
The latter did not leave their jobs permanently to serve in the 
local workers' militia, but served according to a rota drawn up by 
the factory militia commission. At the Metal Works 470 workers
served in the I Vyborg workers' militia between March and July, but
50 only ten served for the whole period. At the Arsenal, Cartridge,
Radio-Telegraph, Siemens-Schuckert and Siemens-Halske works factory
45. Ivanov, N.Ya., Velikii oktyabr' v Retrograde, L., 1957, p.42.
46. Shlyapnikov, A., Semnadtsatyi god, vol. I, M.L., 1923, pp. 152, 205
47. Startsev, V.I., Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi krasnoi gvardii 
	i rabochei militsii, M.L., 1965, pp. 44-5.
48. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie posle sverzheniya samoderzhaviya, p.448.
49. Startsev, op. cit., p.59.
50. ibid., p.57.
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committees lost no time in demanding that management pay workers
51 serving in the militia at the average wage. Reluctantly, most
employers agreed to do so.
In some factories workers' militias not only had the task of 
protecting law and order in the locality, but also of guarding the 
premises and property of the factory. In most enterprises, however, 
a special militia was created to guard the factory, which was directly 
subject to the factory committee or its militia commission. At the 
Pipe Works there were some 90 workers who served in the second and 
fifth commissariats of the Vasilevskii Island workers' militia, and
in addition, the works committee deployed 28 sentries at the various
52 depots and stores in the factory and six guards at the factory gates.
Initially the SFWO urged employers to pay workers doing guard duty
53 at their factories at the ordinary rate of pay.
From the first there was rivalry between the workers' militias, 
subject to the factory committees, and the civil militias, subject 
to the municipal dumas. On 7 March the Soviet EC decided that the 
workers' militias should be absorbed into the civil militia. Only
the Bolsheviks denounced this decision, but they echoed the feelings
55 of many workers at the grass roots. The Cable workers declared:
This attack (on the workers' militias, SAS), begun 
by the bourgeois municipal duma, provokes our deep 
protest. We suggest that at the present time, 
when the democracy is faced with a struggle for a 
democratic republic, a struggle against the vestiges
51. Tseitlin, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
52. Selitskii, op. cit., p.43.
53. LGIA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 183, 1.36.
54. Startsev, op. cit., p.48.
55. Revolyutsionnoe dyizhenie posle sverzheniya samoderzhaviya, pp. 56-8; 
Pervyi legal'nyl komltet rsbornlk materially i protoKoiov zasedanii 
Peterburgskogo komiteta RSDRP(b), M.L., 1927, p.36. "———
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of tsarism and against the constitutional- 
monarchist aspirations of the bourgeoisie, 
the workers' militia should be placed at the 
head of the popular civil (obyvatel'skoi) militia.
In areas where strong commissariats of the workers' militia 
existed, they managed to resist absorption into the civil militia.
At the end of March some 10,000 militiamen, out of a total of 20,000,
57 were organised into specifically workers' militias. As the civil
militia came to control most districts of Petrograd, however, in­ 
creasing pressure was put on the workers' militias to dissolve. 
The city and district dumas urged factory owners to stop paying 
the wages of militiamen in order to force them to become full-time 
militiamen employed by the local authority (at much lower rates of 
pay than they were getting in the factories, incidentally) or else 
to go back to their jobs in the factories. This campaign seems to 
have had some success, for by the end of May there were only 2,000
r o
workers left in exclusively workers' militias. In the same period
56. 'Iz istorii krasnoi gvardii', Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1957, no. 5, 
pp. 122-3.
57. Startsev, op. cit., p.52.
58. ibid., pp. 66-9. At the Metal Works the number of workers in 
the I Vyborg workers' militia fell from 266 in March to 140 in 
April to 40 in May. V. Vinogradov recalled: 'And so, after long 
ordeals, the factory militia was refused payment of its wages 
out of factory funds, as a result of which some of the workers 
who wished to remain in the militia had to submit to the Petrograd 
government and join the civil militia; the rest - the most 
conscious workers - not wishing to lose contact with the factory, 
could do nothing but return to their machines. 1 (Vinogradov, V., 
'Krasnaya guardiya Petrogradskogo metallicheskogo zavoda 1 , 
Krasnaya Letopis', 1917, no. 2 (23), p.166). The historian of 
the factory, however, gives another explanation. 'Some, especially 
the young workers, were attracted by the romance...but as soon 
as it became clear that service in the militia was hard, ceaseless, 
demanding great effort and risk, the detachment began to melt 
away as quickly as it had arisen.' (Sergeev, N.S., Metal1isty: 
istoriya Leningradskogo metallicheskogo zavoda im. XXlI s"ezda 
KPSS, vol. I, L., 1967, p.400.
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however, the number of civil militia fell from 20,000 to 6,000, 
so members of the workers' militias still comprised about a third 
of the total.
On May 27 a conference of Petrograd workers' militias took 
place which poured obloquy on the Soviet EC and the municipal dumas 
for their efforts to integrate the workers' militias into the civil 
militia. The conference agreed that they intended to impose on the 
populace "a police force of the Western-European type which is
hated throughout the world by the majority of the people, the poorer
59 classes". The conference agreed to Bolshevik proposals for the
reorganisation of the workers' militia "as a transitional stage
fin 
towards the general arming of the whole population of Petrograd".
Many factory committees came out in support of the decisions of the 
conference, insisting that employers continue to pay the wages of 
the workers' militias. This was true even of committees consisting 
mainly of Mensheviks and SR's, such as those at the Baltic and 
Admiralty works, in spite of the fact that the official line of both 
parties was to unequivocally oppose the workers' militias. 
Although the Bolshevik-dominated soviet of Vyborg district supported 
the workers' militias all along, in the wake of the conference,
other district Soviets came out in favour of elected workers'
fi? 
militias paid for by the capitalists.
In the spring of 1917 the Bolsheviks began to press for the
CO
crea tion of Red Guards. The Red Guards were rather different
59. Startsev, op. cit., p.74.
60. ibid., p.64.
61. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 71, 451.
62. Startsev, op. cit., pp. 79-82.
63. ibid., pp. 104-7.
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from the workers' militias,in that they had the overtly political 
aim of defending the gains of the February Revolution. On April 17 
a meeting of worker militiamen elected a commission, made up of two 
Bolsheviks and three Mensheviks, to draw up a constitution for a 
city-wide organisation of Red Guards. This commission explained 
that a Red Guard would be "a threat to all counter-revolutionary 
attempts from whatever quarter, since only the armed working class 
can be the real defender of that freedom which we have won". 
Certain factory committees also called for the setting-up of factory 
Red Guards. On April 16 the Renault metalworkers, in one of the 
first resolutions calling for a soviet government, demanded inter
alia "the organisation of a Red Guard and the arming of the whole
65 people". On April 22 6,000 workers at the Skorokhod shoe factory
declared:
Dark forces...threaten to encroach on the foun­ 
dation of free Russia. Since we wish to protect 
the interests of the toiling masses, as well as 
general state interests (which can only be 
defended by the people themselves), we declare 
that we will call on the Soviet to assist us in 
obtaining arms to organise a Popular Red Guard 
of 1,000 people. 66
Red Guards were set up at the New and Old Lessner Works, Erikson, 
Aivaz, New Parviainen, i.e. in precisely that minority of factories 
where Bolshevik strength was already great.
On April 26, the Peterhof district soviet called on workers to 
enrol in the Red Guards, but warned:
64. Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1957, no. 5, p.124.
65. Leningradskie rabochie v bor'be za vlast' sovetov, L., 1924, p.24
66. ibid., p.23.
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Only the flower of the working class may join. 
We must have a guarantee that no unworthy or 
wavering people enter its ranks. Everyone 
wishing to enroll in the Red Guard must be 
recommended by the district committee of a 
socialist party."7
Two days later, the Vyborg district soviet announced that it in­ 
tended to transform the two district workers' militias into a Red 
Guard, whose tasks would be:-
a) to struggle against counter-revolutionary, antipopular 
intrigues by the ruling class;
b) to defend, with weapons in hand, all the gains of the 
working class;
c) to protect the life, safety and property of all citizens
/TO
without distinction of sex, age or nationality.
On April 28, 156 delegates from 90 factories, most of them be­ 
longing to no political party, attended a conference to discuss
69 further the creation of Red Guards. The Soviet EC condemned the
conference as a "direct threat to the unity of the revolutionary 
forces". The Mensheviks blamed it on agitation by 'Leninists' and 
said that the attempt to create Red Guards revealed a deplorable 
lack of confidence in the army.
Although the number of Red Guards may have grown slightly during 
May and June, the Soviet EC successfully blocked plans for the creation
67. Istqricheskii Arkhiv, 1957, no. 5, p.125. This summons was
prefaced with the words: 'The emancipation of the workers is the 
task of the workers themselves.'
68. Pravda, 44, 29 April 1917, p.4.
69. Novaya Zhizn', 10, 29 April 1917, p.4.
70. Rabochaya Gazeta, 43, 29 April 1917, p.l; Izvestiya, 29 April 
1917, p.l.
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of a city-wide network of Red Guards. Because of the political 
difficulties involved in openly organising Red Guards at this time, 
the radicals appear to have rechannelled their energies into the 
workers' militias. On June 3 the second conference of workers' 
militias elected a Council of the Petrograd Popular Militia. This
consisted of eleven members, including an anarchist chairman, seven
72 Bolsheviks and at least one Left SR. It was this Council, rather
than the embryonic Red Guards, which was to play a key role in events 
leading up to the July Days, i.e. the attempted uprising against the 
Kerensky government by workers and soldiers. On June 21 the Council 
hastily summoned a meeting of workers' militias to discuss the 
ejection by troops of anar chists from the Durnovo villa, which had 
taken place two days previously. This meeting fiercely denounced 
the role played by the civil militia in this incident and resolved
to "defend the elective basis of the popular militia of revolutionary
73 workers and soldiers by every means, up to and including armed action".
Over the next couple of weeks the Council whipped up a furore among 
the workers of Vyborg Side at the purportedly antidemocratic and 
counter-revolutionary activities of the municipal dumas,
71. Startsev estimates that by the end of June as many as 52 factories 
had contingents of Red Guards, numbering more than 5,000 members 
(Startsev, op. cit., p.129). Many of these, however, must have 
been units of workers' militia rather than the more politicised 
Red Guards. An earlier Soviet historian is surely correct to 
say that 'down to the Kornilov rebellion, the Red Guard was 
not a broad mass organisation'. (Pinezhskii, E., Krasnaya 
gvardij/a, 2nd ed., M., 1933, p.33).
72. Startsev, op. cit., pp. 82-3.
73. ibid., p.86.
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arguing that "a blow against the militias is a blow against the
74 revolution". In agitating for an armed demonstration against
the government at the beginning of July, the Bolsheviks on the Council 
acted quite outside the control of the party Central Committee. 
The Red Guards as such kept a low profile during the July Days.
The fiasco in which the July Days ended provided the govern­ 
ment with the opportunity for which it had been waiting. It un­ 
leashed repression against the far left and took pains to extirpate 
not only the Council of the Popular Militia, but all the remaining 
independent workers' militias. The factory committees were compelled 
to recall all workers serving in such militias and force them to
choose between going back to their benches or enrolling in the civil
75 militia for a paltry salary of 150r a month. The July Days thus
spelt the end of the workers' militias,after an adventurous five 
months' existence.
Factory committees and labour discipline
In view of the image of the factory committees prevalent 
in the West, which projects them as chaotic, anarchic, elemental 
organisations, it comes as a surprise, initially, to learn that 
all factory committees, regardless of their political physiognomy, 
took the problem of labour discipline extremely seriously. In the 
aftermath of the February Revolution the abolition of punitive 
sanctions against labour indiscipline, such as fines, searches, 
petty tyrannies and exactions, helped precipitate a crisis in labour
74. ibid., p.87.
75. For the Admiralty, Baltic and Putilov works see Fab, zav. kom., 
pp. 144, 284, 458-9.
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discipline which was limited in scope in the spring of 1917, but 
which grew to chronic proportions by the spring of 1918. This 
crisis of labour discipline can be measured in several ways, but 
one striking index of it is the rate of absenteeism. A survey 
by the Ministry of Trade and Industry showed that the turn-out of 
workers to work in March 1917 was 6.6% below the January level, 
and 16.4% below in the metal industry. At the Vyborg spinning 
mill men worked an average of 19 days in January 1917 and 18.5 in 
July; for women the figures were, respectively, 19.6 and 18.1 days. 
In January about 10% of the workforce at Putilov were absent for
various reasons; by September, this had risen to 25% and by November
78 to 40% of the workforce. The factory committees had to decide how
to deal with this breakdown in discipline.
By democratising factory relations, factory committees tried to 
create a moral climate in which workers would voluntarily develop a 
collective self-discipline at work. They issued countless proclam­ 
ations calling on workers to work conscientiously, many of which 
were coloured by defencist political sentiments in the spring of 1917 
At the New Parviainen works, at Putilov, the Franco-Russian works and 
the Admiralty works general meetings passed resolutions which con­ 
demned negligence at work and large wage demands and called for
79 self-sacrifice in the interests of the revolution. From the first,
76. Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 84, 25 April 1917, p.2.
77. Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue III, Pg., 
1919, p.24.——
78. Rabochaya Gazeta, 154, 7 September 1917, p.4; Gaza, op. cit., p.415
79. Rabochaya Gazeta, 17, 26 March 1917, p.4; Rabochaya Gazeta, 18, 
28 March 1917, p.l.
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however, it was clear that ideological inducement and moral suasion 
could not by themselves ensure that inexperienced workers, suddenly 
liberated from despotism, would work assiduously. Certain formal 
sanctions had to be enforced. Many factory committees set up 
commissions of inquiry (sledstvennye komissii) or committees of 
internal order (komissii vnutrennogo rasporyadka) to take responsibility 
for work discipline. These drew up new internal regulations and set 
penalties for infraction of these. Often such penalties were stiff. 
At the 1886 Electric Light Company the committee announced on March 
16 that "all abuses and individual actions which undermine organis­ 
ation and disrupt the normal course of work will be punished as 
follows: such workers will be suspended from work for two weeks and
their names will be made known to the workers of Petrograd through
80 the press". The committee, which had seven Bolshevik, two Menshevik
and two SR members, fired a peasant worker on 23 May for absenteeism
81 and drunkenness. At the Nevskaya cotton mill the largely Menshevik
committee warned that any worker stopping work before time would be
op
"punished without mercy". At the Koenig mill a general meeting 
on 25 May agreed that "in order to reduce absenteeism and careless­ 
ness, a worker should receive strict censure for a first offence, one 
ruble fine for a second (the fine to go to a workers' newspaper) 
and dismissal for a third offence". After three warnings a woman was
oo
sacked for "bad behaviour".
The factory committees, bastions of skilled, well-paid, exper­ 
ienced, literate workers, frequently came up against opposition from 
less experienced low-paid workers in their efforts to inculcate
81. LGIA, f. 1477, op. 3, d. 1, 1.90.
82. Shishkin, V.F., Velikii oktyabr' i proletarskii moral 1 , M., 1976, pp 
74-5.
83. ibid., pp. 75-6.
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labour discipline. When work was resumed at the Pipe Works after 
the February Revolution, the factory soviet of workers' deputies dec­ 
lared:
According to the declarations of several workshops, 
production of goods has gone down significantly, so 
that certain workshops are threatened with total 
standstill. Many workers will lose their wages and 
this will cause dissatisfaction and have the most 
alarming consequences. The council of workers 
believes that production has declined because 
many workers, on various pretexts, are avoiding 
work and ignoring the instructions of foremen and 
others responsible for output.
The Council declares that it will take every 
measure against those who neglect their duties, 
including dismissal. A council of starostas 
is being set up to watch over the course of 
work, to resolve questions affecting relations 
between workers and also relations between workers 
and management... The council of starostas in 
each shop will act in full accord with the adminis- 
tration of the shop, on whom lies full responsibility 
for output.
A group of anarchist workers promptly reacted to this statement on 
13 March:
The council of workers' deputies of the Pipe Works, 
instead of making definite proposals and raising 
questions for discussion by a general meeting, 
delivers orders and threatens us with punishment, 
including the sack, if we do not carry them out... 
Formerly, we were slaves of the government and 
of the bosses, but now there is a new despotic 
government in the shape of our elected represen­ 
tatives, who, in a touching display of unity with 
the management, are executing the police task of 
supervising the conduct and work of the workforce 84
From late spring onwards a fall in labour productivity became 
apparent. This was caused partly by a deterioration of machinery
84. Kommuna, 1, 17 March 1917, p.7.
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and materials and partly by a deterioration in the quality of labour 
power. The latter was due first and foremost to the worsening diet 
of workers but secondly to a decay in labour discipline. Contem­ 
poraries were quick to blame this decay on 'Bolshevism 1 . The SR 
commentator, Eroshkin, wrote: "We must not lose sight of the fact 
that Bolshevism has poisoned the psychology of the workers, that 
masses of workers have become corrupted by sheer idleness and their 
productivity has fallen to an incredible degree". In fact the 
Bolsheviks were just as concerned as other parties to stem the tide 
of falling productivity, except that they linked this to the question
OC
of workers' control. As the economic crisis deepened, labour 
productivity began to plummet and factory committees - regardless 
of their political complexion - were forced to take action to ensure 
that workers kept on working.
In May the mainly SR shop stewards' committee at the Franco- 
Russian works rejected management complaints about a deterioration 
in labour discipline, but promised that its technical-economic 
commission would investigate. The latter came to the unwelcome 
conclusion that "the workers have become undisciplined and do not 
want to work" In consequence, the stewards agreed by 61 votes,
with none against and four abstentions, to recommend a return to
87 piece rates. At the Putilov works the huge gun shop swung away
QO
from the Mensheviks towards the Bolsheviks in mid-June, but this
85. Eroshkin, M.K., The Soviets in Russia, New York, 1919, p.44.
86. Yu. Larin wrote: 'Whoever talks of the necessity of labour dis­ 
cipline and does not demand workers' control of capitalistenter- 
prises is a hypocrite and a windbag', Rabochii Put', 39, 18 
October 1917, p.2.
87. Vestnik Obshchestva Zavodchikov i Fabrikantov, 5, 10 June 1917, p.3
88. It passed a resolution put to a shop meeting by the Bolshevik 
orator, Volodarskii, on 14 June. Mitel'man, op. cit., p.101.
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did not stop the largely Bolshevik shop committee from taking 
strict measures to uphold labour intensity. In July a general 
meeting of the shop condemned certain young workers who were de­ 
liberately breaking their machines and the shop committee began to 
fine and even dismiss workers for slackness or absenteeism. 
By September, a crisis of labour discipline extended throughout 
the Putilov works. A Menshevik worker at the plant reported to 
the district committee of his party:
There is not even a shadow of discipline in the 
working masses. Thanks to the replacement of 
professional guards by soldiers, who are not quite 
familiar with the rules for letting workers in 
and out of the factory, thefts have become more 
frequent recently. The number of instances of 
workers being drunk is also increasing. But 
what is most terrible, is the sharp fall in the 
productivity of labour. Just how low this is 
is shown, for example, by the fact that formerly 
200 gun carriages were produced each month, but 
now at most there are 50 to 60. The situation 
is complicated by purely objective factors, the 
most important of which is the shortage of fuel 
and materials, and also the fact that many people 
of doubtful qualifications have entered the work­ 
force. The Putilov works is in debt to the state 
to the tune of about 200 million rubles and is 
hurtling towards the abyss. It is already in a 
catastrophic state.90
The Menshevik district committee, after discussion, passed the following 
resolution:
1) Putting aside all party strife, the conscious 
workers must develop self-discipline in order to 
give a shining example to the mass of the work­ 
force; 2) Measures must be taken, even of a 
repressive character, such as imposing fines, 
in order to eliminate carelessness and an un- 
serious attitude towards work; 3) The intro-
89. Rabochaya Gazeta, 114, 23 July 1917, p.3; Stepanov, op. cit., pp 
129-30.
90. Rabochaya Gazeta, 174, 30 September 1917, p.3.
169
duction of piece rates must be sought. This 
latter measure, although contradicting the 
party programme, is necessary and for the time 
being the only radical measure which will raise 
productivity.9'
Many factory committees proceeded to implement such measures. 
Fines were reintroduced on a larger scale, mainly for lateness and 
absenteeism. On 14 September the Executive Committee of the 
delegate council of the woodworkers' union in Narva district decided
that a worker who was absent for more than three days without cause
92 should be fined^and if he repeated it, should be sacked. The
next day a general meeting of workers at the Voronin, Lyutsch and
Cheshire cloth print factory agreed to reintroduce periodic searching
93 of workers in view of the alarming increase in stealing. On 3
October the workers' organisations at Izhorsk decided that "every 
order of the foremen, journeymen and senior workers must be uncon­ 
ditionally carried out... In all cases of doubt about the validity
of an order, you must immediately inform the shop committee, without
94 any arbitrary opposition or resistance to carrying out the order 1.1
Such evidence of factory committee concern with labour discipline 
hardly ties in with the picture painted by some Western historians 
of anarchic organisations busily undermining capitalism. It would 
be wrong, however, to jump to the opposite conclusion that factory 
committees were workplace police forces. We shall explore later the 
complex dialectic between democracy and discipline.
91. ibid.
92. Stepanov, op. cit., pp. 129-30
93. Rabochii KontroT, pp. 195-6.
94. Stepanov, op. cit., p.130.
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Factory committees and the campaign against drunkenness
Heavy drinking was deeply rooted in the popular culture of both 
the towns and villages of Russia. In the towns most working men 
spent their few leisure hours drinking. On Vyborg Side around 1905
there were numerous bars and liquor stores, 53 churches, but no
95 workers' club and only one small open-air theatre. A survey of 1909
revealed that 92% of workers in Petersburg drank alcohol. In 
1908 5.4% of the income of a married male metalworker was spent on
drink and tobacco and single male textile workers spent as much as
97 11% of their income in this way. Women workers, however, spent
hardly anything on alcohol, and married women had to fight hard to 
prevent their husbands squandering their wages on vodka. Several 
worker-memoirists recall how wives would stand outside the factory 
on pay-day in order to catch their husbands before they had a 
chance to spend their wages at the local bar. Buzinov writes:
Vodka and gambling were the cause of family 
quarrels. A very real 'class struggle 1 was 
waged between men and women around this issue. 
Every pay-day women would meet their unreliable 
husbands near the wages-office and 'expropriate' 
their wage-packets. This operation was accompanied 
by squabbling on both sides and would sometimes 
end in a brawl. The sympathy of the workers who 
watched was invariably on the side of the op­ 
pressed husbands, but that did not prevent them 
making fun of those defeated in battle by the 
women. Justice demands that one point out the 
selfless heroism of these women, which revealed 
itself during the heated skirmishes and des­ 
perate screams. Thin, ground-down, as small 
as ladybirds, or pregnant, these women laid hold 
of real Goliaths and would not leave the field 
of battle until they had got at least half the
95. Vyborgskaya Storona, L., 1957, pp. 10-11.
96. Rossiiskii proletariat: oblik, bor'ba, gegemoniya, M., 1970, p.278.
97. Prokopovich, S.N., Byudzhety peterburgskikh rabochikh, Pbg., 1909 





During the 1905 Revolution women textile workers launched the 
Popular Campaign against Drunkenness in Nevskii district; this
elicited the scorn of male workers at first, but soon factory
99 meetings were passing resolutions against vodka. This campaign,
along with other temperance campaigns by the Church and middle-class 
organisations, had few lasting effects however.
Although per capita consumption of alcohol was higher in some 
European countries than in Russia, in the years preceding the First 
World War (1909-1913) consumption in Russia rose steadily. It 
was partly in response to this, that the government introduced pro­ 
hibition in 1914. The ban on liquor had an immediate effect, in 
that the number of registered cases of alcoholism fell 
by nearly 40% in 1914 compared to 1913. And in the Moscow region, 
during the first three months of the ban, absenteeism at work fell 
by 27%, and by 47% among men. In Petrograd the sale of wine and 
beer was forbidden in December 1914, and in 1915 there was a drop 
in the number arrested for being drunk and disorderly. As the war 
dragged on, however, and as the diet of workers deteriorated severely, 
so the sale of alcoholic substitutes, particularly methylated spirits,
A 101increased.
98. Buzinov, A., Za Nevskoi zastavoi, M.L., 1930, pp. 25-6; also 
see Buiko, A.M., Put' rabochego: zapiski starogo bol'shevika, 
M., 1934, p.11.
99. Buzinov, op. cit., p.73.
100. Binshtok, V.I. and Kaminskii, L.S., Narodnoe pitanie i narodnoe 
zdorov'e, M.L., 1929, pp. 45-6.
101. ibid., p.50.
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After the February Revolution alcohol became more freely 
available. In the first heady months of spring, workers' morale 
was high, real wages were rising and drunkenness does not appear 
to have been a big social problem. From early summer, however, 
contemporaries began to warn of a disturbing rise in heavy drinking.
In May 1917 the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet warned of
102a recent wave of drunkenness. At the Okhta explosives works con­ 
cern was expressed at the scale of drunkenness in the factory,
103 particularly among workers making trotyl. At the Atlas metal
works the committee of starostas claimed that insobriety was rife:
They drink methylated spirits, varnish and all 
kinds of other substitutes. They come to work 
drunk, speak at meetings, bawl inappropriate 
exclamations, prevent their more class-conscious 
comrades from speaking, paralyse organisational 
work, and the result is chaos in the workshops. 
Thanks to alcoholism, class-conscious workers 
are being suffocated; they don't have the strength 
to work when every step they take brings them 
up against some obstacle. But what is more 
shameful is that some class-conscious, advanced 
(peredovye) workers are now taking part in this 
vile activityJ04
Whether there was an objective increase in the scale of drunkenness 
or simply an increased awareness about the problem is unclear. 
Certainly all workers' organisations appear to have developed a 
heightened sensitivity to the problem of working-class intemperance. 
In mid-May a plenary session of the Vasilevskii Island district 
soviet passed the following resolution:
102. Novaya Zhizn', 24, 16 May 1917, p.2.
103. Pravda, 59, 17 May 1917, p.4.
104. Rabochaya Gazeta, 78, 11 June 1917, p.4.
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Having discussed the question of how to 
fight growing alcoholism, it has been de­ 
cided to oppose it by the following measures:
1. To combat the spread of alcoholism by 
creating a network of cultural-educational 
institutions which will strive to raise the 
intellectual and moral level of the populace.
2. To invite military units and factory com­ 
mittees to bring people in a drunken state 
before the comrades' court (tovarishcheskii sud), 
to ostracise them if necessary, and to publish 
their names, so that everyone may know that they 
are bringing revolutionary democracy into dis­ 
repute by their behaviour.
3. To establish a control organ to combat trade 
in liquor and drunkenness in public places.
4. To demand that the Petrograd Soviet immed­ 
iately decree that all those trading in liquor 
are guilty of criminal activity and are liable 
to have their property confiscated.
5. Most importantly, to encourage the self- 
activity of the populace in combatting the 
terrible evil of alcoholism
On May 23 the Baltic works committee decided that any elected 
workers' representatives who were found drunk would immediately be 
relieved of their duties: two promptly were. At the same time the 
Sestroretsk works committee suspended an adjuster in the box shop 
for drunkenness, and dismissed two workers in the machine shop for 
stealing two quarts of methylated spirits from the laboratory. 
Factory committees elsewhere deprived workers of their wages for
I QO
being drunk and, in serious cases, dismissed them. On October 10 
the Nevskii district council of factory committees proposed high
fines for drunkenness and card-playing, the proceeds of which were
109 to go to orphan children. Trade unions also fought against
drunkenness. The conflict commission of the metalworkers' union
105. Raionnye Sovety, vol. I, pp. 111-12.
106. Fab, zav. kom., p.241.
107. ibid., pp. 532, 578.
108. For examples at the Admiralty and Baltic works see Fab, zav. kom pp. 144, 151, 293-4, 401. —————————'
cit., p.131.
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upheld a decision at the Triangle works to impose fines on workers 
who appeared drunk at work. The Petrograd Council of Trade 
Unions ratified the sacking of a worker at the Siemens-Halske works 
for repeated drunkenness. This tough action by labour organis­ 
ations cannot have had much effect, however, in view of the orgy of 
mass drunkenness set off by the October Revolution.
Factory committees and cultural policy
It was axiomatic for all socialists to the right of the Bolsheviks 
that workers in 1917 did not possess a level of culture adequate to 
establishing their hegemony throughout society. This was a favourite 
theme especially of the Menshevik-Internationalist group headed 
by Maxim Gorkii, which published the daily newspaper Novaya Zhizn 1 . 
Gordienko, a moulder at the New Lessner works and treasurer of the 
Vyborg district soviet, recalled a visit to Gorkii's home in 1917, 
where he met Sukhanov and Lopata. Gordienko and his workmates began 
to argue the need for a socialist revolution, at which Lopata 
pointed out of the window to a group of soldiers sitting on the lawn. 
"See how they've been eating herrings and have thrown the bones
into the flower-bed. It's with people like them that the Bolsheviks
112 want to make a socialist revolution". In 1922 Sukhanov reiterated




112. Gordienko, I., Iz boevogo proshlogo, 1914-18gg., M., 1957, p.100
175
You say that thecrea tion of socialism 
demands civilisation. Very well. But 
why should we not at once create such pre­ 
requisites of civilisation amongst ourselves 
as the expulsion of the landlords and 
Russian capitalists and then begin the 
movement towards socialism? In what books 
have you read that such alterations of the 
usual historical order are inadmissible 
or impossible? Remember that Napoleon wrote: 
'On s 1 engage et puis on
This is precisely the argument which the Bolsheviks put to their 
critics in 1917; its reiteration by Lenin in 1923, however, was less 
than ingenuous, for by this time the Bolsheviks had become deeply 
anxious about the social and political problems posed to the soviet 
regime by the low cultural level of the workers and peasants. Lenin 
himself constantly complained of the "semi-asiatic lack of culture, 
out of which we have not yet pulled ourselves" and "the piles of
work which now face us if we are to achieve on the basis of our
114 proletarian gains even a slight improvement of our cultural level".
The problem of improving the educational and cultural level of 
the working class was already a central concern for the new labour
113. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th edn., vol. 45, 
M., 1964, p.381 (see Sukhanov, N.N., The Russian Revolution, 
London 1955).
114. ibid., p.464. Note Trotsky's comment: 'The Russian worker - 
except the very top of the class - usually lacks the most 
elementary habits and notions of culture (in regard to dress, 
education, punctuality etc.). The West European worker possesses 
these habits. He has acquired them by a long, slow process 
under the bourgeois order. This explains why in Western Europe 
the working class - at any rate its superior elements - is so 
strongly attached to the bourgeois regime, with its democracy, 
free capital ist press etc. The belated bourgeois regime in 
Russia had no time to do any good for the working class and the 
Russian proletariat broke with the bourgeoisie all the more easily 
and overthrew the bourgeois regime without regret... History 
gives us nothing free of cost. Having made a reduction on one 
point - in politics - it makes us pay the more on another - in 
culture. 1 Trotsky, L., Problems of Everyday Life, Pathfinder 
Press, New York, p.20.
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organisations in 1917. The general attitude to education among the 
leaders of the labour movement was expressed in an appeal by the 
Putilov works committee which called on Putilovtsy to enrol in 
evening classes:
Let the idea that knowledge is everything 
sink deep into our consciousness. It is 
the essence of life and it alone can make 
sense of life.115
Some time later the same committee urged:
Questions of culture and enlightenment are 
now most vital burning questions... Comrades, 
do not let slip the opportunity of gaining 
scientific knowledge. Do not waste a single 
hour fruitlessly. Every hour is dear to us. 
We need not only to catch up with the classes 
with whom we are fighting, but to overtake 
them. That is life's command, that is where 
its finger is pointing. We are now the 
masters of our own lives and so we must be- -.-.r 
come masters of all the weapons of knowledge.
The factory committees were quick to set up 'cultural-enlighten­ 
ment commissions' in March 1917. The activities of these commissions 
covered a wide area. At the Admiralty works the commission took 
charge of the factory club, renovating its premises and arranging a 
programme of lectures. At the Baltic works the education commission 
sponsored theatrical entertainments; arranged for women workers to 
be given some teaching by women students from the Bestuzhev courses; 
gave financial halp to the apprentices' club and to a school for
115. Bor'ba klassov, 1924, no. 1-2, p.295.
116. Mite!'man, op. cit., p.213.
117. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 93, 149.
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soldiers and sailors; oversaw the running of the factory club and 
bought portraits of the pioneers of the labour movement in Russia. 
At the Sestroretsk works the commission gave the house and garden 
of the former director to local children as a kindergarten, re­ 
organised the technical school and forbade apprentices to leave it 
before they had completed their technical education. At the 
Obukhov and Izhorsk works the education commissions obtained money
1 9f]from the Naval Ministry to enlarge the factory schools. At 
Rosenkrantz management gave the workers 10,000 rubles towards the
cost of a school and the workers each gave a day's pay towards the
121 setting-up of a club at the factory.
One of the areas in which factory committees, trade unions and 
political parties were most active was in setting up workers' clubs. 
Such clubs had arisen in Petersburg during the 1905 Revolution and 
some twenty were in sporadic existence between 1907 and 1914, catering 
mainly for young single, skilled and reasonably educated men. 122 
During the war most of these clubs closed down. After the February
Revolution managements at Phoenix and Erikson works gave large don-
1 ?^ ations towards establishing factory clubs. On March 19 workers at
Putilov founded a club with a small library and buffet. Soon it had 
2,000 members and a management committee, comprising Bolsheviks,
118. ibid., pp. 203, 213, 382-3, 397.
119. ibid., pp. 566, 587, 596.
120. Stepanov, op. cit., p.199.
121. Novaya Zhizn', 206, 20 December 1917, p.4.
122. Levin, I.D., 'Rabochie Kluby v Peterburge 1907-14', Materialy 
	po istorii professional'nogo dvizheniya, M., 1925, vol. 3, p.4.
123. Rabochaya Gazeta, 10, 17 March 1917, p.2.
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Mensheviks and SR's. During its first three months of existence, 
eight lectures were given at the club on themes such as 'The Con­ 
stituent Assembly and Coming Popular Rule', 'On Socialism', 'On 
Cooperation 1 , 'The Trade Unions and the War 1 . Each lecture attracted 
an average audience of 710 people and some as many as 3,000. The 
club had a library of 200 books and 475 copies of journals. The 
club defined its aim as to "unite and develop the working-class 
public in a socialist spirit, to which end are necessary general
knowledge and general development, resting on basic literacy and
124 culture". On Vasilevskii Island a club named New Dawn was founded
in March which soon had 800 members. As well as lectures, the club 
organised a geographical expedition to Sablino, a steamer excursion
to Shlissel'burg for 900 people, a brass band concert and an enter-
125 tainment for workers at the Pipe Works. The opening ceremony to
inaugurate the Orudiinyi works club consisted of a recital by 
workers of arias from Mussorgsky operas and a performance by the 
works band of the Internationale and the Marseillaise. The club 
housed a library of 4,000 books, a reading room, a small theatre and 
a school. Evening classes were held in literacy, legal affairs,
I <-)C
natural sciences and mathematics.
By the autumn of 1917 there were over 30 clubs in Petrograd, 
including ones for postalworkers, tram-workers, Polish workers, 
Latvian workers, an SR club in Rozhdestvenskii district, the New Life
124. Novaya Zhizn', 70, 9 July 1917, p.5.
125. Novaya Zhizn 1 , 76, 16 July 1917, p.5.
126. Novaya Zhizn 1 , 124, 10 September 1917, p.4
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127 club in Kolpino etc. Their chief activities consisted of
political meetings and lectures, most of which were on political 
themes. An inter-club committee existed,consisting of representatives 
from every club and delegates from factory committees and trade 
unions, which coordinated educational work and provided speakers. 
Mensheviks were the political party most actively involved in the 
clubs and appear to have tried to diversify the activities of the 
clubs away from an exclusive concentration on politics. 128 
Attempts to put on dances, concerts, literary evenings, sporting 
events, functions for children were attacked in some quarters, 
however, as a diversion from the major struggle of the day.
Workers' clubs and some factory committees sponsored amateur 
dramatic societies among the workers of Petersburg prior to the war. 
Workers' clubs staged plays by Ostrovskii, Tolstoy, Gogol 1 , Hauptmann 
and lesser-known playwrights. Workers liked realistic plays about 
everyday life, with which they could identify directly. They dis­ 
liked religious or didactic plays, plays about peasant life, fantasy
130 or foreign plays. After the February Revolution working-class
theatre took on a new lease of life. At Putilov the works committee
took over the factory theatre, formerly in the charge of the adminis-
131 tration. At the Nobel works a workers' socialist theatre group was
set up in July, which enunciated its aim thus:
127. Novaya Zhizn', 25, 17 May 1917, p.5; Novaya Zhizn', 108, 20 
August 1917, p.5.
128. Go!os Rabotnitsy, 4, 29 May 1917, pp. 4, 7; Golos Rabotnitsy, 7, 1 July 1917, pp. 6-7. ———————————
129. See the debate at the conference of proletarian educational 
organisations, 16-19 October 1917, Novaya Zhizn', 157, 19 
October 1917, p.4.
130. See the survey of working-class taste in Kleinbort, L.M.,
Ocherki rabochego intelligentsii : teatr, zhivopis' muzika, vol. 2, Pg., 1923, pp. 14, 42'.———————————————————————
70, 9 July 1917, p.5.
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He exist not to amuse (razvlechenie) but 
to foster spiritual growth, to enrich con­ 
sciousness. . .to unite individual personalities 
into one gigantic class personality. All that 
does not serve the development of Humanity is 
vain and empty. We want theatre to become -100 
life, so that in time life will become theatre.
In Sestroretsk local workers staged Hamlet, Shaw's 'Candide 1 and 
a play by Maeterlinck. Larissa Reisner, later famous for her ex­ 
ploits in the Red Army, lived in Sestroretsk at the time and com­ 
plained about the number of crude, tendentious 'class 1 plays which 
were staged at the local theatre. She also disliked the sentimental ism
of the productions - the tendency to play on emotion rather than
133 reason.
Other artistic activities organised in the factories included 
classes in painting and drawing,and poetry readings by the accom­ 
plished worker-poet, Ivan Loginov, at the New Parviainen works.
At the Metal Works there was a wind band, a string orchestra and a
134 band of folk instruments conducted by a draughtsman. Factory
committees sponsored lectures on the arts, the most famous of which
135 were those by the Bolshevik Lunacharsky. Not all Bolsheviks
however seem to have taken the arts as seriously as the future 
Commissar of Enlightenment. Asked by the gun shop at Putilov to 
send a speaker on 'Art and the Proletariat', the Petersburg Committee
132. Novaya Zhizn', 82, 23 July 1917, p.5.
133. Novaya Zhizn', 76, 17 July 1917, p.5; Novaya Zhizn', 106, 
20 August 1917, p.5.
134. Vogne revolyutsionnykh boev, vol. II, M., 1971, p.45; Sergeev, 
op. clt., vol. I, p.338.
135. In August and September Lunacharskii gave a series of lectures
on the culture of the Athens, Florence, Ghent and Paris Communes.
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of the Bolsheviks sent someone who clearly knew nothing at all about 
art, but who managed, rather ingeniously, to launch into a speech 
on The 'Art 1 of Insurrection, which resulted in the meeting passing
I or
a resolution in support of a soviet government.
Organising social and artistic activities came second for 
most factory committees and trade unions to the more basic work of 
eradicating illiteracy. One of the most ambitious attempts to teach 
workers to read and write - one which anticipated the likbez 
campaigns of the 1920's - took place on Vyborg Side. After the Bol­ 
sheviks won a majority in the Vyborg district duma in June, N. 
Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, took on the job of combating illiteracy. 
An Educational Council was set up on which there were representatives 
from all factories in the district. Krupskaya recalls:
When the question came up of the need for 
introducing general literacy, the workers in 
all the factories quickly registered all the 
illiterates. The employers were asked to 
provide rooms in the factory for classes 
instructing the illiterate. When one of them 
refused, the women workers raised an awful row 
and exposed the fact that one of the rooms was 
being occupied by shock troops. Finally, the 
employer had to rent premises outside the 
factory for the school. A committee of workers 
was set up to supervise the attendance of the 
classes and the work of the teachers J37
O.A. Stetskaya taught in the literacy class at the Rosenkrantz works 
in a brand new classroom built by the factory-owners at a cost of 
100,000 rubles. At first,25 workers enrolled to be taught to read
136. Novaya Zhizn 1 , 106, 20 August 1917, p.5; Mitel'man, op. cit., 
pp. 161-2.
137. Krupskaya, N., Memories of Lenin, London: Panther, 1970, p.307.
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and write, but later the number rose to 60. She taught the workers
to read by writing Bolshevik slogans on the blackboard in large
, .. 138 letters.
Such politicisation of work in education was characteristic of 
the time. On July 19 representatives from 120 factory committees 
met members of the agitation collective of the Petrograd Soviet to 
discuss educational work. A Menshevik member of the collective, 
Dement'ev, criticised political meetings as a means of education, 
arguing that they merely served to inflame the passions of workers. 
Factory committee representatives were furious at this, and the 
resolution passed by the meeting stated, specifically, that "the 
cultural enlightenment activity of the factory committees must be
revolutionary-socialist and must be directed towards developing
139 the class-consciousness of the proletariat". The meeting agreed
to call a conference of all proletarian educational and cultural or­ 
ganisations, which took place on October 16-19.
The range of activities undertaken by the factory committees 
in the sphere of culture and education is impressive, but it must 
be put into perspective. Although the labour leaders were very 
aware of the crucial importance of work in this area, achievement 
constantly lagged behind aspiration. In practice,,work in education 
tended to come low on a list of priorities, top of which was the 
simple need to keep everyone fed. Of the unions only the leather-
138. Vogne revolyutsionnykh boev, vol. I, M., 1967, p.151.
139. Borshchenko, I., ed., Profsoyuzy SSSR, vol. I, M. 1963, p.425.
140. The proceedings of this conference are fascinating and foreshadow
the debates within Narkompros and Proletkult. Lunacharskii, Gorkii, 
Osip Brik and many others took part in discussions about art, 
education and proletarian culture. The fullest proceedings of 
this conference are only available in German. See Gorsen, P. 
and Kntidler-Bunte, E., Proletkult: System einer proletarischen 
Kultur, Band I, Dokumentation, Stuttgart, 1974. ~~—
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workers' union put a significant amount of time and energy into
141 such work. Other unions, such as printers' union, did almost
142 nothing. The factory committees were more effective than the
unions, on the whole, but their work was less satisfactorily or­ 
ganised than it might have been, since they often competed with 
one another in the same area and worked less satisfactorily than they 
might have, had they been more coordinated. Finally, cultural work 
tended, as the economic situation deteriorated, to take second 
place to other, more pressing claims on the attention of the committees.
Factory committees and the organisation of food supply
Before 1914 grain exports from Russia averaged between 9.8 million
143 tonnes and 12.3 million tonnes per annum. The ending of grain
exports in 1914 ought to have improved the domestic grain supply, 
but war in fact worsened it. The area under seed shrank because 
peasants no longer found it profitable to market their grain - 
there being few manufactured goods to buy with profits. Moreover
distribution of such grain as was marketed was hampered by growing
144 disruption of the transport system. In Petrograd grain shortages
141. Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 195, 8 September 1917, p.2.
The leatterworkers' union organised lectures for young people, 
special courses for women, adult education classes, social 
evenings and a special evening devoted to Lermontov. Golos 
Kozhevnika, 1, p.19 and ibid., no. 2-3, p.14.
142. Tikhanov, A., 'Rabochie-pechatniki v 1917g.', Materialy po
istorii professional'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii, M., 1925, 4, p.18.
143. Lyashchenko, P.I., History of the National Economy of Russia, 
New York: Macmillan, 1949, p.767.
144. Keep, J.H.L., The Russian Revolution: a study in mass mobilis- 
ation, London: Weidenfeld, 1976, ch. 3.
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became particularly acute in the autumn of 1916. Delivery of wheat
and rye flour to the capital was down to 91% of the monthly average
145 in November 1916 and 48% in December. In the spring of 1917 grain
supplies improved somewhat, after the Provisional Government es­ 
tablished a grain monopoly and set up food committees in the localities 
to organise supplies. Even so, by the beginning of May procurements
of grain nationally were meeting only 58% of the army's needs and
146 41% of civilian needs. In Petrograd grain deliveries on the
Marinskii canal system in the first half of 1917 were down by 41,000
147 tonnes compared to the first half of 1916. By July the food
situation in the capital was grave. On 2 July the Ministry of Food
reported that there was enough grain in the capital to last twenty
148 days and that buckwheat would not last until August. By the
beginning of August there was only two days' bread supply left, 
but the situation improved as the harvest was brought in and deliveries 
for September were adequate. However, the harvest was not a particul­ 
arly good one and attempts by the government to induce peasants to 
market more grain by doubling fixed grain prices had only a limited 
effect. By the beginning of October grain supplies were lower than 
ever, with only three to four days' supply left in the capital. Meat 
stocks were depleted and livestock was dying off owing to lack of 
animal feeds. Sugar, milk and most other staple commodities were 
in dangerously short supply. To make matters worse, chaos on the
145. Lyashchenko, op. cit., p.767.
146. Selitskii, op. cit., p.22.
147. Adibek-Melikyan, E.A., Revolyutsionnaya situatsiya v Rossii 
nakanune Oktyabrya, Erevan, 1967, p.156.
148. Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 140, 4 July 1917, p.3.
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transport system was aggravating the food shortages. On 14 October 
there was only 3| days' supply of grain left in the capital, yet 
13,000 tonnes were stranded on the railways and canals outside the 
city limits. The food in 1200 wagons at the Nikolaevsk railway
depot had to be thrown away after it went rotten while waiting to
149 be unloaded.
For most working-class families the crisis in food supplies 
spelt hunger and the growing prospect of starvation. Even prior to 
the war, the diet of most working people had been grossly inadequate. 
Bread was the staple food, supplemented by Kasha a few herrings or 
milk products, cabbage soup and occasionally sausage (kolbasa or
'dog's delight', as it was known in Moscow). Meat and milk were
150 bought only on special occasions. In 1916, according to data
collected by Dr. Gordon, the average worker in Petrograd ate between
800 and 1200 grams of bread each day, 400 grams of potatoes or 200
151 grams of Kasha, a little milk, a few onions and no meat. In
February 1917 citizens of the capital were rationed to 500 grams of 
bread per day and in summer rationing was extended to a kilo of sugar
per month, 200 grams of buckwheat per month, 600 grams of fats per
152 month, 800 grams of meat per month and 20 eggs per month. The
problem was that there was not enough food in the capital to meet 
these rations. According to official ration estimates, some 4,000 
tonnes of meat were required each week in Petrograd, but in the month
149. Stepanov, op. cit., pp. 66-7.
150. Davidovich, op. cit., pp. 17-19. The poorer textileworkers'
families in this survey could not afford enough of even these items
151. Anskii, A., ed., Professional'noe Dvizhenie v Petrograde v 1917g., 
L., 1928, p. 15 (henceforward, Prof. Dvizh.).————————
152. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy Ekonomiki Truda, M., 1964, p.350.
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of May only 885 tonnes were delivered. By October the bread ration 
had been reduced to 300 grams per day and a further reduction to 
200 grams was imminent. These rations represented only what people 
were allowed to buy at official prices, but many could simply no 
longer afford to buy food, even at fixed prices. Buying food on the 
market was simply out of the question, since food prices had soared 
off into the stratosphere. People were thus competing for an ever- 
diminishing stock of food, the price of which was rising ever 
higher. Queues were to be seen everywhere. The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs noted that queues "have in fact turned the eight-hour working 
day into a 12 or 13-hour day, because working-class women and men go
straight from the factory or workplace to stand in queues for four
153 or five hours". The inevitable result was that workers were
eating far less. Nationally, Strumilin estimated that the calorie 
intake of workers was down by 22% on the 1913 level, but in Petrograd 
things were much worse. Binshtok estimated that a worker doing medium 
to hard work needed more than 3,000 calories a day and that in
Petrograd in the summer of 1917 such a worker consumed about half of
4-u- ,. 154 this amount.
A host of different popular organisations threw themselves into 
the grim business of staving off hunger. Most important were the 
democratically-elected central and district food boards, which dealt 
mainly with rationed products. Cooperative societies were also 
heavily involved in securing and distributing food. Between May and 
July the Union of Workers' Cooperatives distributed over 1,600 tonnes
153. Stepanov, op. cit., p.67.
154. Binshtok and Kaminskii, op. cit., pp. 31, 54; Usloviya byta
rabochikh v dorevolyutsionnoi Rossii, M., 1958, p.14; Kabo, E., 
Pitanie russkogo rabochego do i posle voiny, M., 1926, p.69.
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of vegetables and 10-15 wagonloads of Estonian milk, as well as
155 butter and cheese. In addition, district Soviets took an active
part in food distribution. On Vyborg Side the soviet attempted to
organise the population into house committees and distribute produce
156 through them, in an effort to eliminate queuing. The Peterhof
district soviet donated 10,000r. towards organising workers' canteens
157 and imposed strict control of local bakeries.
Factory committees and trade unions worked in liaison with the 
cooperatives and Soviets. The factory committees took over the 
running of factory shops and of works' canteens. At the Okhta 
explosives works the committee set up a works canteen to serve 2,500 
cheap meals each day; it also ran two shops and a bakery, looked 
after 80 pigs and a fish pond and grew potatoes. At the Cable
works the food commission of the works committee ran a canteen which
159 produced 1,200 dinners a day. At the Pipe Works no fewer than
110 workers were actively involved in procuring and distributing food 
In months of particularly acute food shortage, such as May, July and 
October, some factory committees attempted to buy food independently. 
The Izhorsk works committee bought fish and potatoes from local 
peasants and the Putilov works committee sent 39 workers into the 
countryside to try to purchase food. At the Putilov works tension
155. Trud, 2-3, September 1917, p.29.
156. Stepanov, op. cit., p.70.
157. ibid., p.69.
158. Rabochii Kontrol', p.106.
159. Stepanov, op. cit., p.68.
160. Loginova, S.E., 'Partiya bol'shevikov-organizator revolyatsionnogo 
tvorchestva mass v reshenii prodovol'stvennoi problemy v period 
podgotovki oktyabrya', Uchenye zapiski Len. un-t. seriya ist. nauk., vol. 31, 1959, pTTT.——————————————————
161. Stepanov, op. cit., p.68.
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was particularly high. Hhen meat suddenly appeared in local 
restaurants in the Peterhof district^at a time when there was a 
complete dearth of meat elsewhere, starving workers from Putilov 
attacked members of the district cooperative society and sacked 
food shops. Only prompt action by the works committee and district
1 r n
soviet prevented the spread of disturbances.
Such initiatives by grass-roots organisations were utterly puny 
compared to the colossal scale of the food crisis, which simply got 
worse through the winter of 1917-18 until mass starvation drove 
hundreds and thousands out of the capital. Nevertheless one day's 
dinner meant a great deal to a hungry worker and the fact that the 
factory committees did all in their power to provide such meals, 
immeasurably enhanced their prestige in the working class.
The political character of the factory committees
The preceding review of six areas of factory committee activity 
gives an insight into the essentially local, practical character of 
most factory committee business, oriented as it was towards day-to­ 
day issues such as labour discipline, control of hiring and firing, 
education, food and law and order. An examination of the records 
of factory committee meetings reveals that they only rarely busied 
themselves with matters not directly concerned with the workplace, 
although occasionally they might discuss major political events, 
such as the June 18 demonstration organised by the Soviet, the July 
Days or the Kornilov rebellion. Yet it would be wrong to infer from 
this that the committees were apolitical or not active politically.
162. Raionnye Sovety, vol. 3, p.264; Pankratova, A., Fabzavkomy i 
profsoyuzy v revolyutsii 1917g., M.L., 1927, p.38.
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If they did not discuss politics at their meetings it was because 
they considered that the general meeting of the whole workforce was 
the proper forum for such discussion. General meetings were the 
sovereign bodies in the factory and the committees contented them­ 
selves with organising such meetings, where the general will could 
be expressed in a political resolution. If the committees therefore 
abstained from political discussion amongst themselves, it did not 
prevent them from taking a thoroughly political approach to all the 
problems which faced them - even the most commonplace, as the pre­ 
ceding review showed. Factory committees were intrinsically political 
bodies, not least because they were generally elected on a party 
political basis and because they were the first working-class 
institutions to hoist the Bolshevik colours to their mast. Whilst it 
is not the purpose of the present work to examine the political 
development of the working class, a brief survey of the political 
development of the factory committees at grass roots cannot be 
forborne, if one is to set their general activities in context and 
to disclose how the factory committees, as the democratic represen­ 
tatives of the workers in each enterprise, changed their political 
coloration in response to the changing political affiliations of those 
whom they represented.
In the early stage, the members of the factory committees tended 
not to be elected on a party-political franchise. In the textile 
industry most factory committee members belonged to no political 
party. At the Pal 1 , Leont'ev and Northern-weaving mills almost all
•I £-0
factory committee members were non-party. At the First Spinning 
163. Perazich, V., Tekstili Leningrada v 1917g., L., 1927, pp. 28-9.
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Mill the chairman of the committee was a right-wing SR, but apart
from one Menshevik woman and a Menshevik joiner, the rest were non-
164 party. At Kozhevnikov weaving mill the chairman of the committee
was a Bolshevik, but the five women and two male scutchers who made
165 up the rest of the committee belonged to no political party.
In the metalworking industries political parties were more entrenched. 
Here Mensheviks and SR's tended to dominate the factory committees, 
just as they dominated the Soviets,in the spring of 1917. At the 
Pipe Works almost all the 40 shop stewards were members of the SR party, 
although there were two or three Bolsheviks. At the Obukhov works 
only five of the 32 members of the committee were Bolsheviks, the
•j r-i
rest were SR's or Mensheviks. At the Nevskii shipyard,elections 
in early April put three Mensheviks, three SR's and one Bolshevik on
"I /TO
the committee. In the Central Workshops of the North-Western
Railway, Mensheviks and SR's dominated the workers' Executive Committee
169 although its chairman was a Bolshevik. At the Langenzippen works
SR's and Mensheviks controlled the committee. Even in factories 
where Bolsheviks were soon to become extremely powerful the moderate 
socialists tended to dominate the committees. Thus at the radical 
Aivaz, Nobel and New Lessner works the first committees comprised 
mainly of Mensheviks and SR's. At the New Parviainen works
164. Leningradskie tekstilya, 1927, 6-7, p.9.
165. Perazich, op. cit., p.28.
166. Prof. Dvizh., p.271.
167. Petrogradskie boTsheviki v oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, !_., 1957, 	pp. 44-5.——~~
168. Payalin, N.P., Zavod im. Lenina, 1857-1918, M.L., 1933, p.346.
169. Petrogradskie boTsheviki v oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, p.55.
170. Tomkevich, I.G., Znamya oktyabrya, L., 1972, p.33.
171. Petrogradskie boTsheviki v oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii, p.55.
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Bolsheviks were somewhat better represented, comprising three members 
of the committee, against three non-party members and one Menshevik. 
Factories where Bolsheviks had a majority from the first were few. 
At the Phoenix works the Bolsheviks were the largest political grouping, 
and at the 1886 Electrical Light Company on April 17 Bolsheviks won
673 votes and 7 places on the committee; Mensheviks and SR's in a
172 joint slate won 406 votes and 4 places.
In other industries the political make-up of factory committees 
in the spring of 1917 was similar. At the Skorokhod shoe factory
most of the 40 committee members belonged to no political party; only
173 one woman was a Bolshevik. At the Triangle rubber works SR's
comprised a majority of the 16 members of the committee in March
174 and April; the Bolsheviks had two members on the committee.
The predominance of Mensheviks and SR's on the committees re­ 
flects the prevailing sentiments in the working class at the time, 
summed up by Lenin as 'revolutionary defencism 1 , i.e. enthusiasm 
for the February Revolution and a willingness to defend it against 
its enemies-be they foreign or indigenous. The moderate socialists 
best responded to this mood. However the election of members of 
particular political parties was not,at this time,necessarily 
evidence of support for the policies of the parties which they 
represented. Many members of the factory committees were elected 
because of their record as shopfloor leaders* individual reputation
172. Vogne revolyutsionnykh boev, vol. I, pp. 131-2; Okt. rev, i Fab., vol. I, p.56.————————
173. Istoriya Len. gos. obuvnoi fabriki, Skorokhod, L., 1969, p.134.
174. Shabalin, B., Krasnyi Treugol'nik, 1860-1935, L., 1938, p.158.
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was more important at this time than political affiliation. The 
fact that more Mensheviks and SR's were elected to the committees 
than Bolsheviks may simply reflect the fact that they were numerous 
in March,si nee the Bolsheviks had lost more members than they as the 
result of wartime repression. Conversely, the fact that Bolsheviks
such as V.Ya. Chubar 1 , I.I. Lepse, A.K. Skorokhodov, N.I. Derbyshev,
175 A.E. Vasil'ev, Ya. A. Kalinin, V.N. Kozitskii were made chairmen
of their factory committees is more a reflection of their individual 
prestige than of support for Bolshevik policies within the workforce. 
The Putilov works is a good example in this connection. For the 
giant plant did not swing decisively to the Bolshevik party until 
after the July Days, yet from April the works committee consisted
1 -jc
of 12 Bolsheviks, 7 non-party, 2 SR's and one anarchist.
The factory committees were the first working class organisation 
to fall under the influence of the Bolshevik party. Already when 
the first conference of factories' committees took place at the end 
of May (see chapter 7) 82% of the votes went to a resolution on 
workers' control drafted by Lenin and introduced by Zinoviev. 
Bolsheviks may have been over-represented at the conference in 
relation to their numbers on the factory committees. At the Nevskii 
shipyard, for example, Bolsheviks were outnumbered six to one on the 
committee, yet the committee sent two Bolsheviks and one SR to the
conference, either because of thfe/r greater personal kudos or their
178 greater political acumen. Nevertheless many of those who voted for
175. They were chairmen, in respective order, of factory committees
at the Orudiinyi, Langenzippen, Duflon, Soikin, Putilov, Skorokhod 
and Siemens-Halske works.
176. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets na putyakh k oktyabryu, M.L., 1933, p.85.
177. This resolution got 297 votes, with 21 against and 44 abstentions. 
Pravda, 74, 4 June 1917.
178. Payalin, op. _cvt., p.386.
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the Bolshevik resolution were almost certainly not members of the 
party and may very well have been members of moderate socialist 
parties. For the fact is that,at factory level,many Mensheviks and 
SR's were far more radical in their practice than the official line 
of their parties permitted. At the Orudiinyi works, the committee, 
chaired by the Bolshevik Chubar 1 , consisted mainly of Mensheviks and 
SR's. It implemented radical forms of workers' control from early 
spring, yet as late as July a general meeting expressed confidence in 
the Kerensky government. Those moderate socialists who implemented 
radical measures of control at Ovudiinyi were simply responding to 
a situation which seemed to call for radical measures. At 
factory level Bolshevik talk of workers' control made far more sense 
to them than their own parties' talk of state control of the economy.
Being the institutions closest to the mass of workers, the 
factory committees were the first to respond to the shift to the 
left which occurred in popular political attitudes. Those moderate 
socialists on the factory committees who refused to swing into line 
with their constituents were soon removed. From the early summer 
the number of Bolsheviks on the factory committees began to increase. 
In June at the Langenzippen works Bolsheviks won a majority of
I on
places on the committee after new elections. After the failure 
of the June offensive on the Eastern Front and the repression which 
ensued from the July Days, the process of 'Bolshevisation 1 acceler­ 
ated. At the Skorokhod works Bolsheviks swept the board in new fac­ 
tory committee elections at the end of July, winning 64 places
179. Selitskii, op. cit., p.38; Rabochii kontroT, pp. 124-5;
Rabochaya Gazeta, 54, 12 May 1917, p.4; Rabochii Put', 14, 19 
September 1917, p.4.
180. Izvestiya raionnogo komiteta Petrogradskoi Storony, 1, July 1917, p.3. ~~
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181 against ten to the SR's and five to the anarchists. At the
Sestroretsk arms works on August 1 Bolsheviks won eight places on
182 the committee, SR's five and Mensheviks two. At the Parviainen
works the Bolsheviks got 1,800 votes against the SR's 300 votes in
18 "3new factory committee elections. In the wake of the Kornilov 
rebellion at the end of August the tempo of Bolshevik success quickened
At the Lessner works Bolsheviks gained 471 votes, non-party candidates
184 186, SR's 155 and Mensheviks a mere 23 votes. At the Dynamo works
the Bolsheviks received one-and-a-half times as many votes as the SR's
185 in new factory committee elections. At the Mint,new elections
to the committee produced five Bolsheviks, three members of no
"I oc
political party and one SR. The complete collapse of moderate 
socialism in the face of a rising tide of popular Bolshevism is 
nowhere more evident than at the Pipe Works. This was for long a 
bastion of the SR's. At the beginning of June new elections were held 
for the factory committee and district soviet, in which the SR's 
gained 8,852 votes (56% of the vote), the Bolsheviks and Internation­ 
alists 5,823 votes (36%) and the Menshevik Defencists 1,061 votes
(7%). As a result,the SR's got 21 places on the committee, the
107 
Internationalists 14 places and the Defencists 2 places. On
October 13 the workers succeeded in getting new elections once again.
181. Istoriya...Fabriki, Skorokhod, p.172.
182. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 573-4.
183. Rabochii, 6, 29 August 1917, p.4.
184. Rabochii Put', 22, 28 September 1917, p.4.
185. Rabochii Put', 20, 26 September 1917, p.4.
186. Freidlin, op. cit., p.158
187. Pravda, 79, 11 June 1917, p.4.
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This time the Bolsheviks gained 9,388 votes (62% of the vote), the 
SR's 3,822 (25%), anarchists 640 votes (4%) and Mensheviks 552 
(3.7%). As a result, the Bolsheviks gained 23 places on the factory 
committee, the SR's 16, the anarchists two and the Mensheviks one.
By October the Bolsheviks were by far the largest political 
grouping in the factory committees. In some large factories such as 
the above-mentioned Pipe Works, or the Obukhov and Izhorsk works, 
which had been strongholds of moderate socialism, the Bolsheviks 
had won paramountcy very recently and did not always enjoy an 
absolute majority vis-a-vis other parties. Nevertheless in the vast 
majority of firms in the metal industry they were completely trium­ 
phant. Only a handful of factories had failed to register Bolshevis- 
ation to some significant extent.
188. Qktyabr'skoe Vooruzhennoe Vosstanie v Retrograde, M., 1957, p.118,
189. Typical of the politically conservative factories were two
textile mills in the bourgeois Aleksandro-Nevskii district of 
central Petrograd. At the Pal' factory the committee con­ 
sisted of 12 non-party people, 4 SR's, one Bolshevik and one 
Menshevik in October. And at the Maxwell cotton mill the 
committee comprised five non-party, four SR's and three 
Bolsheviks at this time. Perazich, op. cit., p. 92.
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5 . THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADE UNIONS
Trade unionism in Russia was a very different phenomenon from 
trade unionism in Western Europe. In the West, the organised labour 
movement was far more powerful than in Russia - in terms of member­ 
ship, organisational resources, industrial muscle and political punch. 
Yet the by-product of the growth in strength of the labour movement 
had been the emergence of a bureaucratic labour leadership which, to 
some extent, stood as an obstacle to working-class militancy. As 
early as 1911, Michels had analysed the apparently inexorable ten­ 
dency for a conservative oligarchy to emerge in both socialist parties 
and trade unions as a function of increasing size and organisational 
complexity, but it was only with the outbreak of war that the full 
implications of this development were revealed. In return for the 
high accolade of government recognition, trade unions in Britain and 
Germany abandoned any pretensions to socialism and agreed to support 
their government's policy of Burgfriede, or civil peace, by subordin­ 
ating the interests of the working class to the higher interests of 
the Union Sacrge. In Russia the unions were suppressed during the 
war. In March 1917 labour leaders faced the task of constructing a 
labour movement from scratch. Yet by an irony of history this 
'disadvantage' proved to be a great advantage as far as socialism 
was concerned. For the absence of an entrenched labour bureaucracy 
enormously facilitated the development of a revolutionary socialist 
labour movement in Russia, whereas in Germany and Italy when semi- 
revolutionary situations emerged in 1918-19 and 1919-20, the trade
1. Michels, R., Political Parties, New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1968
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union and socialist leaders proved constitutionally incapable of 
leading the insurrectionary popular movements and played instead 
a crucial role in restabilising the bourgeois order.
In February 1917 eleven unions maintained a shadowy existence 
in the Petrograd underground: they were tiny, illegal and much subject 
to the depredations of the police. A further three unions - of 
printing employees, pharmacy employees and shop assistants - existed
legally, but were as tiny as the illegal unions and almost as in-
2effective. After the February Revolution trade unions quickly re­ 
established themselves. In the first two weeks of March alone about 
thirty were refounded. Militants who had been active in the earlier 
periods of union construction of 1905-8 and 1912-14 called meetings 
of workers in different industries, which were advertised in the 
socialist press, in order to re-form the unions. On 11 March a
thousand textileworkers assembled to elect 20 members (half of them
3 women) to a new board to take on the task of reconstructing the union.
The next day nearly 2,000 metalworkers met to elect an organisation 
commission, to which mainly Mensheviks were elected. Until mid-April,
however, when a Central Board was established, the metalworkers' union
4 existed only as a congeries of local groups. On 5 March bakers met
to elect six deputies to the Soviet (three Bolsheviks, two SR 
Maximalists and one Menshevik) and they revived their union at the 
same time. Workers in small enterprises had to get together in order 
to form a large enough group to elect a deputy to the soviet. In 
meeting together for this purpose, they usually used the occasion to
2. Leiberov, I.P., Na shturm samoderzhaviya, M., 1979, p.61.
3. Pravda, 12, 18 March 1917, p.4; Tkach, 1, November 1917, p.28.
4. Pravda, 9, 15 March 1917, p.4; Lepse, I., 'Piterskie metallisty 
v oktyabre 1917g.', Metallist, 1922, 12, p.63.
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resuscitate a trade union. This was one reason why the first unions 
to get off the ground were those in small workshop industries, such
as tailoring, hairdressing, gold-, silver- and bronze-smithery and
5 joinery. In the larger factory industries factory committees
initially promoted workers' interests and it was thus a couple of 
months before the larger, industrial unions began to function properly
The metalworkers' union was particularly slow to get off the 
ground. It did not function on a city-wide basis until the middle 
of April. Prior to this, metalworkers' unions functioned at dis­ 
trict level. The Bolsheviks organised a union in Narva district, 
which had 11,000 members by the end of April, and all but one of the 
district board were Bolsheviks. Mensheviks set up the Vyborg dis­ 
trict union, which by the end of April had 5,000 members, and they 
were balanced equally with the Bolsheviks on the district board. 
Mensheviks dominated the Moscow district union, which had 7,500 
members, and SR's dominated the Nevskii district board. Bolsheviks 
were instrumental in organising unions in Petrograd district, the 
First and Second City districts, Kolpino and Sestroretsk. By the 
time the different districts amalgamated into a city union they had 
50,000 members. On 7 May 535 delegates from the districts met to 
elect a city board of the metalworkers' union. This meeting resolved 
that the union should be an industrial union embracing all workers 
in the metal industry regardless of their job.
5. Shlyapnikov, A., Semnadtsatyi God, vol. II, M.L., 1925, p.133.
6. Anskii, A., ed., Professional'noe Dvizhenie v Petrograde v 1917g., 
L., 1929, p.119 (henceforward Prof. Dvizh.); Rabochaya Gazetal 
42, 28 April 1917, p.4.
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From the beginning of May 1917 the major unions of the factory 
workers in Petrograd grew spectacularly. According to figures 
published in 1928, which are almost certainly exaggerated, the 
membership of the major factory-based unions in Petrograd was as 
follows:-
Union Membership Membership on
on 1 July 1917 1 OctoberT9T7
Metalworkers 82,000 190,000 (140,000)
Textileworkers 28,000 32,000 (32,658)
Printers - 25,328 (25,000)
Paperworkers - 6,400 (5,200)
Cardboardmakers - 2,000 (3,100)
Woodworkers 15,000 20,500 (20,500)
Leatherworkers 15,750 16,708 (16,708)
Foodworkers - 13,000 (13,250)
Tobaccoworkers - 14,000 (14,000)
Chemicalworkers - - (17,200)
Source: Anskii, A., ed. Professional'noe Dvizhenie v Petrograde 
v 1917g., L., 1928, pp. 341-3.The figures in brackets 
in column three are the official trade union figures for 
Petrograd membership on 1 October 1917. See Delo Naroda, 
174, 7 October 1917, p.4 and Professional'nyi Vestrisk, 
314, 15 October 1917, p.21. I have not used the table 
in Stepanov, op. cit., p.50, as his figures seem to be 
too high.
By October there was a total trade union membership of about 390,000 
in Petrograd, including non-factory workers such as shop workers,
The number of members in the metal, leather and wood unions 
exceeds the total number of workers in the respective industries. 
This may partly be due to the fact that these unions included 
workers in the province of Petrograd, and not just city, but it 
seems more likely to be due to the fact that the figures represent 
not current membership in October and July, but the number of en­ 
rollments since March, i.e. they make no allowance for drop-outs. 
Compare V. Ya. Grunt's analysis of the figures for trade union 
membership in Moscow in Istoriya SSSR, 1965, 1, p.232.
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catering workers, postal and railroad workers. Throughout Russia 
as a whole there were about 2 million trade union members - about 
10% of wage-earners of all kinds. 8
The unions appear to have had no difficulty in recruiting 
members; indeed in some industries there appears to have been close 
to 100% membership. Data on payment of subscriptions suggest that 
the drop-out rate was not very high. In the metalworkers' union 
monthly subscriptions were 80k. for the low-paid; lr.40k. for the mid­ 
dle wage group and 2r. for the highly-paid. 9 Monthly subscriptions 
to the union totalled 94,335r. in June and 133,540r. in July. In 
the textile union monthly subscriptions rose from 4,800r. to 10,000r. 
between May and July, but in the same period subscriptions to the 
leatherworkers 1 union fell from 18,093r. to 15,167r. 10 In September 
the glassworkers 1 union reported that "subscriptions are being paid 
promptly". This suggests that the membership was paying its dues 
but tells us very little about their actual involvement in union 
affairs. This problem shall be examined further in chapter 9.
Craft unionism
In Europe and America craft unions proved to be the natural form 
of organisation in the early phase of the labour movement. Craft 
unions, such as the A.F.L. in America or the 'model 1 unions in Britain,
8. Such a level of unionisation - achieved in less than six months - 
did not compare badly with the levels in the West. In 1912 
about 20% of the total occupied labour force in Britain were 
members of trade unions; in Germany about 25%; in the USA and 
Italy about 11% and in France only 8%. Kir'yanov, Yu. I., 'Ob 
obi ike rabochego Klassa Rossii', in Rossiiskii proletariat - 
oblik, bor'ba, gegemoniya, M., 1970, p.130.
9. Metallist, 1-2, 17 August 1917, p.19.
10. Ekho derevoobdelochnika, 2, 19 October 1917, p.11. None of these 
figures include enrollment subscriptions.
11 Proletarskii Prizyv, 4, 20 September 1917, p.4.
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proved far stronger than more broad-based unions such as the Knights 
of Labor in America or the General National and Consolidated Trade 
Union in Britain. The result was, however, that by the twentieth
century union members in the West were fragmented into myriad small,
12 competing unions.
After the February Revolution Russian workers began by building
local and craft unions. In the metal and allied trades over twenty
13 such unions appeared in March - but few lasted for very long. Many
of them were based on workers in small enterprises. At the beginning 
of March an appeal was launched to metalworkers in workshops and 
factories of less than 500 workers in the Moscow district of the 
capital to meet to elect deputies to the soviet and to form a union:
You comrade artisans (remeslyiniki ) are the 
stepsons of the proletarian family; because 
of your lack of organisation, and a whole 
number of other factors, capital oppresses 
you far more than the proletarians in the 
large factories. 14
A meeting of blacksmiths from small forges met around the same time 
to elect a deputy to the soviet and to form a union. They passed a 
Menshevik resolution which welcomed the soviet and called on it to 
strictly control the actions of the Provisional Government. These 
unions, together with unions of foundry-workers and machinists, were 
very quickly absorbed into the metalworkers' union. Other craft unions
12. In 1913 in Britain there were 1,269 different trade unions with 
a membership of 4,135,000, and in Germany in the same year there 
were 49 Free Unions, with a membership of 2,574,000, 23 Hirsch- 
Duncker unions, with a membership of 107,000, and 25 Christian 
unions, with a membership of 343,000. International Encyclopedia 
of Social Sciences, see under Trade Unions.
13. Metal list, 1922, 12, p.66.
14. Pravda, 7, 12 March 1917, p.3.
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resisted absorption into the metalworkers' union however. In April 
stokers from the Metal Works, Rozenkrantz and Phoenix formed a
union, on the grounds that "we are weaker than other masterovye,
15 despite doing one of the most severe, strenuous and responsible jobs".
On 18 September a meeting was held to discuss merger with the metal­ 
workers' union, but this proved abortive since the stokers' union would 
not accept the metalworkers' collective contract. It informed the 
Petrograd Council of Trade Unions that:
The metalworkers' union mistakenly stands 
for a narrow production principle, which the 
Society of Factory and Works Owners exploits 
in order to weaken the organisational work 
of Petrograd trade unions.^
The stokers argued that theirs was a growing profession, that many 
of their members were outside manufacturing industry and that to join 
the metalworkers' union, where there was no independence for each 
craft, would be "suicide". It did not fuse until January 1918.
On 30 April a union of welders was formed, which had a mere 700 
members by October, but which proved to be a thorn in the side of 
the metalworkers' union leadership. Writing in the union journal, 
A. Shlyapnikov, the Bolshevik cha/r^man of the union, warned of the 
dangers of craft unionism and cited the example of the Gruntal work­ 
shop, where eight welders had joined the welders' union, put forward 
a wage demand, and then left the factory when it had been refused; 
whereupon the owner had fired the rest of the workers, who had never
I O
been consulted about the welders' action. The welders' union paid 
scant regard to the veiled threats of Shlyapnikov, not joining the
15. Pravda, 41, 26 April 1917, p.4.
16. Professional'nyi Vestnik, 7, 16 December 1917, p.7.
17. Prof. Dvizh., p.125.
18. Metallist. 1-2, 17 August 1917, p.14.
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metalworkers' union until January 1918.
The electricians' union was the only craft union to agree to 
fuse with the metalworkers prior to October. Other unions, such as
those of gold- and silversmiths (1,300 members in October) and watch- 
in 
makers (360 members) continued in existence until 1918. Precisely
why these groups, and not others, formed craft unions is not, at this 
stage, possible to say.
The strength of craft unionism in Russia was not great when
one compares it to other countries. There was not the same tradition
20 of gilds in Russia as there was in Western Europe, and so gild
traditions played less of a formative role in the early phases of 
union construction than in the West. Moreover, as argued in chapter 
1, skilled craftsmen in Russian industry were more 'modern 1 than 
those who had formed the 'model 1 unions in Britain. Russian crafts­ 
men were less of an exclusive caste and thus less likely to see their 
interests as being different from those of other workers in the same 
industry. Craft unionism did not disappear overnight in 1917 but it 
did not prove a serious contender to industrial unionism, in spite 
of the fears of some union leaders.
In a matter of eight months in 1917 Russian labour leaders 
achieved more in building powerful industrial unions than had been 
achieved in decades in the West. In the first phase of union con-
19. Prof. Dvizh., p.341.
20. Gilds (tsekhi) had been legalised by Peter the Great in 1722 but 
had never become deeply entrenched. In the 1850's and 1860's 
there was a campaign to abolish them. On the latter, see 
Zelni k's excellent account. Zelni k, R., Labor and Society 
in Tsarist Russia, Standford University Press, 1971, pp. 120-133. 
For an interesting account of the tsekh system in the bakery 
trade at the beginning of this century see Ivanov, B., Po 
stupen'yam bor'by: zapiski starogo bol'shevika, M., 1934, pp. 167-9.
21. This does not mean that sectionalism was not a headache for union 
leaders once they came to implement collective wage contracts. 
See chapter 6.
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struction in Russia - in the period after the 1905 - most unions 
that were set up had been trade unions, in the sense that they em­ 
braced workers in the same occupation across different factories. 
In 1917 a conscious effort was made to avoid a situation where there 
would be a number of different craft and trade unions within the same 
enterprise. The aim of labour leaders was 'industrial unionism 1 , i.e. 
the construction of unions according to branch of industry, so 
that all workers who worked in the same industry, regardless of their 
job, would be members of the same union. At first, industrial 
unionism was not the norm. In the spring of 1917, for example, at the 
Triangle works four unions existed - for chemical workers, metalworkers, 
clerical workers and for foremen and technicians. At the Okhta powder 
works the unions of woodturners, powder-makers, construction workers, 
metalworkers and office-workers existed alongside each other.
Gradually, however, efforts were made to establish me union for all
22 workers in each enterprise.
At the Third Trade Union Conference in June - the first national 
conference of unions in 1917 - union leaders of all political persuasions 
argued the case for industrial unionism. There was pressure in some
quarters for trade unionism, but Mensheviks and Bolsheviks united
23 to quash this in the final resolution. It was not merely the
leadership which favoured industrial unionism, for when delegates 
from Petrograd metal works met to elect a board for the union on 
May 7, they overruled the secretary, who was prepared to allow the 
setting up within the union of sections to represent individual
22. Shatilova, T., Fabzavkomy i profsoyuzy v 1917-18gg., L., 1927, p.8.
23. Tret'ya vserossiiskaya konferentsiya professional 1 nykh soyuzov 1917g 
stenograficheskii otchet, M., 1927 (henceforward, Tret'ya 
konferentsiya }'. Pankratova is quite wrong to claim that Bolsheviks 
believed in revolutionary industrial unions, whereas Mensheviks 
believed in neutral trade unions. Pankratova, A., Fabzavkomy 
i profsoytizy v revolyutsii 1917g., M.L. 1927, p.56.
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trades. 24
The consensus within the working class appears to have been that 
industrial unionism was superior to craft or trade unionism since 
it most closely corresponded to the idealised image of a working 
class united in struggle against the employers; but not all trade 
union leaders shared this enthusiasm.
The woodturners' union was the largest union in Petrograd to 
reject the policy of industrial unionism. By October it had 20,000 
members which made it the seventh largest union in the capital. 
Only a third of its members worked in wood-working factories and 
joinery enterprises, however; the rest worked as carpenters and 
joiners in other industries. In spite of its rampant Bolshevism, 
the woodturners' union pursued a steadfast craft policy. It refused 
to allow woodturners to join the union of the industry in which they 
worked. On 8 May a delegate council of the union rejected a plea
nr
to this effect from the metalworkers' union. At the Okhta powder 
works woodturners refused the tariff cate6yry into which the chemical 
workers tried to put them and at Putilov carpenters and wood machinists 
objected to being placed in category three of the metalworkers' con­ 
tract. On 1 August the woodturners' union put a wage contract to the
27 SFWO, which turned it down. Six days later a meeting of 57 factory
delegates, having denounced the Kerensky government for imprisoning 
Bolsheviks, passed the following resolution:
24. Pravda, 51, 7 May 1917, p.3; Pravda, 57, 14 May 1917, p.3.
25. Stepanov, Z.V., RabochiePetrograda v period podgotovki i
provedeniya oktyabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, M.L., 1965, p.89
26. Ekho derevoobdelochnika, 2, 19 October 1917, p.12.
27. ibid., p.14. The rates proposed in the contract of 2r.20k. for 
highly skilled workers; Ir.SOk. to 2r. for skilled; lr.50k. to 
lr.75k. for semi-skilled and 90k.for unskilled men and 75k. for 
unskilled women do not represent a wide spread of differentials 
and do not suggest craft elitism among skilled woodturners.
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Every regenerated organisation, if it is 
to establish its work at the necessary 
level, must insist, when working out a 
contract, that one profession is not
competent to determine the wages of 
another.28
After two months of abortive negotiation with the employers, the 
union decided to prepare for a strike. On October 12 it issued 
a statement saying that a strike would begin four days later, since
"at present the union does not have the wherewithal to restrain
29 desperate workers from protests and excesses." At the Putilov
works woodworkers had already gone on a go-slow in protest at the 
refusal of management to negotiate with them separately. The 
Executive of the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions agreed to support
the strike on condition that it involve only enterprises where wood-
30 workers comprised a majority of the workforce- A day after the
strike had begun, however, an angry meeting of 8,000 woodworkers
rejected this stipulation, calling on all woodworkers to join the
31 strike. This call was condemned by Shlyapnikov since it disrupted
normal working in hundreds of factories not connected with the wood 
industry. The strikers rejected charges of causing disorganisation 
and appear to have won reluctant support from other groups of workers, 
At the Baltic works and the Okhta explosives works factory committees 
refused to allow the carrying-out of work normally done by wood­ 
turners and called for pressure to be put on the employers to com­ 
promise. The strike was still going on when the October Revolution
28. Ekho derevoobdelochnika, 3, 12 December 1917, p. 15.
29. Revolyutslonnoe dvizhenie y Rossii nakanune oktyabr'skogo
vooruzhennogo vosstaniya: dokumenty i materialy, M., 1962, p. 277.
30. Rabochii Put 1 , 36, 14 October 1917, p. 4.
31. Oktyabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Petrograde: dokumenty i materialy, M.. m/, p.iz». ————————————————
t., p. 90.
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supervened and on 28 October it was called off. 33
In spite of the example of the woodturners' union, the record 
of the craft and trade unions must be pronounced a failure when 
measured against that of the industrial unions. Sectional pressures 
of all kinds existed, and were a force to be reckoned with, but they 
did not fundamentally threaten the project of industrial unionism. 
This will become clear in the next chapter when we analyse the 
implementation of collective wage contracts.
Political composition of the trade unions
Soviet historians are fond of depicting political conflict within 
the trade unions in 1917 as a fight between reformist, economistic 
Mensheviks and militant revolutionary Bolsheviks, in which no punches 
were pulled. In reality the political history of the Petrograd trade 
unions was more complex than this manichaean interpretation allows. 
Before analysing this history in detail, it is worth pointing out 
that the political centre of gravity of the Russian labour movement 
was far to the left of that of its Western counterpart. Prior to 1917 
attempts to promote reformism in the labour movement had been made by
33. Professional'nyi Vestnik, 7, p.6.
34. So far we have used the term 'craft union 1 in a strict sense to 
denote a narrow exclusive union of workers of one specific trade. 
The woodturners' union was not a craft union in this sense, but 
rather a 'trade 1 union in the British sense, in that it embraced 
workers in several different wood trades. It was unable to es­ 
tablish itself as a proper industrial union because of the 
paucity of workers in the wood industry proper. One should beware 
of accepting Soviet usage of the term 'craft union' at its face 
value. Some unions were dubbed craft unions retrospectively in 
the 1920's, after another union had established itself as the in­ 
dustrial union for a particular branch of industry. For example, 
a tiny glass workers' union survived until 1921 as the 'industrial' 
union for workers in the glass industry. It was then absorbed into 
the chemical workers' union and its sorry history (it had opposed 
the October Revolution and remained obdurately Menshevik'.) was re­ 
written as that of a narrow craft union. See Shatilova, T., Ocherk 
istorii leningradskogo soyuza khimikov, 1905-18gg., L., 1927.————
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intellectuals (cf. the 'Economists', led by S.N. Prokopovich and 
Kuskova), by the government (cf. the Zubatov and Gapon unions) and 
by workers themselves (cf. the Workers of Russia's Manchester (1899), 
the Moscow printers in 1903, the Workers Voice group in Petersburg 
in 1905 and the Union of Workers for the Defence of their Rights 
in Khar'kov in the same year). These attempts at home-grown reformism 
never got very far, however, for the simple reason that even the 
most 'bread and butter' trade union struggles scuppered themselves on 
the rock of the tsarist state; all efforts to separate trade union­ 
ism from politics were rendered nugatory by the action of police
35 and troops. In this political climate trade unions grew up fully
conscious of the fact that the overthrow of the autocracy was a basic 
precondition for the improvement of the workers' lot. It is true 
that there was a powerful moderating tendency in the trade unions, 
represented by right-wing Mensheviks such as those involved in the 
Workers' Group of the War Industries Committee, but even this ten­ 
dency was verbally committed to a brand of socialist trade unionism 
which would have appeared strikingly dangerous to 'bread and butter' 
trade unionists such as Gompers in the USA or to the Liberals of 
the early TUC in Britain. It is thus important, when analysing the 
conflict between 'right 1 and 'left 1 in the Russian unions in 1917, to 
remember that even the 'right 1 was fairly left-wing by Western stan­ 
dards, since it was committed to socialism of a rather full-blooded 
kind.
35. Pipes, R., Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Move­ 
ment, Harvard University Press, 1963, ch. 6.Wildman, A., The 
Making of a Workers' Revolution, Chicago University Press, 1967, 
esp. pp. 123-6, 137-49.Pospielovsky, D., Russian Police Trade 
Unionism, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971.
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The approach to trade unionism of the two major political parties 
within the unions in 1917 sprang from their respective diagnoses 
and prognoses of the political situation in Russia. The Mensheviks 
believed that Russia was in the throes of a bourgeois revolution, 
and that therefore the unions should raise demands for the maximum
•JC
democratisation of the social and political system. They did not 
believe in the political 'neutrality 1 of the unions (they were on 
the side of 'democracy 1 and 'socialism') but they did not believe 
that the unions should take up positions on particular questions, 
such as the demand for all power to the Soviets. In contrast, the 
Bolshevik position was summarised in the resolution on the party and 
the trade unions, passed by the Sixth Bolshevik party Congress in 
August:
The epoch of world war has inevitably become 
the epoch of sharpening class struggles. The 
working class is entering a terrain of immense 
social horizons which culminate in world 
socialist revolution. The trade unions are 
faced by the totally practical task of leading 
the proletariat in this mighty battle. Together 
with the political organisation of the working 
class, the trade unions must repudiate a neutral 
stance towards the issues on which the fate of 
the world labour movement now hangs. In the 
historic quarrel between 'internationalism' 
and 'defencism 1 the trade-union movement must 
stand decisively and unwaveringly on the side of 
revolutionary internationalism.3/
In Petrograd a conflict between these two perspectives took place 
on the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions. On 15 March the foundations 
were laid for what became the Central Bureau of the Petrograd Council 
of Trade Unions, when eighteen representatives from different unions
36. See, for example, the article by D. Kol'tsov in Professional'nyi 
Vestnik, 3-4, 15 October 1917, p.6. ——
37. Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP (b): protokoly, M., 1958, p.264.
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met together. Five days later, an executive committee was elected, 
which comprised four Bolsheviks (Schmidt, Razumov, Antoshkin, Lebedev),
four Mensheviks (Rubsov, Volkov, Acheev, Gonikberg, and the
38 syndicalist, Gastev. The Central Bureau subsequently formalised
its structure, changing its name to the Petrograd Council of Trade 
Unions. All unions in Petrograd were invited to send representatives 
to the Council, according to their size. Until June thirty unions 
were represented. This later rose to 50 and subsequently to over 70. 
Only class unions were allowed onto the Council, so unions of
workers not considered to be proletarian, such as musicians, writers
39 and theatre employees, were excluded.
According to its constitution, drawn up in May, the powers of 
the PCTU were coordinative rather than directive. The Council did 
not have the right to manage or intervene in the affairs of a member 
union, but in practice it sometimes did this, for example, by en­ 
couraging industrial unionism or by helping consolidate union structure. 
In spite of its self-denying ordinance, the PCTU also intervened in 
specific economic disputes, by giving advice, publicity or financial 
help. The range of issues on which the PCTU gave a lead to individual 
unions is shown by the following statistics. Between March and December 
the Executive Committee of the PCTU discussed 21 items of a political 
nature, 101 concerning organisational construction, 26 concerning 
representation, 10 concerning education, 8 concerning unemployment and 
25 miscellaneous items. The 30 plenary sessions of the PCTU dis­ 
cussed 29 matters of a political nature, 26 concerning organisational
38. Prof. Dvizh., p.45,
39. ibid., p.57; 63.
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construction, 14 concerning economic struggles, 4 concerning repre­ 
sentation, 3 concerning unemployment, 3 concerning education and 5
40 miscellaneous items.
The vast bulk of PCTU business was practical and did not pre­ 
cipitate party conflict. Unlike trade unions in the West, however, 
the Russian trade unions were vitally interested in political 
questions,and as politics became more polarised in Russian society, 
political acrimony between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks on the PCTU 
increased. The first sign of this came on May 1 during discussions 
on the constitution. The Bolsheviks insisted on a sentence about 
"coordinating the actions of the unions with the political party of 
the proletariat". The Mensheviks demanded that the word "party" be
in the plural. When the matter was put to the vote, they lost by
41 17 votes to 9. By May the Bolsheviks could command a majority on
42 the PCTU, by getting the support of independents like the Mezhraionets.,
D.B. Ryazanov (who joined the party in August) and some of the Men- 
shevik Internationalists. In the May elections to the Executive 
Committee, the Bolsheviks won a majority and at the end of the month 
the PCTU passed a resolution calling for the transfer of power to the 
Soviets. By the beginning of June the Bolsheviks were the strongest 
party on the PCTU, but they did not wield supremacy on this body as
40. ibid., pp. 58-9.
41. ibid., p.48. At the Third Conference of Trade Unions a row broke 
out over the same phrase. Conference voted to substitute the 
word 'movement' for 'party'. See John Keep's excellent dis­ 
cussion, Keep, J.H.L., The Russian Revolution: a study in mass 
mobilisation, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976, p.89.
42. The so-called Interdistrict Group of Social Democrats, of which 
Trotsky became leader after his return from the USA in 1917.
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they did on the Central Council of Factory Committees (see chapter 
7), for the presence of a strong group of Menshevik Internationalists, 
on whom the Bolsheviks relied for support, combined with disagree­ 
ment among the Bolsheviks themselves, meant that the political line 
of the PCTU was not always clear-cut. The PCTU was caught napping 
by both the 18 June demonstration and the July Days. The PCTU 
supported the demonstration called by the Soviet EC for 18 June, but 
it was taken aback by the Bolshevik success in making this a show of 
opposition to the policies of the Soviet EC. Whereas factory 
committees busily organised contingents from the factories to march 
under Bolshevik banners, only odd unions, such as the needleworkers, 
strove to mobilise their membership. During the July Days the PCTU 
was completely isolated from the abortive insurrection by workers and 
soldiers. On 6 July the PCTU met with the Central Council of Factory 
Committees (CCFC) and the boards of the major unions. Trotsky 
attended this meeting and vigorously castigated the Soviet leaders 
for creating the disillusionment in the masses which had issued forth 
in the July Days; he called on the meeting to refuse any kind of 
support to the Kerensky government. Ryazanov was less certain: he 
argued that the new Coalition government could win back the support
of the masses if it undertook bold measures. For two days no con-
43 sensus was reached. The final resolution, proposed by three
Bolsheviks (Schmidt, Skrypnik and Antselovich) Ryazanov (soon to 
become a Bolshevik) and two Mensheviks (Astrov and Volkov) was passed 
unanimously with four abstentions. It was a milk-and-water affair,
43. Prof. Dvizh., p.50.
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bearing all the hallmarks of compromise and making no mention of a 
transfer of power to the Soviets - the main aim of the July demon­ 
strations.
The response of individual trade unions to the July Days was 
also mixed. On 23 July 1,400 woodturners condemned the Provisional 
Government for betraying the confidence of the working class and
called for the immediate arrest of counter-revolutionaries, the
45 abolition of the death penalty and the release of political prisoners.
On 7 July a meeting of delegates from all print works in Petrograd 
passed a resolution by 24 votes to 11, with two abstentions, accusing
the Bolsheviks of fomenting the July Days and pledging support for
46 the Soviet. A general meeting of pharmacy employees agreed to rally
round the Soviet against the counter-revolution and support the
47 government only on condition that it carry out its 8 July programme.
These reactions attest the fact that on political matters the unions 
were still not able to pursue a policy as consistent as that of the 
factory committees, which operated almost as adjutants of the 
Bolshevik Central Committee.
During the Kornilov crisis, at the end of August, when General 
Kornilov attempted to overthrow Kerensky and crush the Soviets, 
the PCTU worked in a more resolute fashion than in previous crises. 
On 26 August a joint meeting of the PCTU and the CCFC passed a motion 
on the defence of Petrograd, introduced by Lozovskii, which called 
for a workers' militia, an end to the persecution of political leaders,
44. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v iyule : iyul'skii krizis : dokumenty i materialy, M., 1959, p.337.——————————————————
45. Ekho derevoobolelochnika, 1, 7 September 1917, p.13.
46. Pechatnoe Delo, 4, 10 July 1917, p.8.
47. Zhizn 1 farmatsevta, 8-9, 15 August 1917, p.7.
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control of military units, public eating places, an end to queuing and
48 a programme of public works to minimise unemployment. The next
day the joint meeting demanded that the government proclaim a 
republic, institute workers' control of production and fight the 
counter-revolution. On 29 August the two organisations threw them­ 
selves into the task of arming workers, organising defences around
the city centre, and setting up patrols to guard the city centre, as
49 news of Kornilov's advance on the capital filtered through. The
PCTU put 50,000r. at the disposal of the military centres, and the
50 unions of food workers and woodturners also provided help.
This survey of the political history of the Petrograd unions 
shows that the picture which is sometimes painted of a Menshevik- 
dominated trade union movement counterposed to a Bolshevik-dominated 
factory committee movement does not correspond to reality, at least 
in Petrograd. Nationally, and in cities like Moscow, the Mensheviks 
did enjoy more influence than the Bolsheviks inside the unions, but 
in Petrograd this was not the case. As early as June, the Bolsheviks, 
with the support of Menshevik-Internationalists, could ensure that 
the political line of the PCTU was considerably to the left of that 
of the Soviet EC. Yet because of this reliance on Menshevik-Inter- 
nationalists, political positions were usually arrived at by a process 
of compromise. On some of the most controversial questions of the 
day - such as the call for a transfer of power to the Soviets - the
48. Prof, dvizh., p.53.
49. Stepanov, op. cit., p.172.
50. Bor'ba, 3, September 1917, p.l; Rabochii Put', 10 September 1917,
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unions were unable to adopt a firm stance. Thus Bolshevik influence 
in the unions was far less certain than in the factory committees. 
However, the great bulk of trade union business did not involve 
politics directly, and so on a day-to-day basis, Bolsheviks and 
Mensheviks worked together quite happily on the PCTU.
On the boards of most major trade unions in Petrograd the 
Bolsheviks held a majority of places. The political make-up of these 
central boards was not a reflection of the political sympathies of 
the membership, for they were not elected directly by the membership, 
as were factory committees. Nevertheless the balance of political 
forces within the union boards does give an indication of the 
strength of the main political parties within the union movement as 
a whole.
On the board of the Petrograd metalworkers' union Bolsheviks had 
a slight majority of places but Mensheviks comprised a large minority, 
mainly due to the prestige of the individual Mensheviks concerned,
rather than because of significant support for their politics amongst
51 the rank-and-file. On the district boards, directly elected by
factory delegates, Bolsheviks had more influence than their rivals. 
By the summer they dominated the boards of the Narva, the Petrograd, 
the I and II City, the Sestroretsk and the Kolpino districts of the 
capital. In Vyborg and Vasilevskii districts they still shared power 
with a Menshevik minority. Mensheviks were strong only in the Moscow 
district (mainly due to their influence at the Dynamo works) and the 
SR's were significant only in Nevskii district. SR's, generally, were
51. Prof. Dvizh., p.123.
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a minor influence in the metal union, most of their industrial
52 members channelling their energies into the factory committees.
Menshevik influence in the union began to wane in the autumn of 1917 
and at the first national congress of the union in January 1918, 75
delegates were Bolsheviks, 51 belonged to no political party, 20
53 were Mensheviks, 7 were Left SR's, 5 Right SR's and 3 were anarchists.
In the textile unions Bolsheviks were the dominant influence. 
The union published a journal, Tkach, which took a strongly revol­ 
utionary line,and at the first national conference in late September, 
48 delegates were Bolsheviks, 10 Mensheviks, 4 SR's and two belonged
to no party. The conference called for an energetic struggle to
54 transfer power to the Soviets. The needleworkers 1 union also took
a strongly Bolshevik line, although in Petrograd the union was not 
as strong as in Moscow, owing to the fact that its artisanal base 
had been undermined during the war. At the first national congress 
of the union in January 1918, 40 of the delegates were Bolsheviks, 5 
were members of the Jewish Bund, 4 were Menshevik-Internationalists,
one was a Polish socialist, one a Finnish socialist, one a Jewish
55 Socialist, one a syndicalist and two were non-party. Throughout
1917 the woodturners' union was a fortress of Bolshevism, with a 
Bolshevik chairman, I.F. Zholnerovich, and journal packed with 
articles critical of the conciliationist majority in the soviet. In
52. ibid., p.119. The SR's were a significant influence in the 
leatherworkers' union, the transport workers' union and the 
union of postal employees.
53. Metallist, 2, 19 February 1918, p.9.
54. Volin, S., Deyatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoyuzakh pri sovetskoi vlasti, Columbia, 1962, p.32.————————————————————
55. Proletarii igly, 1, 25 March 1918, pp. 4-5.
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summer the union sent out a questionnaire to woodworking establish­ 
ments, asking about the political affiliation of their workforces. 
About 80 replies were received, of which 38 declared themselves 
for the Bolsheviks, 12 for the SR's and one for the Mensheviks. 
Replies ranged in formulation from "we belong to the Bolshevik party", 
"we sympathise with the Bolsheviks", "we've secretly joined the 
Bolshevik party", to "we have not joined a party, we are members of
the workers' party", to "we beg you to explain what is a 'party 1 -
56 we do not yet know; we know we are workers". The union formed a
squad of Red Guards in October, commanded by Zholnerovich, which took 
part in the storming of the Winter Palace. Yet in spite of its 
vigorous Bolshevism, the woodturners union steadfastly rejected 
official party policy on industrial unionism.
The Bolsheviks were strong in the union of food workers. A group 
of them on 5 March founded the union of flour workers, which was 
one of the first unions to publish a journal, Zerno Pravdy. As early 
as 14 May over 700 flour workers passed a resolution proposed by the 
Bolshevik leader of the union, Boris Ivanov, calling for a transfer
of power to the Soviets. A motion expressing confidence in the Soviet
57 EC gained only six votes. In July the union of flour workers
amalgamated with the unions of confectionary workers and butchers to 
form the food workers' union. The flour workers had recalled their 
Menshevik deputy to the Soviet in May and elected two Bolsheviks and 
one SR Maximalist instead. The food workers' union came to be re­ 
presented by a similar mix of deputies. In early November a general
56. Ekho derevoobdeloch^ika, 2, 19 October 1917, p.6.
57. Zerno Pravdy, 1-2, 10 July 1917, pp. 11-12.
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meeting of food workers elected seven Bolsheviks, two SR Maximalists 
and one anarchist to the Soviet. In the catering workers' union 
also, a Bolshevik majority shared power with an anarchist minority. 
At the first national conference of the food workers' union on 23 
November the 45 delegates included 25 Bolsheviks and one sympathiser,
4 Left SR's, 3 SR Maximalists, 3 Menshevik Internationalists, two
59 anarchists and 6 who belonged to no party.
In the leatherworkers' union a meeting on 12 March elected a
board consisting of 4 Bolsheviks and one sympathiser, 5 SR's, one
fin 
anarchist and two non-party workers. In later months the Menshevik
Internationalist, Yuzevich, came to be a leading light in the union.
•
By September there were 9 Bolsheviks, 6 SR's,l Menshevik-Internationalist, 
2 non-party and a handful of unknowns on the board. The political 
line of the board thus depended upon the way in which non-party members 
voted i.e. with the Bolsheviks or with the SR's. The contents of the 
union journal, Golos Kozhevnika, were unequivocally internationalist, 
which suggests that the SR's in the union were on the left wing of the 
party.
In the union of chemical workers, the union of employees of 
medicine and perfume enterprises and in the union of glass workers, 
Menshevik-Internationalists and Mensheviks were the major political 
force. The Bolsheviks were weak in all these unions (though not in
58. Nabat, 5., 18 November 1917, p.10. There was conflict between
Bolsheviks and SR Maximalists in the union, with the latter accusing 
the former of trying to monopolise union control, and the former 
accusing the latter of sabotaging union work in certain bread 
factories, ibid., p.12 and Rabota soyuza muchnykh izdelii i 
osnovanie soyuza pishchevikov 1917g., L., 1927, p.6.
59. Nabat, 6, 22 December 1917, p.5.
60. Prof. Dvizh., p.135.
61. ibid., p.143.
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Moscow), but in the chemical workers' union, two members did have some
fi? influence.
A bastion of Menshevism was, of course, the printers' union. 
The peculiarly aristocratic character of many type-setters predisposed 
them towards moderation in politics and a rejection of extremism. 
Printers had one of the oldest and best organised unions, founded in 
1903 and surviving down to 1917. During the war most printers supported 
the defencist wing of Menshevism and Mensheviks continued to dominate 
the union until the civil war period. In Petrograd Bolsheviks were 
rather more influential in the union than elsewhere, but they had 
only five places on the city board compared to the Mensheviks'
C o
fifteen. The latter tried to steer the union clear of political 
involvement, though after the Kornilov rebellion - when trade 
unionists everywhere were flocking to the Bolshevik banners - they 
did adopt the slogan 'Unity in Action by all parties represented in
the Soviet'. In the new elections to the union board in October,
64 9,000 printers elected eleven Internationalists and fourteen Defencists.
As late as 10 April, 1918, when the Petrograd board was again re- 
elected, 6,145 printers voted for the Menshevik/SR/Unemployer Workers'
list; 3,416 voted for the Bolshevik list and 138 ballot papers were
65 invalid.
This survey of the main factory unions shows that the Bolsheviks 
were the most influential political party within the boards of the 
unions of Petrograd. More political parties were represented in the
62. Shatilova, op. cit., p.64; Volin, op. cit., p.29.
63. Volin, op. cit., p.23.
64. Pechatnoe Delo, 13, 8 December 1917, pp. 10-11.
65. Novyi Den', 26, 11 April 1918, p.4.
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unions than in the factory committee which made them, from the view­ 
point of the Bolshevik Central Committee, less reliable allies in 
the period up to October.
The social composition of the labour movement
Before going on to examine the economic struggles of the trade 
unions it is important to analyse the relationship of the organised 
labour movement, which included both trade unions and factory committees, 
to the working class as a whole. As argued in chapter 1, two very 
broad social groups can be distinguished within the working class: 
on the one hand, skilled, proletarianised male workers and, on the 
other, peasants and women new to industry. The organised labour 
movement based itself on the former group and had certain difficulties 
relating to the latter group. The semi-proletarian peasant and 
women workers were unused to organisation; they were docile and 
apathetic for much of the time, although their quiescence would be 
punctuated by sudden bouts of rebellion, similar in character to 
peasant bunty or jacquerie. They were not accustomed to formal, dur­ 
able organisation but tended to engage in direct action to achieve 
their ends - direct action which was sometimes violent or destructive. 
The task of the leaders of the labour movement was to channel the 
militancy of these workers into organised channels, to persuade them 
that the interests of the working class as a whole could properly be 
defended only by collective action and negotiation.
That it was the newer, inexperienced peasant and women workers 
who engaged most in forms of violent, elemental direct action, was a 
point made frequently by labour leaders. The Horkers 1 Group of the
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War Industries Committee, arguing in 1916 for the need for starosty 
to represent the interests of factory workers, noted that;
During the war, the composition of the working 
class has changed; many alien, undisciplined 
elements have come into the workforce. In 
addition, the intensification of work, the 
broad application of female and child labour, 
uninterrupted overtime and holiday work, over­ 
work... have increased the number of grounds for 
conflict of all kinds and these often arise 
spontaneously. Instead of organised defence of 
their interests, workers engaqe in elemental out­ 
bursts and anarchic methods.66
Kaktyn, writing in early 1918 in the journal of the Central Council 
of Factory Committees, made the same point, blaming "anarchic dis­ 
orders" on the "not yet fully proletarianised mass of workers con­ 
sisting of refugees, people from the countryside and others, tempor­ 
arily swept into industry by the war". Employers too blamed dis­ 
orders on what they called the 'alien element 1 (prishiyi element). 
At the Franco-Russian works, for example, management complained that 
those who had come to the factory during the war had had a bad effect
r O
on the discipline of the workforce as a whole. The disorders, of 
which the above commentators speak, can best be understood by examining 
two factories in detail.
The Pipe (Trubochnyi) Works was one of the largest enterprises 
in Petrograd, having a workforce of almost 19,000 in 1917. It was a 
state enterprise producing pipes of all kinds, fuses for hand-grenades, 
percussion tubes, detonating fuses, etc. During the war the workforce
66. Cited by Pankratova, A., Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsial- 
isticheskuyu fabriku, M., 1923, p.152.
67. Novyi Put', 1-2, 14 January 1918, p.4.
68. Vestnik Obshchestva Zavodchikov i Fabrikantov, 5, 10 June 1917, p.3
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trebled in size; new workers came to the factory mainly from the 
countryside, since even before the war 60% of recruits had come 
from peasantry. Working-class women also entered the factory and by 
1917 comprised nearly a third of the workforce. Almost all these 
new recruits did unskilled and semi-skilled jobs as machinists and 
sorters. Only about 14% of the workforce was skilled, consisting of 
male fitters and turners. Prior to 1917 only shops like the no. 8 
instrument shop - with its highly skilled workforce - had any reputation 
for militancy. During the February Revolution militant workers could 
get unskilled workmates to strike only by sabotaging their machines.
Many of these new workers were untouched by the activities of 
the labour movement in 1917. A woman from shop no. 4, where 2,000 
women worked, wrote to the Bolshevik newspaper for working women:
Sometimes you see how the women will read 
something, and from their conversations it 
becomes clear that a desire to step forward 
has been kindled in their heart. But to our 
great regret, at present there is very little 
organisation among the women of the Pipe Works. 
There are no women comrades among us to fan the 
spark of consciousness or point out to us the path 
to truth. We really need a comrade who can speak 
on the tribune in front of a sea of faces and tell™ 
us where to go, who to listen to and what to read.
i
Around the same time as this woman was writing, in May 1917, an 
incident took place at the Pipe Works, which was fairly typical of 
factory life at this time, but which received considerable press coverage
69. Spisok fabrichno-zavodskikh predpriyatii Petrograda, Pg., 1918; 
Murzintseva, S.V., 'Izuchenie formirovaniya sostava rabochikh 
Trubochnogo zavoda 1907-14gg.', in Rabochie Rossii v epokhu 
Kapitalizma, Rostov-on-Don, 1972, p.65; Prof. Dvizh., pp. 272-6.
70. Rabotnitsa, 7, 19 July 1917, p.14.
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The Bolsheviks at the Pipe Works, their fortunes on the ascent, 
were agitating for new elections to the district soviet (Vasilevskii 
Island), and it was decided to hold these on May 17. However, the 
Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet arranged a meeting at the 
factory for the same day, so the shop stewards decided to postpone the 
elections. The workers in the foundry, however, decided to go ahead 
with their election regardless. Kapanitskii, a member of the council 
of starostas and an SR deputy to the Petrograd Soviet, was sent to 
persuade the foundry-workers to change their minds. When he arrived at 
the foundry, the workers were in a very ugly mood. The official 
protocol of a general meeting of the factory, held subsequently, 
describes what happened:
The workers in the factory sat comrade Kapanitskii 
in a wheelbarrow, beat him up and threatened to 
throw him in the furnace, but then decided to save 
the furnace for other people. They confined 
themselves to wheeling him out into the factory yard 
and then to the river. It was only thanks to the 
intervention of comrades in shops numbers 8 and 4, 
that he was released.71
A few Bolsheviks seem either to have provoked the violence or else 
to have connived at it, and consequently Mensheviks and SR's at 
the factory refused to take part in the elections which the Bolsheviks 
had been demanding. Three Left SR's who had agreed to stand on the 
Bolshevik slate withdrew from it. The starosta from the foundry made 
a public apology to a general meeting, blaming the violence on a 
handful of workers.
71. Rabochaya Gazeta, 61, 20 May 1917, p.3; Pravda, 64, 24 May, p.4; 
Delo Naroda, 60, 28 May, p.4.
72. ibid.
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The adverse publicity which this incident received - it particularly 
shocked contemporaries because the violence was directed against an 
elected workers' representative, rather than a member of management - 
did nothing to quell unrest at the Pipe Works. Only a week later, 
the thousand soldiers who had been detailed to work at the factory 
(and who were from the countryside), demanded that they be represen­ 
ted by their own committee, rather than have representatives on the 
shop stewards' committee. At a meeting which the soldiers held, 
both the Bolshevik worker, Chertkov, and the Menshevik soldier, 
Stumillo, opposed this separatist proposal, but were howled down by 
the soldiers. One soldier denounced the workers at the factory: 
"They're bourgeois (burzhui ) , they've got carpets, and the next thing 
you know they'll have cooks and maids". It was with difficulty that
• 1 +. A 73violence was averted.
The Petrograd Metal Works, unlike the Pipe Works, was techno­ 
logically very sophisticated, producing war ships, turret constructions, 
gun carriages, shells, mines, turbines, turbo-generators and other 
iron goods. It had a significant layer of skilled workers, strongly 
Bolshevik in 1913, but during the war the workforce had doubled to 
over 6,000 and it now had many inexperienced, unskilled workers. 
Conflict between skilled workers, who saw organisation as the 
answer to their problems, and unskilled workers, who saw violence as 
the solution, was a recurrent problem throughout 1917.
72. ibid.
73. Rabochaya Gazeta, 68, 31 May 1917, p.4.
225
A carpenter at the Metal Works wrote to his union journal 
describing the attitude of many of the workers towards the trade 
unions:
A majority of workers...in essence do not 
belong to the category of true proletarians. 
These people have come to the factory from the 
countryside in order to avoid military service 
and the war, or to assist the rural household 
with a good factory wage. This element...will 
move only when it feels that it is directly 
defending its own interests, but it has no't 
grasped the principle of organising the working 
masses into unions for permanent, day-to-day 
struggle. They reduce this principle merely to 
paying subscriptions, and argue that they do not 
need this extra expense, or frankly admit that 
they are going to leave the factory as soon as 
the war is over and return to the countryside.74
In November unskilled painters at the Metal Works beat up a represen­ 
tative of the metal workers' union and refused to release him until 
he agreed to sign an order granting all workers a wage of twelve rubles 
a day, backdated to 5 June.
Violent, elemental actions, such as these, posed a problem to the 
leaders of the labour movement. We shall explore this in greater 
depth in the next chapter. In conclusion, however, it must be 
pointed out how under-represented were the less proletarianised 
sections of workers in the unions and factory committees. The syn­ 
dicalist leader of the metalworkers' union, A.K. Gastev, told the first 
national congress of metalworkers:
74. Ekho derevoobdelochnika, 3, 12 December 1917, p.13.
75. Petrogradski i rabochii, 1, 1 February 1918, p.20.
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In the unions we operate by basing ourselves on 
the skilled element of the workforce, for example, 
the turners and fitters...this is the most active 
section of the working class. The unskilled 
workers are, of course, less active.76
A study of fitters at the Putilov works in 1918 showed not only how 
skilled workers dominated all working-class organisations, but how 
the most skilled fitters had been the first to join the metalworkers' 
union. This is borne out by a complaint made by the employers' 
newspaper in the spring of 1917 that "it is usually the most skilled
workers, they being the most conscious, who participate in the
78 different committees - the factory committees, Soviets, etc.". Of
course, as the figures for union membership show, the unskilled and 
low-paid workers did join the unions - as an elementary defence against
a deteriorating standard of living and food crisis - but they rarely
79 played a leading role in them.
A good gauge of this is provided by examining the number of women 
workers in factory committees and trade unions in 1917. In spite of 
the fact that a third of the working class was female, the factory 
committees remained a bastion of the male workers. At the First 
Conference of Factory Committees, which took place from May 30 to
on
June 15, of the 585 delegates, only about 20 were women (4%). 
The leading woman Bolshevik, Alexandra Kollontai, was allowed to
76. Vserossiiskii uchreditel'nyi s''ezd rabochikh metallistov, Pg., 
1918, p.87.
77. Strumilin, S.G., Problemy ekonomiki truda, pp. 72-73.
78. Torgovo - Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 84, 25 April 1917, p.2.
79. Volin, op. cit., p.3.
80. Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i fabzavkomy, vol. 2, M., 1927, pp. 217- 
231 (henceforward Okt. i Fab.).
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speak to the national conference of factory committees on the 
subject of women workers and she attacked the indifference of factory
committee leaders to women, warning of the political dangers of such
81 an attitude. The Conference, however, did not bother to discuss
the problem.
The problem was not so much that there were no women on the 
factory committees, but rather that they were grossly under-represented 
At the Nevskaya footwear factory, for instance, where 45% of the 
1,300 workers were women, none of the starostas was a woman in July. 82 
At the Pechatkin paper mill, where again about 45% of the 400 work­ 
force was female, only two of the thirteen starostas were women. 83 
In textile enterprises, where women formed the vast majority of the 
labour-force, the representation of women was rather better. At 
the Sampsonievskaya cotton spinning and weaving mill, for example,
where 85% of the workforce were women, four out of seven factory
84 committee members were female. And at the New Cotton Mill, where
87% of the 1,800 workers were women, a woman was elected to go to
or
the First Factory Committee Conference.
In June Kollontai spoke on the question of women workers to the 
Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions. She exhorted the 
assembly to take seriously the unionisation of women workers and 
reproached them for not paying attention to the questions of mater-
Or
nity provision and equal pay. In September Kollontai wrote on
81. ibid., p.192.
82. LGIA, f. 1182, op. 1, d. 96, 1.17.
83. LGIA, f. 1186, op. 4, d. 16, 1.39.
84. Karpetskaya, N.D., Rabotnitsy i velikii oktyabr', L., 1974, p.59
85. Okt. i Fab., vol. II, p.226.
86. Tret'ya Konferentsiya, pp. 425-6; 456-8.
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the question of women workers in the journal of the Petrograd trade 
unions. She pressed male trade union leaders to treat women "not as 
appendages to men, but as independent, responsible members of the 
working class, having the same rights and also the same responsib­ 
ilities to the collective". She called for the setting up of 
women's commissions within the trade unions and for unions to take up 
the struggle for the eight hour day for women, for a ban on night 
work, for equal pay, for protection of working mothers and for creches 
She even entertained the setting up of independent women's unions in
industries, such as domestic service, where female labour was prepon-
87 derant.
By autumn the indifference of unions towards women workers seems 
to have resided not so much in a reluctance to recruit women to member­ 
ship, as in a reluctance to take steps to involve them actively in 
union life. Paper membership of unions by October was high - even, 
it seems, among women workers. Although no direct figures for female 
membership exist, it is possible to make an indirect calculation of 
this. Since unions were organised on an industrial rather than 
craft basis, by correlating the membership of a particular union with 
the number of workers in the industry concerned, one gets an approx­ 
imate value for the proportion of union members in each branch of
oo
industry. With singular exceptions such as chemicals, the level of
87. Vestnik professional'nykh soyuzov, 2, 15 September 1917, p.5.
88. In Germany in 1907 women constituted 7.6% of total trade union 
membership, but by 1918 26.6%. Thonnessen, W., The Emancipation 
of Women, London: Pluto, 1976, pp. 57 and 144. In France in 1911 
women comprised 9.8% of trade-union membership and 36% of the 
working population. Guilbert, M., Les femmes et 1'organisation 
syndicale avant 1914, Paris, 1966.
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unionisation was high - in the 70-80% region. There is no suggestion 
that in industries with a high proportion of women workers, such as 
textiles or food, unionisation was significantly lower than in in­ 
dustries where women were in a minority. Women were thus being re­ 
cruited into unions, but other evidence points to the fact that they 
were not taking an active part in union life. Hardly any women, for 
example, were on the governing bodies of unions. Women comprised 
70% of workers in the textile trades, but on the board of the textile 
union, which had 32,000 members in Petrograd by October, there were 
only two women, as against 13 men; and the boards of the metal­ 
workers', leatherworkers' and sewers' unions were as unrepresentative -
89 each having a solitary woman member. Clearly, therefore, women
were not significantly involved in leadership of either factory com­ 
mittees or trade unions.
/
Finally, teenage workers were under-represented in unions and 
factory committees. In view of the youthful ness of all labour and 
socialist organisations in 1917, this may appear to be a strange 
claim. After all, the average age of delegates to the first national
congress of the metalworkers' union was only 29, and that of the
90 delegates to the leatherworkers' congress about the same. Yet
there were few attempts by the unions to take up the demands of 
apprentices in any serious way or to support the demand of young 
people for the vote at 18. Young workers had to fight hard to get 
representation on the factory committees. The committees of the Baltic
89. Perazich, V., Tekstili Leningrada v 1917g., L. s 1927, p.51; 
Prof. Dvizh., p.123, p.143.
90. Metallist, 2, 19 February 1918, pp. 8-9; Golos Kozhevnika, 
10-11, 15 April, 1918, p.18.
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works, Orudiinyi, Anchar and Putilov works all turned down this
91 demand initially. And Novaya Zhizn' concluded an article on young
workers by saying: "time and again, labour organisations ignore the
92 legal and economic interests of proletarian youth".
It is clear that the problem of 'spontaneity 1 in the working
93 class was not invented in Lenin's head. In Lenin's theory the
spontaneous character of working-class struggles is a universal 
phenomenon - in the absence of class-conscious leadership, but it is 
clear that the theory particularly fits the Russian context. The 
above review has tried to show that 'spontaneity' was not merely a 
problem for the Bolshevik party but for the labour movement as a whole. 
The militancy of the working class was largely 'spontaneous 1 and it 
was this militancy which provided the momentum of the revolutionary 
process in 1917. 'Spontaneity 1 by itself, however, was not enough to 
promote the interests of a united working-class on a long-term basis. 
Organisation was necessary - organisation which was basically the pos­ 
session of skilled, literate, experienced male workers. These workers 
formed the backbone of the trade unions and factory committees and they
91. Dryazgov, G., Na puti k komsomolu, L., 1924, pp. 31-32;
V bpyakh: sbornik vospominarni, posvyashchennyi geroicheskoi 
bor'be vasileostrovtsev za 15 let, L., 1932, p.33.
92. Novaya Zhizn 1 , 143, 3 October, p.4.
93. 'Spontaneity 1 is a translation of the term stikhiinost', an ab­ 
stract noun derived from the word stikhiya, which means 'the 
elements'. Thus Lenin's concept of 'stikhiinost 1 ' has the sense 
of something elemental, natural and untamed.
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faced the task of channelling the militancy of the unskilled, low- 
paid, semi-proletarian layers of peasant and women workers into 
organised struggle.
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TRADE UNIONS AND THE BETTERMENT OF WAGES
A. STRIKES AND INFLATION
Although the cost of living had more than tripled between 1914 
and January 1917, the wartime rate of inflation was as nothing 
compared to the rate for 1917. Strumilin estimates that in the 
course of that year official fixed prices in Petrograd increased 
2.3 times, while market prices rose a staggering 34 times. He 
calculated that the daily calorie intake of a working man (3,600 
calories) cost 2r.95k. at fixed prices in May but 27r.61k. at market 
prices; two months later, it would have cost 6r.37k. and 37r.l9k. 
respectively. Stepanov, using budget and price data, reckoned that
by October 1917 the cost of living in Petrograd was 14.3 times
2 higher than the prewar level (mixing fixed and market prices). In
table 16 are reproduced Stepanov's calculations of monthly real wage 
levels in six factories between January and October 1917. It is 
apparent that despite huge increases in nominal wages, by October real
wages were down by between 10% and 60% on the January level which, of
3 course, was well below the prewar level.
Not unexpectedly, spiralling inflation had the effect of pushing 
more and more workers to strike for higher wages. Nationally, the
1. Strumilin, S.G., Zarabotnaya Plata i proizvoditernost 1 truda _y_ 
promyshlennosti, M., 1923, p.25; Strumilin, S.G., Problemy 
ekonomiki trucfa, p.352.
2. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda^v period podgotovki i provedeniya 
oktyabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, M.L., 1965, p.53. It is 
impossible to construct an accurate price index for Petrograd in 
1917, in view of inflation and the paralysis of statistical agencies. 
Stepanov's calculations are the best one can hope for.
3. The decreases were smaller in percentage terms in low-wage in­ 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































monthly number of strikers rose from 35,000 in April, to 175,000 
in June, to 1.1 million in September to 1.2 million in October. 
The geographical area covered by strikes broadened out from the 
Petrograd and Central Industrial Region in spring, to the whole of 
European Russia by autumn. All the time, strikes became more or­ 
ganised, more large-scale and more militant. Strikes were a 
politicising experience for those who took part in them: they saw 
with their own eyes how employers were going on investment strike, 
engaging in lockouts, refusing to accept new contracts or to repair 
plant; how the government was colluding with the employers, curbing 
the factory committees and sending troops to quell disorder in the 
Donbass. The strikes were important, therefore, in making hundreds 
and thousands of workers aware of political matters and in making 
the policies of the Bolshevik party attractive to them. Yet from 
a practical point of view, strikes were less and less effective. 
Their chief aim was to achieve wage increases in line with the 
cost-of-living, but in practice workers were falling further and 
further behind inflation. As the economic crisis deepened, employers 
were no longer either willing or able to concede huge increases and 
increasingly they preferred the prospect of closure and redundancies 
to that of bankruptcy caused by a high wages bill. In Petrograd strike 
activity did not conform to the national pattern. There was a 
plethora of strikes of a spontaneous, atomised character in the 
spring (see Chapter 3), at a time when the working class nationally 
was relatively calm. The economic crisis set in early in the capital
4. Gaponenko, L.S., Rabochii klass Rossii v 1917g., M., 1970, pp. 
378, 384, 436.
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however, because of its reliance on the transport system for fuel and 
raw materials, and it quickly dawned on labour leaders that in an 
economic crisis, strikes were not necessarily an effective weapon 
for defending jobs and living standards. The labour movement there­ 
fore, from early summer onwards, turned its attention to two al­ 
ternative modes of struggle: on the one hand, a fight for collective 
wage contracts to cover all workers in each branch of industry; and 
secondly, the battle for workers' control of production.
Workers in Petrograd did not stop going on strike after the 
early summer, but those workers who did strike were not, in the main, 
in the major factory industries. They were the workers who in the 
early months of the revolution had been considered "backward" - 
workers in non-factory industries, women etc. Because the focus of 
this study is on workers in factory industry, these strikes will 
not be examined, but it is important to mention them, in order to 
situate the struggle for collective wage contracts (tariffs) in 
context. In May and June there was a rash of strikes by market- 
stall tenders and shop assistants, envelope-makers and a threatened 
strike by railway workers. In June many of the strikes involved 
extremely low-paid women workers, principally laundrywomen, catering 
workers and women dye-workers, (who were on strike for four months). 
Others who struck over the summer included sausage-makers and building 
workers. All of these strikes were small, but in spite of the fact 
that they involved workers with no traditions of struggle, they were 
militant and fairly well-organised - throwing up strike committees 
and trade unions. In September there were three rather bigger strikes, 
led by unions of pharmacy employees, paper-workers and railway workers.
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Finally, as mentioned in chapter 5, there was an important strike 
by wood-turners in October. These strikes formed the background to 
the campaign for collective wage contracts.
B. THE CAMPAIGN FOR COLLECTIVE WAGE CONTRACTS ('TARIFFS')
In a matter of months in 1917, collective bargaining developed 
in Russia to a level which far outstripped that of Western Europe. 
Centralised collective bargaining was slow to develop in the West 
and was probably most advanced in Britain by 1914? but even there, 
bargaining at a regional or national level on questions of pay and 
hours was comparatively rare. The outbreak of war led to a big 
expansion of collective bargaining in Britain, with agreements on 
war bonuses and the emergence of Whitleyism; but the big lead en­ 
joyed by Britain in this area of labour relations was quickly lost 
to Russia in 1917.
In Russia the conclusion of collective wage contracts between 
trade unions and employers' associations, covering all workers in 
a branch of industry in one area, was one of the greatest achieve­ 
ments of the unions in 1917. The unions of Petrograd led the way in 
the conclusion of such contracts, or 'tariffs', as they were known.
25 contracts were signed in the capital up to October, and a
5 further 24 up to July 1918. Moscow, Sormovo, Khar'kov and the
Donbass slowly followed the example of the metropolitan unions, 
though employers' organisations put up stronger resistance to cen-
5. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, Pg., 1919, p.10.
237
tralised collective bargaining in these areas.
The trade union leaders of Petrograd were pushed into centralised 
collective bargaining by the spontaneous, atomised wages struggles 
of spring 1917. These had meant that the less well-organised, 
less strategically-placed workers had been unable to achieve in­ 
creases in wages on a par with those achieved by workers who were 
better-organised and whose skills were in demand. The localised 
character of these wage struggles had increased the already con­ 
siderable variation in wage levels between different factories in 
the same industry. It was in order to overcome growing unevenness 
in wage levels and to help the low-paid, that unions began to draw 
up contracts. A further consideration which disposed the unions 
towards collective bargaining was the fact that elemental wages 
struggles stultified efforts to create an organised, united labour 
movement. The board of the metalworkers' union issued a strongly- 
worded statement in early summer which said:
Instead of organisation we, unfortunately, now 
see chaos (stikhiya); instead of discipline 
and solidarity - fragmented actions. Today 
one factory acts, tomorrow another and the day 
after that the first factory strikes again- 
in order to catch up with the second. In 
individual enterprises, alas, we see not even 
purely mechanical factory actions, but irres­ 
ponsible actions by individual sections within 
the factory, such as when one section delivers 
an ultimatum to another. The raising of demands 
is often done without any prior preparation, 
sometimes by-passing the elected factory com­ 
mittee. The metalworkers' union is informed
6. Vestnik Metallista, 1917, 1, p.18.
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about factory conflicts only after demands 
have been put to management, and when both 
sides are already in a state of war. The 
demands themselves are distinguished by lack 
of consistency and uniformity.^
The contracts, which were drawn up by the unions, were designed 
to overcome such inconsistency. They sought, firstly, to specify 
the wage rates for all jobs in a particular industry and thus to 
rationalise the pay structure; secondly, to diminish differentials 
in earnings between skilled and unskilled workers; thirdly, they 
aimed to standardise working hours, improve working conditions, 
control hiring and firing and to establish a procedure for the 
arbitration of disputes.
Collective bargaining, generally, is a double-edged sword. 
From the point of view of labour, it marks an extension of trade- 
union power in the sphere of wage bargaining and the recognition 
by employers of trade-union legitimacy. From the viewpoint of capital, 
however, collective bargaining can be a means of incorporating unions 
into an established system of industrial relations and of under­ 
cutting the influence of the union rank-and-file in favour of 
'responsible' officials. In Petrograd some sections of employers 
and some circles of government were not unaware of the potential
o
advantages of collective bargaining, but their hopes were quickly 
dashed, since the balance of power in 1917 was so decisively tilted 
in favour of the unions. The result was that the SFWO tended to find
7. Za 2O let: k dvadtsati letiyu soyuza metallistov, ed. Rabinovich, V., L., 1926, pp. 98-y. ———————————————
8. See statement of the Special Council on Defence in Browder,
Government, vol. II, Stanford University Press, 1961, p. 170; and
statement by SFWO on 3 June, LGIA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 113, 1.86.
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union proposals unacceptable, and negotiations proved to be ex­ 
tremely protracted. In six cases, involving leatherworkers, glass- 
workers and bakers and others, no agreement could be reached and 
the unions forced through the contract unilaterally. Several unions, 
including the printers and paperworkers, threatened to go on strike 
in order to force the employers' hands. Most other unions, in­ 
cluding the metalworkers, threatened strike action in the course 
of negotiations. Collective wage contracts, therefore, did not 
come about without a fight.
C. THE METALWORKERS' CONTRACT
The following account of the conflict between the metalworkers' 
union and the metalworking section of the SFWO over the collective 
wage agreement is interesting not merely for what it shows about 
the relationship between organised labour and capital, but also for 
what it shows about the complex and often fraught relationship 
between the organised labour movement and the unorganised rank-and- 
file. It reveals how a section of the working class, considered to 
be one of the most 'backward 1 i.e. the chernorabochie (unskilled 
labourers) of the metal industry, organised in pursuit of their 
economic welfare and developed a revolutionary political conscious­ 
ness through the experience of this essentially 'economic 1 struggle. 
At the same time, the account shows how the militancy of the cherno­ 
rabochie came close to jeopoardising the contract being negotiated 
on their behalf by the union leaders.
In May a special rates commission was set up by the board of 
the metal union to collect information about wages in the 200
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different metal works of Petrograd and to investigate the 166 
different claims which had been made by metalworkers in March and 
April. The task of drawing up a contract was by no means easy, 
since there were about 300 different jobs in the metal industry. 
Nevertheless, after nearly two months' work the union produced a 
contract which divided metalworkers into four groups - highly skilled, 
skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. It employed three criteria to 
classify the 300 jobs in the industry into these four categories 
and to determine appropriate rates for each job: firstly, the 
necessary minimum for subsistence; secondly, the skill, training and 
precision required by each job; thirdly, the difficulty, arduousness 
or danger of the job. Each of the four groups was sub-divided into
three categories to take into account differences in length of
9 work experience. The union hoped to persuade the SFWO to accept
the wage rates proposed for each of the four categories in return 
for a promise of no further conflict while the contract was in 
force.
On 22 June negotiations between the union and the SFWO began, 
but almost immediately reached an impasse because of what A. 
Shlyapnikov, the Bolshevik leader of the union, described as the 
"groundless rejection by our factory delegates of all the SFWO pro­ 
posals, particularly the point about guaranteed productivity norms". 
The board of the union was prepared to agree to a productivity clause
9. MetalVist, 1-2, 17 August 1917, p.7
10. ibid., p.4.
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in the contract, but managed only with great difficulty to persuade 
the union delegates to accept such a clause. At a further delegate 
leeting on 2 July it was agreed to accept productivity clauses as 
a way of "maintaining production at a proper level" and of "removing 
the necessity for trivial personal supervision by members and organs 
of administration". The delegates furthermore agreed that the fixing 
of norms of output "puts on the agenda the question of workers' 
control of production as the necessary guarantee of both labour 
productivity and the productivity of the enterprise as a whole". 
Having gained agreement in principle to a productivity clause in the 
contract, the union went back to the negotiating table on July 12; 
but in the meantime the July Days had occurred, with the result that 
the SFWO took a much tougher line and clashes arose immediately over 
the size of the wage increases proposed by the union.
Meanwhile an explosive conflict had been building up among the 
low-paid workers of the metal industry, which centred on the Putilov 
works. Accelerating inflation was rendering the situation of the 
low-paid ever more desperate. Recognising that their weak position 
in the labour market was compounded by lack of organisation,
chernorabochie from factories throughout Petrograd met together on
12 9 April to form a union of unskilled workers. This existed only
for a couple of months and then dissolved into the metalworkers' 
union at the end of June. It was a short-lived but significant 
development, for it signalled that unskilled workers, having taken 
little part in the labour movement up to this time, were beginning
11. ibid., p.20.
12. Rabochaya Gazeta, 33, 16 April 1917, p.4.
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to move. It was at the Putilov works, where some 10,000 chernorabochie 
were employed, that the unskilled were most active. Wages at 
Putilov were lower than average and those of the unskilled were 
barely enough to keep body and soul together. The works committee 
was in negotiation with management in April and May over a wage 
rise, which would have given unskilled men a wage of six rubles a
day and unskilled women five rubles, but no agreement could be reached
13 on whether the new rates should be backdated. On 21 April the
works committee appealed to chernorabochie "to refrain from careless
and ill-considered actions at the present time and peacefully await
14 the solution of the problem by the works committee".
During May prices began to climb and food shortages became acute. 
By the beginning of June the distress of chernorabochie was deep. 
On 4 June chernorabochie from nine metal works on Vyborg Side met 
to formulate the demands which they wished the metalworkers' union 
to include in its forthcoming contract. They agreed to:
"recognise the necessity of conducting an 
organised struggle together with all workers 
in the metalworking industry and to decisively 
repudiate sectional actions except in excep- 
ti onal ci rcumstances".
They voted for a daily wage of twelve rubles for unskilled men and 
ten rubles for unskilled women; equal pay for women doing the same
jobs as men ; a sliding scale of wage increases to keep abreast of
15 inflation and an end to overtime.
13. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets v trekh revolyutsiyakh, M., 1933, pp. 327-8.
14. ibid., p.329.
15. Pravda, 77, 9 June 1917, p.4; Zemlya i Volya, 63, 9 June 1917, p.3.
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At the Putilov works the wage dispute dragged on. At the 
beginning of June several shops announced that they intended to go 
on strike. On 8 June the works committee beseeched them to change 
their minds, since the dispute was about to be referred to arbit­ 
ration by the Ministry of Labour. On 19 June the Ministry turned 
down the rates proposed by the works committee. In a flash, the 
whole workforce was out on strike. The works committee called on 
the charismatic Bolshevik agitator, Volodarskii to come to the factory 
to persuade the workers to return to work. The next day he managed 
to persuade most shops to end their strike, but those with high 
proportions of unskilled workers, such as the gun shop, embarked on 
a go-slow.
On 20 June the Petersburg Committee of the Bolshevik party held 
an emergency meeting to discuss the situation of Putilov. S.M. 
Gessen described how seething economic discontent at the factory was 
feeding political radicalism.
In the Narva district there is a sharp change 
of mood in our favour, as the recent elections 
(to the district soviet, SAS), won by the 
Bolsheviks, show. The Putilov works, which 
determines the mood of the whole district, has come 
come over decisively to our side. The militant 
mood of the Putilov works has deep economic 
roots. The question of wage increases is an acute 
one. From the very beginning of the revolution, 
the workers' demands for wage increases were not 
satisfied. Grozdev came to the factory and promised 
to satisfy their demands but did not fulfil his 
promises. On the 18 June demonstration the 
Putilovtsy bore a placard saying, "They have deceived 
us!...We will be able to restrain some Putilovtsy,
16. Mitel'man, M.I., 1917 god na Putilovskom zavode, L., 1939, p.98.
17. Gaza, op. cit., p.334.
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but if there are actions elsewhere, then the 
Putilov works will not be restrained and will 
drag other factories behind it
This proved to be a remarkably prescient analysis, since it 
correctly forecast the catalytic role which would soon be played 
by the Putilovtsy in bringing about the July Days.
On 21 June a meeting took place at the Putilov works of re­ 
presentatives from 73 metal works committees, from the union and 
from the socialist parties, to discuss the contract which the 
union was to begin to negotiate with the SFWO the following day. 
This meeting agreed unanimously to make preparations for joint 
action in support of the contract, including a general strike if
necessary; only a Baptist worker from the Baltic factory opposed this
19 proposal. The meeting passed a fiery resolution by 82 votes to 4,
with 12 abstentions, pledging support to the Putilovtsy but warning 
of the dangers of trying to go it a lone:-
The concerns of the Putilov workers are the 
concerns of the Petrograd proletariat as a 
whole...Partial economic action under present 
economic conditions can only lead to a dis­ 
organised political struggle by workers in 
Petrograd. We therefore propose that the 
Putilov workers restrain their justified 
displeasure at the conduct of the ministers 
who have delayed the solution of the con­ 
flict by every means. We believe it is 
necessary to prepare our forces for a speedy 
and general action. Furthermore, we propose 
to the Putilovtsy that they let the metal- 
workers' union conduct negotiations with the 
employers and ministers concerning their demands... 
We believe that even if the wage increases are now 
granted, the uninterrupted rise in the price 
of commodities and of accommodation will render
18. ibid., pp. 346-7.
19. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets na putyakh k oktyabryu, M.L., 1933, p.106 
(henceforward Gaza ii op. cit.y!
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this gain worthless. And so a decisive struggle 
is necessary to establish workers' control of 
production and distribution, which, in turn, 
requires the transfer of power into the hands 
of the Soviets.20
A Putilov worker, reporting on the conference for Pravda explained 
how the three-month struggle for better wages had radicalised his 
fellow-workers:
We have seen with our own eyes...how the 
present Provisional Government refuses to 
take the resolute measures against the 
capitalists, without which our demands 
cannot be satisfied. The interests of 
the capitalists are dearer to it than the 
interests of the working class.21
By the end of June the labour organisations of Putilov could no 
longer restrain the militancy of the low-paid, and found themselves 
in danger of being sucked into the maelstrom of discontent. An
angry crowd beat up members of the board of the consumer cooperative,
22 claiming that they were selling products of poor quality. On 26
June the works committee and the district soviet set up a 
'revolutionary committee' to keep order at the factory. A Bolshevik 
member of the works committee, I.N. Sokolov, reported:
The mass of workers in the factory...are
in a state of turmoil because of the low
rates of pay, so that even we, the members
of the works committee, have been seized
by the collar, dragged into the shops and told:
'Give us money 1 .
By 3 July the labour organisations could restrain the workers no 
longer. Having made contact with revolutionary regiments, they
20. Rabochaya Gazeta, 89, 24 June 1917, p.4.
21. Gaza, op. cit., pp. 349-50.
22. Gaza ii, op. cit., p.109.
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23 emptied onto the streets. The secretary of the Petrograd Soviet,
the Bolshevik A. Tsvetkov-Prosveshchenskii, attended a factory 
meeting at Putilov on 3 July and recalled:
The mood of the workers was so agitated 
that any speaker who spoke against the 
action, including even the Bolsheviks, 
was not allowed to speak and was inter­ 
rupted by cries of 'Clear off 1
The debacle in which the July Days culminated seems to have had 
little effect on the movement of the low-paid. On 1 July the first 
proper delegate conference of chernorabochie had taken place, with 
representatives from 29 of the largest factories. This demanded
fixed prices on subsistence commodities and voted against action by
25 individual factories. On 7 July the chernorabochie at Putilov met
together to declare that they could no longer live on 6r.20k. a day. 
They demanded 10 rubles and a "curb on the rapacious appetites of 
those blood-suckers and pirates who speculate in everyday necessities". 
Three days later the second delegate conference of chernorabochie 
met to discuss the deadlock which had overtaken negotiations on the 
contract.
On 12 July negotiations between the metalworkers' union and the 
SFWO resumed. The draft contract recommended hourly rates of 2r. to 
2r.20k. for the highly skilled, lr.90k. for skilled workers; lr.75k.
for semi-skilled workers and rates of between Ir. and lr.50k. for
27 unskilled male workers, falling to 80k. for unskilled female workers.
23. For an excellent account of the July Days see Rabinowitch, A., 
Prelude to Revolution, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1968, esp. pp. 147-151.
24. Gaza ii, op. cit., p.114.
25. ibid., p.110.
26. ibid., p.112.
27. Vestnik Metallista, 1, p.16.
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The SFWO did not object to the rates proposed for skilled categories, 
but rejected outright the rates proposed for the unskilled, since 
the relative cost of conceding the wage increases to the low-paid 
would have been much greater than the cost of the increases to 
highly-paid. Instead the employers proposed an hourly rate of 70k. 
to 80k. for unskilled men and 60k. for unskilled women and between
po
Ir.SOk. and lr.50k. for semiskilled workers. Stalemate ensued and 
it was agreed to turn to government arbitration.
Against the advice of the Bolshevik Central Committee, which had 
not yet recovered from the battering it received at the hands of the 
Kerensky government after the July Days, the Bolshevik leaders of 
the metalworkers' union began to make preparation for a general 
strike. The blockage of the contract negotiations had created a 
further groundswell of discontent among metalworkers and convinced 
the union leadership of the need to prepare for action. At Putilov 
around 17 July, mortise-makers, borers, planers and saddle-makers
were all on strike - to the annoyance of the shop and works committees -
29 but it was not until 22 July that general unrest flared up. On
that day the government arbitration commission announced its final 
decision: chernorabochie were to get 10% less than was proposed by 
the contract, but more than was on offer from the SFWO. The SFWO, 
however, immediately announced that it would not accept the decision. 
The next day a meeting of union delegates from the factories agreed, 
with one vote against and one abstention, to call a general strike.
28. Pravda, 93, 28 June 1917, p.4; Za 2O let, pp. 105, 112.
29. Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety Petrograda v 1917g., M., 1979,
p7459 (henceforward Fab, zav.
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The response to the SFWO's rejection of the arbitration settle­ 
ment was instant. On 25 July 152 chernorabochie from 52 factories 
met at the Putilov works and backed the previous day's decision by 
the union to call a general strike. They also passed the following 
political resolution:
We...protest most decisively against the policies 
of the Provisional Government, which is horse-trading 
with the capitalists and the Kadets. We demand the 
immediate transfer of power into the hands of 
revolutionary leaders (vozhdei), i.e. into the 
hands of the Soviets of workers', soldiers' and 
peasants' deputies. Only they can save the country 
from starvation and destruction both at the Front 
and the Rear. But Messrs. Pal'chinskii and Co. 
can save nothing and only make the state of the 
country worse. We also demand the immediate 
dispersal of the State Duma and State Council and 
the bringing to book of those who slander the 
party activists. We protest against the per­ 
secution of comrade Lenin* and against the destruc- o 
tion of our political and trade-union organisations.
No sooner had the chernorabochie committed themselves to a 
general strike, than they were overtaken by events. The Ministry of 
Labour announced that the settlement proposed by the arbitration 
commission would be made binding on the employers. On 26 July a 
further meeting of metalworkers' delegates met to discuss whether 
or not to go ahead with the strike, in view of the government's 
decision. The feeling expressed by most factory delegates was that 
it would be very difficult to sustain a strike in the existing con­ 
ditions. The union and the leaders of all the socialist parties 
recommended acceptance of the arbitration settlement, but whilst 
the delegates agreed to call off the strike, they voted unanimously,
30. Gaza ii, op. cit., p.129. At the point marked by the asterisk, 
this resolution has been bowdlerised by Stalinist editors in 
order to exclude the names of Trotsky, Zinoviev et <al_.
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with ten abstentions, not to accept the 10% reduction in the wage
31 rates for chernorabochie decided by the arbitration commission.
In spite of this the board of the union resolved to go ahead 
and accept the reduced offer made by the arbitration commission. 
It managed to cajole a delegate meeting into accepting the com­ 
promise as the best they could hope to achieve. On 7 August the
32 contract was duly signed. The union may have thought that its
problems were now over, but they had not counted on either the 
continuing opposition to the rates agreed in the wage contract or 
to the difficulties of actually implementing the contract. Some 
of the strongest opposition to the contract came from workers in 
state enterprises. The Artillery Administration accepted the con­ 
tract in principle but expressed opposition to some of its clauses. 
Workers in the enterprises subject to the Artillery Administration 
insisted on ratification of the contract in full, although they felt 
the rates to be too low. In spite of some pressure to increase the 
rates from rank-and-file workers, the full contract was implemented 
by the Artillery Administration on 26 September. In the Naval 
Department rank-and-file opposition to the wage levels in the con­ 
tract was far more powerful. A conference of workers in enter­ 
prises subject to the Department accepted the principles of the
33 tariff on 11 September but upped the rates. This led to wrangles
between the Naval Department, the Naval works committees and the 
metalworkers' union and a decision was made to hold a ballot of all 
workers under the Naval Department. At the Baltic works on 16
31. Za 2O let, pp. 117-8; LGIA, f. 1477, op. 3, k. 1, 1.66.
32. Vestnik Metal!ista, 1, pp. 1-6. The SFWO signed reluctantly. 
At a meeting of the Petrograd district section of the city SFWO 
on 3 August A.G. Berger urged colleagues to accept the contract, 
since, although its wage rates were high, it would make for uni­ 
formity and, moreover, made provision for piece rates and pro­ 
ductivity deals. LGIA, f. 1278, op. 1, d. 183, 1.127.
p.387.
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October the works committee discussed whether or not to accept the 
original terms of the contract. A Bolshevik resolution recommending
acceptance was passed by 29 votes to 15 against an anarchist
34 resolution supporting higher rates and smaller differentials.
The result of the general ballot, however, was to reject the 
original contract by 27,000 votes to 23,000. 35 The contract had still 
not been accepted in the enterprises of the Naval Department at the 
time of the October Revolution.
The unskilled workers in the metal industry reluctantly accepted 
the contract? but rocketing inflation meant that by the time the 
contract came inbforce,its rates for the unskilled were already 
below subsistence level. In general, chernorabochie resigned them­ 
selves to the contract, feeling that even a small increase would 
stave off destitution. At Putilov the chernorabochie on 28 July 
agreed not to accept the arbitration commission compromise, but
o/r
later changed their minds. However a further round of emeutes 
broke out at the factory because management refused to backdate the 
contract to March. The works committee desperately appealed for 
calm at the beginning of August.
Comrades 1 His Majesty the Working Class, the 
Proletariat, is only truly majestic when it is 
united, not fragmented, when the will of thous­ 
ands is represented as a single will...to our 
great regret, by no means all comrades are 
aware of this. Habits of the old order, now 
sunk into oblivion, have left deep traces 
among the unconscious section of the workforce... 
Now the situation is such that neither the
34. ibid., pp. 395-6.
35. ibid., p.404.
36. Gaza, op. cit., p.306.
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employer, the directors, the shop manager or 
foreman has the right to increase or decrease 
earnings. That requires the permission, the 
sanction of the general boss (Obshchego Khozyeina), 
which for the workers is their national or the 
Petrograd union, and for the employers, the SFWO... 
Recently several sections of workers have gone on 
strike solely in order to speed up the examination 
of their demands, paying no regard whatever to 
the fact that those representatives elected by 
them to defend their rights are exhausting them­ 
selves, trying to satisfy therr just demands... 
and to achieve a quick solution to the problem. 
In the present situation, by your strikes, com­ 
rades, you only provide more ammunition for your 
enemies... Finally, we must recognise that the 
essence of the problem of the suffering, starving, 
impoverished people lies in the general political 
situation ofythe country and in the general econ­ 
omic chaos.
At Putilov, as elsewhere, the contract was implemented in the 
course of September and temporarily relieved the misery of the 
chernorabochie; but inflation continued to rise steeply and to plunge 
the low-paid towards beggary. Immiseration, together with deep 
political frustration at the Provisional Government's failure to 
tackle the pressing problems afflicting the people of Russia, 
encouraged chernorabochie in the Petrograd metal industry to keep 
meeting together. During August three conferences took place to 
discuss redundancies, the growing counter-revolutionary threat and 
the crisis of the Kerensky government.
To implement the contract, rates commissions were created in the 
factories to distribute workers into wage categories and to fix price 
rates. These commissions comprised an equal number of worker and
management representatives. All disputes were referred by the
39 factory committees to a Central Rates Commission. With inflation
37. Rabochii KontroT i natsionalizatsiya promyshlennykh predpriyatii 
Petrograda v I9l7-13gg., vol. I, L., 1947, pp. 137-140 (hencefor­ 
ward Rabochii kontrol').
38. Gaza ii, op. cit., p.130; Mitel'man, op. cit., p.133.
39. Metallist, 1922, 12, p.43; Vestnik Metal!ista, 1, p.47.
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soaring wildly, it was natural that workers should attempt to achieve 
as high a wage classification for themselves as possible. The 
refusal of the rates commissions to capitulate to such sectional 
pressure engendered bitter conflict. At the Putilov works a general 
meeting of planers, borers and mortise-makers called on workers in
these three crafts In all factories to come to a conference to
40 discuss their low categorisation in the contract. In the crucible
shop workers walked out in mid-September when they learnt the 
category to which they had been assigned. A general meeting of 
workers in the gun shop called on them to return to work, saying
"your strike only plays into the hands of the employers and dis-
41 organises the solid ranks of Putilov workers". In the shrapnel
shop some workers tried to induce the foremen to introduce bonuses
42 on their piece rate in order to boost their earnings. At the New
Parviainen works some 200 fitters and turners in the repair depart­ 
ment went on strike to protest their contract classification at the
beginning of October - an action lauded by anarchists but deplored
43 by the Bolshevik factory committee. Some time later chernorabochie
at the factory demanded an equal wage for all workers regardless of
44 skill - a demand turned down by a general factory meeting. At the
Rosenkrantz works contract disputes had to be referred to the Central 
Rates Commission, which finally announced its decision in early
40. Gaza ii, op. cit., p.128.
41. Stepanov, op. cit., p.82.
42. Pankratova, A. 5 Fabzavkomy i profsoyuzy v revolyutsii 1917g., 
M.L., 1927, p.40.
43. Novaya Zhizn', 148, 6 October 1917, p.4; Rabochii Put', 35, 
13 October 1917- p.4.
44. Vogne revolyutsionnykh boev, vol. II, M., 1971, p.43.
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November. When the decision became known, several groups of workers 
placed in category III appeared at the director's office armed with 
rifles to demand reclassification. When the director pointed out 
that they were flagrantly contravening the decision of the Commission, 
the workers retorted: "We spit on the union and on its rates commission". 
A similar incident occurred a few days later at the factory, and when 
Shlyapnikov, now the Commissar of Labour in the new Bolshevik
government, heard about it, he ordered the district Soviet to arrest
45 the perpetrators of violence. At the Erikson works electricians
carted out a foreman, but a general meeting of workers insisted that 
the electricians apologise, on pain of dismissal. 46 At the Cable,
in
Anchar and Baranovskii works chernorabochie engaged,brief strikes in 
protest against the low rates of the contract. In a few factories 
management was coerced into paying more than the going rate, but 
the metalworkers' union strongly opposed this, suggesting to
the SFWO that it fine any of its members who did not abide by the
48 contract. As early as August, Shlyapnikov wrote a stern article
in the union journal condemning sectional opposition to the contract:
We propose to comrades dissatisfied with the 
rates commissions to send petitions directly to 
the union and not to try to settle disputes out 
of court, so as not to bring disorganisation 
into our ranks...Our contract does not open the 
gates to the kingdom of socialism...it is an 
agreement between two warring sides and thus has 
force only in so far as each side is organised.49
45. Vserossiiskaya tarifnaya konferentsiya soyuzov metallistov, Pg., 
1918, pp. 136-7 (henceforward Tarifnaya konferentsiya).
46. ibid., p.137.
47. Rabochii Put', 26, 30 October 1917, p.4; Novyi Put', 1-2, 
15 October 1917, p. 15; Tarifnaya Konferentsiya, p. 137.
48. Vestnik Metallista, 1, p.48.
49. Metallist, 1917, 1-2, p.6.
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Three months later Shlyapnikov imputed such sectionalism to exclusive 
groups of craft workers in the industry:
There cannot be several unions in one 
enterprise - all trades must unite in one 
family...Every attempt by individual trades 
to use the 'right moment 1 to raise separate, 
particularist demands is inadmissible. The 
conscious layers of skilled metalworkers - 
fitters, turners, etc. - understand this 
beautifully, and refrain from any separate 
demands. The same position is taken by the 
very unfortunate, badly-paid chernorabochie. 
Despite the severity of their situation, 
separate demands by chernorabochie are rare. 
Particularism is apparent chiefly among small 
trades such as welders, who scarcely exceed 
a thousand people in the whole of Piter, 
also pattern-makers, stokers, draughtsmen, 
who constitute an extremely limited number, 
but who are imbued with prejudices to the 
effect that their own profession is quali­ 
tatively different from any other and that 
they cannot collaborate with others in the 
defence of their interests.50
Shlyapnikov was here minimising the degree of opposition to the 
contract on the part of chernorabochie, for it was soon to become a 
thorn in the side of the new Bolshevik government.
In spite of the many problems involved in implementing the con­ 
tract, it was in operation in the majority of factories by October. 
This was no mean achievement, given the intractability of the in­ 
dustrial crisis. Sectional opposition to the contract was basically 
a response to this crisis rather than evidence of strong, particularism 
or craft exclusiveness in the working class, and its importance should 
not be exaggerated. In the last analysis, the fact that the union 
was able to implement its contract among some 200,000 workers attests
50. Metallist, 5, 9 November 1917, p.2.
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the fact that pressures towards class unity were stronger than those
51 towards sectionalism.
D. THE WAGE CONTRACTS: THEIR KEY FEATURES
A central aim of union policy in drawing up contracts was to 
reduce wage differentials in each industry. The printers' union was 
a pioneer in this respect. The printers' union was the first in 
Petrograd to draw up a collective wage contract in March^and^in 
effecting it, it fought hard against sectionalism within the print 
workforce. Printers had been unique among skilled workers in 
Petrograd in suffering a sharp decline in real wages during the war
(by the end of 1916 they were 33% down on the 1913 level) and in
52 suffering from unemployment. There was thus a considerable head
of pressure behind economic demands in March. The union leaders 
determined to reduce wage differentials by raising the rates of 
unskilled printers by 90% to 100%, compared to an increase of 50% for 
skilled printers. This provoked opposition from a minority of type­ 
setters, mainly those in state print works. They set up a liaison 
committee of state print works which tried to negotiate a separate
wage contract, involving vast increases of 75r. to 80r. a month for
53 the highly skilled, compared to 20r. to 30r. for the unskilled.
51. The degree of sectional opposition to the contracts was less in 
other industries, though it is evident among type-setters 
(egged on by Bolsheviks), journeymen weavers and among some 
leatherworkers. Tkach, 1, November 1917, p.31; Tikhanov, A., 
'Rabochie-pechatniki v 1917G.', Materialy po istorii professional'nogo 
dvizheniya v Rossii, vol. 4, M., 1925, p.190; Golos Kozhevnika^ 
4-5, 1 December 1917, p.14.
52. Tikhanov, A., 'Rabochie-pechatniki v gody voiny', Materialy po
istorii professional'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii, vol. 3, M., 1925, p. 114
53. Pechatnoe Delo, 4, 10 July 1917, pp. 7, 13.
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One angry member of this committee wrote to the union journal lam­ 
basting it for "putting the wretched water-carrier's nag on a par
54 with the drayman's fine mare". The union rode the storm, but when
it came to renegotiating the contract in June, opposition again 
burst forth. Debate raged in the pages of the union journal as to 
the virtues of a "levelling" tariff. K.P. Tik gave a classic 
defence of wage differentials, arguing that type-setters were not 
getting reward for their skills and were scarcely better off than 
'bums' (khamy) who spent their time playing cards and getting drunk. 
A union spokesman delivered a vigorous counter-blast, enquiring why
type-setters were so different from other skilled workers, and why
55 unskilled workers should not also live decently. The union was
forced to make some concession to craft pressure, -for the second 
wage contract increased differentials slightly. Negotiation of 
this contract went less smoothly than in March, as the employers 
refused to backdate it to August 1. This caused the union to bring
out twenty print works, employing 3,000 printers, in a well-organ-
57ised strike in August. The employers capitulated, but were con­ 
demned for doing so by the SFWO, and the new contract came into 
effect from September. The compromise contract, which moderated earlier 
demands for control of hiring and firing and longer holidays, pro­ 
voked discontent among some rank-and-file printers, for example, at
54. Tikhanov, A., op. cit., vol. 4, p.166.
55. Pechatnoe Delo, 5, 22 July 1917, pp. 9-10.
56. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, Pg., 1919, pp. 52-3.
57. Pechatnoe Delo, 8, 1 September 1917, p.3; Delo Naroda, 118, 
4 August 1917, p.4; Delo Naroda, 126, 13 August 1917, p.4.
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the Kan print works and among envelope makers; the Bolsheviks 
did not fail to exploit/ In spite of this, it is not possible to 
accuse the union of giving into craft sectionalism. It successfully 
resisted pressure from the aristocratic sections of type-setters 
and pursued a strict class policy in its conduct of the wages 
struggle* it must have had the backing of most printers, since 
no less than 90% of them were members of the union by the summer -
thus making them the most highly unionised of any group of industrial
, 58 workers.
In the metal industry differentials increased during the war 
and by 1917 were larger than in any other industry, except the glass 
industry - where the very high earnings of an aristocratic elite 
of glass-blowers made for an especially wide differential between 
top and bottom earnings (see Table 17). The metal union tried to 
combat this trend by assigning larger percentage increases to the 
low-paid than to the higher-paid. They specifically repudiated the
principle of an equal wage for all, however, though this principle
59 won some support from chernorabochie in the autumn. The huge
diminution in differentials which came about in the metal industry 
between 1917 and 1918 was due less to union policy than to 
plummeting real wages. By the spring of 1918 money wages accounted 
for an ever-decreasing part of real income, much of which was now 
paid in kind. By April 1918 the metal union felt that levelling had 
gone far enough and between July and September it increased dif­ 
ferentials from 1.39:1 to 1.75:1. 60
58. Tikhanov, op. cit., vol. 4, p.162.
59. Metallist, 1922, 12, p.42. See the speech by Konovalenko on 
behalf of the unskilled at the first national metalworkers' 
tariff conference on 17 October, Tarifnaya Konferentsiya, p.58.
60. Strumilin, Zarabotnaya Plata, pp. 35-6.
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Table 17
Wage Differentials among Factory Workers in Petrograd 1917-18 
The daily wage of the highest-paid category of workers expressed 
as a percentage of the daily wage of the lowest-paid category
(= 100)
Collective Wage 0/ n . XJ.3 % Difference
Contract —————————————————
1 June 1 Oct. 1 Jan. 1 April 1 July 


















































































































Source: Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, Pg., 1919, pp.22-3
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Another interesting aspect of contracts concerned their policy 
on piece rates. Piece rate systems had been the bane of workers' 
lives under the old order and after February workers clamoured to 
abolish them. Although all the wage contracts were drawn up on the 
basis of fixed hourly rates, not all of them ruled out piece rates 
however. The leatherworkers' union, for example, placed the demand 
for the total abolition of piece work to the fore of its campaign 
for a wage contract, but in July the Skorokhod shoe factory agreed 
to the restoration of piece rates, terminated in March, in return 
for management ratification of the rest of the contract. 61 On 15
August the union announced that it had decided to accept the SFWO
fi? recommendation to revive piece rates throughout the industry. The
woodturners' contract specified that piece rates should be determined
CO
jointly by the SFWO and the union. The metalworkers' union included 
piece rates as part of the productivity package which they promised 
the SFWO. In early October a meeting of 217 members of factory rates 
commissions in the metal industry agreed that piece rates need not
CA
be a means of 'wringing sweat 1 from the workers. However some 
union leaders, such as Ryazanov, considered piece rates to be the 
materialisation of the capitalist work ethic and profoundly inimical 
to socialism. There is no doubt that piece rates were a powerful 
factor disposing the SFWO to accept contracts. In early September 
the employers' newspaper opined:
61. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v iyule i iyul'skii krizis, M., 1959, p.341
62. Golos Kozhevnika, 4-5, p.21.
63. Ekho derevoobdelochnika, 2, 19 October 1917, p.14.
64. Metallist, 4, 18 October 1917, pp. 8-9.
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The other extremely important point in our 
collective wage contracts concerns the intro­ 
duction of piece rates...against which the 
workers fought so energetically until recently. 
This is dictated by the necessity of raising fit. 
labour productivity, which has fallen so low.
One of the most controversial aspects of the contracts was 
their productivity clauses. Employers were implacable in their 
insistence that in return for a guaranteed wage there should be 
guaranteed output. As we have seen, metal union leaders had to 
overcome strong opposition from rank-and-file delegates to get this 
principle accepted. In September the Provisional Central Committee 
of the national metalworkers' union ordered local branches to pay 
heed to productivity:
We must be sure that the organised masses bring 
into the new world which we are making a definite 
level of production, we must be confident that 
the working masses will enter the new system 
with a culture of production (proizvodstvennaya 
kul'tura) which will guarantee them from chaos fifi 
under the new, free forms of economic management.
The establishment of these 'new, free forms' in practice was to show 
how difficult it was to avoid chaos. The chemical workers' contract 
included a productivity clause almost identical in wording to that 
of the metalworkers' contract. The paperworkers' contract specified 
that norms of output should be agreed jointly by management and workers 
and that in case of non-fulfilment of norms, workers should receive 
only two-thirds the agreed rate.
65. Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 195, 8 September 1917, p.2.
66. Metallist, 1922, 12, p.22.
67. Prof. Dvizh., pp. 164-5.
68. Pischebumazhnik, 2-3, 21 October 1917, p.19.
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'Equal pay for equal work 1 was a phrase which figured in most 
contracts, but it is difficult to ascertain what it actually meant. 
The demand for equal pay was not one which figured much in the 
struggles of women workers prior to 1917. 69 The RSDLP, in con­ 
trast to the German SPD, did not include a demand for equal pay in 
the party programme. This may have reflected the fact that very 
few Russian women did jobs identical to those of men. In 1917 
women began to raise the demand, but the unions and factory committees 
did relatively little to back them. When the metalworkers' union 
drew up plans for a contract, a meeting of delegates from the Vyborg 
district warned the leadership not to forget equal pay. 71 The 
contract included a clause on equal pay, but, significantly, the rates 
for unskilled women were lower than those for unskilled men. The 
same was true of the textile workers', printers', woodturners' and 
paperworkers' contracts and may have been true of the leatherworkers'
and chemical workers' contracts, although both included equal pay
72 clauses. The contracts thus did little to alter the relative pay
and status of women workers, in spite of putative support for the 
principle of equal pay.
All contracts included clauses on working hours and most unions 
managed to 'legalise 1 the eight-hour working day in their contracts. 
Provisions for overtime and holidays were also specified. Already
69. Glickman, R.L., 'The Russian Factory Woman, 1880-1914',
Women in Russia, ed., Atkinson, D., Dallin, A., and Lapidus, G., 
Standford University Press, 1977.
70. Vtoroi S"ezd RSDRP, 1903, Protokoly, M., 1959, pp. 198-207; 
Thonnessen, op. cit., p.54.
71. Pravda, 77, 9 June 1917, p.4.
72. Vestnik professional'nykh soyuzov, 1, 20 May 1917, p.13; 
Tkach, 1, pp. 21-2; Delo Naroda, 172, 5 October 1917, p.4; 
Ekho derevoobdelochm'ka, 2, p.14; Prof. Dvizh., p.154.
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the prospect of growing unemployment was a serious one and so 
unions tried to get employers to agree to redundancy terms and to 
payment for temporary stoppages. They were fairly successful in this. 
Less successful was the attempt to get employers to recognise the 
de facto control of hiring and firing that was in force; several 
unions, including the print union agreed to drop this demand in the 
course of negotiations.
It is difficult to evaluate the overall success of the contracts. 
In terms of their overriding objective, i.e. that of improving the 
material conditions of workers, they were a depressing failure, but 
this was due not to faults in the contracts themselves, but to 
spiralling inflation. In other respects, the contracts were not 
an overwhelming victory for labour against capital: they bore all the 
hallmarks of compromise, as is evidenced by reductions in the rates 
proposed by the unions, productivity clauses and piece rates. 
Nevertheless, workers made some real gains, both in wages and hours, 
holidays and even job security - no mean feat, when viewed against 
the background of accelerating economic chaos. The contracts were 
most significant, however, in that they overcame the situation of 
spring 1917 in which different groups of workers each fought for 
themselves and left the weakest to go to the wall. In spite of 
sectional opposition from some quarters, the contracts succeeded in 
overcoming variation in wages and, so far as it was possible, in 
strengthening the position of the weakest sections of the working 
class. Finally, the regulation of wages across whole industries, via 
centralised collective bargaining, marked a new stage in labour 
relations, not just in Russia, but internationally.
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E. RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS AND SLUZHASHCHIE
The period between February and October 1917 saw a surge of 
organisation and militancy among white-collar workers in the factories. 
The February Revolution was crucial in severing some of the bonds 
which bound white-collar workers to management, and in encouraging 
them to form independent organisations of a trade-union type. In 
the honeymoon period of the revolution, i.e. in the months of March 
and April, clerical and technical personnel went to great lengths 
to repair relations with workers on the shop floor, to make a fresh 
start. This was exemplified in some factories by the desire of 
white-collar workers to be represented on the factory committees. 
In early March office-workers at the Triangle and Rosenkrantz works
elected delegates to the works committees. At the Arsenal works a
73 representative of the foremen sat on the committee. At the
Admiralty works white-collar workers were allowed four represen­ 
tatives on the committee, but in April it was reported that they
74 were not attending meetings. Generally speaking, white-collar
workers set up their own committees independent of the workers' 
committees. At the Baltic works white-collar workers not only had 
a works committee but also committees in each shop. Labour leaders 
made periodic pleas for manual and white-collar workers to unite 
their committees, but with only limited success. At the First 
Factory Committee Conference in June, Levin, an SR and organiser of
73. Baklanova, I.A., Rabochie Petrograda v period mirnogo razvitiya 
revolyutsii, L., 1978, pp. 94-5.~
74. Fab, zav. kom., p.36, 57.
75. ibid., p.344.
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the conference, called on factory committees to embrace clerical 
and technical personnel. At the Tentelevskii chemical works on 
1 August workers and salaried employees did agree to dissolve their 
separate committees. At the Triangle works the three committees
of manual, clerical and technical staff formed a joint executive in
78 September. At the beginning of October committees of workers and
salaried employees in factories under the Naval Department amal­ 
gamated. Yet these were not typical. In most, though by no means 
all, factories in the capital, manual and white-collar workers 
continued to have separate organisations at enterprise level.
The growth of trade unionism among sluzhashchie was remarkable, 
in view of their lack of organisation under the old order. In the 
spring and summer of 1917 about thirty unions of sluzhashchie sprang 
to life in Petrograd, which, by a process of fusion, decreased in 
number to around fifteen by October. White-collar workers in 
factories were organised into a number of different unions. Some 
were members of the largest union of sluzhashchie, the union of 
commercial and industrial employees (soyuz torgovo-promyshlennykh 
sluzhashchikh), which by October had about 26,000 members. Most of 
its members were shopworkers, however, which meant that many clerical 
and technical staff felt unhappy about joining this union ("What has
an office-worker in common with a sausage-maker?" being a prevalent
79 attitude). In addition, the union had a strong Bolshevik leader-
76. Okt. Rev, i Fabzavkomy, vol. I, p.117
77. ibid., p.260.
78. Stepanov, op. cit., p.111.
79. Bor'ba, 1917, 1, pp. 7-9.
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ship, which alienated some white-collar workers and encouraged a
group of Mensheviks to form a break-away 'union of factory
sluzhashchie', which had a very limited success in the Petrograd
on
and Vasilevskii districts of the capital. The largest of the 
solely white-collar unions was the union of clerical workers (soyuz 
lits zanimaynshchikhsya kontorskim trudom) which, by October, had
a membership of around 20,000 and included many workers in factory
81 offices. The union of factory foremen and technicians had about
6,000 members in October and the union of draughtsmen about 2,000.
op
A small union of accountants also existed. Yet in the first half 
of 1917, none of these unions can really be said to have represented 
white-collar workers in the factories. Instead, they were represented 
by a curious hybrid organisation which was part trade union and part 
factory committee.
The Central Council of Starosty of Factory Sluzhashchie (CCSFS)
/
was founded on 24 March and consisted of stewards elected by white- 
collar workers in each factory. By May white-collar workers in over 
200 factories were affiliated to the CCSFS, which aspired to represent 
sluzhashchie both inside and outside industry, but in practice 
represented mainly sluzhashchie in industry, since those in commercial
80. Antoshkin, D., Ocherk dvizheniya sluzhashchikh v Rossii, M., 
1921, p.70.
81. Prof. Dvizh., pp. 346-7.
82. ibid., pp. 347, 349. The political complexion of the unions of 
sTuzhashchie was more diverse than that of manual trade unions. 
At the first national congress of white-collar unions in July 
1917, representing 103 unions and 29 mutual aid societies, 
delegates included 66 Mensheviks, 50 SR's, 24 Bolsheviks, 16 
Popular Socialists, 14 Bundists, 13 Jewish Socialists, 3 
Trudoviks, 8 Plekhanovites, 4 Kadets and 11 non-party. Volin, 
op. cit., p.27.
266
and governmental institutions tended to organise through their 
different unions. The CCSFS was the first organisation of white- 
collar workers to pursue a militant economic policy. Its leaders, 
the Menshevik-Defencist, Novakovskii, and the Menshevik (but one- 
time Bolshevik) Yakovlev formulated a series of radical demands at 
the beginning of April, for a six-hour working day, wage increases, 
a minimum wage of 150r. a month, equal pay for women, overtime at 
time-and-a-half, recognition of the committees of sluzhaschie and
oo
control of hiring and firing. These demands were put to the SFWO, 
which took exception to the demands for a six-hour day and equal
pay. After abortive negotiation, the CCSFS resolved on 16 May to
84 call a strike. It called on the support of the factory committees
and of all white-collar workers. While most white-collar unions 
agreed to support the strike in principle, they made little effort 
to organise practical support. The union of foremen and technicians,
for example, left it up to each Factory to decide whether or not to
85go on strike. In the event the strike was averted by the inter­ 
vention of Grozdev at the Ministry of Labour, who persuaded the 
SFWO at the end of May to agree to wage rises and the six-hour day, 
although they would not concede the right to control hiring and
oc
firing. Having achieved a partial victory, the CCSFS rapidly went 
into decline. It had been held together mainly by the duumvirate 
of Novakovskii and Yakovlev and when both went to work in the 
Ministry of Labour, the CCSFS fell apart. By October the rocketing 
cost of living was causinci individual strikes of white-collar workers
83. Delo Naroda, 55, 19 May 1917, p.4.
84. Revolyutsiya 1917g: Khronika sobytii, vol. 2 (aprel'-mai) ed 
Avdeev, N., M.L., 1923, pp. 173-4; 180.
85. Vestnik professional'nykh soyuzov, 4, 7 November 1917, p. 12.
86. Delo Naroda, 125, 12 August 1917, p.l.
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of the Nevskii shipyard, Tudor, Aivaz and Ippolitov works, but
neither the CCSFS nor the clerical workers' union offered much in
87 the way of leadership.
It is difficult to generalise about the extent to which 
workers and sluzhashchie supported one another in their struggles. 
At the Putilov works on 2 June the works committee supported the 
demands raised by the CCSFS, but warned white-collar workers at the 
factory from taking any partial action pending the outcome of the
oo
Ministry of Labour's arbitration. A couple of weeks later clerical 
and technical personnel voted not to take joint action with the workers 
in support of the metalworkers' tariff, arguing that this would be 
a "stab in the back to organised revolutionary democracy and to our 
valiant revolutionary army which has shed its blood for free Russia".
At the Putilov shipyard white-collar workers applauded the June
89 Offensive and expressed admiration for Kerensky. On 19 July a
general meeting of clerical workers went on strike because they 
objected to a bonus system negotiated by the office-workers' union. 
Over half of the clerical staff were still earning a paltry 80r. to 
160r. a month at this time. The works committee condemned the 
strike as a 'disorganising' move, but the attempt to continue normal 
working whilst the clerical staff were on strike, caused disagree­ 
ment on the committee. Some members felt that moral support should 
be given to the strikers, whilst others considered it reprehensible. 
Apparently, there was little sympathy for the clerical staff on the
87. Kontorskii Trud, 2, November 1917, p.12
. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 446-7. 
89. Gaza ii, op. cit., p.106.
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shop floor, and the strikers sought the support of neither the 
shop floor nor the works committee. Several members of the works 
committee accused the clerical staff of seeking to set up an 
'office republic 1 , of flaunting class principles and of philistine, 
petit-bourgeois attitudes. The sanguinary Bolshevik, Evdokomov, was 
all for dispersing the strikers at gun-point: "Let a thousand perish, 
for 40,000 will be saved", but other Bolsheviks on the committee took 
a less inflammatory line. A resolution was passed by 14 votes to 1 5 
with three abstentions, calling on the clerical staff to end their
strike, since it was doomed to failure and/merely encourage
90 similar sectional strikes by other groups of workers.
A couple of weeks later, after the clerical workers' strike had 
collapsed, the works committee at Putilov felt it incumbent to issue 
a declaration to the workers, warning, amongst other things, 
against:
the erroneous view that people not engaged 
in physical labour are not to be tolerated, 
that they are basically drones and parasites. 
Comrades who argue thus lose sight of the 
crucial fact that in industry, in technical 
production, mental labour is as indispensable 
as physical labour.91
This prejudice towards white-collar workers was linked to a pre­ 
valent attitude within the working class which regarded only manual 
labour as authentic work, conferring dignity and moral worth on the 
worker.
90. Fab, zav. kom., p.460-4.
91. Rabochii kontrol', p.138.
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At the Baltic works the factory committee agreed on 31 May to 
back the demands of the CCSFS for a six-hour day and a month's 
holiday, but asked to know which employees would be affected. 
A month later, when white-collar workers began to unilaterally 
implement a six-hour day, there were protests from the shop floor, 
so the works committee called on the employees to wait until the 
text of the agreement between the CCSFS and the SFWO was published. 93 
On July 27 the works committee expressed concern at the effect on 
production of the six-hour day worked by accounts department staff. 94 
Relations between the works committee and sluzhashchie appear to 
have been rather strained.
At the Skorokhod shoe factory relations were better. From 
the first, junior employees cooperated closely with workers, and 
after the factory committee supported the CCSFS struggle, senior 
employees also swung towards the workers. On May 18 they published 
a declaration which announced:
We, the sluzhashchie of Skorokhod, do not regard 
ourselves as sluzhashchie, but as mental workers, 
and we will go hand in hand with our worker-comrades 
in other occupations.
The practical support given to the sluzhashchie by workers at
Skorokhod, Petichev cable works and elsewhere in their wage campaign
96 alarmed the SFWO. In September it called on the government to ban
92. Fab, zav. kom., p.250.
93. ibid., p.284.
94. ibid., p.305.
95. Istoriya obuvnoi fabriki 'Skorokhod', L., 1969, pp. 161-2.
96. Rabochii Kontrol', p.72.
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joint committees of workers and sluzhashchie, but with no success
On the whole, relations between mental and manual workers 
appear to have been fairly tense: instances of cooperation between 
the two sides being outnumbered by instances of outright antagonism. 
The general situation seems to have been accurately summed up by 
a draughtsman in September 1917:
In the majority of factories, the workers 
have their own organisation and the sluzhashchie 
theirs; each side keeps to itself and decides 
things for itself...there is no common under­ 
standing, but mutual disregard and animosity... 
There have been cases where workers have 
protested against the six-hour day and holi­ 
days, and sluzhashchie, in their turn, have 
blamed workers for not accepting the system 
of grades and for exploiting the present
situation in order to achieve absurd wage 
increases.97
97. Golos Chertezhnika, 3, 1 October 1917, p.5.
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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF WORKERS' CONTROL OF PRODUCTION
A. THE THEORY OF WORKERS' CONTROL
The whole subject of workers' control in the Russian Revolution 
is awash in confusion. There is not even an agreed theoretical 
definition of what consistutes 'workers' control of production'. 
Precisely what kinds of activities should we conceive as 'workers' 
control'? Can all the activities of the factory committees - which 
included struggles for higher wages, shorter hours and for the 
organisation of food supplies - be seen as part of workers' control? 
Soviet historians, such as V.I. Selitskii and M.L. Itkin, answer in 
the affirmative. Yet if one sees workers' control as operating 
on the terrain of struggles over the "appropriation of nature", as 
argued in the introduction, then it becomes obvious that not all 
factory committee activities can be subsumed into the category of 
workers' control. Z.V. Stepanov is correct to define as workers' 
control only those "measures, implemented by proletarian organis­ 
ations, and linked directly to intervention in the productive and 
commercial activity of the industrial enterprise, to the organis­ 
ation of multilateral accounting and to control of the whole of
2 production." It is difficult to go beyond this rather vague definition
1. Selitskii, V.I., 'Nekotorye voprosy bor 1 by petrogradskikh 
rabochikh za kontrol' nad proizvodstrom v period mirnogo 
razvitiya revolyutsii', Istoriya rabochego klassa Leningrada, 
issue 2, L., 1963 and Itkin, M.L., 'Nekotorye funktsii rabochego 
kontrolya v period podgotvki vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, Rabochi i 
klass i rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v 1917g., M., 1964.
2. Stepanov, Z.V., 'K voprosu o rabochem kontrole nad prozvodstrom 
i raspredeleniem', Istoriya SSSR, 1968, 4, pp. 225-8. For further 
discussion of this problem see Ignatenko, T.A., Sovetskaya 
istoriografiya rabochego kontrolya i natsionalizatsiya promyshlennosti 
v SSSR, 1917-67gg., M., 1971, pp. 203-5. "————————
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'Workers' control 1 is not a concept which can be determined with 
great theoretical rigour, for in historical reality workers' con­ 
trol took a plurality of forms and changed radically in character 
within a short space of time. Not all the forms of workers' con­ 
trol fit neatly into the category of struggles around "the approp­ 
riation of nature", but the advantage of this definition is that it 
excludes from analysis the important struggles around wages, hours 
and unemployment which were taking place, and orients us towards 
examining the various struggles at the point of production i.e. 
around the labour process and the social organisation of production 
in the enterprise. However theory can take us no further, for under 
the impact of revolutionary events workers' control soon ceased 
merely to operate in the sphere of "appropriation of nature" and 
spilt over into a struggle for the abolition of the capitalist 
system itself.
The second problem of a theoretical nature relates to whether
the struggle for workers' control is an 'economic' or 'political'
3 struggle. In What Is To Be Done? (1902), Lenin had argued that there
is a clear disjunction between the spontaneous 'economic 1 struggles, 
which generate "trade union consciousness", and political struggles, 
which are based on Social Democratic ideology introduced "from 
outside". Soviet historians have wracked their brains trying to de­ 
cide whether or not the struggle for workers' control is 'economic' 
or 'political 1 . In faithfulness to orthodoxy, they conclude that
3. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 6, M., 1959.
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the movement was essentially economic, but politicised by the 
"outside" intervention of the Bolshevik party. Western historians 
appear to be divided on the question. Paul Avrich sees the move­ 
ment for workers' control as essentially political, but sees its 
politics as syndicalist rather than Bolshevik. William Rosenberg 
writes: "the movement for workers' control throughout the period
was primarily a struggle for economic security and material better-
5 ment rather than a political movement". A cursory glance at the
factory committees, however, shows that whilst the initial im­ 
pulse behind workers' control may have been 'economic', it engaged 
with politics from the first. In fact the theoretical argument 
in the introduction shows the inadequacy of Lenin's economics/politics 
dichotomy. Lenin may have been right to argue that 'economic 1 
struggles can only generate "trade union consciousness", since they 
do not challenge the status of labour as a commodity and express 
the reality of class society rather than challenge it, but he is 
talking only of struggles around the "appropriation of the product". 
He overlooks an entire realm of 'economic' struggle over the 
"appropriation of nature". It is in this realm that the movement 
for workers' control is initially located. This helps explain the 
peculiar fusion of economic and political elements in that movement, 
and the fact that it cannot be reduced to one or the other.
Although theoretical confusion abounds in discussions of 
workers' control, historical interpretation of workers' control in
4. Avrich, P., The Russian Revolution and the Factory Committees, 
Columbia University Ph.D., 1962, ch.2.
5. Rosenberg, W., 'Workers and Workers' Control in the Russian 
Revolution 1 , History Workshop, 5, Spring 1978, p.92.
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Russia in the West is remarkably consistent. Most Western his­ 
torians portray the movement for workers' control as a syndicalist 
movement which sought to oust the bosses and allow the workers to 
run the factories themselves. Paul Avrich sees the working class 
as inspired by a kind of chiliastic syndicalism. "As the workers' 
committees acquired a greater measure of power in the factories 
and mines, the vision of a proletarian paradise seemed to grow 
more distinct and the labouring masses (became) impatient to enter
c
their 'golden age 1 ". In practice, according to Avrich, "the 
factory committees (contributed) to a form of 'productive anarchy 1 
that might have caused Marx to shudder in his grave". Employers 
desperately tried to erect a break-water against "the syndicalist
o
tide (that) was carrying Russia to the brink of economic collapse", 
but to no avail. In the same vein, John Keep discusses the meaning 
op workers' control: "There is little doubt that the majority of 
delegates (at the First All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees - 
SAS) took this slogan in its literal sense, as meaning a real transfer 
of power within the enterprise to the men's chosen representatives, 
who were to exercise the functions of management in the interests of 
their electors. Needless to add, they showed no concern whatever 
for the effects which the full 'democratisation 1 of industrial 
relations would be bound to have on productivity and the national
Q
economy as a whole". Frederick Kaplan goes even further and asserts
6. Avrich, op. cit., pp. 92-3. Avrich is the leading historian of 
workers' control in the West. As well as his Ph.D. thesis, see 
The Russian Anarchists, Princeton 1971; 'The Bolsheviks and 
Workers' Control 1 , Slavic Review, vol. 22, no. 1, March 1963 and 
'The Russian Factory Committees in 1917', Jahrbucher f(jr 
Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 2, 1963.
7. Avrich, Ph.D. thesis, p.110.
8. Avrich, Slavic Review, vol. 22, no. 1, 1963, p.54.
9. Keep, J.H.L., The Russian Revolution: a study in mass mobilisation,__
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categorically that workers actually took over the factories: 
"...it becomes clear that the workers conceived of control as 
ownership. Having seized the factories, the workers instituted 'a 
type of cooperative association, a shareholding workers' society 1 , 
in which all the workers and employees of a particular factory 
owned a portion of the enterprise and shared in the profits". 
It will be argued that this dominant interpretation fundamentally 
misreads the reality of workers' control in Petrograd, where the 
movement was most developed. Whilst it would be idle to deny that 
there were syndicalist elements within the movement or that there 
were instances of workers taking over their factories or of factory 
committees exacerbating economic chaos, to put these phenomena at 
the centre of one's picture is to gravely distort the history of the 
factory committees and their efforts to control the economy. We shall 
begin this critique, firstly, by briefly examining the extent of 
syndicalist and anarchist influence in the Petrograd labour movement 
prior to October. We shall then go on to examine the practice of 
workers' control in its initial stages, before going on finally 
to survey the political debates about workers' control of production.
B. ANARCHISM, SYNDICALISM AND THE PETROGRAD LABOUR MOVEMENT
In their interpretation of the movement for workers' control 
of production Western historians follow the lead of syndicalists and 
anarchists, such as G. Maksimov and A. Berkman, who argued in their
10. Kaplan, F.I., Bolshevik Ideology and the Ethics of Soviet Labor, 
London 1976, p.89.
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histories of the Russian Revolution that anarchists and syndicalists 
exerted an influence on the revolutionary movement out of all 
proportion to their numbers. Maksimov, who for a short time was a 
member of the Petrograd Central Council of Factory Committees, 
argues that the factory committee movement was under the sway of 
anarcho-syndicalist ideology and sought to make the factories into 
producer and consumer communes. Other anarchists, however, 
equally involved in the events of 1917, take a very different view. 
Volin, who became editor of the first anarcho-syndicalist newspaper 
in Petrograd (Golos Truda), on his return from the United States in 
the summer of 1917, reports that "the anarchists were only a 
handful of individuals without influence" and recalls with shocked 
surprise that "in the fifth month of a great revolution, no 
anarchist newspaper, no anarchist voice was making itself heard in
the capital of the country. And that in the face of the almost
12 unlimited activity of the Bolsheviksl" As late as November 1917
an anarchist periodical in Petrograd reported that: "up to now 
anarchism has had an extremely limited influence on the masses, its
forces are weak and insignificant, the idea itself is subject to
13 corruption and distortion". Whose testimony is one to believe?
11. Maximoff, G.P., Syndicalists in the Russian Revolution (re­ 
printed to celebrate Essex Libertarian Conference, 1978).
12. Voline, The Unknown Revolution, 1917-21, Chicago, 1974, pp. 183, 185
13. Golos anarkhista, 1, 21 November 1917. An anarchist Gorelik
wrote that "anarchist workers were too weak in ideas and numbers 
to have much effect", cited by Komin, V.V., Anarkhizm v Rossii, 
Kalinin, 1969, p.145.
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True to its philosophy perhaps, anarchism, as an organised 
political force, was extremely weak in Russia. By the time of the 
February Revolution, there were only about 200 active members of
anarchist organisations, though by the end of 1917 there were 33
15 anarchist groups and 21 papers and journals in Russia. In Petrograd
anarchist groups were revived in the Vyborg, Narva and Moscow dis­ 
tricts during the war, but they were tiny in numbers and comprised 
deserters from the army, bohemians, criminals and a sprinkling of 
workers. In Petrograd in 1917-18 there were two main tendencies 
within the anarchist movement. The strongest was an anarcho- 
communist tendency, whose ideology derived from Kropotkin, and a 
much less influential anarcho-syndicalist tendency. Both were small 
in numbers and had few organisational resources.
In the course of 1917 the rising tide of economic chaos combined 
with governmental inertia to strengthen the political and emotional 
appeal of anarchism among some layers of workers, and especially 
among sailors and soldiers. There was much admiration of anarchist 
bravado in organising armed actions, such as the seizure of the 
print works of the right-wing newspaper, Russkaya Volya on 5 June, 
and the raid on the Kresty jail two weeks later, led by the anarchist
14. One should note that in Spain the success of anarchism derived 
entirely from its organisational strength. In Andalusia in the 
last third of the 19th century the anarchists successfully 
merged trade-union organisation with communal organisation in 
order to pit the power of the pueblo against the latifundists 
and wine-growing bourgeoisie. After the First World War the 
anarcho-syndicalist CNT owed its success largely to organisational 
flexibility, linked to strategic perspicuity. See Kaplan, T., 
'The Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903',Princeton University 
Press, 1977; Romero Maura, J., 'The Spanish Case', in Anarchism 
Today, eds. Joll, J. and Apter, D., London: Macmillan, 1971.
15. Kanev, S.N., Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i Krakh anarkhizma, M., 
1974, p.54.
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Zhuk. Around this time, too, the expulsion by the government of 
anarchists from the Durnovo villa fostered sympathy for the anarchist 
cause - one of the contributing factors behind the July Days 
explosion. In general, simple slogans, such as 'Rob the robbers 1' 
or 'Exterminate the bourgeoisie and its hangers-on! 1 were the source 
of anarchism's appeal to desperate and frustrated workers. Only 
rarely did anarchists try to put across their ideas in a more devel­ 
oped coherent form. Simple anarchism tended to appeal to some of 
the same workers as were attracted to the Bolsheviks, but whereas 
the official policy of the Bolsheviks was to divert the anger and 
frustration of these workers into organised channels, anarchists were 
generally content to fuel this anger^with the aim of triggering off
a popular explosi.on which would blow apart the Kerensky Government
18 and the capitalist system. At the end of June and again in
October the Bolsheviks almost lost the support of these groups of 
discontented workers, because of their policy of caution and re­ 
straint, and it was partly the danger of losing them to the anarchists 
which convinced Lenin that a seizure of power was unpostponable. 
However, the appeal of anarchism to Petrograd workers should not 
be exaggerated: it was essentially a minority appeal, and the 
anarchists never succeeded in organising the working-class support 
which they had.
16. ibid., p.73.
17. Gorev, B.I., Anarkhizm v Rossii, M., 1930, p.124.
18. This was not true of anarcho-syndicalists. At the Izhorsk
works they 'took every measure to ensure that actions by workers 
have an organised and not a partial character'. Golos Truda, 
20, 25 November 1917, p.4.
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At factory level the anarchists had few functioning cells,
the main ones being at the Metal Works, Pipe Works, Putilov, Aivaz
19 and Izhorsk. These cells seldom succeeded in persuading workers
to vote for anarchist or syndicalist resolutions and made only
sporadic efforts at fund-raising. The number of anarchists elected
Hm 
to factory committees or trade unions was very small, though/may
partly reflect a principled refusal to take part in elections, which 
for some anarchists, represented the tyranny of the majority over 
the minority. At the conferences of Petrograd factory committees 
anarchists were in a small minority. At the first conference in 
May,Zhuk, the chairman of the ShlUsselburg works committee, presented
a moderate anarchist resolution which gained 45 votes, compared to
?n the 290 votes cast for the Bolshevik resolution. At the first
national conference of factory committees in October an anarchist
resolution gained five votes against the 65 gained by the Bolshevik
21 resolution. Nevertheless at this same conference Milyutin, the
Bolshevik spokesman, found it necessary to explicitly refute the 
anarchist notion of workers taking over the factories- which
suggests that at factory level anarchist influence may have been
22 strong enough to worry the Bolsheviks. One Menshevik source claims
that 18,000 workers voted for anarchist candidates in factory committee 
elections in Petrograd in October, which suggests that anarchist
19. See Golos Truda and Kommuna passim and Pervyi legal'nyi
Komitet PK RSDRP(b) v 1917g., M.L., 1927, pp. 175-6 and 186.
20. Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya i Fabzavkomy, vol. 1, M., 1927, 
pp. 70-1 (henceforward Okt. Rev, i Fab.).
21. ibid., vol. 2, p.186.
22. ibid., p.184.
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influence was on the increase. But it is not clear what elections 
are being referred to, nor is it clear what,precisely,, a vote for an 
anarchist candidate meant. Whilst there is evidence to 
suggest that anarchist influence was on the increase in the autumn 
of 1917, there is none to suggest that they were gaining hegemony 
in the factory committee movement. Anarchist conceptions had only 
minority support. Volin defines the 'Anarchist idea' as:
to transform the economic and social bases 
of society, without having recourse to a 
political state, to a government or to a 
dictatorship of any sort. That is, to 
achieve the Revolution and resolve its pro­ 
blems not by political or statist means, 
but by means of natural and free activity, 
economic and social, of the associations of 
the workers themselves, after having over­ 
thrown the last capitalist government.
There is no evidence that this was the aspiration of any but a 
handful in the Petrograd labour movement. As Hi Hi am Rosenberg 
commented recently, "it would appear that the overwhelming mass of
Russian workers lacked this (i.e. syndicalist) outlook, as well as
25 organisations, literature and activists anxious to cultivate it".
In what follows it is hoped to demonstrate that the movement for 
workers' control, far from aiming at an anarchist Utopia, based on 
factory communes, was, in its initial stages at least, concerned 
with the far more practical aim of limiting economic disruption, 
maintaining production and preserving jobs.
23. Novaya Zhizn', 6 January 1918, p.4.
24. Voline, op. cit., p.175.
25. Rosenberg, op. cit., p.95.
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C. WORKERS' CONTROL AS A RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC CHAOS
The revolutionary process of 1917 cannot be understood except 
against a background of growing economic chaos. Western historians 
have been so mesmerised by the astonishing political developments 
of this annus mirabilis, that they have overlooked the economic 
crisis which underpinned the crisis in politics and have tended 
not to see how the struggle for elementary economic and social 
needs provided the driving force behind the politicisation of the 
masses. As early as 1916, there were alarming signs that Russia 
was heading towards a grave economic crisis, but it was not until 
the summer of 1917 that the crisis fully began to manifest itself. 
The chief symptoms of the crisis at this stage were severe shortages 
of food, raw materials and fuel - particularly acute in Petrograd 
because it was isolated on the Western seaboard of the vast Empire, 
far away from where these things were produced. From the outbreak 
of the war, the Donbass was the chief source of coal for Russian 
industry, but the excessive strain placed on the Donbass mines led
to a drop in production from 2.57 million tonnes in January 1917 to
?fi 2.15 million in May. Iron and steel production fell from 4.04
million tonnes in 1916 to 2.55 million in 1917, and pig iron
07 
production from 4.63 million tonnes to 3.12 million in the same period.
More critically, the fuel and raw materials which were produced no 
longer reached the centres of industrial production, owing to the
26. Selitskii, V.I., Massy v bor'be za rabochii Kontrol', M., 1971, p.91
27. Gaponenko, L.S., Rabochii klass Rossii v 1917g., M., 1970, p.449.
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paralysis of the transport system. During the first seven months
of 1917, 16 million tonnes less was carried in freight on the rail-
28 ways than during the same period in the previous year. The
shortages of fuel and raw materials led to a decline in output of
29 manufactured goods in Russia of 40% by September, a decline
which was aggravated by other factors. Firstly, the Provisional 
Government had accumulated a colossal debt of 60,000 million rubles
more during its term of office than during the whole 32-month
30 period prior to February. The result was spiralling inflation
leading to ever greater wage demands and a slump in investment (in 
spite of the trebling of profit levels of the big monopolies during 
the war). Secondly, the fall in labour productivity, caused mainly 
by the deterioration in diet, combined with worn-out machinery and 
technical disorganisation to further depress output. Thirdly, 
the heightened tempo of class struggle, together with the imminent 
likelihood of the run-down of all war industries, made industrialists 
reluctant to maintain production. Employers now faced the stark 
possibility of bankruptcy or closure, whilst workers faced the dire 
prospect of starvation and mass unemployment.
The policy of workers' control of production was first and fore­ 
most an attempt by factory committees to stem the tide of industrial 
chaos. Throughout its brief life, but especially in its infancy, the 
workers' control movement made a valiant attempt to maintain 
production amid mounting economic anarchy. The impulse behind the 
movement, far from being ideological, was initially practical.
28. Trud., 2-3, September 1917, p.11.
29. Graponenko, op. cit., p.225.
30. Volobuev, V.P., Proletariat i burzhuaziya Rossii v 1917g., 
M., 1964, p.217.
283
Opening the First Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees on 
30 May? the Socialist Revolutionary, V.M. Levin, had this to say:
All the works and factories of Petrograd are 
experiencing a crisis, but management do not 
display any activism in supplying their fac­ 
tories with a sufficient quantity of raw mat­ 
erials and fuels. As a result, workers may be 
thrown to the mercy of Tsar Hunger, unemployed. 
Therefore, it is the workers themselves who 
must show activism in this sphere, since the 
industrialist-employers are not showing any. 
Only the unified organisation of factory 
committees, not only in Petrograd but throughout 
Russia, can do this. It is obvious that to do 
this, there must everywhere exist workers' 
organisations which must band together to 
intervene in industrial life in an organised 
manner.31
The Conference went on to discuss the state of industry in Petrograd; 
control and regulation of production and the flow of production in
the factories; the tasks of the factory committees; unemployment and
32 the demobilisation of industry; the role of the factory committees
in the trade union movement? their relation to labour exchanges 
and cooperatives and, finally, the creation of a unified economic 
centre, attached to the Central Bureau of Trade Unions. The 
Second Conference of Factory Committees (7-12 August) reflected the 
same practical economic concerns, though it also discussed politics. 
On its agenda were three key questions: firstly, the economic state 
of the enterprise (fuel, raw materials, food supplies and the state 
of production); secondly, the current conjuncture and the tasks of 
workers' control; thirdly, unemployment, the evacuation of the 
factories and the demobilisation of industry.
31. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. I, p.82
32. ibid., p.161.
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Historians such as Kaplan argue that what was said at factory 
committee conferences was one thing, but that what was done by the 
factory committees in the enterprise was quite another. Yet in 
the majority of factories the key concern of the committees in the 
early stages was to keep production going,rather than to establish 
workers' self-management. On 8 November the factory committee at 
the Franco-Russian engineering works sent a letter to the company
which began: "Production and the normal life of the factory are the
33 chief work and concern of the committees". And the works committee
at the Sestroretsk armaments plant claimed: "Since the first days
of our work we have stood by the view that our main aim is the task
34 of maintaining production in the factory come what may...".
In order to establish the fact that for most factory committees 
workers' control was a question of survival rather than of Utopian 
aspiration, it is worth looking in detail at the two areas in which 
factory committees first exercised "control", viz. the utilisation 
of fuel and the utilisation of raw materials.
The fuel shortage affected all industrial establishments in 
Petrograd, but large factories were particularly hard-hit. Both 
the Second Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees in August and 
the First All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees in October 
discussed the critical fuel situation after reports delivered by 
professional economists; but it was at the grass-roots that the most
33. Natsionalizatsiya promyshlennosti i organizatsiya sotsialisticheskogo 
proizvodstva v Petrograde, 1917-20gg., vol. I, L., 1958, p.34.
34. ibid., p.266. See too the long report sent by the Copper-Rolling 
W0 rks committee to the CCFC on its activities, all of which were 
orientated towards upholding production. Revolyutsionnoe 
dvizhenie nakanune oktyabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstamya, M., 
1962, pp. 286-7.
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active work went on. As early as March and April factory committees 
at the Vulcan and Putilov works began to search out fuel supplies. 
At the Nevskii shipyard management protested at the officious way 
in which the factory committee monitored production, and on 10 May 
it informed the factory committee that unless it could find fresh 
supplies of oil, then certain shops would have to close. The
oc
factory committee agreed to try to find fuel in order to avert closure. 
From early summer onwards factory committees at the Pipe Works, 
the Arsenal, Rozenkrantz and elsewhere began to send 'pushers'
(tolkachi) to the Donbass and other parts of Southern Russia in
37 search of fuel. At the Putilov works the fuel shortage was especially
acute and the works committee set up a fuel commission which sent 
'pushers' to the coal and oil-producing areas, but they came back 
empty-handed,and by autumn output at the factory had slumped to a 
third of its normal level. The works committee thereupon created 
a technical commission to effect the transfer of the metal furnaces 
from mineral fuel to firewood. On 20 October the committee wrote 
to the Special Commission on Defence, requesting information on fuel 
supplies in Petrograd and offering to take care of deliveries, but
oo
the Commission could offer them little. The Central Council of 
Factory Committees announced that it would requisition fuel from 
any factories which had more than three months supply in order to
give it to power stations, water works and flour mills where it was
39 most needed.
35. Selitskii, Massy op. cit., p.42.
36. Payalin, N.P., Zavod im Lenina, 1857-1918, M.L., 1933, pp. 378-9.
37. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i
provedeniya oktyalTr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstanlya, M.L., 1965, pp. 114-5
38. Mitel'man, M.I., 1917 god na Putilovskom zavode, L., 1939, p.141.
39. Novyi Put', 3-4, 1 December 1917, p.25.
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The shortage of raw materials in Petrograd factories became 
serious in the late summer. On 21 July the committee of the New 
Admiralty works reported that although the factory had orders up to 
January 1918, it had only one month's supply of cast iron left. At 
the Aivas works at the beginning of September, 300 machines were
standing idle because of shortages of non-ferrous metals and
40alloys. By this time, most factory committees were busily mon­ 
itoring stocks of raw materials and incoming and outgoing supplies.
In April the Cartridge Works Factory committee requested a weigh-
41 scale to check materials coming into the factory. On 7 April a
general meeting at the Kebke tarpaulin factory agreed to investigate
42 why management was removing canvas from the factory. At the
Paramonov leather works the committee set up control of all goods
43coming in and out of the factory. At the Petrograd carriage- 
construction company on 8 April the committee forbade management to
44 remove deal boards from the premises. At Rozenkrantz management
denied that it had any spare materials when asked by the War
Industries Committee, but on 14 July the works committee discovered
45 4,000 puds of metal which it offered to factories standing idle.
By summer, factory committees were trying to share what little 
fuel and raw materials there were. The Central Council of Factory
40. Stepanov, op. cit., p.115.
41. Selitskii, Massy, op. cit., p.43.
42. Rabochii kontrol' i natsionalizatsiya promyshlennykh predpriyatii, 
vol. 1. L., 1947, p.57 (henceforward Rabochii kontrol').
43. ibid., p.43.J J
44. Krasnyi Arkhiv, 103, 1940, p.108.
45. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v iyule, M., 1959, p.352.
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Committees took part in the various supply committees of the govern­ 
ment in order to get information on the state of stocks and to ensure 
equitable distribution. It was thus able to help factory committees 
share out materials. At the Brenner works the works committee was 
refused a loan by the Ministry of Labour to buy raw materials and 
turned to the shop stewards' committee at Triangle Works,who agreed 
to loan the committee 15,000 rubles from its strike fund; the Putilov 
works committee also donated some spare materials. The workers' 
committee at Rozenkrantz donated some brass to the Baranovskii and
Ekval' factories and at Sestroretsk works the committee received
48 some self-hardening steel from Putilov. Factory committees by
the autumn were on guard against covert attempts by management to 
sabotage production. For while factories were being forced to 
close because of metal shortages, the administrations at the Duflon 
works, the Markov box factory and the Nevskii wood and metal-process­ 
ing factory were selling off stocks of metal at exorbitant prices,
with a view to closing down operations. They were stopped by their
49 respective factory committees. The workers' committee at the
Brusnitsyn factory publicised a decision of the Chief Committee for 
the Leather Trade to send elsewhere leather which was needed in
Petrograd. At the Bezdek sweet factory the committee on 17 September
50 reported its boss to the authorities for speculative selling of sugar.
The activities of the factory committees in 'controlling 1 fuel 
and raw materials in the enterprise were dictated by the practical
46. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 2, pp. 76-80
47. Trudorezina, 15, 29 July 1917, p.l.
48. Stepanov, op. cit., p.116.
49. ibid.
50. ib-cL p. i i~r.
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need to maintain production rather than by any syndicalist desire 
to take over the enterprise. Workers' control of production 
throughout its brief life in the period 1917-1918 remained funda­ 
mentally concerned with minimising economic disorder and preserving 
jobs. However as the economic crisis deepened and as class struggle 
intensified, the forms of workers' control became ever more ambit­ 
ious and the movement as a whole became more revolutionary and 
contestatory. Broadly speaking, in the eight-month period between 
the February and October Revolutions, workers' control went from 
being reactive, defensive and observational to being proactive, 
offensive and interventionist. From being concerned essentially to 
supervise production, workers' control developed into an attempt 
to actively intervene in production and drastically limit the 
authority of capital. It is difficult to periodise this trajectory 
precisely, for the tempo at which individual factories moved towards 
a more active, aggressive style of workers' control varied according 
to the specific conditions of ectch factory, but, crudely speaking, 
workers' control in Petrograd developed through four phases in the 
period February to October, each linked to the different economic and 
political conjunctures of the revolutionary process.
In the first period of March to April, which we have already 
examined, workers' control of production was confined mainly, 
though not exclusively, to state enterprises. Factory committees 
everywhere attempted to establish some control of hiring and firing, 
as part of a broader drive to democratise factory relations. Em­ 
ployers were optimistic about the future and prepared to make 
concessions. In the second phase, from May to June, most factory
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committees began to monitor supplies of raw materials and fuel and 
to check that their factories were being run efficiently. It was 
in this period that the Bolsheviks achieved political hegemony 
within the movement. In the third phase, from July to August, 
economic crisis erupted and class struggle deepened. Employers 
went into the offensive and attempted to curb the powers of the 
factory committees, which were intervening in production on a 
large scale, challenging management authority, checking financial 
accounts, etc. In the fourth period, from September to October, 
these developments were strengthened. There was a severe economic 
and political crisis and polarised class conflict. Some employers 
tried to close their factories and a few factory committees completely 
took over the running of their enterprises. Factory committees 
became actively involved in the battle to transfer power to the Soviets, 
and workers' control, as a response to economic difficulties, 
began to mesh with the earlier impulses to democratise factory 
life, in order to produce a movement groping towards workers' self- 
management.
D. CENTRALISATION OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEE MOVEMENT
Western historians have placed considerable emphasis on the 
local, decentralised aspect of the factory committee movement, but 
their depiction of a diffuse, centrifugal movement, harnessed after 
October into centralist channels, is in need of qualification. For 
whilst the committees were characterised by greater decentralis­ 
ation and local autonomy than the trade unions, from the first
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there were pressures towards centralisation and higher-level 
coordination within the movement. Centralisation was not imposed
from above by a triumphant Bolshevik government, it arose from
51 below, at the behest of the committees themselves.
As early as the beginning of March the communications and 
organisation commission of the Izhorsk works committee was estab­ 
lished to "coordinate the actions of the workers' committee with the 
actions of other workers' committees". Coordination with other 
factories was discussed by workers at the Atlas engineering works on 
4 March, and at San Galli the works committee quickly established 
contact with district organisations and other works committees. 
As we saw in chapter 3, works committees in state enterprises
subject to the Artillery Department met to coordinate their activ-
52 ities as early as 13 March. At the beginning of May factory
committees in the Nevskaya yarn company set up a body "for joint 
organisation and practical work" and a week later, workers at the 
six factories in the Voronin, Lyutsh and Cheshire group formed a
central committee "for close contact and information about the
53 operations of each factory".
Simultaneous with this process of inter-factory coordination 
went a process of coordinating factory committee activities in each 
district of the capital. The first district council of factory 
committees was created on Vasilevskii Island on 29 March. It issued
51. Goodey, C., 'Factory Committees and the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat', Critique, 3, Autumn 1974, 39.
52. Baklanova, I.A., Rabochie Petrograda v period mirnogo razvitiya 
revolyutsii, L., 1978, pp. 96 and 99.
53. Itkin, M.L., 'Tsentry fabrichno-zavodski'kh komitetov Rossii v 
1917G 1 , Voprosy Istorii, 1974, no. 2, p.27.
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a leaflet to soldiers explaining why production for the war effort
was being undermined and discussed the formation of a workers'
54 club, the food situation and elections to the district duma.
Workers at the Arsenal and at Old Lessner proposed the setting up 
of a district council of factory committees on Vyborg Side but
nothing seems to have come of it, for the council did not get off
55 the ground until 4 September. A more successful council was set
up in Nevskii district in May, which represented 34 factory committees 
In general, however, the attempt to establish a district level of 
factory committee organisation at first came up against various 
obstacles, causing the Second Factory Committee Conference in 
August to propose that the middle-level organisation of factory 
committees be on the basis of branch of industry rather than geo­ 
graphical district. It proved, however, even harder to organise on 
an industrial basis and so the Third Factory Committee Conference 
(10 September) once again pronounced in favour of territorial organ­ 
isation and urged all districts to form district councils of
56 factory committees. In Okhta district this proposal met oppos-
*» 
ition from the defencist district soviet and from the district
57 metalworkers' union but was implemented nevertheless. In the
next weeks councils were set up elsewhere and by October fully 
operational district councils existed in Nevskii, Peterhof and
(TO
Vasilevskii districts and others were beginning to function.
54. Baklanova, op. cit., p.97.
55. Stepanov, op. cit., p.108.
56. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 2, pp. 36-7.
57. Rabochii Put 1 , 7, 10 September 1917, p.4.
58. Rabochii Kontrol', pp. 211-12; 218-9.
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These district councils gave help to individual factory committees 
in the practical work of workers' control and also settled disputes 
The councils had control commissions which supervised the adminis­ 
trative, financial and technical sides of production. Some had 
commissions which distributed fuel and raw materials and others
dealt with the demobilisation of inikl/stry, i.e. the transfer to
59 civilian production.
The supreme expression of the centralising tendency within the 
factory committee movement was the Petrograd Central Council of 
Factory Committees (CCFC) which was set up in June after the First 
Conference of Factory Committees. Introducing a debate at this 
conference, the SR, V.M. Levin, said:
The workers, by means of the factory committee, 
must immediately establish control over operations 
in the enterprises, regulate production and 
ultimately organise it. Of course, the individual 
committee will not be able to cope with such a 
task, nor even will a united centre of factory 
committees in one town or region. Such a job 
is within the power only of an All-Russian centre 
of factory committees, within which all enterprises 
will be unified according to branch of industry.
As a first step in this direction, the Conference set up a Central 
Council of Petrograd Factory Committees.
In its early days the CCFC was involved mainly in diverting 
threatened factory closures and in wage disputes. As the trade 
union apparatus became more developed, however, the CCFC's four 
main departments dealt with administrative and financial control, 
technical and production control, raw material supplies and fuel
59. Stepanov, op. cit., p.108.
60. Okt. Rev. i Fab., vol. I, p.117.
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supplies. CCFC members sat on state economic organs - in particular, 
the committees of supply and the Factory Convention (Zavodskoe
Soveshchanie) - but refused payment for their work, on the grounds
fi? that this would make them state officials. There are no grounds
for saying, as does Solomon Schwarz, that the Bolsheviks deliber­ 
ately obstructed the economic work of the CCFC, using it instead
c o
for the political ends. If the CCFC failed in its central aim
of restoring order to the economy, this was not through lack of
64 trying, but because of the intrinsic hopelessness of such a project.
From its inception the CCFC was a bulwark of Bolshevism, as was
« 
the factory committee movement as a whole. The first CCFC members
comprised 19 Bolsheviks, 2 Mensheviks, 2 SR's, 1 Mezhraionets
65 (Trotsky's group) and 1 syndicalist. Unlike the PCTU, the CCFC
was not riven by political wrangles, it intervened constantly in 
politics but in an undeviatingly Bolshevik direction.
E. THE DEBATE ABOUT WORKERS' CONTROL: FEBRUARY TO OCTOBER 1917
The dominant Western interpretation of workers' control of 
production posits a dichotomy between the Bolshevik party and the 
factory committee movement. The party is seen as committed to a cen­ 
tralised statist economy, whilst the factory committees are portrayed
61. ibid., vol. 2, p.37.
62. ibid., vol. 2*pp. 175-6; 259-60; Novyi Put', 1-2, 14 January 1918, 
p.7. The Factory Convention was created at the end of 1915 to 
coordinate the work of the state and private factories in the 
Petrograd region for the war effort. After February it was de­ 
mocratised by the addition of representatives from the soviet, 
trade unions and Ministry of Labour.
63. Schwarz, S., 'Fabrichno-zavodskie Komitety i profsoyuzy v pervye 
gody revolyutsii', extract in Browder, R.P. and Kerensky, A.F., 
The Russian Provisional Government, vol. 2, Stanford Univ. Press, 1961.
64. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, pp. 170, 190. M ^ lgfi7 ^ ^
65. Freidlin, B.M., Ocherk istorii rabochego dvizheniya v Rossii v J917g.,
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as protagonists of a decentralised economy run by the workers them­ 
selves. It is argued that the Bolsheviks pursued an opportunist 
policy towards the movement for workers' control, cynically supporting 
it until October not because they agreed with its aims, but because 
it was creating disorder in industry and undermining the capitalist 
class. Once they had gained power, however, the Bolsheviks crushed 
the factory committees, eradicated workers' control and reorganised 
the economy on hierarchical lines. Thus Avrich tells us:
From April to November, Lenin had aligned him­ 
self with the Anarcho-syndicalists, who desired 
the utter annihilation of the old order... But 
after the Bolshevik Revolution was secured, Lenin 
abandoned the forces of destruction for those of 
centralisation and order.66
In a more conspiratorial vein, Kaplan writes:
The factory committees...were used by the Bol­ 
sheviks as a mask for the seizure of economic 
power. The economy was to be disorganised by 
means of 'workers' control 1 of industry. 
Workers' control was to have a dual function: 
1) to undermine the economy of the country so 
that the Provisional Government could not effic­ 
iently function; 2) to establish the basis for 
Bolshevik control over that economy.67
Anweiler repeats the charge that the Bolsheviks disingenuously ex­ 
ploited workers' control for their own ends:
The Bolsheviks furthered the syndicalist and 
anarchist tendencies emerging in factory com­ 
mittees, whose general aim was workers' rule 
in the plants, without centralised direction 
from above and without regard to the state of
66. Avrich, Slavic Review, 1962, p.62.




It seems to me that such a line of interpretation is fundamentally 
misguided for a number of reasons. Firstly, as argued above, and 
amplified below, it is inadequate to argue that the aspirations of 
the factory committees were 'syndicalist'. Secondly, up to October, 
the Bolsheviks generally were not aware of any incompatibility 
between the workers' control of the factory committees and state 
organisation of the economy. Thirdly, to counterpose the factory 
committees to the Bolshevik party is incorrect, since most of the 
leading cadres of the factory committees were also members of the 
Bolshevik party. Finally, such a counter-position suggests that 
there was a uniformity of views within both the factory committees 
and the Bolshevik party which did not in fact exist.
What follows is not an attempt to recount debates on workers' 
control in detail, so much as to disclose the problematic of such 
debates and to discuss some of their implications.
a) Menshevik, SR and anarchist perspectives on control of the economy
The Menshevik and SR demand for state control of the economy 
was proffered as a solution to the severe crisis racking Russian 
industry. The right-wing Menshevik economist, Cherevanin, diag­ 
nosed the severity of the crisis at the First Conference of Petrograd 
Factory Committees in the following terms:
The economic life of Russia has reached a 
terrifying state of collapse. The country 
is already edging towards a catastrophe, which
68. Anweiler, 0., The Soviets: the Russian Workers', Peasants' and 
Soldiers' Councils, 1905-21, New York: Random House, 1974, p.127.
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threatens destitution and unemployment to 
the mass of the population and renders futile 
every struggle of the working masses to im­ 
prove their position.69
He explained this chaos as the result of the structural strain 
imposed on the economy by the war and by the demobilisation of the 
war industries, and not as the result of conscious "sabotage" by 
the capitalists. The solution which he proposed was:
Planned intervention by the state in economic 
life via regulation of the distribution of raw 
materials, fuel and equipment between branches 
of production; via equal distribution of articles 
of consumption among the population; via forced 
trustification of the basic branches of production; 
via control of the banks; by the fixing of prices, 
profits and wages and by increased taxation of 
capitalist incomes.71
The Mensheviks utterly rejected "workers' control" as a serious 
strategy for controlling the economy. They believed that the 
Bolsheviks had popularised the slogan purely as a demagogic manoeuvre 
As a strategy for dealing with economic chaos it was a recipe for 
disaster in their eyes. Workers' control encouraged decentralised, 
spontaneous initiatives by atomised groups of workers in individual
enterprises and its net effect could only be to exacerbate economic
7? chaos. What was required was planned, centralised, all-embracing
69. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.95.
70. The left-wing Menshevik, D. Dallin, did admit at the conference 
that industrialists were deliberately cutting back production, 
ibid., p.106.
71. ibid., p.95.
72. The much-depleted Menshevik cell at the Aivaz works in November 
bewailed the 'pernicious delusion that it is possible for workers 
to alleviate the economic chaos and protect the working masses 
from the effects of the rising cost of living and imminent un­ 
employment simply by their own efforts'. Plamya, 1, 24 November 
1917, p.4.
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control of the economy, and only the state had at its disposal an 
apparatus adequate to this task. It was only through the state that 
the whole of democracy - and not just the working class - could 
participate in a massive public effort at economic control. The 
Mensheviks, supported by the SR's, favoured the representation of all 
popular organisations on government organs of economic regulation. 
They disliked the factory committees for being both parochial and 
purely proletarian and argued that,even at factory level, control
of management should involve not just factory committees but repre-
73 sentatives of government and "revolutionary democracy".
The official position of the SR party was very similar to that 
of the Mensheviks. They too believed in state control of the 
economy rather than in workers' control, but their reasons were 
somewhat different. The Sft's objected in principle to one class - 
the working class - controlling the economy in its own interests. 
All popular forces should be involved in the business of control 
and this could best be done via the state, "because only the state
is the representative of the interests of both the producers and
74 consumers". The SR's considered the factory committees as having
the job of controlling hiring and firing, but denied them any 
privileged role in the control of production. They believed that 
workers' control as practised by the factory committees was leading 
to the atomisation of the economy and to conflict between the working
73. See Cherevanin's resolution to the third trade union conference. 
Tret'ya vserossiiskaya konferentsiya professional 'nykh 
soyuzov, M., 1927, pp.
74. 'Tezisy dlya agitatorov i propagandistov 1 , Central Committee of 
SR party, no. 9, 1918 (no place of publication).
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75 class and the peasantry. The SR's, however, were a profoundly
divided party and opinion within the party was as divided on the 
question of workers' control as on all other major questions of the 
day. The left wing of the party rejected calls for state control 
of the economy out of hand, but was unhappy with the notion of 
workers' control. Some Left SR's, such as V.M. Levin, the only 
SR of any standing in the Petrograd factory committee movement, 
propounded a notion of workers' control identical to that of the 
Bolsheviks, 'but the Left SR newspaper demanded 'public control 1 of 
the economy - by producers and consumers - via the factory committees, 
trade unions, cooperatives etc. Other Left SR's called for control 
by the 'toiling people 1 . The heterodox SR Maximalists called for 
the socialisation of the factories, to be run by elected committees, 
but control of production by the factory committees until such time 
as this came about.
The attitude of the anarchists and syndicalists to workers' 
control of production varied. At the first factory committee con­ 
ference Zhuk presented a mild resolution which called on the 
'toiling people 1 (truzhenik-narod) "to take the organisation of their 
fate into their hands" and "to quickly create control commissions 
which will not only strictly monitor the running of the enterprise,
75. See resolution on factory committees passed by the third con­ 
gress of the SR's, Delo Naroda, 64, 2 June 1917, p.2.
76. Znamya Truda, 13, 6 September 1917, p.4.
77. Volya Truda, 2, 12 September 1917, pp. 2-3; Volya Truda, 1, 
1 September 1917, p.4.
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yo
but regulate the activity of the enterprise." Other anarchists 
however demanded the seizure of factories by workers as a direct 
act of expropriation of the bourgeoisie. Naturally, they rejected 
any notion of state organisation of the economy - some going so far 
as to reject any kind of centralised coordination. The key concept 
was that of producers' communes linked into federations. Factory 
committees were seen as the embryos of such communes, whereas trade
unions were seen as vestiges of capitalist society at best, or
79 "living corpses" at worst. Syndicalists, unlike their confreres
in Western Europe, also tended to prefer the factory committees to
the trade unions, though some toyed with the idea of federations of
autonomous unions rather than of factory committees.
b) The Bolsheviks and workers' control
The Bolshevik party had no position on the question of workers' 
control prior to 1917. They began to formulate a position in res­ 
ponse to deepening turmoil in the economy. Bolshevik policy on 
workers' control was forged in a context of rapid political and 
economic change. Because the party's ideas were in a process of 
formation, there is no absolute clarity, still less uniformity, in
78. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.94. Both anarchists and syndicalists 
preferred to talk of control by the 'toiling people', rather 
than by the 'working class'. G. Lapot, writing in the syndicalist 
newspaper, said: 'We are on the threshold of socialism: we need 
not only workers' but general toilers' control of production, 
distribution and transport - in a word, full toilers' control 
by peasants, workers and employees in all economic spheres'. 
Golos Truda, 10, 13 October 1917, p.2.
79. Bill Shatov's famous characterisation of the trade unions at the
first national congress of trade unions in January 1918, Pervyi
vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soyuzov, M., 1918, p.273.
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its attempts to come to terms with the movement for workers' con­ 
trol. Lenin was the outstanding policy-maker in the party in 1917 
and it is largely through his writings that I have tried to chart 
the development of Bolshevik policy, but it should not be assumed that 
party members obeisantly deferred to him. For purposes of clarity 
of argument, I shall assume that Lenin's thinking is that of the 
official party leadership; only subsequently shall I bring out 
differences in the views of party leaders.
In the period up to October 1917 a bitter debate raged around 
the question of control of the economy. This is usually presented 
as a debate between the Menshevik advocates of a statist solution 
to Russia's economic problems and the Bolshevik supporters of an 
anti-statist, grass-roots movement for workers' control of production. 
This is misleading, as it suggests that the key point at issue 
between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks was whether control of the 
economy should be implemented by the state or by the workers in situ. 
Yet the Bolsheviks never deviated, before or after the October 
Revolution, from a commitment to a statist, centralised solution to 
economic disorder. The disagreement between the two wings of the 
socialist movement was not about state control in the abstract, 
but about what kind of state should coordinate control of the economy: 
a bourgeois state or a workers' state? In May 1917 Lenin wrote:
'State control 1 - we are for it. But by whom?
Hho is in control? The bureaucrats (chinovniki)?
Or the Soviets?80
80. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 32, M., 1962, p.438,
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Unlike the Mensheviks, Lenin and the Bolsheviks resolutely refused 
to support initiatives undertaken by the Provisional Government to 
control economic chaos, not because they preferred demotic to 
governmental initiatives, but because they believed that, as a 
bourgeois government, its initiatives must necessarily be at the 
expense of working people. Even if the government sincerely tried 
to restore economic order, its measures would be either totally in­ 
effective or, if more radical, would be sabotaged by capitalist
pi
interests. The fond hopes of the Mensheviks and SR's for state 
control of the economy in the general interest completely overlooked 
the class dimension of this control. This was the crux of the dis­ 
agreement between the two wings of the socialist movement. "In essence", 
wrote Lenin, "the whole question of control boils down to who con­ 
trols whom, i.e. which class is controlling and which is being 
controlled...We must resolutely and irrevocably pass over to control 
over the landowners and the capitalists by the workers and
op
peasants." This was the nub of Bolshevik support for workers' 
control of the economy against the state control advocated by the 
Mensheviks and SR's.
81. Unlike Bukharin, who had argued that state regulation of the 
economy was indispensable in the monopoly phase of capitalism 
(Imperialism and WorId Economy, 1915), Lenin tended to stick to 
the more traditional view that state intervention was antag­ 
onistic to private ownership. He thus found it difficult to 
explain the apparent enthusiasm of certain sectors of capital 
for 'state control of the economy'. He wrote: 'Capitalists 
"warmly" recognise in words the "principle" of control and the 
necessity of it...but insist on only "gradual", planned, state- 
regulated introduction of such control. In actual fact, these 
plausible phrases merely hide the wrecking of control, its 
transformation into a fiction 1 . Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 
vol. 34, M., 1974, pp. 157-8.
82. Lenin, ibid., p.175.
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The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks did not disagree radically in 
the specific measures which they advocated for control of the economy, 
In a pamphlet written in September 1917, entitled The Impending 
Catastrophe and How to Fight It, Lenin summarised the major measures 
which were necessary. By far the most important, in his eyes, was 
the nationalisation of the banks, since no order could be brought 
into the economy unless the state had a firm hold on the nation's 
purse-strings. Second in importance, were measures to nationalise 
the largest syndicates in industries such as sugar, oil, coal and 
metallurgy. In addition industrialists and traders should be 
forced to join syndicates in order to facilitate government con­ 
trol. Finally, the whole population should be compulsorily organ­ 
ised into consumer societies to facilitate the distribution of
oo
subsistence commodities. Lenin stressed in this pamphlet that 
there was absolutely nothing original in these concrete proposals: 
his sole point was to emphasise that these very simple measures 
could only be implemented once the working class wielded state 
power. If Lenin understood these measures as measures of 'workers' 
control', it is clear that he is here using the term in a very 
different sense from that of the factory committees. The proposals 
which he is advocating are thoroughly statist and centralist in 
character, whereas the practice of the factory committees was 
essentially local and decentralist. Should we conclude from this 
that Lenin never believed in workers' control in any sense other than 
as a counter-slogan to demands for state control? Would it be more 
accurate to characterise him not as an advocate of workers' control 
but rather of state control by a proletarian state?
83. Lenin, ibid., p.161.
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The factory committees launched the slogan of workers' control 
of production quite independently of the Bolshevik party. It was 
not until May that the party began to take it up. Lenin had cleared 
an ideological space for the slogan in the April Theses, when he had 
demanded:
Such measures as the nationalisation of land, 
of all banks and capitalist syndicates, or, 
at least, the establishment of immediate 
control of them by the Soviets of Workers' 
Deputies, etc. - measures which do not in
any way constitute the 'introduction 1 of 
socialism.
For a time, the Bolsheviks talked of control by the Soviets: for 
instance, a leaflet put out at the beginning of May by the Lesnovskii 
subdi strict committee of the party, called for the "establishment 
of control by Soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies over the 
production and distribution of products". 85 As yet little mention 
was made of the factory committees. It was only at the end of May, 
when the First Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees registered 
the extent of support for the Bolsheviks within the committees, that 
the party leadership began to pay attention to these new institutions
Lenin personally drafted the resolution on the economic crisis 
and workers' control which was put to the First Conference of 
Petrograd Factory Committees by Zinoviev. This resolution attacked 
attempts at bureaucratic regulation of the economy by the bourgeois 
state and called for a statewide system of workers' control of 
production and distribution. Workers' control was conceived as
84. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 31, M., 1962, p.168.
85. Listoyki petrogradskikh bol'shevikov, 1917-20gg., vol. 3, 
L., 1957, p.40.
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operating not only at local level in matters of supply and pro­ 
duction, but also at national level in the spheres of banking, 
exchange between town and countryside, labour discipline, labour
Or
allocation and workers' defence. The resolution was passed by 
a majority of 297 votes to 21, with 44 abstentions. 87 The resolution 
clearly understands 'control' in the sense of 'checking 1 or 
'supervising 1 , rather than of 'managing'. Lenin invariably linked 
the word 'kontrol' to the word 'uchet', or 'accounting'; 'accounting'
oo
was central to Lenin's vision of socialism at this time. This 
'accounting', however, is not confined to central government level. 
Lenin envisages that it will be based at the grass roots and coordin­ 
ated into a national system. Right up to the beginning of 1918, 
Lenin saw absolutely no contradiction between centralised control 
and the creative initiatives of workers in their factories. Indeed 
he never tired of insisting that local initiatives were the bedrock 
of centralised control. It was precisely the creativity of the 
masses which qualitatively distinguished workers' control from the 
reactionary bureaucratic control of the bourgeois state:
Vital creativity of the masses - that is the 
fundamental factor in the new society. Let 
the workers take on the creation of workers' 
control in their works and factories, let 
them supply the countryside with manufactured 
goods in exchange for bread. Not one article,
86. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 32, pp. 195-7; 
Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.86.
87. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.70.
88. In November 1917 Lenin gave the following, problematic definition 
of socialism: 'Socialism equals accounting. If you wish to 
account for every piece of iron and fabric, then that will be 
socialism 1 , Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 35, 
M., 1962, p.63.
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not one funt of bread must remain unaccounted 
for, since socialism is first and foremost 
accounting. Socialism is not created by orders 
from on high. Its spirit is alien to state- 
bureaucratic automatism. Socialism is vital 
and creative, it is the creation of the popular 
masses themselves. 89
Between August 1917, when he wrote The State and Revolution, and the
beginning of 1918, Lenin was to harp continuously on the theme of
90 working class self-activity. Far from seeing such self-activity
as antipathetic to centralised control of the economy, he viewed it 
as its absolute precondition:
Let every factory committee feel concerned 
not only with the affairs of its factory but 
let it also feel that it is an organisational 
cell for the construction of the whole of 
state life...There cannot and will not be any 
concrete plan for the organisation of economic 
life. No one can offer this. The masses can 
do this only from below, by their own experience 
There will, of course, be instructions given 
and paths sketched out, but we must begin immed­ 
iately from above and from below. 9 '
It cannot be said that Lenin satisfactorily theorised the 
relationship between grass-roots workers' control of production and 
state-wide regulation of the economy, and the Bolsheviks were soon 
to learn through bitter experience how difficult it was to reconcile 
the two in practice
c) The Factory Committee Conference debates on workers' control
When one examines the debates on workers' control at the factory 
committee conferences an immediate problem arises. For it emerges
89. ibid., p.57.
90. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 33, M., 1962.
91. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 35, p.148.
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that there is no authentic, spontaneous 'factory committee' dis­ 
course which can be counterposed to official Bolshevik discourse, 
for a majority of the delegates at these conferences were themselves 
Bolsheviks and the conferences voted overwhelmingly for Bolshevik- 
inspired resolutions. It could be argued that the factory commmittee 
conferences are not, therefore, a true reflection of opinion within 
the movement but rather occasions for the Bolshfl/ik party to win 
formalistic ratification of its policies. This is unconvincing on 
two scores. Firstly, the hundreds of delegates who attended these
conferences were bona fide representatives sent from individual
92 factories in Petrograd. Secondly, these delegates had to choose
between the very different policies on workers' control, put for­ 
ward by the three major factions - Bolshevik, Menshevik and anarcho- 
syndicalist. If, as Avrich and others argue, factory committees 
on the ground were 'syndicalist', why did their delegates so 
decisively reject the perspective projected at these conferences 
by anarcho-syndicalists such as Zhuk or Bill Shatov, the former 
Wobblie? The answer can only be that most factory committee members 
recognised the need for some degree of centralised coordination of 
control, as the Bolsheviks argued, whereas the anarcho-syndicalists 
decidedly did not. At every conference they voted overwhelmingly 
for the formula of 'state workers' control'.
As we have seen, the first resolution on workers' control 
passed by a conference of factory committees was drafted by Lenin 
himself and envisaged a centrally-coordinated system of workers'
92. Okt. Rev. i Fab., vol. 2, pp. 217-63.
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control. At the Second Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees, 
which took place from 7 to 12 August, against a background of rapid 
economic breakdown, V.P. Milyutin, from the Bolshevik Central Committee,
introduced a resolution on workers' control which was passed over­ 
go 
whelmingly by 213 votes to 26, with 22 abstentions. This was in
many ways the most comprehensive exposition of Bolshevik policy for 
dealing with the economic crisis. It saw the crisis as the consequence 
of the burdens placed upon the economy by the war, but blamed the 
bourgeoisie and the Provisional Government for aggravating disorder. 
It stressed the need to end the war, which, it claimed, was not 
only destroying the nation's productive forces, but also leading to 
excessive centralisation of production in the hands of a militarist 
state and the consequent enserfment of the proletariat. It demanded 
that state power be transferred into the hands of the proletariat 
and the poor peasantry so that they could begin the job of state 
regulation of the economy. The whole thrust of Milyutin's resolution 
was towards regulation of the economy at macro- rather than micro-level, 
since it called for nationalisation of the banks and monopolies. 
'Workers' control' figured comparatively little and was envisaged as 
operating at central level through the assignment to the Soviets, 
trade unions and factory committees of a majority of places in 
government organs of control. To tackle the financial crisis, the 
resolution proposed an end to the issue of paper money, the cancel­ 
lation of state debts and the investigation of company finances. 
The resolution underlined the necessity for allocation of manpower 
and for general labour conscription once power was in the hands of 
the people. In spite of its generally centralised tenor, the resol-
93. ibid., vol. 1, p.215.
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ution did mention initiatives in the localities by trade unions,
94 factory committees and Soviets.
The Third Factory Committee Conference met on September 10 in 
the wake of the Kornilov rebellion and the Skobelev circulars. The 
conference paid more attention to politics than its predecessors, 
warning of the danger of counter-revolution, condemning the Demo­ 
cratic Conference, clamouring for the revocation of the Skobelev 
circulars and demanding the broadening of workers' control to 
thwart the machinations of the extreme right. The leitmotif of the 
Fourth Conference a month later (10 October) was again the danger 
from the right. The Bolshevik, Skrypnik, defined the tasks of the 
factory committees as "struggle with the counter-revolution in the 
sphere of production". The discussions at the conference reflected 
a growing awareness that whilst the factory committees were equipped 
to combat disorganisation by individual capitalists, they were not 
able to deal with large-scale problems such as the demobilisation 
of the war industries. A heavy accent was therefore placed on the 
need for greater centralisation of the movement for workers' con­ 
trol to stem the systemic chaos in the national economy. Zhivotov
hoped that the forthcoming All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees
95 would create a national apparatus to control the economy. And
Skorodumov amplified this:
partial control of production cannot bring 
significant results and we are calling the 
Conference in order to establish control over 
industry as a whole.96
94. ibid., pp. 217-9.
95. ibid., vol. 2, p.121
96. ibid., p.122.
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The resolution summoning an All-Russian Conference called for:
the unification of the activities of the 
working class in the task of regulating 
the economic life of the country, so that 
once it has power in its hands, the working 
class can, finally, with the support of the 
poor peasantry, fight the self-interest of 
the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and 
bring planning and organisation into the 
sphere of production.97
At the All -Russian Conference of Factory Committees, which met 
from 17-22 October, Milyutin was once again the proponent of the 
resolution on workers' control. His resolution demanded a transfer 
of state power to the Soviets and a break with the policies of the 
moderate socialist parties, the transfer of land to the peasants 
and the nationalisation of the major branches of industry. Clause 
four of the resolution proclaimed:
The workers' control being implemented in 
the localities through the factory committees 
must be organised into a state-wide system, 
for only then will it achieve real, serious 
results. A majority (2/3) of the members of 
the organs of control must be workers, delegated 
by the factory committees, trade unions and 
the Soviet of workers' deputies. As well as 
workers' representatives, there must be 
scientifically-educated technical personnel 
(engineers, technicians, ^°
Larin, a recent convert from left-wing Menshevism, was then called 
upon to concretise the perspectives put forward by Milyutin, but 
proceeded instead to propound a very moderate, schematic interpret 
ation of workers' control. Largely ignoring the practical work of 
the factory committees, he argued for the primacy of planning^and
97. ibid., p.124.
98. ibid., pp. 170-1.
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proposed that the trade unions and factory committees become exec-
99 utors of a central economic plan. Skrypnik criticised Larin's
proposals on the grounds that they suggested that workers' control 
could be integrated into a system of planning this side of the 
revolution. He argued that workers' control was a transitional 
class measure which could develop into a state-wide system of 
regulated production only when power had been transferred to the 
masses. The final resolution passed by 65 votes to 8, with one 
abstention, followed the general line of Milyutin and Larin but 
was considerably more specific. It called for workers' control to 
be coordinated into a state-wide system, regulated by a plan. 
Factory committees were to be amalgamated by branch of production, 
and at enterprise level were to handle such matters as hiring and 
firing, disputes with the administration and supplies, within the 
overall context of the plan.
The outstanding support for the formula of 'state workers' 
control' suggests that factory committees on the ground recognised 
that grass-roots creativity by itself was not enough and that to be 
effective 'control 1 must be centrally coordinated. There thus never 
existed a clear-cut antinomy between Lenin, the proponent of state­ 
wide, centralised control and the factory committees, proponents of 
grass roots creativity. All the major statements from factory 
committee organisations both before and after October bear ample 
testimony to their belief that order could be restored to the 
economy only by the action of a proletarian government. Moreover
99. ibid., pp. 171-4.
100. ibid., pp. 179-80; 184.
101. ibid., pp. 186-8.
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the examination of the resolutions on workers' control passed by the 
factory committee conferences reveals two clear shifts in thinking: 
firstly, a shift in concern from rather narrow economic problems to 
more broadly political ones; secondly, a growing awareness of the 
need for state-wide, centralised control of the economy. Yet one 
should not infer from this brief survey of the factory committee 
debates that there was pure consonance on the question of workers' 
control. If one looks more closely at the debates of the conferences, 
differences do begin to emerge. These are not differences between 
'syndicalists' and Bolsheviks, they are differences within the 
Bolshevik party. These differences centre on two problems: the 
first concerns the differing estimations of the efficacy of workers' 
control as a cure for Russia's economic ills; the second concerns 
the importance attached to the factory committees as agencies of 
'control'.
Two broad currents of opinion emerged at the factory committee 
conferences with respect to the capacity of workers' control to 
resolve the economic crisis. The chief exponents of 'state workers' 
control', Milyutin and Larin, put the main emphasis on central planning
rather than grass roots control. In so doing, they were close 
ideologically to important Bolshevik trade union leaders such as 
Ryazanov, Lozovskii, Shlyapnikov and Schmidt. In contrast, the 
Bolsheviks on the Central Council of Factory Committees, such as 
Skrypnik, Chubar', Antipov and Amosov, whilst supporting calls for 
'state workers' control', placed heavy emphasis on the importance 
of local initiatives. They were more optimistic than leading Bolshevik 
economists and trade unionists about the potentiality of workers'
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control to combat disorder. This was not because they were 
principled believers in decentralisation, but because they shared 
with many rank-and-file workers, a belief that the crisis in the 
economy was caused essentially by the conscious sabotage of indus­ 
trialists, which could be halted by determined action on the part of 
factory committees. They tended to ignore the complex structural 
character of the crisis, seeing the economic disruption as the direct 
product of sabotage, and until autumn at least, many factory 
committees rather naively assumed that by combatting disorganisation 
in their particular enterprise they would bring order into the 
economy as a whole and create the conditions for its transformation 
along socialist lines. The Bolshevik, Zhivotov, a worker at the 
1886 Electric Light Company, explained the tasks of workers' control 
to the First Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees:
One must be blind or mentally subnormal not 
to see the counter-revolutionary work of the 
bourgeoisie. The sabotage of coal-owners in 
the Donbass, the sabotage in the textile 
industry and similar organised sabotage by 
employers in a whole number of Petrograd 
factories demand the organised intervention 
of the working class in the form of the 
immediate establishment of workers' control.
Zhivotov clearly had more faith in popular initiative as a means of 
combatting economic disorder than did Bolsheviks such as Milyutin, 
who believed that the structural crisis of capitalism could only 
be solved through socialist measures at a national level by a 
proletarian state.
102. ibid., vol. 1, p.106.
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The second area in which there was a clear divergence of emphasis 
was related to the first and concerned the precise responsibilities 
of the factory committees. Bolsheviks connected with the factory 
committees assigned full responsibility for workers' control of 
production to the committees alone. This never became official 
Bolshevik party policy. Party statements viewed 'state workers' 
control 1 as being the responsibility not just of factory committees 
but of all labour organisations. Milyutin's resolution to the Third 
All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions at the end of June concerning 
workers' control did not even mention factory committees and spoke
of control being the joint responsibility of Soviets and trade
103 
unions. Again the Sixth Party Congress spent much time discussing
the trade unions and the economic crisis, but barely mentioned the 
factory committees. This was but one aspect of a more general 
tendency by the official leadership of the Bolshevik party to under­ 
estimate and, indeed, ignore the factory committees.
To those who believe that the Bolsheviks connived to jump on 
the factory committee bandwagon, it must come as a shock to realise 
how little attention leading Bolsheviks paid to the committees. 
They were, after all, probably the most important organisations in 
the Russian Revolution - more important even than the Soviets, from 
the point of view of their closeness to the masses and their function 
of mediating between the mass of workers and the Bolshevik party. 
Yet when Lenin came to revise the party programme in the autumn, he
103. Tret'ya Konferentsiya, pp. 482-4.
104. Shestoi s"ezd RSDRP(b): Protokoly, M., 1958, pp. 261-3.
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forgot to mention the committees or the need for democratic 
organisation in the factories. 105 This, it seems, was largely 
because of his total absorption in the political question. Whilst 
he spent the whole summer trying to understand the Soviets as 
emrbyonic forms of the proletarian state, he paid scant attention 
to the factory committees. This was because he considered that 
the struggle for state power took precedence over the struggle 
for power in production. He believed that there could be no pro­ 
letarian power in the factory before the achievement of proletarian
i A/T
power in the state. This led him to neglect the theoretical 
and political problems concerning the articulation of the movement 
for workers' control with the drive for soviet power. After the 
October Revolution, it was to have grave consequences in the shape 
of a theoretical and political foreclosure of the movement for 
workers' self-management.
105. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 32, pp. 139-62; 
cf. Larin's critique of the draft programme, Rabochii Put', 31, 
8 October 1917, p.2.
106. In this belief, Lenin was at odds with Gramsci, leader of the
Italian factory councils, who envisaged proletarian state power 
growing up on the basis of workers' power in the factories, and 
who saw the struggle for workers' control as growing naturally 
into a contestation for state power. On this point, as on 
many others, it was Bordiga, not Gramsci, who was closer to 
Lenin. It is also worth noting in this connection that 
Gramsci saw the Italian councils as the (potential) equivalent 
of the Russian Soviets. He believed that the forms of the 
proletarian state must be councils based on production. In 
Russia, however, it was the factory committees which were based 
on production, whereas the Soviets were organised on a territorial 
basis (though largely elected on a production basis). Gramsci 
rejected Bordiga's call for territorially-based organisation, 
since he believed that it was as producers, that the working 
class would make communism. See Gramsci, A., Political Writings, 
1910-20; Williams, G., Proletarian Order. One should note, 
finally, that both Trotsky and Ordzhonikidze claim that Lenin 
toyed with the idea of making the factory committees state 
organs instead of the Soviets, but this was a purely tactical 
turn, reflecting Lenin's anxieties about the political reliability 
of the Soviets. It did not mark a worked-out integration of the
into a strategy for the achievement of socialism. Trotsk 
thp Rns^'a" Revolution, vol. 2, London: Sphere Bks,
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F. HOW WORKERS' CONTROL OF PRODUCTION WAS VIEWED AT FACTORY LEVEL
It is difficult from the extant evidence to discover how 
factory committees on the ground understood workers' control. One 
comes closest to understanding the meaning of workers' control at 
grass roots level by looking at the practice, rather than the theory, 
of workers' control, and, as we have seen, this practice is not 
compatible with the interpretation of the movement as 'syndicalist'. 
Nevertheless a certain amount of evidence exists as to rank-and-file 
attitudes to workers' control which it is worth reviewing.
The most important source of evidence on this matter are the 
resolutions passed by general meetings of workers in the factories 
of the capital. There are several historiographical problems 
related to interpretation of these resolutions, not least because 
they cannot be considered as spontaneous utterances of the workers, 
since they were often drafted by local party organisations and put 
to general meetings for ratification. Nevertheless, even where 
workers did not themselves draft the resolution, several different 
resolutions would usually be put to a general meeting for discussion 
and so choice of a Bolshevik rather than Menshevik resolution is some 
indirect indication of opinion within the factory.
An analysis of resolutions which mention control of the economy 
reveals that workers overwhelmingly supported the Bolshevik formula 
of 'workers' control of production 1 . Resolutions using this 
formula were passed in August and September (when the disorder in 
the economy had become a critical issue) by workers at the Baltic, 
Triangle, Putilov, Kuznetsov and Westinhouse works, at several 
textile mills and by the Vasilevskii district council of factory
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committees. In September many resolutions use the rather more 
orthodox Bolshevik formula of 'workers' control of production at a 
state-wide level' to distinguish workers' control from any 
anarchist project of individual factory squires. Resolutions at 
Aivaz, Langenzippen, the Pipe Works and one by Lithuanian workers
I no
on Vyborg Side use this formula. This formula was not a com­ 
promise with Menshevism:- it was that which was embodied in the 
Bolshevik resolution passed by the first national conference of 
factory committees in October. Occasionally, resolutions were passed 
which do appear to be attempts to bridge differences between 
Bolshevik and Menshevik conceptions of control. Resolutions passed
at the Stein company, the Baranovskii works and elsewhere in July,
109 called for 'state control with a majority of workers' , as did a
resolution by Obukhov workers in October. A resolution passed 
by metalworkers' union delegates on 26 July called for 'the im­ 
plementation of real control of production and distribution of pro­ 
ducts and state regulation of industry 1 . In September the first 
national textileworkers' conference, which had a big Bolshevik
majority, passed a resolution calling for 'state regulation of
112 industry on a national scale under workers' control'. In contrast
to Moscow, however, the Menshevik call for 'state control of the 
economy 1 had little resonance within the Petrograd labour
107. Oktyabr'skge vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Petrograde, M., 1957, 
pp. 92, 103-4, 110, 135; Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v avguste, 
M., 1959, p.212; Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v sentyabre, M., 
1961, pp. 259,292"^TT
108. Okt. voor. vosst., pp. 92, 96, 99, 125, 133.
109. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v iyule, M., 1959, pp. 352-3.
110. Pravda, 178, 3 November 1917, p.4.
111. LGIA, f. 1477, op. 3, d. 1, 1.66.
112. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v sentyabre, pp- 329-30.
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movement.
More common in Petrograd were workers' resolutions which called 
for control of production by the 'toiling people 1 , suggesting Left 
SR or anarchist influence. It is interesting to note, however, that 
the marxist notion of the 'working class' often underwent a populist 
inflection in working-class discourse - apparently spontaneously - 
to become the 'toiling people' (trudovoi narod). Resolutions incor­ 
porating this formula, therefore, may not necessarily have been 
drafted by Left SR's or anarchists. At the beginning of August 
workers in the iron-rolling shop at Putilov passed an earthy resol­ 
ution which declared:
We, workers of the iron-rolling shop, having 
discussed at a general meeting the impending 
crisis in industry and the widespread hunger, 
demand:
1) that the Ministry of Labour immediately 
order factory owners and industrialists to stop 
their game of 'cat and mouse' and start at once 
to mine more coal and ore, and to produce more 
agricultural tools and machines in order to 
reduce the number of unemployed and halt the 
closure of works and factories. If Messrs. 
Capitalists will not pay attention to our 
demand, then we, the workers of the iron- 
rolling shop, demand total control of the 
branches of industry by the toiling people...
4) ...From you capitalists, weeping crocodile 
tears, we demand you stop weeping about chaos 
which you yourselves have created. Your cards 
are on the table, the game is up, your persec­ 
ution can no longer be successful. Go off and
113. Pankratova, A.M., Fabzavkomy v bor'be, pp. 226-7. The first 
conference of factory committees in Moscow called for 'demo­ 
cratic' control of the factory committees, though the second 
in October called for workers' control. Most of the resol­ 
utions which called for state control in Petrograd were passed 
before the autumn. See, for example, the resolution of the 
seventh district of the Putilov works which, as late as the end 
of July, expressed support for the new Coalition government and 
called for state control of the economy. Zemlya i Volya, 103, 
30 July 1917, p.3.
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hide. Think your own thoughts and don't dare 
show your noses, or else you'll find yourselves 
without a nose and head to
On 14 September workers at the Cable Works agreed that "the normal 
course of life can go on only if there is strict control of enter­ 
prises and of all products and also a transfer of power into the
115 hands of the toiling people". Resolutions which show clear
Left SR influence sometimes used the 'workers' control' formula, 
and, in spite of their populism, clearly conceived of this con­ 
trol as operating in a centralised fashion. One such resolution 
passed by workers at the New Admiralty shipyard on 30 September 
and published in the Left SR newspaper, condemned the Democratic 
Conference for not expressing the 'people's will' (narodnaya volya) 
and went on to demand:
the establishment of a genuinely revolutionary 
government (vlasf), a government of the Soviet 
of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, 
which must strengthen and deepen the gains of 
the revolution by immediately summoning a Con­ 
stituent Assembly to resolve economic disorder, 
by instituting workers' control of production 
and distribution, taking no account of the 
interests of the handful of pirates, by bringing 
an end to the war, having declared democratic 
conditions for peace and having torn up the tsarist 
treaties and by giving land to the peasants and 
bread to the urban democracy J^
It is very difficult to find obviously anarchist or syndicalist 
resolutions on economic questions passed by workers in Petrograd. 
One clear example is the resolution passed by workers in one of the
115. Okt. voor. vosst., p.91.
116. Znamya Truda, 32, 30 September 1917, p.3.
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shops at Langenzippen in July, which stated that "the country 
can be brought out of the chaos in its finances and food supplies 
only by the proletariat, in union with the peasantry, organised 
into pure class autonomous organisations, united on the basis of 
federalism, which will implement full control in all branches of 
industry without exception". A symptom of anarchist influence 
may have been the use of a formula about workers taking the factories 
'into their own hands'. Zhuk, the syndicalist, Piontovskii and 
the SR Maximalist, Vas'ko, all employed this formula at the factory 
committee conferences, but other evidence shows that left Bolsheviks 
also used the phrase, as a way of talking about workers' self-manage­ 
ment - though Milyutin expressly ruled out this phrase at the
118 national conference. Strangely, the resolution which calls
most directly for the transfer of factories into the hands of the 
workers was passed by two branches of the metalworkers' union rather 
than by a factory committee. A syndicalist resolution, passed by 
the Kolpino district delegates of the metal union on 10 August 1917 
and by the Nevskii district delegates on 25 August, recommended:
as the only radical method of struggle... that 
the metalworkers' union take all factories and 
works into its own hands...and liaise closely 
with the CCFC...SO that when the time comes 
for the factories to be transferred into the 
hands of the workers, there will be cells in the 
localities ready not just to take over but to 
continue running the factories.'' 9
117. Golos Truda, 3. 25 August 1917, p.3.
118. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 2, pp. 179-81.
119. Golos Truda, 4, 1 September 1917, p.4; Proletarii, 9, 
23 September 1917, p.4.
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This impressionistic survey of workers' resolutions on control 
of the economy can hardly claim to be a scientific analysis of 
working-class attitudes to this question, but it does show that 
the Bolshevik formula of 'workers' control of production and dis­ 
tribution' was the one most widely supported by workers in Petro- 
grad. Populist formulations about control by the 'toiling people 1 
figure fairly prominently, but Menshevik, anarchist or syndicalist 
formulations are rare. Some resolutions merely demanded 'control
of production 1 , such as one by the Putilov workers on October 11,
120 without specifying what kind of control. Another called for
121 control by the factory committees. Despite a limited degree
of variety in the formulations used, suggesting some variation in 
conceptualisations of control of the economy, the vast majority 
of resolutions share one thing in common. This is a belief that 
economic disruption is primarily the result of wilful, malicious 
'sabotage 1 by the employers. 'Sabotage' and 'saboteur' were key 
words in popular discourse during the revolution and, as we have
seen, Bolsheviks in the factory committees harped constantly on this
122 theme.
120. Okt. voor. vosst., p.113.
121. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v sentyabre, p.302.
122. Compare the fictional dialogue between two bandits during 
the Civil War, as described by Pasternak in Dr. Zhivago:
"All right, but just tell me one thing, Goshka. I still 
don't know all those words about socialism. What's the 
expression sabotazhnik (saboteur, SAS), for instance? 
What does it mean?
I'm an expert on all those words; but I tell you, Terenty, 
I'm drunk, leave me alone. A sabotozhnik is someone who be­ 
longs to the same gang. A vataga is a gang, isn't it? Well 
if you say savatazhnik, it means you belong to the same 
gang. Do you understand, you mug?
That's what I thought it was - a swear word.
Pasternak, B., Dr. Zhivago, translated M. Hayward, London: Collins, 
1958, p.27.
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THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF WORKERS' CONTROL
By mid-summer 1917 the crisis in industry was leading to 
factory closures and rising unemployment. Between March and July, 
568 factories - mainly textile and flour mills— employing some 
104,000 workers, shut down operations. Torgovo-Promyshlennaya 
Gazeta analysed the chief causes of closure as being: firstly, 
shortages of cotton, grain and other raw materials; secondly, the 
'excessive 1 demands of the workers; thirdly, too few orders; fourthly, 
lack of fuel; fifthly, declining profitability. The regions worst 
affected were the Moscow Industrial Region and Southern Russia. 
After July the scale of unemployment increased, as supplies of 
fuel and raw materials began to dry up. It was mainly small firms 
which closed down, but larger firms contributed their share to the 
pool of unemployment. Before October Petrograd was not as badly 
affected as other areas by unemployment.
There are no reliable data on the number of unemployed in 
either Russia or Petrograd for the period after July. In Petrograd 's 
largest industry - the metal industry - the number of metalworkers
registering each day with the union as having no job rose from 37.4
2 in July to 71.3 in October. Skilled metalworkers could still
manage to find jobs, however, so that only about 3% of members of
3 the metal union were unemployed in October. Other industries were
1. Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta, 213, 1 October 1917, pp. 1-2.
2. Delo Naroda, 176, 10 October 1917, p.l.
3. Rabochaya Gazeta, 143, 26 August 1917, p.2; Stepanov, Z.V.,
Rabochie PetrogTada v period podgotovki i provedeniya oktyabr'skogo 
vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, M.L., 1965, pp. 143-4.
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worse hit: the shortage of sugar meant that the Petrograd confec-
tionary industry was on the verge of extinction, thus threatening
4 the livelihood of 4,000 workers. Grain shortages meant that
5 many bakery workers were out of work. In the print industry
unemployment was growing rapidly, owing to the paper shortage; 
by October about 1,000 printers in the capital were out of work. 
Other industries, such as textiles, tailoring and woodworking, were 
not yet suffering closures and redundancies, though their pros­ 
pects were uniformly bleak. In all, there were probably about 
8,000 registered unemployed in the middle of October, and although 
the real figure was almost certainly much higher, the rate of un­ 
employment in the capital was still lower than elsewhere in the 
country. This was due to the success of factory committees and 
trade unions in blocking government attempts to demobilise the 
state enterprises producing for the war effort, and the attempts 
by private entrepreneurs to cut the size of their workforces.
As the economic crisis deepened, so the tempo of class con­ 
flict accelerated. As the workers became more combative and as 
profits disappeared, so industrialists became less willing to invest 
in their enterprises or to take on new orders. At the beginning 
of June the Minister of Trade and Industry declared that ''entre­ 
preneurs, not feeling themselves on firm ground, have lost the 
appropriate energy. They desire a halt to production or seek to
4. Delo Naroda, 160, 21 September 1917, p.4; Rabochii Put', 18, 
23 September 1917, p.4.
5. Rabota soyuza muchnykh izdelii i osnovanie soyuzafeishchevikov - 
1917 god, L., 1927, p.lb.
6. Stepanov, op. cit., p.144.
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transfer the rocketing costs of production onto the broad circles 
of consumers and onto the exchequer by exorbitant increases in 
commodity prices". In Southern and Central Russia from early 
summer industrialists began to wage war on the militant working 
class, seeking to crush its militancy with the cudgel of unemploy­ 
ment. In the Urals and the Donbass, and to some extent in the 
Moscow Industrial Region, organisations of employers launched 
a coordinated strategy of lockouts, designed to demoralise 
workers and to prove to the public that interference in production, 
excessive wage increases and the eight-hour day were bringing
o
industry to its knees. In Petrograd the policy of cut-backs, 
closures and lockouts was less aggressive. The large factories had 
not yet been pushed into a corner and working-class resistance 
was too well-organised to be easily quashed. By June Petrograd 
employers were alairrmed that they had made a terrible miscalculation 
in plumping for a policy of concession rather than repression 
after the February Revolution. The workers, instead of succumbing 
to the blandishments of a liberal industrial relations policy, 
were growing ever more immoderate in their demands. The SFWO 
complained:
Industrialists have made very significant con­ 
cessions, they have made a big sacrifice in 
the hope of restarting work"in the factories 
and mills, but the demands of workers and em­ 
ployees have gone beyond what is possible.9
7. Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune velikoi oktyabr'skoi 
sotsialisticheskoi revolvutsii, part 1, M.L., 1957, p.225.
8. Volobuev, P.V., Proletariat i burzhuaziya Rossii v 1917g., 
M., 1964, pp. 302, 306.
9. Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie, part 1, p.166. The talk of 'big 
sacrifices' must be treated with a pinch of salt, in view of 
the fact that profits in private industry in Petrograd rose in 
real terms by 125% between 1913 and 1916. Strumilin, S.G., 
TzbTannye Proizvedeniya, vol. 1, M., 1963, p.186.
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From June onwards Petrograd employers adopted a much tougher 
industrial policy, resisting wage increases and cutting back 
production in the hope that growing unemployment would make the 
workers 'see sense 1 .
The shift in the attitude of employers was paralleled by a 
shift in the attitude of the government towards the labour 
problem. Under the first Coalition Government, formed at the 
beginning of May, a proper Ministry of Labour had come into being. 
This was headed by the Menshevik, M.I. Skobelev, assisted by P.N. 
Kokokol'nikov, an experienced trade unionist of right-wing 
Menshevik persuasion, and K.A. Gvozdev, bete noire of the labour 
left because of his pivotal role in the Workers Group of the War 
Industries Committee. These Mensheviks came into the new Ministry 
committed to a programme of 'broad social reforms'. Skobelev 
promised to meet the just demands of the masses, to intervene in 
the economy and to confiscate the profits of the captains of 
industry, but these promises stuck in the throats of the 
majority of staunchly conservative government ministers. They 
despatched Skobelev's reform proposals into the labyrinth of 
government committees, from whence only three saw the light of
day. On 11 July labour inspectors were established, as a first
12 step towards revamping the system of factory inspection. On
10. Izvestiya, 63, 11 May 1917, p.l.
11. Izvestiya, 65, 13 May 1917; Izvestiya, 68, 17 May 1917.
12. Browder, R.P. and Kerensky, A.F., The Russian Provisional 
Government, vol. 1, p.745. In July 1917 the 1912 social in­ 
surance legislation was extended so that all workers received 
sick pay and accident compensation, ibid., p.739.
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8 August night work was banned for women and minors under 17 - 
except in defence enterprises. And on 8 October maternity pay 
was introduced. All other proposals for comprehensive social 
insurance failed to reach the statute book, owing to opposition 
from within the government and from the employers who accused the 
Ministry of Labour of "defending the exclusive interests of the 
working class...completely ignoring the interests...of the other 
side 11 . 13
By June the reforming zeal of the Menshevik ministers was 
becoming swamped by their concern to defuse explosive class anta­ 
gonisms. The Ministry of Labour tried to encourage a partner­ 
ship between capital and labour, but although Skobelev still paid 
lip-service to the plight of the working class, he tended in­ 
creasingly to see low labour productivity as the root of Russia's 
economic ills. Hhen visited by a deputation of mine-owners from 
Southern Russia on 13 June Skobelev reportedly promised them help 
in curtailing working-class demands, which he concurred were 
"immoderate" and "in conflict with the general well-being". In 
an address to workers on 28 June Skobelev condemned "arbitrary" 
actions by workers which "disorganise industry and exhaust the 
exchequer". The need for sacrifice became the leitmotif of 
Skobelev's speeches, one which modulated into appeals for an end
to industrial conflict "in the name of strengthening the revolution
15 and honouring our ultimate ideals". Yet in spite of extravagant
13. ibid., pp. 740, 746; Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie, vol. 1, pp 
"7 537-8; Volobuev, op. cit., p. 338.
14. Cited by Volobuev, op. cit., p. 205.
15. ibid.
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displays of impartiality, Skobelev could not win the trust of the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, A.I. Konovalov, who led an on­ 
slaught against further wage increases at a time when the Ministry 
of Labour was enmeshed in painful negotiations over union wage 
contracts. Efforts to establish cooperation between the two 
sides of industry were thus rendered void not just by bitter class 
conflict in industry but by resistance from bourgeois ministers 
within the government.
After the July Days the Kerensky government shifted sharply 
to the right, under sustained pressure from industrialists, 
financiers and the General Staff. Demands from employers for 
the militarisation of labour in defence industries and in trans­ 
port, for a declaration of a state of emergency in the Donbass 
evoked a favourable response from the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and from the Special Commission on Defence. The position 
of the Ministry of Labour became more untenable, as it was torn 
between the irreconcilable forces of capital and labour; it 
oscillated between minor concessions and promises of reform and 
puny displays of strength, such as the Skobelev circulars (see 
below).
Workers resist attempts to evacuate Petrograd industry
As early as the latter half of 1916, the tsarist government 
began to discuss the possibility of 'relieving 1 (razgruzka, lit.
16. ibid., pp. 294-5.
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'unloading') Petrograd of some of its factories to ease the fuel 
shortage. On 7 April 1917 the Special Commission on Defence 
discussed the possibility of transferring key factories from the 
capital to areas closer to sources of fuel and raw materials. News 
of the discussion provoked uproar among workers, so the government 
resolved to tread warily. On 6 July a special committee was set 
up to plan the relief of industry^which in August recommended that 
plant and equipment be evacuated from 47 large factories in Petrograd,
including all state enterprises and the largest private engineering
18 and chemical works. Only some of the workers at these factories
were to be evacuated; the rest were to be dismissed with two weeks' 
pay. The German occupation of Riga on 21 August and the threat of 
a German advance on Petrograd caused the government to contem­ 
plate a far more ambitious evacuation than had originally been 
intended with the plans for partial relief. The dominant motive 
of the government in laying plans for evacuation of industry 
appears to have been a desire to rationalise war production and a 
fear of German occupation. In working-class circles, however, 
the government plans were seen as a thinly-disguised attempt to 
break the power of the revolutionary movement by the simple device
d&sb-oy.Vyj
of its physical base.
/
When news first broke in May of plans for the 'relief of
17. Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue 1, 
Pg., 1918, p.18.
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industry, workers lost no time in letting the government know
their views. On 20 May at Putilov? workers in the gun shop, which was
dominated politically by Mensheviks, unanimously resolved:
If the relief of Petrograd is necessary in 
the interests of rational distribution of food 
products and rational allocation of fuel, for 
the benefit of all toilers, then Petrograd 
must be relieved in the first place of:
1) idlers, drones, men and women in monasteries, 
those who live off their incomes, those who do 
not work or serve,
2) those hired workers brought by force or 
deception from Asia, who should be sent back.
3) The transfer of all luxury items along the 
rail- and water-ways should be halted and these 
means of transport should be used to convey fuel, 
fodder and foodstuffs to wherever they are re­ 
quired. We protest against the slanders that 
accuse workers of disrupting transport, and point 
out that it is those who defend the monks and the 
opponents of the democratic republic who are 
causing and aggravating chaos in the state, and who 
should be replaced immediately by elected represen­ 
tatives of the peasants and workers.
...We demand control of production, industry and 
capital, since the capitalists and industrialists 
are deliberately leading the country to ruin.
We demand of the Coalition Government, through 
the Soviet of workers' and peasants' deputies, that 
the will of the people be fulfilled unconditionally. 
If it takes just one step away from this path, 
then the soviet should recall the socialist minis­ 
ters from the government and transfer power to the 
soviet of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies
Another resolution passed at Putilov at this time by 700 
workers in the boiler and steam-boiler shops denounced evacuation 
plans as a "counter-revolutionary trick of the bourgeoisie to rid 
Petersburg of organised revolutionary workers and to scatter them 
to the backwoods (glush 1 ) of Russia". They called for the city
19. Gaza, I.I., Putilovets v trekh revolyutsii, L., 1933, pp. 340-1.
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to be relieved of "the bourgeois idlers who stroll along Nevskii
on
and Morskaya streets stopping off at restaurants". Workers in 
the Putilov forge also denounced the evacuation plans as a counter­ 
revolutionary plot and continued:
We, workers and peasants, will stay put, since 
we believe that, once the right balance of con­ 
flicting forces is struck, the people will have 
the opportunity to take power into their own 
hands and then no crisis need occur. We suggest 
that Petrograd be unloaded of its monasteries, 
infirmaries, asylums, alms-houses and many 
thousands of idle bourgeois. We also propose to 
find out why there is such a great concentration 
of Chinese in the city".21
These three resolutions all display a fierce hostility to the para­ 
sitic bourgeoisie, a strong sense of the workers as a productive 
class, a deep anti-religious feeling, a covert racism towards 
immigrant workers, not to say a certain lack of imaginative 
sympathy for the unfortunates in the alms-houses and asylums. 
The themes encapsulated in the Putilov resolutions were 
echoed in many other protests against 'relief of industry. 
Somewhat unusually, workers at Sestroretsk blamed the industrial 
chaos not on deliberate sabotage, but on "the disorganisation and 
anarchy of the capitalist system". To the standard list of
proposed evacuees, they added "courtesans, those who play the
22 stock-exchange, speculators and other social parasites".
Bolshevik-minded workers at New Lessner added to the list, "yellow
20. ibid, p.340.
21. Delo Naroda, 62, 31 May 1917, p.4.
22. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v mae/iyune, M., 1959, pp. 280-1.
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labour" and "peasants to be sent back to the fields"; while workers
at the Pella engineering works had the bright idea of "ridding
23 Petrograd...of the gentlemen who can only cry 'War to Victory' 1 "
Similar resolutions, condemning the evacuation plans as a move to 
disperse the revolutionary proletariat, were passed by workers at
the Russo-Baltic works, the Arsenal, the Kebke factory and the
24 Pet/chev engineering works. Only very occasionally did workers
admit that some degree of evacuation might be inevitable in view 
of the fuel, raw materials and transport crisis, but even then,
they stated that it was up to workers to decide if and how
25 evacuation should be carried out.
In the autumn some factory owners began surreptitiously to 
move equipment out of their factories. Factory committees did not 
confine themselves merely to vituperating these owners, they actively 
thwarted their manoeuvres. In September the Putilov administration 
attempted to send machinery by canal to Saratov, but the works 
committee held up the barge for a month until the administration
had proved to their satisfaction that the machinery was not
?fi needed in Petrograd. At the Pipe Works management planned to
remove operations to Penza, Voronezh and Ekaterinoslav, transferring 
4,000 machines, 20,000 workers and about 40,000 members of their 
families. When the works committee visited these places, however, 
they discovered that none of them was ready to receive the evacuees 
and that, in reality, management intended to transfer only 1,281
23. Pravda, 64, 24 May 1917, p.4.
24. Pravda, 65, 25 May 1917, p.4; Pravda, 68, 28 May 1917, p.4;
Pravda, 93, 29 June 1917, p.4; De1o~Naroda, 66, 4 June 1917, p.4
25. See, for the example, the Aivaz resolution, Pravda, 92, 
27 June 1917, p.4.
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workers and fire the rest. Without hesitation, the works committee
27 blocked the proposed plans. Similar discoveries were made by
factory committees at the Okhta explosives works and the Optics 
factory when they visited the sites to which their factories were
OQ
to be evacuated. At the Arsenal works the Okhta powder works the
committees obstructed evacuation plans since they had been inadequately
A 2 9 prepared.
By no means all factory committees opposed evacuation in 
principle. At the Parviainen works the Bolshevik-controlled works 
committee on 22 August drew up an agreement with management which
specified in detail the terms of the transfer of operations out of
30 the capital. At the Baltic works the committee drew up emergency
evacuation plans in case of German invasion, but censured a union 
representative on the government evacuation commission, who had 
admitted in a private conversation that there were too many workers
at the factory, and had suggested that the superfluous ones be sent
31 "to the Front or to the devil". At the Nevskii shipyard the works
committee was fully involved in arrangements to remove the plant
32 to Dubrovka and the Kamenskaya station. At the Admiralty works
the committee kept a stern eye on the plans which were being drawn
up and at Sestroretsk the Bolshevik works committee helped find a
33 place to which the arms factory could be transferred.
27. Stepanov, op. cit., p.99; Rabochii Put', 7, 10 September 1917, p.3.
28. Stepanov, op. cit., p.100.
29. ibid.
30. Metal list, 3, 1 October 1917- p.16.
31. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 336, 342, 349, 378, 391.
32. Payalin, Zavod im. Lenina, 1857-1918, M.L., 1933, p.397.
33. Fab. zav. kom., pp. 91, 95; 593.
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The official position of the factory committee movement was to 
oppose plans for evacuation. This was the line which was propagated 
by the Bolshevik party. At the Third Conference of Factory Committees 
on 10 September Skrypnik poured obloquy on government evacuation 
plans. The conference passed a resolution which argued that the 
practical difficulties of setting up factories in new areas without 
a proper social and industrial infrastructure were enormous; that 
the transport system could not bear the strain of evacuation; that 
it would be too costly and amounted, in effect, to a counter­ 
revolutionary plot. The resolution argued that the way out of the 
crisis lay in a revolutionary popular government bringing the war 
to a close. The resolution, however, did allow for partial evac­ 
uation of single enterprises, so long as this was done under strict 
workers' control, with the full consent of the workforce, and so 
long as three months' redundancy pay was given to those who did 
not wish to move.
The attitude of the trade unions was more or less in line with 
that of the factory committees though there was greater 
willingness to recognise that evacuation might not always be against 
the interests of the working class. In May the Petrograd Council
of Trade Unions strongly attacked the evacuation plans and per-
35 suaded the workers' section of the Petrograd Soviet to do likewise.
Interestingly, however, the metalworkers' union did not share the 
general antipathy to evacuation. At a meeting in May of the union
34. Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya i Fabzavkomy, vol. 2, M., 1927, pp. 35-6
35. Pravda, 65, 25 May 1917, p.3; Pravda, 71, 2 June 1917, p.3; 
Delo Naroda, 58, 26 May 1917, p.4; Vestnik professional'nykh 
soyuzov,T7 15 September 1917, p.10.
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board it was unanimously agreed that:
we should broaden the partial question (of 
'relief, SAS) to include the general regul­ 
ation of the whole of our national industry. 
We thus insist on the immediate creation of 
a national centre of regulation, on which 
the representatives of organised labour will 
have a big say in deciding questions about 
the organisation of the economy.36
Later the Bolshevik V. Schmidt persuaded the union to take a more 
critical position, but the union shifted back to its original 
position in July, justifying evacuation by the argument that "the
ruin of the national economy would lead to the destruction of the
37 revolution". At the beginning of September the union managed to
persuade the PCTU of the necessity of limited evacuation under
oo
wrokers 1 control. By the beginning of October the metal union, 
the PCTU and the Petrograd Soviet had moved to a far less intrans­ 
igent position on the question of evacuation than the CCFC, which 
better fitted their more statist conceptions of regulating the 
economy.
The factory committees against redundancies
In the autumn of 1917 the factory committees of Petrograd 
became very active in fighting attempts at closure and redundancy, 
At the Baranovskii, Parviainen, Vulcan, Pulemet, Metal, Erikson, 
Siemens-Schuckert and Dynamo works, management plans for closure
37. Professional'noe Dvizhenie v Retrograde y 1917g., L., 1928, p.123; 
Metallist, 4, 18 October 1917, p.m.
38. Metallist, 5, 9 November 1917, p.3; Rabochii Put 1 , 10, 14 
September 1917, p.3.
39. Stepanov, op. cit., p.143.
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were blocked by the works committees. At the Bar anovskii works 
management announced on 1 August 1,500 redundancies owing to fuel
shortages. The committee responded by cutting working hours and
39 transferring workers from one shop to another. On 16 August
management at the Vulcan works fired 633 workers and announced the 
closure of the factory on 7 September. When the factory committee 
discovered that there were stocks of fuel and raw materials to
last six months, it accused the director of 'sabotage 1 and tried
40to have him removed from his post. At the end of August manage­ 
ment at Parviainen announced that 1,630 redundancies were in the 
pipeline, but the committee managed to defer them by ensuring a 
more economical use of remaining fuel supplies.
At the Putilov works the administration had tried to lay off 
1,200 workers as early as May, but it was not until the end of 
August that it tried in earnest to implement redundancies. It
announced that 10,000 workers would lose their jobs as a con-
42 sequence of fuel shortages. The works committee declared this
unacceptable and began a desperate search for fuel. It managed to 
find some, but the administration could not afford to buy it. 
Workers and managers set up a commission to investigate production 
at the factory and came to the conclusion that 3,200, not 10,000, 
workers would have to lose their jobs. On 25 September members of 
the works committee met with the vice-president of the Commission on
39. Stepanov, op. cit., p. 143.
40. ibid., p.142.
41. ibid.
42. Gaza, op. cit., pp. 386-7; MiteTman, et al., op. cit., p.142.
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Defence, Pal'chinskii, to discuss the fuel crisis and redundancies. 
He proposed a 'participation' scheme whereby workers would be given 
places on the new company board in return for implementing redundancies. 
The committee rejected this out of hand, since "workers cannot dis­ 
miss workers", but they conceded that some redundancies were
necessary, since "we cannot allow the factory to become an alms-
43 house". On 10 October the works committee met with representations
from the Peterhof district soviet and from the CCFC to discuss 
further the question of redundancies. Committee members were 
criticised for agreeing to one month's redundancy pay instead of 
two. The meeting agreed that workers should only leave voluntarily,
though some felt that shop committees should pressurise the better-
44 off workers into leaving.
Some factory committees did agree to redundancies since the 
alternative was complete closure. Many adopted a policy of making 
women workers redundant rather than men, either on a 'last in, 
first out' basis or because their sojourn in industry was seen as 
an essentially temporary phenomenon induced by the war. At the
Arsenal works, the Nevskii shipyard, Lessner and Russian-Baltic
45 works, the committees took steps to phase out female employment.
At the Baltic works the committee said that every effort would be
made to find alternative work for women but if this were not
46 available they would be dismissed. At the Semenov wood factory
43. Gaza, op. cit., pp. 386-91; Rabochii Put 1 , 32, 10 October 1917, p.4
44. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 490-3.
45. Stepanov, op. cit., p.146.
46. Fab. zav. kom., pp. 267-311.
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and at the municipal tram depot it was decided that women whose 
husbands worked at the workplace should be made redundant. 47 The 
same decision was taken by a general meeting of workers in the 
shrapnel shop at Putilov which, according to a woman who worked 
there, reflected the general contempt with which women were 
treated; however, Putilov works committee condemned the decision. 48 
The CCFC and the Bolshevik party (particularly its women's paper, 
Rabotnitsa) took steps to prevent committees from discriminating 
against women in this way, but it is hard to say with what success. 49
On the whole, the attempt by the factory committees to block 
redundancies was very successful. Only two factories employing more 
than 500 workers were closed down in Petrograd prior to October - the 
Semenov engineering works and the Company for Precision Engineering 
Instruments.
Workers' control becomes more radical
As more and more jobs became threatened, the scope of workers' 
control expanded. Factory committees strengthened their control 
of fuel and raw materials and new forms of control began to appear. 
One of the most important of these was the effort to extend workers'
control into the sphere of company sales and finances. Until June
50 such control was a rare phenomenon. Finance sub-committees existed
47. Ekho derevoobdelochnika, 3, 12 December 1917, p.15; Karpetskaya, 
N.D., Rabotnitsy i velikii oktyabr', L., 1974, p.85.
48. Golos Rabotnitsy, 5-6, 17 June 1917, p.14.
49. See the article by K.N. Samoilova, Proletarii, 17 August 1917.
50. Selitskii, V.I., Massy v bor'be za rabochii kontroT, M., 1971, 
p.195.
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in some factories, like the Pipe Works and the Okhta explosives 
works as far back as March, but they did little but organise the 
finances of the committees themselves. As early as May, however, 
Major-General Belaev, the director of the Izhorsk works, permitted
the works committee to monitor financial operations and pricing
51 policy. At the Russo-Belgian metallurgical company in June, 400
workers, threatened with loss of their jobs owing to the financial 
difficulties of the company, opened the company books to discover 
that orders were in a healthy state. They offered to guarantee the
profitability of the company for the rest of 1917 if they were
52 given the right to check company accounts, but management refused.
At the Skorokhod shoe factory on June 13 the factory committee
53 demanded details of incoming and outgoing orders. At the Langen-
zippen engineering works the factory committee went so far in June
as to attempt to stop the payment of dividends to shareholders,
54 pending an enquiry. The First Conference of Petrograd Factory
Committees called for the abolition of commercial secrecy and the 
Central Council of Factory Committees, set up by that Conference, 
arrogated to itself wide powers of checking company accounts, 
calculating debts and credits, costs of production and rates of 
profit. Yet, in spite of increased activity in this sphere, con­ 
trol of company finances remained an aspiration rather than a
51 . Rabochii Kontrol ' v promyshlennykh predpriyatiyakh Petrograda,
., vol. 1, L., 1947, p. 71 (henceforward Rabochii KontroT )
52. Dmitriev, N., 'Petrogradskie fabzavkomy v 1917g', Krasnaya 
Letopis 1 , 1927, no. 2 (23).
53. Rabochii Kontrol', p. 108.
54. ibid., p. 111.
55. Novyi Put', no. 1-2, 15 October 1917, pp. 9-10.
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reality, because of the overriding influence of the banks. Banks 
were not subject to workers' control and so it was difficult to 
get hold of information about the financial state of a company. 
Nor were attempts by the Central Council of Factory Committees to 
ensure an efficient and equitable distribution of orders much 
more successful. The slump in demand and the dislocation of the 
market merely led to factory committees competing for scarce orders.
Attempts by factory-owners to close down their firms provoked 
workers in a few small factories to either remove the directors 
or to try to run the factories themselves. One of the first and 
most blatant attempts at 'sabotage 1 occurred at the tiny engineering 
shop, owned by V.I. Rykatkin, where 24 workers were employed. 
Between November 1915 and April 1917, Rykatkin had received about 
a million rubles in loans - mainly from the government - but the 
factory had completed orders worth less than 100,000 rubles. The 
War Industries Committee had already begun to investigate suspected 
speculation, when a row flared up at the factory on 2 May. The 
foreman refused to let Rykatkin fire one of his administrators and 
he, enraged at this attack on his "right to manage", determined to 
close his factory. To facilitate this, he secretly removed tools 
and equipment from the factory one night but was caught in the act. 
The Menshevik-dominated factory committee, in retaliation, refused 
Rykatkin entry into the factory and petitioned the government to 
sequester the enterprise:
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Despite the fact that the enterprise is working 
on defence, the owner has conducted his business 
with extreme carelessness. He accepted orders 
only in order to get loans, but once he had got 
them, he cut back the fulfillment of the orders. 
He bought materials in insufficient quantities 
and what he bought he dumped on one side. He 
sold fuel which had been specially assigned for 
defence purposes. He transferred craftsmen, without 
the knowledge of the workers, and there were in­ 
stances when he provoked soldiers at the factory 
against the workers.56
The Ministry of Labour at first tried to persuade the committee
to take back Rykatkin, but at the end of July acceded to the demand
57 for sequestration. At the Semenov machine-construction plant at
the end of June, management for the second time attempted to close 
the plant because of lack of capital and low labour productivity. 
It petitioned the government for a 500,000 rubles subsidy and the 
government agreed to transfer orders to the factory. The factory 
committee in turn agreed to try to raise labour productivity, but 
only on condition that it be allowed to establish a control commission 
with wide powers. By August, however, the factory had closed down, 
putting 700 workers out of jobs.
Small factories were the first to feel the brunt of the economic 
crisis.,and in order to prevent closure, one or two factory committees 
in small enterprises tried to run the factories themselves. These 
first experiments in self-management were not inspired by syndicalist 
utopianism: they were designed to save jobs. They were fairly well-
56. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.146.
57. The case is documented in detail in Krasnyi Arkhiv, 69-70, 
1935, pp. 138-58.
58. Okt. Rev. i Fab., vol. 1, pp. 150-1; 172-4.
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organised experiments and the committees concerned liaised with 
the relevant labour organisations and with the Ministry of Labour. 
Indeed there is a strong suggestion in the Brenner, Slyusarenko 
and Langenzippen cases that self-management was not so much an end 
in itself as a means of forcing the government to take responsibility
/
for the enterprise (so-called 'sequestration'). At the Brenner 
copper-smelting and engineering works the owner informed the factory 
committee on 19 May that he had no funds left and begged it to help 
him expedite outstanding orders as quickly as possible. The 
committee agreed to do this, but five days later Brenner announced 
that he was going to shut the factory for two weeks. The committee 
objected to this, since the factory had received advances of 
420,000 rubles from the War Industries Committee for orders which 
had not yet been completed. The committee therefore decided to 
dispense with Brenner and run the factory themselves. On 6 June 
they issued an appeal to the Ministry of Labour and to the Petrograd 
Soviet:
In view of the fact that the owner of the factory 
has not appeared since 24 May, and that the factory 
has been working under the supervision of the 
factory committee, we are now seeking your permission 
to run production, to receive and fulfil orders, both 
state and private, and to continue production when 
those state orders begun under Brenner have been 
finished and despatched to the institutions from 
which they were received. Without your permission, 
the committee will be deprived of the possibility 
of continuing production at the factory and this 
will make it difficult for the workers to receive 
their wages.59
59. Krasnyi Arkhiv, 105, 1940, p.109.
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On 16 June the Peterhof district soviet agreed to check the 
aoounts of the Brenner works and to make an inventory of stock. 
It later agreed to oversee an experiment in self-management, 
putting the Brenner deputy to the soviet in charge of operations 
at the factory. However the factory was desperately short of 
capital and the committee turned to other factory committees for 
help. The Triangle works lent the factory 15,000 rubles and 
the Putilov works sent some raw material, but this did not really 
help. At one stage the committee began negotiations with Brenner 
about his possible return as director, but his terms proved unaccept­ 
able. By August productivity was sliding fast, workers were not 
receiving their wages and drunkenness was on the increase. On 
24 August the commissar of the local militia reported to the 
Peterhof soviet that he had received an order from the government 
to eject the workers from the factory. 61 The committee then turned
again to the government to demand sequestration. After pressure 
from the CCFC, the government agreed in September to place the 
factory in charge of the Factory Convention. 62 At another small 
enterprise in the early summer, workers discussed the possibility 
of taking over production. At the V.A. Lebedev airplane factory in 
late May the workers put forward a large wage demand which manage­ 
ment refused to countenance. A general meeting was then called 
at which the Socialist Revolutionaries of the factory called for 
the wage claim to be referred to the conciliation chamber. They
60. Raionnye Sovety Petrograda v 1917g., vol. 2, M.L., 1965, pp. 184-6.
61. ibid., pp. 249, 259, 263.
62. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v jyule, M., 1959, pp. 342-3; 
Okt. Rev. i Fab., vol. 1, p.147.
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agreed that^as a last resort, if management proved recalcitrant, 
they should demand the removal of the director. Another group of 
workers, however, demanded the immediate expulsion of the director 
"for disseminating false rumours aimed at disorganising the workers 
and employees of the factory". They won the toss and the workers 
forced the removal of the director from the board of the company. 
On 2 June another general meeting was summoned at which a call was 
made for workers to take over the running of the factory themselves, 
Some pointed out that this was impractical, since they did not have 
any capital to continue operations. A worker by the name of Tamsin 
proposed the following resolution: "We empower the factory com­ 
mittee to take over the running of the factory by itself, to inform 
the board of this step and to invite a government commissar to 
the factory and to inform the metalworkers' union". The SR chair­ 
man of the factory committee resigned at this point and the next 
day the SR factory cell called a meeting which the Bolsheviks 
refused to attend. This meeting agreed that "the question of trans­ 
ferring the factory into the workers' hands cannot be decided by 
an open vote, but only by a secret ballot of all comrade-workers, 
so that each worker considers himself responsible for the decision", 
A member of the City Soviet was called to the factory and he even­ 
tually dissuaded the workers from taking over the factory, leaving
CO
it in charge of the board of directors.
The sheer practical difficulties of running a factory seem to 
have discouraged factory committees from any attempt at complete
63. Delo Naroda, 8 June 1917, p.4.
34-2
takeover. Seizure of an enterprise by workers - so-called 'social­ 
isation 1 - was a rare phenomenon prior to the October Revolution. 
Hhere workers attempted to remove the official administration, it 
was invariably after a bout of bitter conflict and their aim was 
usually to force the hand of the government into taking responsibility 
for the factory. At the Slyusarenko airplane factory the owner closed 
down operations in July after stalemate had been reached in wage 
negotiations. A general meeting of the 227 workers resolved to bar
the owner from the premises and pressed the Ministry of War to
65take direct charge of the factory. At the Langenzippen engineer­ 
ing works the administration announced on 2 June that the factory 
would have to close since production had fallen by a third, owing 
to a shorter working day, a 50% decrease in labour productivity 
and a fuel shortage. Three days later, the factory committee 
replied that in view of management's refusal to recognise the 
workers' commission of control, its abrogation of pay agreements and 
the proposed closure, the committee intended to institute strict 
control of materials, to make its decisions binding on management, 
to check all management decisions, to examine all correspondence 
and to strengthen security in the factory. It turned to the 
Central Council of Factory Committees to ask for its support in a 
bid to get the government to take over the factory but government 
refused. It was not until 1918 that the committee finally ejected 
the director and simultaneously rejected the commissar appointed to 
the factory by the Bolsheviks.
64. In the Urals, however, factory seizures were quite widespread 
by the autumn of 1917.
65. Stepanov, op. cit., p.135.
66. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.148; Pankratova, A.M., Fabzavkomy v 
bor'be za sotsialisticheskuyu fabriku, M., 1923, p.245.
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The demand for state takeover was by no means an index of the 
political radicalism of an enterprise. At the Respirator factory, 
for example, where 7,000 workres were employed making gas masks, 
the factory committee as late as September couched its demand for 
government sequestration in the language of revolutionary defencism:
We have made clear our position regarding the 
sabotage of our factory by the administration, 
which has gone away at this most pressing and 
critical moment. We consider this to be an 
act of desertion of the home front. In 
order not to disrupt or harm production of gas 
masks for the Front, and in order that the 
factory can work normally - in spite of the 
eight-day absence of the administration - we 
unanimously resolve:-
As circumstances will not permit of any delay, 
to demand the immediate appointment of a commissar 
to take care of the legal side of things and 
that he be someone neutral.
The works committee and shop stewards' committee 
take responsibility for production and main­ 
taining output...
In no circumstances must our factory be subject 
to the War Industries Committee, but to the 
state. We demand that the administration, which 
is guilty of desertion, be handed over to a 
democratic court...67
As workers' control became more aggressive and expansionist, 
opposition to it from factory owners hardened. Everywhere employers 
began to resist "interference" by factory committees and to reassert 
their "right to manage". Attempts by the Society of Factory and 
Works Owners to confine the activities of the committees to the 
area demarcated by the law of 23 April failed dismally. Employers 
therefore tried to constrain the committees in other ways. They 
attempted to stop them meeting during working hours. They threatened
67. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v sentyabre, M., 1961, pp. 284-5.
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to stop paying wages to committee members. They deprived committees 
of premises in which to meet and threatened individual members
CO
with dismissal or conscription into the army. More significantly, 
the SFWO put pressure on the Ministry of Labour to use its legal 
powers to curb the ambitions of the committees. Anxious to meet 
objections from employers and to be seen to be doing something, the 
Ministry of Labour took steps to limit workers' control. On 23 
August it issued a circular affirming that the right of hiring and 
firing workers belonged exclusively to the employers. A week later 
it issued a second circular which forbade factory committees from 
meeting during working hours. The circulars provoked uproar in 
the labour movement, not least because they appeared at precisely 
the time when General Komilov was organising to drown the revolutionary 
movement in blood. Meetings of workers at Putilov, the Admiralty 
works, the Cable works, Nobel and Lebedev works heaped opprobrium
on the Ministry of Labour for capitulating to the counter-revolut-
69 ionary demands of the employers. At Langenzippen, the workers passed
a resolution which said:
We reject with indignation the malicious slanders 
of the Ministry of Labour that the work of the fac­ 
tory committee lowers labour productivity. The 
factory committee declares that... 1) Skobelev's 
circular has a purely political character and is 
counter-revolutionary. It prevents the labour 
movement from following an organised course and 
supports the organised march of the counter-rev­ 
olution, which aims to sabotage industry and re­ 
duce the country to famine. 2) We are forced to 
conclude that in the present context (of Komilov) 
the Ministry for the 'protection of labour 1 has 
been converted into the Ministry for the protection
68. Volobuev, op. cit., pp. 266, 269.
69. Rabochii Kontrol', pp. 171, 181-3, 190; Stepanov, op. cit., p.151.
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of capitalist interests and acts hand in hand 
with Ryabushinskii to reduce the country to 
famine, so that the 'bony hand 1 may strangle 
the revolution."70
At the Obukhov works a general meeting declared:
We consider the existence of the factory 
committees to be a matter of life and death 
for the working class. We believe that the 
implementation of Skobelev's circular would 
mean the destruction of all the gains of the 
working class. We will fight with all our 
might and by all means, including the general 
strike, for the existence of our factory 
committees."71
The Third Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees was an emergency 
conference summoned on 10 September to discuss the circulars. It 
roundly condemned them, jeering at Kokokol'nikov's pathetic attempts 
to explain away the circulars on behalf of an embarrassed Ministry 
of Labour.
Some employers saw the circulars as a green light to go ahead 
and bring the factory committees to heel. At the Skorokhod shoe 
factory and the Aivaz engineering works the managements announced
that they were going to stop paying members of the factory committee
73 and stop their interference in hiring policy. On 1 September the
administration at Vulcan announced that it intended to halve the
70. Browder and Kerensky, op. cit., vol. 1, p.723. The allusion 
is to a speech made by Ryabushinskii, the textile magnate, 
to the Congress of Trade and Industry, in which he warned that 
'the bony hand of hunger and national destitution will seize 
by the throat the friends of the people'.
71. Stepanov, op. cit., p.151.
72. Okt. Rev. i Fab., vol. 2, pp. 18, 27-8.
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wages bill of the factory committee. The committee resisted and 
was fully supported by the workers, who, going further in their 
resistance than the committee wished, clamoured for the removal
of the director. After several weeks' bitter conflict, the wages
74 of committee members were restored to their former level. At
the Nevskii footwear factory management persisted for a week in
trying to stop meetings during working hours and in refusing to
75 pay workers appointed to guard the factory, but then gave in.
In general, labour organisations in Petrograd were strong enough 
to stymie efforts by employers to constrain them^and in most 
factories employers do not seem to have thought it worth trying. 
As early as 12 September the SFWO recommended that its members 
continue to pay an average wage to factory committee members "in 
connection with the exceptional circumstances of the present 
period". Ten days later, in an effort to undo the damage which it 
had already caused, the Ministry of Labour ordered employers to pay 
members of the committees, and was duly condemned by the Chief 
Committee of United Industry for its pains.
After the failure of attempts to curb workers' control by legal 
means, employers were thrown onto the defensive. By September 
workers' control had been transmogrified from an essentially defen­ 
sive tactic of maintaining production into an offensive means of 
forcing employers to keep open their factories come what may. 
The dominant feeling amongst employers was aptly summed up by 
Torgovo-Promyshlennaya Gazeta: "The sole dream of the industrialist
74. ibid, and Rabochii Put', 31, 8 October 1917, p.4,
75. Rabochii Put 1 , 7, 10 September , pp. 3-4.
76. Volobuev, op. cit., p.276.
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has become to give up business and to close his enterprise, if 
only for a short time. If cases of closure are not so numerous, it 
is only because the threat of mob law, sequestration and unrest 
hangs over him".
The dynamic of the movement for workers' control was relent­ 
lessly forward-moving. To use Trotsky's parlance, the demand for 
workers' control was a "transitional" demand, stemming from the 
immediate practical needs of workers but pushing them ever forward 
into battle with capitalism itself. Workers' control implied a 
kind of "dual power" in the factory which, like "dual power" at
state level, was intrinsically unstable and necessitated resolution
78 at the expense of one class or another. As the workers' control
movement grew in power in the autumn of 1917 it came to pose in a 
sharp way the problem of whether workers could "control" production 
without taking some responsibility for it. This question had been 
dealt with as early as March 13 by the conference of representatives 
of twelve Artillery enterprises, which had taken a clear stance:
In order to carry out this preliminary 
(predvaritelnyi) control, the works committee 
sends representatives onto the administrative 
organ of factory management and onto the econ­ 
omic and technical committees and also into 
every section of the factory. All the official 
documents of management, all estimates of 
production and expenditure and all incoming and 
outgoing papers must be presented to members of 
the works committee for their information.
Addendum: Not wishing to take responsibility for 
the technical and administrative-economic organ­ 
isation of production under present conditions, 
the works committee representatives go into 
factory management only for advisory purposes, 
until such time as the economy has been fully
77. Torgovo-Pro'myshlennaya Gazeta, 213, 1 October 1917, p.l.
78. Trotsky, L., The Struggle against Fascism in Germany, London: 
Pelican, pp. 35-6.Trotsky incorporated the demand for workers' 
control of production into the Transitional Programme of the 




This position was reiterated by the conference of works committees 
under the Artillery Department on 17 October. The resolution 
passed by the conference affirmed:
responsibility for production lies exclusively 
with the administration...but the works commit­ 
tees have the right of control, which means 
that the works committee, in the shape of its 
control commission, has the right to attend all 
board meetings and to demand exhaustive infor­ 
mation. 80
This was the official policy of both the factory committees and 
the Bolshevik party on this matter, i.e. to demand that workers have 
a majority of places on all organs of management - for purposes of 
'control' of management decisions - but to refuse to accept any 
responsibility for decisions taken. However, as workers intervened 
more deeply into management, it became more difficult to avoid 
taking responsibility. In extreme cases where the factory committees 
actually ejected management, they either took responsibility for 
production or the factory closed.
This problem greatly exercised the committee at the Putilov 
works. As early as June the committee had gone to the Ministry of 
Labour to demand a new administration, and discussions had taken place 
within the committee as to the number of workers' representatives 
that should sit on the new company board. Most of the committee
79. Qkt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.34.
80. Oktyabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Retrograde, M., 1957, p.127
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held that workers should demand a two-thirds majority of the eighteen 
places on the board in line with official factory committee policy,
but the Bolshevik chairman, Vasil'ev, believed that this would
81 vest workers with responsibility for production willy-nilly.
On 25 September members of the works committee met with the vice- 
chairman of the Defence Commission, Pal'chinskii, to discuss the 
state of production at Putilov. He proposed that a joint control 
commission of workers and management be established to supervise 
the running of the factory and to take charge of cutting the work­ 
force and raising productivity. The majority of Bolsheviks and 
Menshevik-Internationalists on the works committee rejected this 
proposal, since they were unwilling to take responsibility for 
sackings and redundancies; instead they called for strict 'control 1
oo
of the company board. At the same time, however, they agreed to 
sit on the joint control commission, without taking responsibility 
for its decisions; but as Vasil'ev pointed out, it was extremely 
difficult to differentiate 'control' from 'responsibility' at 
this level:
Assuming the functions of control, we will be drawn 
unwillingly, but quite naturally, into the sphere 
of operations and of factory productivity, into 
a sphere which is very ticklish from the point of 
view of preserving the principles of revolutionary 
democracy and observing the principles of class 
struggle.°^
81. Fleer, M., 'Putilovskii zavod v 1917-18gg., Bor'ba klassov, 1924, 
1-2, p.294.
82. Gaza, op. cit., pp. 386-91.
83. ibid., p.389. Vasil'ev said this at a works committee meeting 
which Gaza dates as having taken place on 11 September. This 
cannot have been the case; the meeting probably took place 
shortly after 27 September.
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Clearly workers' control was running into contradictions, caused 
by the coexistence of profound economic dislocation and private 
ownership of industry. On the one hand, the prospect of mass 
unemployment encouraged the works committee at Putilov to take 
greater responsibility for production; on the other, because the 
company remained in private hands, the committee felt it should 
confine itself to merely overlooking company activities.
The All-Russian Conference of Metalworkers, called to discuss 
the union wages contract on 15 October pondered further the nature 
of the 'control 1 which should be exercised. The syndicalist, A.K. 
Gastev, opened the discussion, arguing forcefully that the factory 
committees were fooling themselves if they thought that 'control' 
could avoid entailing responsibility. Speakers debated the relative 
merits of 'informational' (osvedomitel'nyi) versus 'responsible 1 
(otvetstvennyi) control and a clear majority spoke up for the 
latter. Although the conference took place only a week before the 
October uprising, the expectation of the delegates was that capitalism 
would continue and that the state would regulate production on an
increasing scale. Control involving responsibility for decisions
84 taken should therefore be exercised jointly by workers and management.
This scheme had the advantage of not ducking the thorny question of 
'responsibility', but it is highly unlikely that it could have been 
implemented, given the depth of class antagonism. In the event it 
did not matter, for the Revolution intervened.
84. Vserossiiskaya tarifnaya konferentsiya soyuzov metal!istov: protokoly, Pg.» 1918, pp. 15-20.———————————————
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The final thing to note is how the movement for workers' con­ 
trol came in the autumn of 1917 to pose questions of workers' self- 
management. Although the main impulse behind the expansion of 
workers' control was practical rather than ideological-motivated 
by the desire to save jobs rather than to enact some socialist or 
syndicalist blueprint - the practical impulse began to merge with 
the impulse to democratise factory life, which had been set in 
motion by the February Revolution. As early as the first factory 
committee conference in May, one or two delegates had argued for 
workers' control of production not merely as a way of bringing 
order into the economy, but as a preparation for socialism and for 
workers' self-management. Naumov, a Bolshevik metal worker from 
the New Parviainen works, had argued:
Control is not yet socialism, nor even the taking 
of production into our own hands, but it does 
still go beyond the framework of the bourgeois 
system...Our task at the present moment is to 
organise production so that workers will enjoy 
the best working conditions. We must bring 
production out of chaos into order...Having 
established ourselves in production, having 
taken control into our hands, we will learn, 
through practice, to work actively in production 
and to develop it in an organised fashion towards 
future socialist production. 85
By the time the first national conference of factory committees 
took place in October, this was a more pronounced theme. Although 
the resolution passed by the conference was, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, commited to a perspective of 'state workers' 
control' and was highly practical in its recommendations for corn- 
batting economic disorder, it nevertheless began as follows:
85. Okt. Rev. i Fab., vol. 1, p.126.
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Having overthrown autocracy in the political 
sphere, the working class will aspire to achieve 
the triumph of the democratic system in the 
sphere of production. The idea of workers' 
control, which arose naturally in the circum­ 
stances of economic ruin created by the 
criminal policy of the ruling classes, is 
the expression of this aspiration.86
After the Bolshevik seizure of power the emphasis on the democratic 
aspect of workers' control was to come to the fore.
86. ibid., vol. 2, p.186.
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FACTORY COMMITTEES VERSUS TRADE UNIONS
A. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE RESPECTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE FACTORY 
COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS
The emergence of a centralised apparatus covering the whole of 
Petrograd in both the trade unions and the factory committees, posed 
the problem of their respective spheres of competence. The first 
public discussion of this problem took place at the First Conference 
of Factory Committees at the beginning of June. Here a minority of 
trade unionists, led by the Mezhraionets, Ryaza/nov, (soon to join 
the Bolshevik party) and the Menshevik, V.D. Rubtsov, argued that 
there was no room for two labour organisations and that the factory 
committees should become the primary cells of the trade unions in 
the enterprise. There is no record of anyone at this Conference 
calling for the diametrical opposite, i.e. the replacement of the
unions by the factory committees, though this was the sentiment of
2 some syndicalists and rank-and-file metalworkers. The majority
of delegates agreed that both organisations had a role to play. 
The Bolshevik worker, Naumov, argued:
1. Oktyabr'skaya Revolyutsiya i Fabzavkomy, vol. 1, M., 1927, 
p.132 (henceforward Okt. Rev, i Fab.).
2. At the Khar'kov conference of factory committees at the end of 
May many delegates expressed the view that the trade unions 
were superannuated organisations, fit only for the dustbin of 
history. A delegate from the works committee at the General 
Electrical Company declared: 'When the workers want to subordin­ 
ate the factory committees, we say "Hands Off!" We are going 
the same way as you. It's time to finish the struggle with 
capital so that it ceases to exist.' Another delegate expressed 
the view that 'the unions are bankrupt throughout the world. 
Where they exist, they merely hold us back from struggle 1 . 
Cited by Pankratova, A.M., Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsial- 
isticheskuyu fabriku, M., 1923, p.254.
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At present to turn the factory committees 
into departments of the trade unions in 
the factories, as Comrade Ryazanov proposes, 
seems impossible, in view of the fact that 
the factory committees have the special task 
of bringing order to the economic life of the 
factories and of implementing control - tasks 
with which the unions are not and cannot be 
concerned.3
The Bolshevik, V.V. Schmidt, on behalf of the PCTU, disagreed with 
Naumov, arguing that the control of production should now become 
the concern of the trade unions. An anodyne resolution was carried 
which by-passed the issues at stake and called merely for close 
liaison between the new CCFC and the PCTU. 4
A week later, on 11 June the Central Board of the Petrograd 
Metalworkers' Union, which was divided about equally between 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, issued a statement on the relationship 
of the factory committees to the trade unions. For the first 
time a large union called unequivocally for the strict subordination 
of the factory committees to the unions:
The union is the highest and only organisation 
responsible for the conduct of workers in a par­ 
ticular branch of production. It alone has the 
right to put demands on the organisations of capit­ 
alists and the state on behalf of the whole 
profession. It alone has the right to conduct 
either general or partial disputes. It alone 
may put demands on the state concerning social 
security. It alone can express the will of the 
whole profession on questions concerning the 
forms of regulation and control of production... 
Local factory committees occupy a position of sub­ 
ordination to the trade union, within the general 
framework of organisation of the branch of pro­ 
duction. . .but the overall structure of the union 
must be made more complex by involving the factory 
committees, so that the union combines within it-
3. Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, p.135
4. ibid., p.136.
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self the organisation of its members by branch 
of production and...by enterprise. However, 
the central organisation of the whole trade union 
must be constituted so that the preponderance 
of union representatives over individual fac­ 
tory representatives is guaranteed. The strength 
of factory committee representation must be 
broadest where the union is acting as regulator 
and controller of production, and narrowest where 
the union is pursuing purely militant aims.-*
This was a scarcely-veiled attack on the newly-created CCFC, opposing 
the factory committees' setting-up a centralised structure alongside 
that of the unions. It is interesting to note that these proposals 
concerning the interrelationship of the two organisations, pre­ 
figured with uncanny accuracy the inter-relationship which was to 
be established after October.
On 20 June the Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions 
opened in Petrograd - the first national conference of trade unions 
since the February Revolution. The 211 delegates comprised 73 
Bolsheviks, 36 Mensheviks, 6 Menshevik-Internationalists, 11 
Bundists, 31 non-fractional Social Democrats, 25 SR's, 7 members 
of no political party (others unknown). The moderate socialists 
commanded a majority. The Menshevik, Grinevich, introduced the 
discussion on the tasks of the trade unions. He argued that the 
basic task of the unions was to conduct the economic struggle of 
the working class, whose chief weapon within the framework of 
capitalism was the strike. He insisted that unions should not 
involve themselves in the regulation of production, as this was 
the job of the government. With regard to politics, he argued that 
they should support a democratic republic, the Soviets and the
5. Metallist, 1922, 12, pp. 64-5.
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socialist parties and call for an end to the war, but they should 
avoid getting directly involved in day-to-day political questions. 
There was much that the internationalist bloc could agree with in 
Grinevich's report, but on two points they were in violent dis­ 
agreement. The first concerned trade union involvement in politics; 
the second concerned workers' control of production and the tasks 
of the trade unions.
The internationalists excoriated the Menshevik rapporteurs, 
N. Garvi and Astrov, for their support of state control as opposed 
to workers' control. The primacy which they attached to the struggle 
for workers' control led them to adopt a peculiar position with 
regard to the factory committees. The Bolshevik spokesman, N. Glebov- 
Avilov, in effect, argued that the job of workers' control was too 
important to be left to the factory committees, that it should be 
taken over by the trade unions and that the factory committees should 
be subordinated to the trade unions: "The factory committees must 
be the primary cells of the unions. Their activities in the 
localities must be made dependent on the economic-control commissions 
of the unions". This adumbrates the position adopted by the Bol­ 
sheviks after October, but is totally at variance with the line taken 
by the First Conference of Factory Committees. The position adopted 
by the Mensheviks, which was accepted by Conference by 76 votes to 63 
votes, was even more peculiar. The Mensheviks, of course, disliked 
the factory committees, but so opposed were they to the trade unions 
becoming involved in the work of controlling production, that they
6. Tret'ya konferentsiya professional'nykh soyuzov, M., 1927, pp.76-88
7. ibid., pp. 484-5.
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insisted that the factory committees take responsibility for this. 
At the same time, they called on the unions to turn the factory 
committees into their supports (opornye punkty) in the localities 
and to execute their policies through them. Thus the position 
adopted by the Conference was to subsume the committees into the 
union, whilst allowing them to embroil themselves in the futile
o
folly of workers' control.
Meanwhile within the metalworkers' union an ideology of what 
might be termed 'productivism 1 was gaining ground, which emphasised 
that the concerns of the trade unions were no longer merely with 
the defence of workers' interests, but with the regulation of the 
economy. On 21 July the Provisional Central Committee of the metal 
union passed a resolution based on the assumption, derived from 
Hilferding, that a new phase of state capitalism was coming into 
being. The resolution demanded widespread state monopolisation and 
trustification of production and distribution, and union represen-
Q
tation on the Economic Council being set up by the government. The 
new emphasis on organising production seems to reflect partly the 
union's concern at the effects of demobilising the war industries, 
and also the fact that the union embraced large numbers of skilled 
workers who played a far more active role in production than did the 
'mass production' workers.
A full discussion of the relationship of the factory committees 
to the trade unions took place at the Second Conference of Petrograd 
Factory Committees (7-12 August). Lozovskii, later a key advocate 
of the organisational subordination of the factory committees to
8. ibid., p.388.
9. Vsesoyuznyi Soyuz metallistov v resolyutsiyakh iI postanovleniyakh 
s"ezdov i Konferentsii, vol. 1, M., 1927, pp. 104-5.~
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the unions, put forward a position which was designed to bridge 
the divide between the two organisations. He argued that they both 
had different spheres of interest: trade unions were to defend the 
wages and conditions of labour and oversee the implementation of 
labour protection legislation* factory committees had the task of 
regulating production. He argued that:
The factory committees, uniting all the workers 
in each factory, embrace the whole working mass, 
whereas the unions embrace a narrower circle of 
organised workers who are aware of the necessity 
of professional unification. The committees unite 
workers who are divided along vertical lines; the 
unions unite workers divided along horizontal lines.
In the last analysis, Lozovskii argued, the committees should be 
subordinate to the unions, insofar as they should be obliged to 
implement the latter's decisions at factory level and should not 
decide to strike without union permission. This position was 
fiercely denounced by the anarcho-syndicalist, Volin, who lauded 
the factory committees as the only revolutionary organisations capable 
of pursuing the struggle of labour against capital and dismissed
the trade unions as being eternally condemned to mediate between
12 capital and labour. He, in turn, was attacked by Voskov, the
Bolshevik metalworkers' delegate from the Sestroretsk arms works, 
who argued that the factory committees:
cannot unite workers in the same way as the unions 
do. The whole fragmented mass of workers in a 
particular factory is included in the factory




organisation and if the factory closes, this 
organisation dissolves. The factory committee 
hangs by a thread, it can be replaced on the 
slightest pretext. The union unites the truly 
conscious, organised workers; it remains con­ 




Lozovskii's resolution, proposing a division of labour between the
unions and the factory committees, won the day. Volin's resolution
14 gained a mere eight votes.
On 20 October the All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees 
discussed once more the inter-relationship of the factory committees 
and the trade unions. The Bolshevik Ryazanov and the Menshevik 
Lin'kov, on behalf of the trade unions, accused the factory commit­ 
tees of separatism and called for their organisational subordination. 
They were particularly unhappy about the existence of the Central 
Council of Factory Committees alongside the All-Russian Central 
Council of Trade Unions, and called for the disbandment of the 
former. They were bitterly opposed by the anarcho-syndicalist, 
Piontrovskii from Odessa and by the Left SR, Levin, from the CCFC, 
both of whom contrasted the vitality of the committees with the 
lassitude of the unions. The Bolshevik, V. Schmidt, from the metal­ 
workers' union, conceded that the factory committees had a particular
role to play in the sphere of control of production but wished to
15 see them working under the auspices of the unions. The Bolshevik
Skrypnik, from the CCFC, emphasised that there could at this stage 
be no question of making the committees the executive organs of the 
unions, but went some way towards placating the trade unionists by
13. ibid., p.231.
14. ibid., p.233.
15. ibid., vol. 2, p.193.
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agreeing that the CCFC should collaborate with city organisations of 
trade unions in the realm of control of production.
The Conference did not pass a resolution, so it is difficult 
to detect whether opinion was shifting towards acceptance of the 
idea of a merger of the two labour organisations. However, a nine- 
person commission did agree upon a resolution which, for the first 
time, went some significant way towards recognising tnQlje union 
primacy over the committees. Whilst stressing the independence of 
the two organisations and the right of the factory committees to 
organise into a national structure, the commission's resolution 
called for the CCFC to include trade union representatives and for 
it to be given the status of a department of workers' control of 
the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions (ARCTU). In addition, it 
called for councils of factory committees to be established in 
each branch of industry which should become the section for workers' 
control of the respective industrial union. There is a certain 
vagueness about this resolution. It oscillates between the new 
idea of factory committees as a branch of the union and the old idea 
of a division of labour between two autonomous organisations. 
Clearly, the inter-relationship of these two organisations remained 
as unresolved as ever on the eve of the October uprising, and dis­ 
agreements on the question polarised not along party lines but 
according to the institutional loyalties of factory committee and 
trade union leaders.
16. ibid., pp. 189, 193.
17. ibid., p.193. The Moscow conference of factory committees in 
Uctober agreed upon a much greater degree of subordination of 
the committees to the unions, ibid., vol. 1, p.271.
361
B. DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY IN THE FACTORY COMMITTEES AND TRADE UNIONS
In view of the bureaucratic dictatorship which emerged out of 
the Russian Revolution, it is important to try to assess the degree 
of democracy which existed in the labour movement in 1917. What 
follows is an examination of the theory and practice of democracy 
in the trade unions and the factory committees, designed to shed 
light on the broader problem of the degeneration of the Russian 
Revolution.
a) Democracy in the Trade Unions
One usually thinks of 'democratic centralism 1 as the form of 
organisation espoused by the Bolshevik party, but the term was 
used widely in Russia to describe the structural mode best suited 
to all labour organisations. 'Democratic centralism' does not 
represent a set of organisational rules, so much as the vague principle 
of democratic involvement in decision-making, combined with cen­ 
tralised execution of all decisions made. This principle was 
accepted by both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks at the Third Conference 
of trade unions in June 1917 as being that which should underpin 
the organisational construction of the new union movement. It was 
intended to ensure "the participation of every member in the affairs 
of the union and, at the same time, unity in the leadership of the
I O
struggle." In the large factory unions, democratic centralism 
came to be realised as follows: power rested in the union board, 
which, in theory, was elected by a council of delegates, each of whom
18. Tret'ya konferentsiya, pp. 446-7.
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represented and was elected by the workers in the individual 
factories. Centralisation was expressed in the fact that the 
central board ran the union on a day-to-day basis. In the metal­ 
workers', printers' and leatherworkers' unions, boards also existed 
at district level, but they did not have the right to act inde­ 
pendently of the central city board: nor did professional sections 
in those unions, such as the leatherworkers 1 and foodworkers', where 
they existed. The central board controlled union funds, to which 
local branches were expected to pay 10% of their assets. 
Centralism should also have meant that the PCTU had jurisdiction 
over all union boards, but individual unions tended to assert
their autonomy of this all-union body, being lax in the payment of
19 levies to the PCTU etc. The supposedly supreme central body of the
trade-union movement - the All-Russian Central Council of Trade
Unions, set up by the third conference - gave relatively little
20 leadership to the unions in practice.
Democracy in the unions operated via the delegate councils.
21 These councils elected the boards of the larger unions, though
in smaller unions, including the printers', the boards were elected 
by the whole membership. The boards, whilst responsible for the day- 
to-day running of the union, had to refer all major policy questions 
to the delegate councils and could be overruled by them. Printers'
19. Professionarnoe Dvizhenie v Petrograde v 1917g., L., 1928, p.60.
20. Milonov Yu. K., ed., Putevqditel' pp rezolyutsiyam vserossiiskikh 
s"ezdov i konferentsii professional'nykh soyuzov, M., 1924, p.57.
21. On 4 June 300 delegates from 26 textile mills met to elect a 
board of 16 for the textile union. They agreed that the dele­ 
gate meeting was the sovereign body in the union and should meet 
no less than once a month. Tkach, 1, November 1917, p.28.
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and metalworkers' delegates, for example, approved the union wage 
contracts and supervised negotiations. The woodturners' delegate 
council began and ran the strike in October. Delegates were 
expected to coordinate the work of the union, to call general meet­ 
ings and to keep members informed of what was happening. In practice 
it proved rather difficult for union delegates to involve members 
at factory level in union business.
Workers did not always have a choice about joining a union. 
In the metal industry the question of joining the union was usually
put to a general meeting of workers and the factory voted to join
22 the union en bloc. On 8 May the delegate council of the woodturners'
union threatened to expel from the factories any worker who refused
23 to join the union. This 'closed shop 1 policy, however, was not
the norm. A sizeable minority of workers remained outside the unions, 
of whom a large number were women. Rabotnitsa frequently complained 
that women regarded unions as organisations for men; and the leather
workers' union set up special women's commissions in an attempt to
24attract peasant women into the union. On the whole, however, low- 
paid workers did join the unions as an elementary insurance policy 
against starvation and unemployment, but they were unlikely to be 
involved in union activity in the workplace. The woodturners' 
union sent out a questionnaire to factories, asking whether workers 
attended union meetings. The majority of the 80 replies said 'yes', 
though some said 'weakly', 'lazily' or 'seldom', and others 'not
22. Metal list, 1922, 12, p.63.
23. Ekho derevoobdebchnika, 2, 19 October 1917, p.12.
24. Rabotnitsa, 4, 30 May 1917, p.6; Golos Kozhevnika, 2-3, 7 October 
1917, pp. 8-9.
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always' or 'not everyone'. Attendance was best at factories with
25 active socialist cells. This suggests that, in part at least, mass
involvement in the unions was dependent on the active encourage­ 
ment of workplace militants. This is borne out by a complaint 
which appeared in the metalworkers' journal about the behaviour of 
some factory delegates:
If the central and district boards (of the union) 
are responsible to the meetings of (factory) 
delegates, then the delegates themselves are 
responsible to nobody. The majority of dele­ 
gates, once elected, do not fulfil their 
duties, they do not recruit members, they do 
not collect subscriptions and do not even appear 
at delegate meetings...All the time we observe a 
host of instances where the majority of our 
members are not aware of the policies and dec­ 
isions of the central organs...Naturally such 
ignorance at times causes apathy in the member­ 
ship. Often one feels that the central organs 
of the union are totally cut off from the mass 
of the members. This threatens to turn the cen­ 
tral organisation into a bureaucracy.26
It would be wrong to conclude from this that trade unions in 
Petrograd in 1917 were bureaucratic organisations. A trade-union 
bureaucracy in the literal sense did not exist in 1917. It is true 
that the Petrograd metalworkers' union had about 100 full-time 
officials by summer, but they lacked a bureaucratic esprit de corps: 
their commitment to democracy was sincere. Democracy functioned in 
the unions at the level of the delegate councils, these met regularly 
and closely monitored the activities of the union boards. At 
factory level, however, it was a different story; the union depended 
on the activism and expertise of workplace militants to involve the
25. Ekho derevoobdelochnika, 2, pp. 6-7.
26. Metallist, 7, 16 December 1917, p.2.
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mass of members but it seems to have been an uphill battle to 
try to create unions with an active rather than passive member­ 
ship.
b) Democracy in the Factory Committees
In contrast to the trade unions, factory committees were 
regarded by rank-and-file workers as "their" organisations. Whereas 
trade unions embraced the workers in a branch of industry, the 
factory committees embraced the workers in a single enterprise. 
Whereas trade unions were based on skilled workers, factory 
committees were elected by all the workers of the enterprise. 
Because of this the factory committees were the more popular organ­ 
isation. The SR, I. Prizhelaev, wrote:
The factory committees have the crucial merit of 
being close to the worker, accessible, compre­ 
hensible to everybody - even the least conscious. 
They are involved in all the minutiae of factory 
life and so are a wonderful form of mass organ­ 
isation. . .The trade unions are less accessible 
because they appear to stand further away from 
the rank-and-file worker. 27
7,000 workers at the Respirator factory on 3 September described 
the factory committees as "the best mouthpieces of the working class 
and the only real and true reflection of the moods of the toiling 
people". 28
A factory committee was elected by a general factory meeting, 
though shop stewards' committees usually consisted of delegates 
elected by individual shops. Unlike trade unions, which embraced 
only a proportion of the workforce and, in the early months of the
27. Delo Naroda, 121, 8 August 1917, p.l.
28. Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v sentyabre, p.267
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Revolution, were sometimes created on a craft basis, the factory 
committees represented all the workforce in an enterprise. Every 
worker could vote in the election of the factory committee, regard­ 
less of job, sex or age. Any worker might stand for election, so
on
long as he or she did not perform any managerial functions. 
Elections were often by secret ballot and at least half the 
workforce had to take part in them. Generally, members of the 
factory committee were elected for a year, although they could be 
recalled by a general meeting at any time. The Second Conference 
of Petrograd Committees, however, determined that the members should
be elected for six months only and it also made provision for
31 instant recall. Once elected, factory committees were expected
to meet regularly. At the 1886 Electric Light Company the factory 
committee met every day, although the full factory committee might
meet less regularly, where sub-committees dealt with much of the
32 business. At the Gun works the committee met once every three days.
Factory committees were required to report back to their membership 
on a regular basis. The Conference of representatives from state
enterprises agreed on April 15 that factory committees should report
33 to general meetings at least once a month.
29. In some factories such as the Putilov works, workers under the 
age of 20 were excluded from standing for election. Sviridov, 
A.A., 'Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety kak forma organizatsii 
piterskikh rabochikh v 1917g.', Uchenye Zapiski Leningradskogo 
gos. ped. In-t., vol. 298, 1971.
30. Secret ballots were stipulated by the conference of representatives 
of state enterprises on 15 April, by the statutes for factory 
committees published by the labour department of the Petrograd 
Soviet and by the Second Conference of factory committees, 
Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. 1, pp. 25, 32, 241.
31. ibid., p.241.
32. ibid., pp. 48,57-8.
33. ibid., p.30.
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The extent to which the working-class movement was permeated by 
a commitment to far-reaching democracy is reflected in the fact 
that it was not the factory committee per se which was the sovereign 
organ in the factory, but the general meeting of all workers in the 
factory or section. It was this general assembly which passed 
resolutions on the pressing political questions of the day or 
decided important matters affecting the individual enterprise. 
The sovereignty of the general factory meeting was established in
practice from the first and enunciated formally by the Second
34 Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees on 12 August. At the
conference of representatives from state enterprises on 15 April 
it had been decided that general meetings of the factory workforce
should take place at least once a month and should be called by
35 either the factory committee or by one-third of the workforce. The
Second Conference of Petrograd lowered this requirement, by stipul­ 
ating that one-fifth of the workforce might summon a general meeting 
which should be attended by at least one-third of the workers in 
order to be quorate. The Conference laid down that authority was
•jr.
vested in the workforce as a whole rather than in the committee.
Marc Ferro has argued recently that we should not allow our­ 
selves to be bewitched by the far-reaching democracy of the paper 
constitutions of the popular organisations of the Russian Revolution: 
reality was a very different matter. He argues that long before 
October the popular organisations were undergoing a process of bureau- 
cratisation 'from above 1 and 'from below 1 . Bureaucratisation 'from 





and was designed to prevent the breakdown of representation according 
to class. Bureaucratisation 'from below 1 was a process whereby
each popular organisation - Soviets, factory committees, Red Guards -
37 sought to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the rest. In the case
of the factory committees, Ferro argues that the leadership of the 
movement became more entrenched and less accountable to the member­ 
ship. Bureaucratisation 'from above 1 was manifest in a decline in 
the proportion of delegates at factory committee conferences elected
ini
from the factories and/an increase in the proportion of 'bureau-
oo
cratically appointed' delegates. Bureaucratisation 'from below 1 
was evident in the refusal of factory committee members on the ground
to submit to reelection, and in the growing practice of inquorate
39 meetings taking decisions. I propose to explore how widespread
37. Ferro, M., October 1917, London: Routledge, 1980, ch. 7; 
Ferro, M., 'The Birth of the Soviet Bureaucratic System', 
Reconsiderations on the Russian Revolution, ed., Elwood, R.C., 
Ohio State University, 1976.—————————
38. Ferro, M., October 1917, p.193. Ferro purports to show on the 
basis of the source cited below that the proportion of 'bureau- 
cratically appointed 1 delegates to the Petrograd conferences of 
factory committees rose from 4% at the First; to 7% at the 
Second; to 12% at the Fourth. Using the same data, I calculate 
that the figures were respectively 12%, 7% and 10% - hardly 
evidence of growing bureaucratisationl The point is, however, 
that the 'bureaucratically appointed' delegates were not, in 
the main, party officials: they were representatives from the 
trade unions, soldiers' organisations and peasant Soviets. One 
might regard their presence at the conferences as evidence of 
democratic courtesies being extended to other popular organis­ 
ations, rather than of bureaucratisation . The final proof 
that there is nothing sinister about their presence, is that they 
were not allowed voting rights and thus were in no position to 
influence conference decisions (see Okt. Rev, i Fab., vol. II, 
pp. 217-264). Finally, my own sample does not support Ferro's 
claim that the factory committees sent the same people to the 
conferences; there seems to have been a high degree of turn­ 
over in the delegates to successive conferences (ibid.)
39. Ferro, M., October 1917, p.194.
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bureaucratic practices by the factory committees were, by examining 
the proceedings of the Admiralty, Baltic and Sestroretsk works 
committees, which have been recently published in the Soviet Union. 
I propose to try to determine the extent to which factory committee 
members were an entrenched stratum by examining whether or not they 
submitted to reelection, jj^ other indices of 'bureaucratic' or 
'democratic 1 behaviour where they seem pertinent.
Three factories made up the Admiralty works - two of them on 
Galernyi Island and the shell-manufacturing section in the Okhta 
district. At the main Admiralty works, SR's dominated the works 
committee in league with a Menshevik minority. The committee 
was not reelected between March and October, the few members who 
resigned being replaced by the runners-up in the March election. 
The committee met 94 times during this period; it rebuked sluzhashchie
for not attending regularly and allowed women workers a special
40 representative on the committee. At the New Admiralty works the
committee was also dominated by SR's, having been elected by secret
ballot on 28 March. It elected its presidium three times between
41 March and October. Both the Admiralty committees faced a rising
tide of Bolshevik feeling among the workers on Galernyi Island after 
July, which expressed itself in vociferous demands for new elections 
to the Soviets. The committees eventually arranged these for 27 
September. 85% of the workforce took part, casting 1,295 votes for 
the Bolsheviks and 476 for the SR's, thus electing two Bolsheviks
to the Petrograd Soviet and four Bolsheviks and one SR to the Kolomenskii
42 district soviet.
40. Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety Petrograda v 1917g.: Protokoly, 
M., 1979, pp. 95-96 (henceforward Fab, zav. kom.).
41. ibid., pp. 114, 122, 125.
4? Rahochii Put', 36, 14 October 1917, p.4.
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The Okhta shell section employed 1,330 workers, including 
900 soldiers. It was one of the few places where the influence of 
the SR's and Mensheviks remained significant right up to October. 
The latter controlled the factory committee, which submitted for 
re-election at the end of July. Whenever a member of the committee
resigned, the shop which was represented by that member was called
43 on to elect a replacement. Although the Okhta shop committee
was the only one of the three Admiralty committees to be re-elected 
between March and October, all three committees appear to have 
operated in a reasonably democratic fashion.
At the Baltic works a majority of the 8,000 workers supported 
the Mensheviks and SR's until the July Days. In the second week of
April the works committee organised elections to the Vasilevskii
44 district soviet, at which Mensheviks and SR's swept the board.
In June, at the request of a general meeting? the committee arranged 
new elections to the Petrograd Soviet. It allowed any party or non- 
party group to put up a slate of candidates, providing it could
muster fifty signatures. The slates were then published and voting
45 took place by secret ballot. The SR's and Mensheviks won a slight
majority of votes, although the Bolsheviks made a better showing than
in the March elections. Deputies were chosen on the basis of proportional
representation. After July growing support for the Bolsheviks
caused some shops to recall the Menshevik and SR deputies assigned
to them, so that by the end of August there were no fewer than six
Bolsheviks (compared to three SR's), representing the Baltic works
43. Fab, zav. kom., pp. 141, 160, 162
44- ibid., p.210.
45. ibid., pp. 262-3.
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in the city soviet. The committee decided that full-scale elec­ 
tions would have to be called, but these did not actually take
AC
place until after the Bolshevik seizure of power.
The original works committee was made up of non-party, SR and
Menshevik members. The committee was re-elected in the second half
47 of April and a handful of Bolsheviks got in for the first time.
At the end of July, however, a general meeting expressed no con­ 
fidence in the committee. The committee rejected this vote of no
confidence, but agreed to call shop meetings in order to find out
48 what grievances the workers had against them. On 15 September
a general meeting demanded the immediate recall of the committee,
49 whereupon the committee resigned. Elections took place by secret
ballot three days later and the Bolsheviks won a majority of the
50 40 places. The metalworkers' union complained that three places
on the committee had not been reserved for it, so the committee
51 duly made them available. The evidence, on the whole, suggests
that the committee behaved in a remarkably democratic fashion. It 
organised elections to the Soviets and itself submitted to re- 
election twice, albeit with some reluctance since it had not served 
its term of office.
In the small town of Sestroretsk, 34 kilometres from Petrograd, 
the armaments works, which employed 6,200 workers, quickly won a
46. ibid., p.406.
47. ibid., pp. 220, 222
48. ibid., pp. 311-2.
49. ibid., p.350.
50. ibid., pp. 355-7.
51. ibid., p.458.
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reputation as a Bolshevik 'nest'. The Bolsheviks were in a minority 
on the first works committee; this set up a revolutionary commis­ 
sariat in the town on 13 April, on which the Bolsheviks were also 
in a minority. At the end of May, the works committee arranged to 
hold elections in order to transform the commissariat into a fully- 
fledged soviet of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies, but 
it declared the election void when only about half the electorate 
bothered to vote. The committee issued a solemn warning to workers:
In view of the seriousness of the present moment, 
general factory meetings must be well-attended. 
It is the duty of every worker, as an honest 
citizen, to attend discussions of all questions 
concerning both the factory itself and the 
government in general.52
The soviet elections were rescheduled for the end of July and the 
Bolsheviks won them overwhelmingly. On 1 August the works committee 
arranged new committee elections. 72% of the workforce voted in
these elections, and on the basis of proportional representation
53 the Bolsheviks won 8 places, the SR's 5 and the Mensheviks 2 places.
Re-elections of factory committees were common in the period 
up to October, contrary to Ferro's assertion. They took place at
the Electric Light Company, the Pipe Works, Langenzippen, Skorokhod,
54 Parviainen, Lessner, the Mint and Promet. It is true that in
52. ibid., p.540.
53. ibid., p.574.
54. Oktyabr'skoe voornzhennoe vosstanie v Petrograde, M., 1957,
pp. 102, 127.Data on the proportion of workers who took part 
in factory elections are too scanty to allow of generalisation. 
At the Pechatkin paper mill 57% of the workforce took part in 
factory committee elections in March. At the Old Lessner 
works 69% of the workforce took part in factory committee 
elections in Spetember, compared to 74% of the Pipe Works 
workforce a month later. 88% of the workforce at Parviainen 
took part in factory committee elections in August. In soviet
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many factories the committees did not undergo re-election in the 
period up to October, but this cannot be seen as proof of bureaucrat- 
isation, since few had completed their six-month term of office. 
As the above survey shows, variation existed between different 
factories in the degree of democracy which operated and undemocratic 
practices were by no means unknown. Yet one is left with the 
general impression of a situation where, for a short period of 
eight months, a form of democracy flourished in the factories 
which was both direct and representational.
This is not to dispose of the problem of 'bureaucracy 1 . For, 
contrary to popular belief, 'bureaucracy 1 and 'democracy' need not 
be polar opposites. The terms 'bureaucracy' and 'bureaucratisation 1
have been deployed in a mulitplicity of confusing and conflicting
55 ways. One line of thinking on bureaucracy, which goes back at
least as far as Robert Michels, construes bureaucratisation as a 
process whereby the leaders of ostensibly democratic organisations 
acquire unregulated power in the interests of organisational effic­ 
iency and, in so doing, lose sight of the original goals of the 
organisation. The preceding review of factory committee activity, 
does not suggest that they were in 1917 characterised by goal dis­ 
placement and domination by an oligarchy. In contrast to Michels, 
Max Weber emphasises the inter-relationship of bureaucracy, ration-
elections in October, 85% of the Admiralty workers and 68% of 
the Promet workers turned out to vote. LGIA, f. 1186, op. 4, 
d. 16, 1.2; Baklanova, I.A. and Stepanov, Z.V., 'Rabochie- 
metallisty Petrograda v dni velikogo oktyabrya 1 , Oktyabr'skoe 
vooruzhennoe vosstanie v Petrograde, M.L., 1957, p.74; 
Oktyabr'skoe vooruzhennoe v Petrograde (collection of documents), 
p.127; Rabochii, 6, 29 August 1917, p.4.
55. Albrow, M., Bureaucracy, London: Macmillan, 1970.
56. Michels, R., Political Parties, New York, Macmillan, Free Press, 1968
374
ality and legitimate authority (Herrschaft) and his analysis appears 
to be more apposite to the factory committees. As argued in 
chapters 4 and 7, factory committees, far from being anarchic, 
protozoan bodies, as the conventional wisdom would have it, were solid, 
structurally-ramified organisations which functioned in a regular,
routinised manner. To a certain extent, therefore, factory com-
57 mittees were 'bureaucratic 1 , in the Weberian sense. The duties
of the factory committees and of their sub-commissions were fixed 
by rules and administrative dispositions; their activities were 
spelt out in written records; to a point, the committees followed 
"general rules which are more or less stable, more or less ex­ 
haustive and which can be learned". In other respects the committees 
operated in marked contrast to the Weberian model. There was no 
strict hierarchical system of authority, such that the lower levels 
of the factory committee movement were subordinate to the higher 
levels; though this was, arguably, the aspiration of the CCFC. 
The members of the factory committees in no way saw themselves as 
functionaries operating according to fixed rules. They were policy- 
makers in their own right who viewed their 'office' as a means of 
effecting economic and social change. They were not trained for 
office and enjoyed no stability of tenure. Finally, members of the 
factory were not appointed by some impersonal organisation, but 
elected by and accountable to the workers.
57. Weber's general concept of bureaucracy is most fully elabor­ 
ated in chapter 8 of Weber, M., Economy and Society, vol. 3, 
New York: Bedminster Press, 1968, ch. 11.
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Perhaps the most influential current of thinking on bureau­ 
cracy - at least in relation to the Soviet Union - is that which 
conceives of bureaucracy as a social stratum. This line goes 
back at least as far as Marx, who argued that the state bureaucracy 
functions to secure acceptance of the rules of the social order, 
by representing them in universal terms and maintaining them by force 
For Hegel the state bureaucracy embodied the general interest, 
whereas for Marx the general interest was reduced to that of the 
bureaucracy, which required the permanence of particular spheres
ro
in order to appear as an imaginary universal. The marxist con­ 
ceptualisation of bureaucracy as both a product and a mediation of
class conflict is at the heart of subsequent writing on the soviet
59 bureaucracy. Marc Ferro is clearly influenced by this tradition,
in seeing the bureaucracy which arose out of the popular organ­ 
isations of 1917 as a "new social grouping", characterised by a new 
source of income, a new role in society, a break with class origins, 
necessary solidarity with the Bolshevik party and dependency on the 
leading institutions. He suggests that:
58. Albrow, op. cit., and, especially, Lefort, C., Elements d'une 
critique de la bureaucratie, Paris: Droz, 1971, pp. 287-292.
59. As early as 1918, the Menshevik Martov argued that a bureau­ 
cracy must necessarily emerge in Russia as a product of the 
irreconcilable contradiction between the tasks posed by the 
proletariat and the objective economic conditions and social 
relations of a backward peasant society (Martov, Yu., in God 
russkoi revolyutsii, M., 1918). The same line of analysis was 
pursued by the Workers' Opposition group in 1920-21 and was 
developed to its fullest extent by Trotsky, who construed the 
soviet bureaucracy as a distinct social stratum which had arisen 
because of the poverty of society in objects of consumption and 
which had appropriated political power in order to maintain un­ 
equal distribution of wealth, whilst defending the nationalised 
means of production. (Trotsky, L., The Revolution Betrayed, 
New York: Pathfinder, 5th edn., 1972~Trotsky is the (progenitor 
of all subsequent theories of a 'new class 1 in the Soviet Union 
(for a review of these theories see Lane, D., The End of Inequality? 
London: Penguin, 197l).
fin. Ferro. M.. October 1917, pp. 196-7.
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the so-called Stallnist period corresponds to the 
slow transfer of power from the old revolutionaries, 
with their mingling of tsarist officials, to the 
new apparatchiki coming from plebeian institutions 
such as raion committees (i.e. district Soviets, SAS) 
and the Red Guard. 6 "1
An analysis of this stimulating thesis would take us far beyond the 
scope of the present work into 1930's. Mention is made of it merely 
in order to raise the question of whether or not the factory 
committee leadership represented a nascent bureaucracy in 1917? and 
also because Ferro's thesis coincides to a remarkable degree with 
an argument put forward by another historian of the factory committees, 
Chris Goodey.
Goodey argues that the factory committee layer "was closely 
associated from the very beginning with the attempt to build a
new, centralised economic apparatus to raise the level of the
fi? productive forces". Just as Ferro argues that the district Soviets
and Red Guards provided the personnel for Stalin's political 
bureaucracy, so Goodey argues that the factory committees provided 
the key personnel for the economy bureaucracy (V.S.N. Kh. - the 
Supreme Council of National Economy)-for they most closely iden-
r o
tified with Stalin's goal of 'industrialisation at all costs'. 
Again, in order to do justice to this challenging thesis, one would 
have to go far beyond the scope of the present work, but a few 
brief comments would not seem out of place. Firstly, although it is 
not possible to estimate the number of former factory committee 
activists who went into the economic state apparatuses after 1917, 
the number was certainly minuscule. By the beginning of 1921,
61. ibid., 202; Ferro, Reconsiderations, p.129.
62. Goodey, C., 'Factory Committees and the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat 1 , Critique, 3, Autumn 1974, p.39.
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no fewer than 24,000 people were employed in the central apparatus 
of V.S.N.KH.J a further 93,600 worked in provincial sovnarkhozy
en
and 106,000 in uezd sovnarkhozy. As early as August 1918, the pro­ 
portion of workers in the central apparatus of V.S.N.Kh. was a mere 
10%, the overwhelmingly majority of employees being former
sluzhashchie, well-educated, under the age of 40 and not members of
65 the Bolshevik party. By 1922, the proportion of workers had
shrunk even further, as a consequence of the expansion in size of 
the economic apparatuses. In that year workers comprised a derisory
/" /*
2.8% of V.S.N.Kh. employees. It is true that the proportion of 
workers in the higher levels of the economic apparatus was greater 
than this: in 1920, 26% of members of boards of glavki and economic
C~J
centres were workers; some of these would have had experience in 
the factory committees. At the very top level, we know that the 
Petrograd CCFC sent key members onto the V.S.N.Kh. at its foundation, 
including P.N. Amosov, N.K. Antipov, M.N. Zhivotov, V.Ya. Chubar'
CO
and N.A. Skrypnik. But none of this evidence suggests that, 
overall, factory committee members were a major force within the
64. Gimpel'son, E.G., Velikii oktyabr 1 i stanovlenie sovetskoi 
sistemy upravleniya narodnym khozyaistvom, 1917-20gg., M.,
65. Drobizhev, V.Z., Glavnyi shtab sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti, 
M., 1966, pp. 225-7; Iroshnikov, M.P., Sozdanie sovetskogo 
tsentral'nogo gosudarstvennogo apparata: oktyabr' 1917 - yanvar' 
1918, L., 1967, pp. 418-9.
66. Drobizhev, op. cit., pp. 230-1. It was only at the level of 
enterprise management that the proportion of workers was sig­ 
nificant. A survey by the metal union in 1919 of 184 factories 
showed that workers comprised 64% of management board personnel. 
Gimpel'son, op. cit., p.285.
67. Gimpel'son, op. cit., pp. 285, 289.
68. Iroshnikov, op. cit., p.230.
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economic apparatus. Those who went into the economic apparatus 
comprised a tiny proportion of factory committee activists in 1917, 
so it is extremely dangerous to generalise about the latter on the 
basis of the future careers of a tiny percentage of their number. 
Secondly, whilst Goodey is absolutely correct to insist that the 
factory committees aspired to a planned socialist economy, this 
aspiration cannot simply be equated with Stalin's goal. Socialist 
planning in 1917 was inextricably linked to workers' democracy - 
not normally reckoned to be one of Stalin's major concerns 1 
Between 1917 and 1929 a lot of water flowed under the Liteinyi 
bridge: if a tiny handful of CCFC members went on to make careers 
for themselves in Stalin's economic bureaucracy^ one cannot assume 
that this was their implicit destiny in 1917.
This overview of factory committee practice,in the light 
of different theories about bureaucracy, is not intended to dismiss 
the problem of bureaucracy as irrelevant to 1917. Indeed it is the 
major merit of the interpretations of Ferro and Goodey that, by 
raising the problem of bureaucracy in the context of 1917, they 
challenge one of the shibboleths of the contemporary Left in Western 
Europe, i.e.the assumption that 1917 represents the golden age 
of innocence of the Russian Revolution, during which workers' 
democracy flourished unhampered, only to be stamped out after 1917 
by a bureaucracy which arose through a combination of 'objective' 
social and economic factors and/or Bolshevik party policy. It has 
been the aim of the present work to show that far-reaching workers' 
democracy did indeed exist in 1917, but this does not mean that 
what Ferro calls the 'phe'nome'ne bureaucratique' was entirely absent.
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In any large-scale democratic organisation elements of 
bureaucracy and democracy cohabit in uneasy tension. In order to 
implement its goals, a democratic organisation must develop some 
bureaucracy and a certain degree of autonomy from those who elected
it, so that there are some spheres of day-to-day practical activity
69 which are left to its discretion. Within labour organisations
bureaucracy also exists in another form, which has been succinctly 
analysed by Richard Hyman:
There is an important sense in which the problem of 
'bureaucracy 1 denotes not so much a distinct 
stratum of personnel as a relationship which 
permeates the whole practice of trade unionism. 
'Bureaucracy is in large measure a question of 
the differential distribution of expertise and 
activism: of the dependence of the mass of union 
membership on the initiative and strategic 
experience of a relatively small cadre of leader­ 
ship - both 'official 1 and 'unofficial'...the 
'bad side of leadership 1 still constitutes a problem 
even in the case of a cadre of militant lay 
activists sensitive to the need to encourage the 
autonomy and initiative of the membership.'O
We have already seen that in the Russian labour movement the depen­ 
dence of the rank-and-file on the initiative and experience of the 
leadership was particularly acute, in view of the fact that the 
rank-and-file comprised unskilled or semi-skilled women and peasant 
workers unused to organisation. The skilled, proletarianised male 
leaders of the labour movement sought to bind these inexperienced 
workers into a disciplined unity, so that they might realise their 
democratic potential and exercise power on their own behalf. In 
practice, however, they ran the constant danger of dominating the 
rank-and-file. The balance between democracy and bureaucracy in this
69. Eisenstadt, S.N., 'Bureaucracy and Bureaucratisation', Current 
Sociology, vol. 7, 1958, p.102.
70. Hyman, R., 'The Politics of Workplace Trade Unionism', Capital 
and Class, 8, Summer 1979, p.61.
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relationship depended on the economic and political conditions 
in society at large. So long as these conditions were favourable 
to the revolutionary goals which the labour leaders had set them­ 
selves, then democratic elements overrode bureaucratic elements 
i.e. the conditions were such that the popular forces could check 
the effectivity of bureaucratic forces. Once these conditions 
changed radically, however, as they did after October, bureaucratic 
elements came to the fore, which fostered the emergence of a 
bureaucratic social stratum dominating the whole of society. We 
shall briefly describe the political origins of this bureaucracy 
in chapter 12, where we shall see how the Bolshevik leaders of the 
factory committees, sincerely committed to workers' democracy 
but lacking working-class support, began to concentrate power in 
their hands, excluded the masses from information and decision- 
making and set up a hierarchy of functions. This may all suggest 
that bureaucratisation was inscribed in the revolutionary process 
in 1917, but if so, it was inscribed as a possibility only. It 
is not to pessimistically invoke some fatal 'iron law of oligarchy' 
(the implied position of Ferro). Democratic and bureaucratic 
elements existed in a determinate relationship in all popular organ­ 
isations; this relationship was basically determined by the goals 
of the organisations and the degree to which those goals were 
facilitated by political and economic circumstances. These cir­ 
cumstances were to change dramatically in the autumn of 1917, and 
decisively shift the balance between the forces of democracy and 
bureaucracy-in favour of the latter.
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/O. THE OCTOBER REVOLU1 ION AND THE DEBATES ON THE FACTORY COMMITTEES AND
TRADE UNIONS
A. PREPARING FOR OCTOBER
It is not the aim of this chapter to give an account of the 
Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917 - this has been excellently 
done by other historians, but rather to concentrate on the debates 
about economic policy after power had been seized. In order to 
situate the debates about the transition to a socialist economy in 
their historical context, however, it is necessary to say a few 
words about the October insurrection and the events leading up to 
it, particularly about the role of the factory committees and trade 
unions in these developments. As the October Revolution was, in 
the first place, an armed seizure of political power, it is impor­ 
tant to say something about the part played by these two organisations 
in the arming of the working class.
The failure of the July Days had led to a revival of the Red 
Guards i.e. the armed detachments of workers designed to strengthen 
the gains of the revolution and to combat the 'counter-revolution 1 
in all its forms. The initiative to revive the Guards had come on 
2 August when representatives from 18 Red Guard units elected a 
five-man commission (pyaterka) including the Bolshevik V.A. Trifonov 
and the anarchist Zhuk. This pyaterka, operating quite outside any 
party control, had begun to clandestinely train small numbers of 
Red Guards in the most militant factories and had staged a couple 
of daring raids on arms caches. It was not until the Kornilov
1. Startsev, V.I., Ocherki po istorii Petrogradskoi krasnoi gvardii 
i rabochei mih'tsii, M.L., 1965, pp. 294-5.
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It was not until the Kornilov rebellion, however, at the end of 
August, that the formation of Red Guards began in earnest. The 
sudden epiphany of counter-revolution, conjuring up visions of 
Thiers 1 revenge on the Paris Commune, shocked thousands of workers 
into a realisation of the precariousness of the gains which they 
had made. They thus turned to the Bolsheviks who, ironically, 
were the chief beneficiaries of Kornilov's bungled coup. During the
critical days of 29-29 August,the Interdistrict Committee of dis-
2 trict Soviets oversaw the defence of revolutionary Petrograd, and
the factory committees took the initiative in setting up Red Guards. 
Workers were encouraged to join the Guard, but only with the recom­ 
mendation of the committees or of a socialist party. At the Baltic 
Works the committee appointed a Bolshevik and a Left SR to instruct
the factory Red Guard,and every recruit was given a revolver and a
3 red armband. At Skorokhod the factory committee appealed to the
Moscow district soviet to provide arms for its 362 Red Guards and
4 forced management to provide them with boots. Weapons were in short
supply, in spite of the fact that the factory committees and dis­ 
trict Soviets had largely failed to comply with a government directive
5 to hand in all arms in the wake of the July Days. The works
committees of the Sestroretsk and Schlusselburg arms works did their 
best to provide the Red Guards with weapons and ammunition.
2. ibid., pp. 148-9, 155.
3. Fabrichno-zavodski komitety Petrograda v 1917g., M., 1979, 
pp. 334-5; V boyakh, L., 1932, p.49.
4. Istoriya Leningradskogo ... obuvnoi fabrkik, Skorokhod, L., 1969, 
pp. 153-4.
5. Startsev, op. cit., pp. 96-7; 'Iz istorii krasnoi gvardii 1 , 
Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 1957, 5, p.129.
6. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgptovki i provedeniya 
oktyabr'skogo voornzhennogo vosstam'ya, M.L., 1965, p.175"
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After the defeat of General Kornilov the number of Red Guards 
in Petrograd grew from about 12,000 to nearly 20,000 by the end of 
October. It became a familiar sight in the capital to see Red 
Guards 'square-bashing' around the factory yard after work. 8 On 
13 September a Central Command was set up, but it did not begin to 
function properly until October, when the Bolshevik Military 
Organisation finally began to take an interest in the Red Guards. 9 
Despite the existence of this Central Command and of a Department for 
the Workers' Guard, attached to the Soviet EC, no city-wide organ­ 
isation of Red Guards operated before 22 October, when 110 Red 
Guard delegates met to establish a central body. The absence of 
a coordinated network of Red Guards at either city level or dis­ 
trict level (except in Vyborg district) was probably one reason 
why the Military-Revolutionary Committee, set up on 9 October, chose 
to rely on Bolshevik regiments of soldiers, rather than on the Red 
Guards, when it began to organise the overthrow of the government. 
In addition, the Red Guards lacked the arms, experience and training 
which the soldiers had.
The role of the Red Guards in the events of 24-25 October was 
largely a back-up one. The Military-Revolutionary Committee used 
the Guards to protect bridges across the Neva. Red Guards from the 
Baltic works and Pipe works helped in the seizure of the Central 
Telegraph Office at 4pm on 24 October. Guards from the Vasilevskii
7. Startsev, op. cit., pp. 164, 195; Collins, D., 'A note on the 
numerical strength of the Russian Red Guards in October 1917', 
Soviet Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, October 1972, pp. 271-5.
8. Rakitov, '0 krasnoi gvardii', Krasnaya Letopis', 1923, no. 6.
9. Pinezhskii, E., Krasnaya Gyardiya, 2nd edn., M., 1933, pp. 42-3; 
Malakhovskii, V., Iz istorn Krasnoi Gvardii, L., 1925, p.12.
10. Oktyabr'skoe voornzhennoe vosstanie v Retrograde, M., 1957, pp. 236-8
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and Vyborg districts assisted sailors and soldiers from the Keksgolmskii 
regiment to take over the Central Post Office later that night. 
Meanwhile soldiers from the Moscow regiment, together with Red Guards 
from Vyborg, occupied the Finland Station. Putilov Red Guards 
helped the Izmailovskii regiment to seize the Baltic Station.
On 25 October Red Guards from the Moscow, Narva and Peterhof dis-
12 tricts helped disarm the first and fourth regiments of Don Cossacks.
Startsev estimates that some 3,700 Red Guards were involved in
suppressing the rebellions of officer cadets at the Vladimirskii,
13 Pavlovskii, Mikhailovskii and Konstantinovskii training schools.
The centrepiece of the seizure of power was, of course, the storming 
of the Winter Palace on the evening of 25 October. Startsev estimates 
that about 13% of the capital's Red Guards took part in this operation, 
mainly from the Petrograd, Vyborg and Vasilevskii districts of the 
capital.
Compared to the February Revolution or July Days - which were 
genuine mass insurrections in which the people took to the streets - 
the October Revolution was more of a military operation, directed 
by the Bolshevik party. The masses were barely involved, except 
vicariously through the Red Guards. The CCFC and the EC of the 
Petrograd Soviet called on workers to stay calm and remain at their 
work-benches. The factory committees were active in acquiring and 
distributing weapons, in requisitioning transport to put at the
11. Stepanov, op. cit., pp. 264-5; Rabinowitch, A., The Bolsheviks 
come to Power, N.Y., Norton, 1976, ch. 15.
12. ibid., p.268.
13. Startsev, op. cit., p.275.
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disposal of the Military-Revolutionary Committee, in issuing rev­ 
olutionary summonses, in guarding the factories and in organising
14 meetings to explain what was happening. Factory committee and
trade union representatives were on the Military-Revolutionary 
Committee, but the unions were less mobilised than the factory 
committees. Revolutionary printers formed one of the first Red 
Guards which, along with that of the woodturners' union, participated 
in the seizure of power. The metalworkers' union put 50,000r. at
the disposal of the new government,and the food and transport
15 unions endeavoured to keep the city operating. /Ill in all,
the unions, and even the factory committees, were relatively un- 
involved in sweeping away the Kerensky government. Both organisations, 
however, were to play a crucial role in establishing the legitimacy 
of the government which replaced it.
There is no doubt that the vast majority of workers in Petrograd 
welcomed the demise of the mighty Kerensky. They regarded the over­ 
turn, not as a transfer of power to the Bolsheviks, but as a transfer 
of power to the Soviets. In the first few days after 25 October 
enthusiastic resolutions, offering unconditional support to the 
new government,were passed by workers at Rozenkrantz, Obukhov, 
Sestroretsk, the Leman letter-foundry, the Petrograd tram park and by 
the foodworkers' union, by catering workers, by textileworkers at 
the Vyborg cotton-weaving, Leont'ev cotton-printing, SchlUsselburg 
cotton-printing and Nevka mills, by the Nevskaya footwear factory, 
by women printers and the by the conference of women workers on




5 November. Particularly noteworthy is the elation of women 
workers at the demise of the 'government of swindlers', as one 
resolution put it. A large number of resolutions, however, 
whilst expressing support for the transfer of power, also demanded 
the formation of a government comprising all the socialist parties. 
For a brief period it was more or less official Bolshevik policy 
to aim for a socialist coalition government, so there was 
nothing particularly heterodox about this demand. In the week 
after 25 October, the CCFC, the PCTU and the EC of the Petrograd 
Soviet all expressed support for the idea of a government of all 
the left parties. This makes nonsense of the claim by some Soviet 
historians that only a Menshevik-inspired clique within the trade 
unions supported the coalition proposal. It is true that the 
demand for a coalition was sometimes a thinly-disguised attack on 
the Bolsheviks: the main supporter of the demand and sponsor of the 
coalition talks, Vikzhel - the executive of the railwayworkers' union 
made no bones about its hostility to the Bolsheviks. In many 
other instances, however, the demand for a socialist coalition 
expressed a deep commitment to the idea of soviet democracy. At 
the Putilov works,workers in the gun shop, shipyard, turret shop, 
machine shop, engine-assembly shop, tank shop and company stores 
all passed resolutions calling for the formation of a government 
of all parties represented in the soviet. But whereas the gun
16. Oktyabr'skoe vooruzhennoe vosstanie, pp. 559, 564, 568-9, 579, 
585-6. Popov, A.L., ed., Oktyabr'skii perevorot, fakty i doku- 
menty, Pg., 1918, pp. 312-T.
17. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets na putyakh k oktyabryu, M.L., 1933, p.154
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shop resolution was a clear statement of no confidence in the Bolshevik
party, the shipyard resolution supported a coalition only on a
1R revolutionary political basis. Other factories which appealed
for a coalition government were the Cartridge, Arsenal, EkvaT,
Atlas, Reikel, Anchar and Odner works and also dockers at the Port.
The major unions, including the metalworkers', textileworkers' and
leatherworkers 1 , also backed this call, following the lead of the
?o PCTU on 31 October. Although the CCFC committed itself briefly
to support for a coalition, only the Nevskii district committee of 
factory committees is on record as having supported its lead. Very 
quickly it became clear that the Vikzhel-sponsored talks were 
getting nowhere, mainly because of the intransigence of the moderate
socialists, though also because the group of Bolsheviks closest
21 to Lenin were none too keen on them. Once it became apparent
that there was no basis of political agreement between the Bolsheviks 
and the right-wing socialists, the consensus of opinion in the 
working class seems to have swung in favour of a government con­ 
sisting mainly of Bolsheviks.
Outright opposition to the soviet regime on the part of the 
workers was astonishingly weak during the first three months of its 
existence. Only a handful of resolutions attacked the Bolshevik 
seizure of power, mainly from odd shops still dominated by Men-
sheviks or SR's in the Cartridge, Baltic, Siemens-Schuckert, Obukhov,
22 Arsenal and Gun Works and from the municipal power station. The
18. Bor'ba Klassov, 1924, 1-2, pp. 291-3; Popov, op. cit., pp. 309-10.
19. Popov, op. cit., pp. 392-7.
20. Volin, S., Deyatel'nost' men'shevikov v profsoyuzakh pri 
Sovetskoi vlasti, Columbia, 1962, pp. 30-1.
21. Liebman, M., Leninism under Lenin, London: Cape, 1975, part 3, ch. 1 
Daniels, Red October, London: Seeker and Warburg, 1967, ch. 10.
22. Popov, op. cit., pp. 316-7.
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Pal 1 factory was about the only textile mill to express opposition
23 to the Bolshevik coup. The total number of workers who supported
opposition resolutions, however, cannot have exceeded more than a 
few thousand. Within the trade-union movement in Petrograd oppos­ 
ition to the seizure of power was based on the unions of white-collar 
workers. The only union of sluzhashchie to support the Bolsheviks 
was the union of commercial and industrial employers, most of whose 
members were shop workers. The printers were the major union of 
manual workers to outrightly oppose the seizure of power, though 
individual printworks supported it. Although Vikzhel was hostile 
to the Bolshevik government, railway workers in Petrograd tended 
not to be, and resolutions expressing support for a soviet govern­ 
ment were passed by the Nikolaev, Baltic and Moscow-Vindavo-Rybinsk
railway depots in the capital, as well as by the Central Workshops
24 of the North-Western Railway. The paperworkers' union manifested
dissatisfaction at the seizure of power, but it was firm in its
condemnation of any attempt to return to a coalition with bourgeois
25 parties. The glass workers' union and chemical workers' union also
condemned "the pernicious policy of isolating the working class" 
and called for a "homogeneous government on a broad democratic 
foundation...to lead the country to the Constituent Assembly and to
nr
give the people peace and land".
23. Edinstyo, 176, 1 November 1917, p.4.
24. Popov, op. cit., pp. 314-5.
25. Novaya Zhizn', 173, 5 November 1917, p.3; Rabochaya Gazeta, 
206, 7 November 1917, p.4.
26. Shatilova, T., Ocherk istorii leningradskogo soyuza khimikov, 1905-18gg., L., 1927, p.64.—————————————————————
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B. THE DECREE ON WORKERS' CONTROL
No sooner had the Winter Palace been stormed, than Lenin 
began work on the founding decrees of the world's first proletarian 
state - decrees on peace, land and workers' control. The Decree 
on Workers' Control was drafted on 26 October and put for discussion 
to the CCFC - which, since the first national conference on 17-22 
October, had become the All-Russian Council of Factory Committees 
(ARCFC). The ARCFC itself drafted a decree, as did Larin and Milyutin 
jointly, but Lenin's draft was accepted as the basis for the Decree 
on Workers' Control. Lenin's decree breathes a spirit of libertar- 
ianism which reflects his profound faith at this time in the creat­ 
ivity of the masses. Lenin envisaged workers' control in all indus­ 
trial enterprises, whatever their size, and his draft made all 
decisions of control organs binding on the employers. All the 
details of implementing workers' control were to be worked out by
local Soviets, factory committee conferences and committees of
27 white-collar employees in situ. This document is noteworthy for
its lack of emphasis on state regulation of the economy, and repre­ 
sents the limit to which Lenin went in supporting the kind of de­ 
centralised workers' control practised by the factory committees. 
It cannot, however, be seen simply as a demagogic attempt to win 
political support from the CCFC leaders by making concessions to 
"syndicalism". Lenin firmly comes down on the side of the CCFC 
against the attempts by Milyutin and Larin to prohibit the control
27. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 35, M., 1962, 
pp. 30-1.
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organs from imposing their decisions on the employers, but he 
sides with the latter, in agreeing that trade unions should have 
the power to override decisions by individual control organs when 
necessary.
A conference was held on 5 November, chaired by Shlyapnikov, which 
decided to accept the Lenin draft as the basis of the decree, but 
to amend.it in accordance with proposals from both the factory
po
committees and trade unions. The Central Executive Committee 
(CEC) of the Soviets set up a five-man commission, including
Milyutin, Lozovskii and the Left SR's Kamkov and Zaks, on 8 November,
29 to work out the details of the draft. On 14 November Milyutin
introduced the Decree to the CEC for discussion and amendment. 
Speaking in an official rather than personal capacity, Milyutin 
explained that three objections had been made to the draft Decree 
in the course of drawing it up (Milyutin himself having been one 
of its most vocal critics). Firstly, critics had objected that 
workers' control could only be discussed in the context of a planned 
economy, but, Milyutin countered, "we have been overtaken by events 
...we have had to coordinate the [work of] control [organs] set 
up in the localities and to draw them into a single, streamlined 
state apparatus, even at the cost of proceeding in an unsystematic 
fashion". Secondly, critics had objected that "the commission was 
extending powers of control too far [downwards] and that these
28. Keep, J.H.L., The Debate on Soviet Power: minutes of the 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets, Oxford 
University Press, 1979, p.318.
29. ibid., p.106.
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powers should be limited". Milyutin countered: "we proceeded from 
the principle of control from below. We based the control 
apparatus on the local factory committees, so that the higher in­ 
stances of control will consist of their central bodies, filled 
out by representatives of trade unions and Soviets". The third 
point which raised objection was whether employers should be bound 
by the decisions of the control organs. Critics felt that to 
make decisions mandatory would endanger the interests of the 
general economic plan; but the commission, whilst agreeing that 
employers should have three days in which to object to decisions,
felt that not to make factory committee decisions binding^would
30 create an unworkable system of workers' control. The CEC ratified
the Decree, which set up a structure of control organs at all 
levels, from the individual factory up to an All-Russian Council 
of Workers' Control, in order to promote "planned regulation of the 
national economy".
On 16 November the Fifth Conference of Petrograd Factory 
Committees opened. The Decree was introduced for discussion and 
ratification by Skrypnik on behalf of the CCFC. It was opposed by 
Kotlov, the chairman of the technical commission of the Ministry of 
Labour, who felt that the Decree unduly restricted workers' self- 
activity^and that regulation of the economy was impossible without 
active workers' control. Taking their cue from him, the anarcho- 
syndicalists argued for factories to be transferred into the hands
30. ibid., pp. 124-5.
31. Akhapkin, Yu., ed., First Decrees of Soviet Power, London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1970, pp. 36-8.
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the workers. Zhuk demanded the expropriation of factories facing 
closure and Bill Shatov preached the virtues of factory committees 
against the trade unions. Bolshevik orators from the CCFC called 
for active, wide-ranging control in the localities, but emphasised 
that this was but one part of regulating production, directed 
mainly against sabotage by factory owners. Skrypnik put the Decree
to the vote and it was passed overwhelmingly, with only one vote
32 against and twenty abstentions.
The importance of the Decree was more symbolic than real. As 
it existed on paper, it was unworkable, for it envisaged a hier­ 
archy of control organs at enterprise, district, city and national 
level, which would have proved too cumbersome. Further problems 
arose from the fact that the Decree did not spell out in concrete 
detail how workers' control was to be implemented. A number of 
local Soviets, trade unions and provincial conferences of factory 
committees worked out sets of instructions on the execution of the 
Decree and the scope of workers' control, by far the most important 
of which were the instructions issued by the Central Council of 
Factory Committees in Petrograd and those issued by the All-Russian 
Council of Workers' Control. It is worth examining these instructions 
in detail, since they reveal clearly what was at issue in the debate 
around factory committees and workers' control which was soon to 
erupt.
The Instructions of the CCFC, first published in Izvestiya on 
7 December, are remarkable for the radicalism with which they
32. Novyi Put', 3-4, 1 December 1917, pp. 25-6. The conference was 
attended by 96 Bolsheviks, 24 SR's, 13 anarchists, 7 Mensheviks, 
6 miscellaneous and 21 whose affiliation was unknown. Kanev, 
S.N., Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i krakh anarkhizma, M., 1974, p.165
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approach the question of workers' control. They represent a bold 
advance on the positions taken by factory committee conferences up 
to October, no longer seeing control as "inspection" but as active 
intervention in production:
Workers' control of industry, as an integral 
part of control over the whole of economic life, 
must be understood not in the narrow sense of simple 
inspection (revizii), but, on the contrary, in the 
broad sense of intervening in the employer's 
disposal of capital, stocks, raw materials and fin­ 
ished goods in the factory; in the sense of ac­ 
tively supervising the proper and expedient ful­ 
filment of orders and utilisation of energy and 
labour power; in the sense of participating in 
the organisation of production on rational lines, 
etc. Control will only achieve its end and jus­ 
tify the hopes pinned on it, if it is firstly, 
implemented by workers' organisations at both 
central and local level in the most energetic 
and vigorous manner, not stopping short of active 
measures to restrain employers who are clearly 
approaching the fulfilment of their duties in a 
negligent or harmful fashion; and secondly, if 
it is closely coordinated with and firmly tied 
to the general regulation and organisation of 
production, both in the individual enterprise 
and in the branch of industry as a whole. Con­ 
trol must be seen precisely as a transitional 
stage towards organising the whole economic 
life of the country on social lines, as the 
first step in this direction taken from below, 
parallel with work at the top in the central 
organs of the economy.33
The Instructions then proceed to specify the tasks of workers' con­ 
trol in a very broad fashion. They envisage active interference in 
management, without clarifying precisely what powers and responsibilities 
management still has. The decisions of the control organs are made 
binding on management. The factory committees, organised into a
33. Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, 1, March 1918, p.28.
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national hierarchy, are vested with sole responsibility for workers' 
control; trade union activity is confined to the area of wages.
Didier-L. Limon argues that these Instructions, in effect, are
34 about workers' self-management rather than workers' control.
This is undoubtedly true, insofar as the Instructions were drawn 
up against a background assumption that there was to be a rapid 
transition to socialism, in which workers' control would be trans­ 
mogrified into workers' self-management. Yet these Instructions 
in no sense represent a syndicalist effort to decentralise the 
running of the economy. At the Sixth Conference of Factory Committees, 
from 22-27 January 1918, the anarchist, Bleikhman, criticised the
CCFC Instructions for their 'centralism 1 , though he conceded that
35this was a 'democratic' type of centralism. Control was en­ 
visaged as taking place at both state level and factory level and 
local initiatives were to be organised into a hierarchy of local 
and regional Councils of National Economy (sovnarkhazy), topped by 
the Supreme Council of National Economy (V.S.N.Kh.). This was not 
an anarcho-syndicalist schema but a plan for the democratic 
socialisation of production, which had the support of perhaps a 
majority of Bolsheviks at this stage, including, for a short period, 
Lenin himself. It is for this reason that the Secretariat of the 
Bolshevik Central Committee sent these Instructions, rather than 
those of the All-Russian Council of Workers' Control, to provincial
34. Limon, D-L., 'Le'nine et le contr61e ouvrier 1 , Autogestion,
no. 4, D£c. 1967, Paris, pp. 83-5.
35. Novaya Zhizn 1 , 19, 26 January 1918, p.3.
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bodies who requested information on how to implement the Decree on
O£
Workers' Control.
The All-Russian Council of Workers' Control (ARCWC) was brought 
into being by the Decree on Workers' Control of November 14, but it 
was virtually stillborn. It met but twice before it was absorbed 
into V.S.N.Kh. (established December I). 37 The ARCWC consisted of 
only five representatives from the factory committees, out of more 
than forty members. The rest comprised representatives from the 
Soviets, the PCTU, the cooperatives etc., including some Mensheviks 
and SR's. It was chaired by the Bolshevik leader of the metalworkers' 
union, V.V. Schmidt. The Council's one act of significance was to 
produce an alternative set of Instructions on workers' control, more 
moderate than those of the CCFC. The ARCWC Instructions emphasised 
the necessity of a centralised system of control in which individual 
factory control commissions would be subordinated to the control- 
distribution commission of the trade union of the particular branch 
of industry. This has led some Soviet historians to argue that these 
Instructions were an attempt by Menshevik trade union leaders to 
subordinate the control organs to the trade unions rather than to the 
state. That they represent an attempt to assert trade union suzer­ 
ainty over the factory committees is beyond dispute, but this was an 
aspiration shared as much by Bolshevik trade-union leaders as by 
Menshevik. The Instructions cannot be interpreted as an effort to 
displace state organs from the sphere of workers' control, since 
they affirmed that trade union control commissions should be subject 
to regional councils of workers' control,which in turn should be
36. Lenin, op. cit., p.448.
37. Carr, E.H., The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 2, pp. 79-80.
3%
subject to V.S.N.Kh. The second significant feature of the ARCWC 
Instructions is that they laid down that management functions should 
remain in the hands of the employer:
Administrative (rasporyaditel'nye) rights 
to manage the enterprise and its operations 
and activities remain with the owner. The 
control commission does not take part in the 
management of the enterprise and does not bear 
any responsibility for its operations and 
activity. 3%
This was merely a restatement of the position of successive factory 
committee conferences prior to the October Revolution. It offered 
no solution to the problem outlined in chapter 8 of how factory 
committees could avoid responsibility for the enterprise if they 
had more de facto power than the official administration in the 
areas of supplies, output, equipment, labour discipline, purchasing, 
demobilisation, etc.
C. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF WORKERS' CONTROL
The two sets of Instructions about the implementation of the 
Decree on Workers' Control were at the centre of the debate between 
the factory committees and trade union leaders in December 1917 and 
January 1918. The Instructions of the Central Council of Factory 
Committees were seen by both trade union leaders and factory committee 
militants as giving carte blanche to individual factory committees 
to implement the most far-reaching schemes of grass roots 'control'. 
It was at these Instructions, therefore, that much of the fire of 
the trade-union opposition was directed. The most devastating
38. Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, 1, 1918, p.28.
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critique of the Instructions was undoubtedly that mounted by the
Bolshevik trade union leader, A. Lozovskii, in his pamphlet,
, 39 Rabochii Kontrol, ('Workers' Control), published on 8 January 1918.
According to Lozovskii, "the basic defect of the projected 
law is that it makes no connection with the planned regulation of 
the economy and disperses control of production, instead of cen­ 
tralising it". Lozovskii and the other trade union leaders 
believed that:
the lower control organ must act within limits 
which are strictly defined by the higher organs 
of control and regulation, whereas the comrades 
who stand for decentralisation and workers' 
control uphold the independence and autonomy 
of the lower control organs, suggesting that 
the masses themselves will imbue the proclaimed 
principle of workers' control with concrete 
content.41
Lozovskii argued that the Instructions of the Central Council of 
Factory Committees were completely illogical, for whilst they talked 
of the employer and of profit, they effectively abolished the old 
management by totally subordinating it to the factory control organ. 
In reality the Instructions did not aspire to workers' control 
at all, but to the complete reorganisation of the economy along 
socialist lines and to workers' self-management: "The notion of
workers' control thus no longer represents a transitional measure
42 but rather the immediate realisation of a new mode of production".
39. A. Lozovskii (S.A. Dridzo) was elected to the All-Russian Council 
of Trade Unions at the Third Trade Union Conference in June. In 
July he joined the Bolshevik party but was expelled in December 
for his views on trade union independence. He rejoined the party 
in 1919 and served it faithfully until his death in 1952.




There is much truth in Lozovskii's strictures. The Bolshevik 
seizure of power, together with ever-deeper economic chaos, had 
caused the leaders of the Central Council of Factory Committees to 
develop a more ambitious concept of workers' control than they had 
entertained prior to October. The Bolshevik, Kaktyn 1 , explained 
in the CCFC journal, Novyi Put', how the nature of workers' control 
was changing^now that socialism was on the agenda: no longer was 
it merely a question of controlling the activities of capital in 
order to maintain production - workers' self-management was now a 
possibility.
You know that what is now taking place is 
not a quiet, peaceful process of social 
development with powerful conservatism in 
the sphere of ideas; on the contrary, we are 
living through the greatest socialist revol­ 
ution, not only in the political, but still 
more fundamentally, in the economic sphere. 
We are experiencing the complete and total 
collapse and destruction of capitalist ideol­ 
ogy in the consciousness of the broad popular 
masses and of basic age-old institutions, such 
as private property, competition, freedom for 
individualist plunder etc. A most cruel war, 
waged for nearly four years by the imperialists 
of the different alliances seeking dominion for 
their capital throughout the world, has un­ 
avoidably brought the toilers of all countries 
firstly, to an ideological revolution - to the 
over-throw of the prejudices of bourgeois 
society ingrained by the centuries - and then 
to a social revolution, which has begun in 
Russia, the country most exhausted by the war, 
and which is rolling in a mighty wave through 
all countries of the world, breaking out in mass 
uprisings, first here, then there.43
43. Novyi Put', 1-2, 14 January 1918, p.4.
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For Kaktyn 1 , as for the other CCFC leaders, the actuality of 
permanent revolution completely transformed the nature of workers 
control, as he went on to explain in the same article:
The very notion of control, at first 
completely unclear, has gradually, with 
the further development of the revolution 
and the aggravation of economic disorder, 
become more concrete and more widely and 
deeply developed...It is clear that in our 
situation there can no longer be any talk 
of the old method of passive control of pro­ 
duction and distribution so cherished by 
our spineless intelligentsia. Even if 
individual comrades in the Bolshevik party, 
along with Novaya Zhizn', defend the idea 
and try to extend it through the higher 
economic organs and cast it in a form which 
totally distorts the original Decree on 
Workers' Control, and even if all those 
seize on it who fear the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and socialism more than 
death (the trade union elite, the union 
of engineers and technicians and others, 
not to mention the employers), then it only 
serves to emphasise their feebleness.
The confusion implicit in this radical concept of 'control 1 
was neatly encapsulated in the opening speech made by the Bolshevik 
Zhivotov to the Sixth Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees 
on January 22, 1918. He proclaimed:
We must no longer talk of control of pro­ 
duction, but of the revolutionary seizure 
of the whole economic life of the country, 
for only then will sabotage and other kinds 
of bourgeois resistance no longer hinder the 
workers from achieving control and imple­ 




He went on to call for the creation of district sovnarkhozy
(councils of national economy) which "must be that socialist organis-
45 ation which will manage the economy". In the one breath Zhivotov
reiterates the old idea of control against capitalist sabotage and 
then elides it into socialist organisation of the economy.
Lozovskii correctly linked the debate on workers' control to 
the fundamental question of the Russian Revolution: was socialism 
on the immediate agenda? -
It is absolutely essential to counterpose the 
organisation or production to the regulation of 
production. For in these two terms are encap­ 
sulated two systems and two views on the next 
tasks of the proletariat in the Russian Revolution. 
If one thinks that Russia can pass to the immed­ 
iate realisation of a socialist system, if one 
thinks that socialism in Russia is a practical 
task of the day, then one must speak of the or­ 
ganisation of production, and not only speak of 
it, but execute it in practice. One must social­ 
ise all enterprises and hand the whole apparatus 
into the hands of the workers. But those who 
think we can organise production do not at present 
go so far in^the logical development of their 
principles.'
Lozovskii himself took up what was in essence a Menshevik-Internation- 
alist, rather than a Bolshevik, position:
There can be no doubt that the immediate social­ 
isation of the means of production and exchange 
is not on the agenda of the Russian Revolution. 
We are faced, and not only we but the whole of 
Western Europe, with living through a rather 
lengthy transitional period of state capitalism 
or state socialism, under which the working class 
will act against the state-employer in selling 
its labour power...Workers' control is a trans­ 
itional revolutionary measure...(it) does not
45. Novyi Put', 4-5, 25 February 1918, p.11.
46. Lozovskii, op. cit., p.24.
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affect the foundations of the capitalist system. 
It leaves intact the private property in the means 
of production and the whole private trading 
apparatus - not because this is better from the 
point of view of proletarian interests, but be­ 
cause at the present historical moment the pro­ 
letariat does not have the power to do more, given 
its lack of organisational experience and in the 
absence of a socialist revolution in the econom­ 
ically-advanced countries of Hestern Europe. The 
proletariat can lay hands on the whole productive 
apparatus, can move close to the whole process of 
production, can take an active part in carrying 
out the state-wide plan of regulation, can reduce 
the appetites of the ruling classes with a rough 
hand and force them to submit to its control - 
but more than this it cannot do.^'
The majority of Bolsheviks were not impressed by the cogency 
of Lozovskii's economic views, merely shocked at what seemed to be 
his political pusilanimity. To men like Kaktyn 1 or Skrypnik, the 
prospect of resigning themselves to a whole historic epoch of state 
capitalism was anathema. Nor were they prepared to sit back and 
await a revolution in Western Europe. They were determined rather 
to push the revolution in Russia as far in a socialist direction as 
it would go, in the hope of stimulating international revolution. 
To such men nothing looked easier than the abolition of capitalism 
in a country in the throes of revolution, war and economic crisis. 
Capitalism was tearing itself apart and it was the duty of revolut­ 
ionaries to ensure that socialism was established in its place. 
Any talk of state capitalism could only come from those who had
sold their souls to capital and could serve only to promote capitalist
0 
restoration.
47. ibid., pp. 24-5.
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It should not be assumed that the views of Lozovskii were shared 
by only a handful of incipient trade union bureaucrats, nor that 
Skrypnik and others necessarily represented the views of the majority 
of the working class, though in the Petrograd metal industry they 
enjoyed widespread support. Not all sections of workers were as 
enthusiastic about the radical style of 'control - with its con­ 
comitant responsibilities - as were metalworkers. The union of 
textileworkers of the Central Industrial Region, the union of 
needleworkers, the economic department of the Moscow Soviet and 
other bodies all produced instructions on the implementation of 
workers' control which followed the moderate line of The All-Russian 
Council of Workers' Control.
D. THE DEBATE ABOUT FUSION OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEES AND THE TRADE UNIONS
On 29 December a conference took place of representatives from 
factory committees and trade unions in the Petrograd metal industry. 
This conference was addressed, on behalf of the metalworkers' union, 
by the Bolshevik G. Weinberg, who described the dismal state of 
production and the massive problems of demobilising the war industries. 
He then went on to attack the factory committees for their paro­ 
chialism and to call for a centralised system of workers' control. 
He argued that it was the trade unions - organisations which em­ 
braced whole industries, in contrast to the localised factory 
committees - which had now to tackle the problems of the economy. 
The factory committee representatives,led by the anarchist Voronkov, 
sharply rebutted Weinberg's arguments, calling for more active
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48 control and affirming their support for the CCFC Instructions.
The Bolshevik Commissar of Labour, Alexander Shlyapnikov, repeated 
the charge of parochialism, accusing the factory committees of col­ 
laborating with, or allowing themselves to be used by, employers
49 as a lever with which to squeeze financial aid from the state.
The conclusion spelt out by both Weinberg and Shlyapnikov was that 
it was time for the factory committees to be absorbed into the trade 
union apparatus by becoming the primary cells of the unions in the 
enterprise.
The charge of parochialism was a stick with which the trade
50 unions had frequently belaboured the factory committees. The
syndicalist leader of the metalworkers' union, A. Gastev, had the 
following to say at the All-Russian Tariff Conference of the Metal­ 
workers' Union on 15 October:
The 'controlling 1 activities of the factory 
committees have given birth to many 'original 
illusions'. The committees are frequently 
buried in the narrow shell of local factory 
problems...Such a narrow 'local' politics goes 
hand in hand with a 'broad 1 understanding of 
immediate tasks.51
This, he argued, led to factory committees competing with one another 
for orders and government loans and to their working with management 
against other factories. He continued:
48. Narodnoe Slovo, 19, 22 December 1917, p.4; Metal list, 1, 11 
January 1918, pp. 12-13.
49. Metal!ist, 1, 1918, p.14.
50. For a discussion of some instances of factory committee parochialism 
see the next chapter.
51. Vserossiiskaya tarifnaya konferentsiya soyuzov metallistov, 
Pg., 1918, p.5.
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In general one must say that it's completely 
inadequate to control a single industrial 
enterprise; one must also control the highest 
organs of finance and management. One must 
remember that large-scale speculation and the 
major levers of production are found outside 
the factory; and under the present system of 
'control 1 , the factory committees sanction 
speculative operations suggested by financial 
dealers who are unknown to them.52
In an article in Metal list, Ya. Boyarkov, a Bolshevik from the 
Khar'kov metal union, fulminated against workers' control in one of 
the most rancorous polemics directed at the factory committees by 
the unions,and one which became a favourite target of critics on 
the Left. In this article Boyarkov argued:
The only real method of struggle against 
the sabotage of industrialists is state 
regulation of production...The whole sense 
of 'workers' control 1 arose from the fact 
that there was no higher authority which 
would put a stop to the criminal disrup­ 
tion of the economy and, willy-nilly, we 
were forced by our own efforts to achieve 
control over the actions of the industrial­ 
ists within the confines of the individual 
enterprise...'Workers' control' by itself 
is an anarchist attempt to establish social­ 
ism in one enterprise and leads in practice 
to clashes between groups of workers... 
Of course, the state can and must be based 
on the proletarian organisations - in the 
first place, on the trade unions, which 
alone can assist the process of restoring 
industrial life'.53
A similar sentiment was expressed by the Central Committee of the 
Atetal Union, which condemned the seizure of factories:
since this leads to the worst kind of class 
collaboration and to workers becoming captives
52. ibid., p.7.
53. Metallist, 6, 30 November 1917, pp. 3-6.
405
of the employers, who exploit them in order 
to solicit loans and subsidies...The Central 
Committee summons workers to stick to the 
tried and tested method of struggle through 
the unions. In addition, the Central Committee 
proposes to get the state to regulate industry 
on a broad basis, with the participation of the 
labour movement in the organs of regulation.54
The factory committee leaders themselves admitted that there was 
some truth to the charges of parochialism (see next chapter for some 
examples). As early as August at the Second Conference of Factory 
Committees, Skrypnik condemned the "patriotism of one's parish" 
(kolokol'ni, lit. bell-tower). Replying to the charges of parochial­ 
ism the journal of the CCFC, Novyi Put 1 argued:
Some people point to the narrowness and 
restrictiveness of individual factory com­ 
mittees, to their local or factory approach 
to solving problems - particularly in the 
provinces. But such deviations are the in­ 
evitable consequence of the narrow limits 
within which the capitalist class and its 
government seek to confine these revolut­ 
ionary economic organisations. The path 
of the working class does not lie in every 
workers' cell pottering around in its own 
little corner, nor in solving the whole 
social question by seizing individual fac­ 
tories for communist experiments. It lies 
rather in the class struggle of the pro­ 
letariat at the head of the broad masses of 
poor peasants, the class struggle of every 
labour organisation - the trade union, the 
factory committee and the soviet of workers' 
and soldiers' deputies - against the counter­ 
revolutionary activity of the bourgeoisie.55
Contrary to the expectations of Novyi Put', the removal of the 
"narrow limits" on workers' control by the Bolshevik decree seems to
54. Metal list, 1, 1918, p.11.
55. Novyi Put', 1-2, 15 October 1917, p.3.
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have aggravated rather than attenuated tendencies towards factory 
committee parochialism, and this was, without doubt, a major factor 
in persuading Lenin and others that the committees must be sub­ 
ordinated to the trade unions.
The other charge made against the factory committees to justify 
their absorption into the trade unions was that they merely duplic­ 
ated the activity of the trade unions. Writing in the journal of 
the Petrograd metalworkers' union, G. Weinberg explained how:
The Petrograd union of metalworkers, as soon 
as it took steps in this direction (i.e. of 
regulating the industry - SAS), unfortunately 
clashed with another organisation - the Central 
Council of Factory Committees. Questionnaires 
on the state of the metal industry, sent out by 
the union to each factory, were matched by 
questionnaires sent by the CCFC. Two labour 
organisations were doing the very same work, 
completely separately, wasting limited energies 
and expending double the resources.56
Weinberg, unlike Lozovskii, saw the task as being that of "socialist 
construction and restructuring of production", but he believed that 
only the trade unions were capable of doing this.
E. THE ROLE OF THE TRADE UNIONS IN THE PERIOD AFTER OCTOBER
The debates about workers' control and the relationship of the 
factory committees to the trade unions were linked to a third debate 
about the role of the trade unions under a workers' and peasants' 
government. The Third Conference of Trade Unions in June had specified 
that the main function of the trade unions was to conduct the economic 
struggle in defence of workers' living standards; it had rejected the
56. Metallist, 2, 19 February 1918, pp. 3-4.
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idea of unions intervening in the sphere of production. Some 
unions, however, most notably the Petrograd metalworkers' union, 
had begun to argue, as early as the summer, that a new task now 
faced the trade union movement, viz. participation in the regulation 
of the economy. After the Kerensky government was ousted from 
office in October, more and more voices were heard arguing for 
a redefinition of the role of the unions. G. Weinberg wrote in 
MetaHist in December that the major task of the unions was no longer 
the defence of workers' economic interests, since the workers'
government could do this far more adequately, but "participation in
57 the organs regulating and controlling production arid the economy".
The leatherworkers 1 journal observed that "facing the unions in all 
its fullness is the problem of organisation and control of production". 
This attempt to redefine the tasks of the unions threw into relief 
a much broader problem about the relationship of the unions to the 
workers' and peasants' state. If the unions were no longer to fulfil 
their traditional function of defending workers' economic interests, 
the state now doing this instead, and if they were to become organs 
of economic regulation under the direction of the state, could the 
unions be said to have any functions separate from those of the 
state? Should they not logically end their separate organisational 
existence and merge themselves into the state apparatus? This was 
the question which was to dominate the proceedings of the first 
national congress of trade unions which took place from 7-14 January 
1918.
57. Metallist, 1, 1918, p.2.
58. Golos Kozhevnika, 4-5, 1 December 1918, p.2.
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About 500 delegates attended the first national congress, 
of whom 428 had voting rights. Nineteen national unions were re­ 
presented with a total membership of 2.5 million, including 600,000 
from the metal union, 500,000 from the textile union, 200,000 from 
the leather union. 9 Of the voting delegates 281 were Bolsheviks, 
67 Mensheviks, 21 Left SR's, 10 Right SR's, 6 SR Maximalists, 6 
anarcho-syndicalists and 37 belonged to no political party. 60 
Interestingly, the right-wing minority consisted of proportionately 
more national executive members than rank-and-file delegates. 
43% of national executive members were Mensheviks and Right SR's, 
compared to 13% of local delegates. Only 37% of national executive 
members were Bolsheviks, Left SR's, SR Maximalists or anarcho- 
syndicalists, compared to 79% of local delegates.
The debate about the role of the unions and their relationship 
to the state took place in a highly charged political atmosphere. 
Zinoviev argued on behalf of the Bolsheviks that:
The political victory of workers and poor 
peasants over the imperialists and their 
petit-bourgeois agents in Russia is bring­ 
ing us to the threshold of international 
socialist revolution and to victory over 
the capitalist mode of production. The 
Soviets of workers', soldiers' and peasants' 
deputies have become the organs of govern­ 
ment and the policy of the workers' and 
peasants' government is a policy of 
socialist reconstruction of society.
59. Pervyi vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soyuzov 7-14
yanvarya 1918g., M., 1918, p.338; Garvi, P.A., FVofessionarnye 
soyuzy v Rossii v pervye gody revolyutsii, 1917-21, New York, 1958, p.32. ————————————————
60. Volin, op. cit., p.35; Pervyi s"ezd, p.338 gives slightly differ­ 
ent figures.
61. Novyi Put', 3, 21 January 1918, p.8.
62. Pervyi S"ezd, p.69; Resolyutsiya vserossiiskikh konferentsii i 
s^zdov professional'nykh soyuzov, Pg., 1919, p.91 (henceforward 
viitsiva prof, soyuzov)!
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He inveighed against the notion that "there can be neutrality in the 
great historic contest between revolutionary socialism and its 
opponents". He argued that "the centre of gravity of trade union 
must now shift to the organisational-economic sphere. The unions, 
as class organisations of the proletariat...must take on the major 
work of organising production and reviving the disrupted productive
C q
forces of the country". In the first draft of his resolution, 
Zinoviev did not hesitate to draw the conclusion that the congress
should "proclaim the trade unions state organisations", but the Moscow
64 party organisation objected to this. The final resolution stated
that "the trade unions will inevitably become transformed into organs
of the socialist state, membership of which will be a civic duty for
65 all those employed in a particular branch of industry". This
compromise formula merely said that 'statisation 1 of the unions would 
not come about at once; it was not a recognition of qualified trade- 
union independence. The right to strike, for example, was explicitly 
rejected by Zinoviev ("the strike would be directed against the 
workers themselves") and the Bolshevik resolution on workers' control 
in its final version deleted a clause recognising the right to strike.
Martov led the Menshevik opposition to Zinoviev, which, in 
spite of profound internal scissions, operated on a common platform
rr
of "unity and independence of the trade-union movement". Martov 
began by reminding the congress that in 1906 Lenin had stated that 
it was impossible to jump from autocracy to socialism, since the
63. ibid.
64. Vestnik Truda, 1921, 3, p.11.
65. Resolyutsiya prof, soyuzov, p.92
66. Garvi, op. cit., pp. 32-4.
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preconditions for socialism were lacking. The proletariat was 
neither sufficiently homogeneous to see in socialism the sole 
solution to its problems, nor sufficiently experienced to manage the 
economy. Concentration of production had not yet reached a level 
where it governed the dynamic of the whole economy since small-scale 
production was still preponderant. The present revolution was thus 
still objectively a bourgeois one. Replying to Zinoviev, Martov 
cried: "To say that the very fact of existence of Soviets is proof 
of a new era in the life of mankind - the era of socialism - is 
vacuous rubbish". If the Bolsheviks continued their socialist 
experiments, he maintained, not only would they destroy the 
economy, they would disenchant the workers and pave the way for a 
capitalist restoration. So long as workers continued to sell their 
labour power, he concluded, free and independent unions were 
necessary to defend workers' interests. This did not mean, however, 
that unions should not take part in the business of economic regul­ 
ation, in order to inject into it "realism, marxism and scientific 
socialism". Martov's resolution received 84 votes against the 182 
cast for Zinoviev 1 s.
This debate on the role of the trade unions adumbrated, in 
many respects, the later, more famous debate of 1920-21. In 
the later debate Trotsky was in a minority in demanding the 'stat- 
isation 1 of the trade unions, but in January 1918, this was the offic­ 
ial, albeit modified, position of the congress. Strangely, the Left 
SR's were the most intransigent advocates of "the creation of organs
67. Pervyi s"ezd, p.82; Professional'nyi Soyuz, 1, February 1918, 
pp. 11-13; Garvi, op. cit., p.37.
68. Carr, E.H., The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 2, London: Penguin,
1966 edn., pp. 220-9; Daniels, R., The Conscience of the Revolution, 
New York, Clarion, 1969, ch. 5.
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of socialist government out of the trade unions" and voted against 
the Bolshevik resolution because, in its final form, it called for 
the gradual, rather than immediate, absorption of the unions 
by the state. More strangely still, Lozovskii was expelled from 
the party in January 1918 for advocating a position remarkably 
close to the compromise position of Lenin at the 10th Party Congress 
in 1921. Lozovskii argued that "the trade unions, whilst taking 
part in all the newly-created organisations...remain independent 
organisations of the working class...So long as capitalism exists, 
so long as private property in the means of production exists, so 
long as human exploitation exists, the unions must conduct the 
economic struggle as one of their tasks...The statisation of the 
unions is possible, finally, when we have arrived at a socialist 
system, when we have not a mixed but an authentic dictatorship of
the working class, when socialisation of the whole economic
69 apparatus has taken place". All Lozovskii's amendments to the
Bolshevik resolution, defending trade union autonomy, were rejected, 
since they were too close to the positions of the Mensheviks to be 
acceptable at this stage.
A majority of trade unions accepted the position adopted by 
the congress on the role of the trade unions and their relationship 
to the state. The first national congress of metalworkers, which 
began on 15 January 1918, endorsed the congress position. The 
first national congress of needleworkers did likewise, by 34 votes to 
10, with one abstention. The needleworkers also affirmed that "the
69. Pervyi s"ezd, pp. 229-35; Vestnik Truda, 1921, 3, p.12.
70. Metallist, 2, 1918, pp. 8-9.
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strike has become unnecessary and harmful under a working-class 
government, when the defence of labour...can be achieved through 
the apparatus of the state". This resolution was passed by 29 votes 
to 6, but with a large number of abstentions. As it turned out, 
these resolutions meant very little. The trade unions continued 
to enjoy considerable independence from the government during the 
civil war, which explains why the debate of 1920-21 took place.
F. THE SUBJUGATION OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEES
The national congress of trade unions resolved the fate of the 
factory committees and of workers' control in three resolutions: 
on the regulation of industry, on workers' control of production and 
on the inter-relationship of the factory committees and trade unions.
The resolution on the regulation of industry, drafted by the 
Bolshevik, G. Tsyperovich, was moderate and typical of Second Inter­ 
national marxism in its theoretical approach. It welcomed capitalist 
concentration of production as opening the gates to a socialist 
economy:
The revolution in Russia has raised the question 
of regulating industry and other branches of the 
economy^in political conditions in which the 
methods of regulation created by the capitalist 
class against the popular masses can and must 
be used in the interests of the masses, against 
the capitalist system as a whole.
The resolution went on:
The all-embracing process of syndication and 
trustification of different branches of industry, 
transport and finance, which is typical of the
71. Proletarii Igly, 1, 25 March 1918, pp. 4-5, 12-14.
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most recent stage of capitalism, completely 
excludes the possibility of regulation 
simply within the individual enterprise. 
This process automatically links the largest 
enterprises in each branch of industry into 
one whole, and then amalgamates the syndicates 
in different branches of industry, unifying 
them on an international scale.
The resolution, in line with Bolshevik thinking at this time, did 
not envisage nationalisation, merely the establishment of strictly- 
centralised syndicates and trusts as the first step towards this. 
It envisaged workers' control as operating in this system since:
the absence of such control would lead to 
the creation of a new industrial bureaucracy 
which would be harmful and would ill-befit 
the new relations of production. Such 
control can only be influential if it is 
tightly coordinated by one major centre of 
regulation, if its cells are joined together 
and subordinated to one major centre of 
workers' control and if it is based on the -,~ 
trade unions, helped by other suitable forces.
It was Lozovskii, now outside the party, who introduced the 
Bolshevik resolution on workers' control, perhaps because it 
accorded with his own views. The resolution stated that the task of 
workers' control was to "end autocracy in the economic sphere, just 
as it has been ended in the political sphere". It specified the 
content of workers' control as involving stock-taking of fuel and 
raw materials, investigation of finances, the determination of output 
quotas and productivity, inspection of accounts and supervision of 
the general running of the factory. The resolution emphasised, however,
72. Resolyutsiya prof, soyuzov, pp. 118-9.
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that such control was part of a general system of planned economic 
regulation and that "it is necessary to repudiate in the most un­ 
equivocal fashion all notions of dispersing workers' control, by 
giving workers in each enterprise the right to take final decisions 
on matters affecting the very existence of the enterprise". The 
resolution vested responsibility for control in the trade unions 
and exhorted them to preach the virtues of centralised control. It 
specified that factory control commissions should be subject to 
the control commissions of the unions and should include union 
representatives not working at the factory. In turn, the union 
control commissions should include factory committee representatives, 
as well as technicians, accountants and statisticians. The 
resolution, finally, endorsed the much-maligned Instructions on
workers' control which had been worked out by the All-Russian
73 Council of Workers' Control.
The Menshevik minority, led by F.A. Cherevanin, opposed these 
two resolutions. Theirs began from the twin assumption that "Russia 
must still pass through a rather prolonged stage of bourgeois devel­ 
opment", and that, internationally, a system of state capitalism 
existed under which the proletariat should strive for maximum repre­ 
sentation on the state organs of economic regulation. The Mensheviks 
called on "all consious layers of the proletariat to fight attempts 
at proletarian dictatorship in the industrial sphere and quasi-socialist 
experiments doomed to inevitable failure". In his summing-up
73. Pervyi s"ezd, p.229-
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Cherevanin provoked howls of protest. While condemning workers' 
control for exacerbating chaos in the economy, he called on Menshevik 
trade unionists to participate in the control organs in order to 
"fight against factory separatism and fight for the complete sub­ 
ordination of the control organs to the state organs of industrial 
regulation". He concluded:
So long as this disastrous and, from our point 
of view, suicidal process is going on, we will 
not stand on one side, we will not content 
ourselves with being spectators, observers, 
we will not say 'Go ahead, destroy yourselves!' 
(Noise, cries from the left of 'saboteur!'). 
We are not calling for sabotage, we remain in 
the ranks of the working class, we will not 
refuse to participate in the different labour 
organisations which are now being created, 
because we believe that the prospects facing 
Russia are too dire and gloomy.74
A further resolution on regulation of the economy was intro­ 
duced by Maksimov on behalf of the anarcho-syndicalists. This 
attacked both the state control lauded by the Mensheviks and workers' 
control as advocated by "the government which loudly proclaims 
itself a workers' and peasants' government". Maksimov argued that 
workers' control was now outmoded, since the task was no longer 
to limit disruption in the economy but to reorganise it. This could 
not be done by the "creation of state institutions in which the 
worker-bureaucrat (chinovnik-rabochii) is sovereign", but only by 
allowing free rein to the toiling people. He argued for socialisation 
of production and the federation of producers in both industry and 
agriculture: "the planned, successful radical transformation of
74. ibid., p.200; Resolyutsiya prof, soyuzov, pp. 125-7; Garvi, 
op. cit., p.41.
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society is possibly only when production is taken over by free,
75 autonomous, revolutionary proletarian organisations".
The debate on the future of the factory committees was intro­ 
duced in brusque fashion by Ryazanov, the proposer of the Bolshevik 
resolution which called for the organisational subordination of 
the factory committees to the trade unions. Having accused the 
committees of parochialism, he called on them "to choose that form 
of suicide which would be most useful to the trade union movement 
as a whole". i.e. to become the factory cells of the relevant 
industrial union. The anarcho-syndicalists were outraged. Bill 
Shatov denounced the trade unions as "living corpses" and Maksimov 
hailed the factory committees as "children of the revolution, 
the direct offspring of the workers themselves...manifesting all 
the intelligence, power and energy of the working class in the 
localities". The anarcho-syndicalists were fighting a rearguard 
action: their resolution gained a mere six votes. For once the 
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks joined forces to vote for Ryazanov's 
resolution.
The position adopted by the First All-Russian Congress of 
Trade Unions was now official Bolshevik policy, but it took several 
more weeks for the CCFC~to finally reconcile itself to fusion with the
yo
trade unions. Although the Bolshevik factory committee leaders 
do not seem to have opposed fusion in principle, they were unhappy
75. Pervyi s"ezd, p.82.
76. ibid., p.235.
77. ibid., p.240.
78. Novyi Put', 1-2, 1918, p.2. The factory committee leaders had 
recently tried to argue that the regulation of the economy was 
the task of neither the unions nor the committees but of the 
sovnarkhozy (ibid.).
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with the manner in which it was being brought about. On 21 January 
the CCFC pointed to the "discrepancy between the verbal revolutionism 
of the Congress and its actual conservatism". They criticised the 
trade unions for their "unrelenting tactic of subordinating the 
factory committees to themselves and absorbing all their functions, 
without looking into whether or not the immense and unorganised 
apparatus of the unions can execute even one of these functions". 
Instead of planning a smooth merger, the trade unions were content 
merely to attack the supposed parochialism of the factory committees:
One detects a complete unwillingness to deal 
with this new revolutionary organisation as a 
worthy collaborator in common work. Instead 
there is a stubborn striving to put them (the 
factory committees) at a lower level - to 
equate them with anarchic, unconscious, mass 
elementalism.79
Although the CCFC appears to have been reluctant to liquidate 
itself - at least on trade union terms, at grass-roots level,the harsh 
facts of economic life were forcing factory committees and trade
V
unions together. On Vasilevskii Island, for example, shortages of 
raw materials and fuels, unemployment and the threat of closures 
had forced the factory committees and trade unions as early as 9 
December to form a joint district council which subsequently took 
the appellation of 'Economic Council of the Workers of Vasilevskii 
district 1 . It consisted of three sections: a department of labour, 
a department for procuring raw materials and fuel, and a department
on
for demobilisation and control. On 15 January the Vyborg district
79. Novyi Put 1 , 3, 1918, pp. 1-2.
80. ibid., p.12.
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council of factory committees called for immediate fusion of factory 
committees and trade unions into a single economic organisation. 
In the textile and leather industries cooperation between the two 
organisations was already advanced by the end of 1917. Only in 
the metal industry was conflict between trade unions and factory 
committees as to the terms of amalgamation acute. On 28 January 
the Central Board of the Metalworkers' Union agreed that the factory 
committees should become primary cells of the trade unions and that 
the trade unions should take over the task of organising production. 
As a sop to the factory committees, it agreed that the delegate 
councils of metalworkers at district and city level should be 
replaced by conferences of factory committees. This concession 
met with a lot of opposition from the city delegate council of the 
metalworkers' union on 1 February, when G. Heinberg put the resol­ 
ution of the Central Board to them for ratification. It was even- 
op 
tually approved by 159:59 votes.
From 22-27 January the sixth and final conference of Petrograd 
factory committees took place. This called for widespread national­ 
isation - "the transfer of all means of production, factories and 
works into the hands of the state" - a call which was supported by
oo
all the delegates save six anarcho-syndicalists. Significantly, 
the resolution demanded that factory committees be charged with respon­ 
sibility for running these nationalised enterprises and was thus, 
in part, a disguised demand for workers' self-management. Conference 
passed a further resolution affirming the need for factory committees
81. Novyi Put', 3, 1918, p.12.
82. Metall 1st. 2, 1918, p.5; Metallist, 3, 23 March 1918, p.15.
83. Novyi Put', 4-5, 25 February 1918, p.13.
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to merge with the trade unions and calling for the functions of the 
CCFC to pass to the corresponding organs of the industrial unions, 
but it would be wrong to interpret this as a gracious admission of 
defeat by the Committees. As Zhivotov proclaimed, "If they (i.e.
the trade unions, SAS) want to refashion us, then they won't succeed
84 By going into the unions, we are going to refashion them". As
if to affirm this intention, the fusion resolution proposed that
85 the factory committees elect the boards of the unions. Moreover,
the conference endorsed the CCFC Instructions on workers' control, 
in spite of the fact that the ARCWC Instructions had been ratified 
by the All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions. Thus although the 
Sixth Conference may have genuflected hastily to the idea of trade 
union supremacy, at root,the will of the factory committees to be 
independent remained unbowed.
On 1 April trade unions and factory committees in the metal 
industry finally fused. At the fusion conference Zhivotov, on 
behalf of the CCFC, explained that the CCFC had lost its raison 
d'etre now that central and regional sovnarkhozy were in existence. 
With the exit from the CCFC of the metalworkers' delegates, who 
comprised two-thirds of the membership of that body, the CCFC ceased 
to exist and its remnants were absorbed into the sovnarkhoz of 
the Northern Industrial Region. Zhivotov emphasised the necessity 
of strong factory committees in each enterprise as the foundation 
stones of the union apparatus, but wisely avoided saying too much 
about the precise functions of the committees. Subsequent events
Or
were to prove that these were as much in dispute as ever.
84. Novaya Zhizn', 19, 26 Uanuary 1918, p.3.
85. Novyi Put 1 , 4-5, 1918, p.13.
86. The syndicalist newspaper welcomed the fusion - a sure
sign that it was not regarded as the end of the committees. 
Golos Truda, 5, 6 April 1918, p.4.
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Did the six months after the October Revolution see a victory 
of the trade unions over the factory committees? Clearly, in 
one sense the trade unions were victorious, insofar as they suc­ 
ceeded in absorbing the factory committees into their apparatus. 
Conversely, the factory committees did not succeed, as the anarcho- 
syndicalists wished, in completely displacing the trade unions. 
At a deeper level, however, the "victory" of the trade unions 
over the factory committees was far more ambiguous. G. Binshtok, 
the Menshevik trade union leader, wrote in Professional'nyi Soyuz, 
the journal set up by the Mensheviks after the First Trade Union 
Congress,to defend the autonomy of the trade unions from the Bol­ 
shevik state:
With complete justice the trade unions 
can say to the factory committees: 
'Thou hast conquered, 0 Galilean! 1 - 
because the trade unions, having taken 
on the organisation of production, have 
in fact been transformed into unified 
factory committees.
Binshtok is here pointing to the significant change which had taken 
place in the function of the trade unions after the October Revolution. 
Prior to October the factory committees and trade unions had worked 
out a modus vivendi, by clearly distinguishing between the function 
of controlling production, which was assigned to the factory committees, 
and that of defending the wages and conditions of workers, which 
was assigned to the trade unions. The transfer of power to a workers' 
government, however, and, more importantly, the destruction of the
87. The quotation is of the purported dying words of Emperor
Julian the Apostate (Theodoret, Historia Ecclesiae, vol. Ill, 
20) Professional'nyi Soyuz, 1, 1918.
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economy,,caused the trade unions to decisively shift the focus of 
their activities away from the wages front towards the production 
front. Increasingly, they came to see their job not as one of 
simply controlling production, but as one of full-scale regulation 
and organisation of production. In so acting, they were clearly 
taking their cue from the factory committees, which had since their 
inception desperately tried to keep production going. Thus, even 
if the factory committees as an institutional form were subordinated 
to the unions, it was the factory committees' definition of problems, 
i.e. the concern with the regulation of production, which triumphed. 
In practice the decision to subordinate the factory committees 
to the trade unions remained as much of a pipe-dream as the con­ 
temporary decision to move towards the statisation of the unions. 
Civil war developments, such as the nationalisation of all industrial 
enterprises and the attempted restoration of one-man management, 
merely raised again - in a new form - the old problems about the 
scope of workers' control and the relationship of the factory 
committees to the trade unions. As late as April 1920 - two years 
after he had helped promote the fusion of the factory committees and 
the trade unions - Lozovskii could report to the Third All-Russian 
Congress of Trade Unions:
We must subordinate the work of the factory 
committees and collectives to complete 
control and to the complete influence of the 
trade unions. You know from the experience of 
the last two years, particularly of the last 
year, that very often the factory committees 
or collegia consider themselves absolutely 
independent of the unions.'00
88. Cited by Pankratova, A.M., Fabzavkomy v bor'be, pp. 298-9.
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It is clear from this remark that long after the formal integration 
of the factory committees into the union apparatus, factory committees 
still displayed that spirited independence and concern for self- 
management which had been a hallmark of their activity prior to 
1918. They refused, in other words, to "commit suicide", as Ryazanov 
had urged at the First Congress of Trade Unions.
G. LENIN, THE BOLSHEVIKS AND WORKERS' CONTROL AFTER OCTOBER
Was the subordination of the factory committees to the trade 
unions proof that the Bolsheviks had merely supported the committees 
for opportunistic reasons prior to October? Lenin's first draft of 
the Decree on workers' control suggests not, for it ascribed far- 
reaching powers to the factory committees and placed heavy emphasis 
on grass-roots control rather than 'state workers' control 1 . This 
reflected Lenin's faith in the creativity of the masses - so much 
a feature of his thinking during the first three months of soviet 
power. He was intoxicated by the spectacle of workers, soldiers 
and peasants taking power into their own hands and profoundly 
optimistic about the potential inherent in such self-activity. In 
an article of late December entitled "How to Organise Competition", 
Lenin wrote:
One of the most crucial tasks at present, 
if not the most crucial, is to develop the 
independent initiatives of the workers and 
toilers and exploited generally in the sphere 
of creative, organisational work. At all 
costs, we must destroy that old, absurd, 
savage, vile and loathsome prejudice that 
only the so-called 'upper classes' can run 
the state.89
89. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 35, p.198.
423
Nevertheless even when Lenin's thinking was its most libertarian, 
he did not abandon his belief in the necessity of complementing the 
independent initiatives of the masses with action at state level. 
In early October he had reminded his Menshevik critics that:
We are for centralism and for a 'plan', but 
for centralism and for a plan by the pro­ 
letarian state: proletarian regulation of 
production and distribution in the interests 
of the poor, the toilers and the exploited - 
against the exploiters.
After the overthrow of the Kerensky government it was the existence 
of a proletarian state which dominated his thinking. As winter 
set in, the honeymoon period of the revolution began to draw to a 
close, and the Bolshevik government became more and more aware of 
the appalling economic and social difficulties facing the country. 
To Lenin the existence of proletarian state power seemed to be the 
one beacon in the enveloping gloom. Increasingly, the theme of 
state initiative assumed precedence in his discourse over the theme 
of mass initiative.
With regard to workers' control, Lenin seems quickly to have 
qualified his initial optimism about the capacity of workers and 
peasants to resolve the economic crisis through their own efforts. 
More and more he insisted that only centralised, planned inter­ 
vention by the state on a national scale could begin to tackle the 
anarchy induced in the economy by three years of war. At first 
Lenin does not appear to have had any definite position on whether 
the trade unions should supersede the factory committees as organs 
of economic regulation. The increasingly radical practice of workers
90. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 34, p.320.
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control in the winter of 1917, however, seems to have persuaded him 
and other leading Bolsheviks of the correctness of the arguments 
of those trade union leaders who castigated the factory committees 
for their parochial, tunnel-visioned approach to economic problems. 
As Lenin's commitment to centralised state regulation of the economy 
increased, he appears to have come round to the idea that the trade 
unions were better suited than the committees to the tasks of 
economic regulation, since they had their base not in the individual 
enterprise but in the branch of industry as a whole.
Workers' control of industry had begun in the early summer of 
1917 as an attempt to minimise capitalist disruption of industry? but 
had entailed not just the maintenance of production, but the 
democratisation of the relations of production and the creation of 
new relations of production in which workers would display the 
maximum initiative, responsibility and creativity. It was this 
potential for workers' self-management which increasingly came to 
the fore as the movement for workers' control developed. Up to 
October the struggle to maintain production and the struggle to 
transform capitalist relations of production appeared to be two 
sides of the same coin. It seemed that the combination of workers' 
power in the enterprise and a transfer of state power to the Soviets 
would bring about a socialist solution to the economic crisis. After 
October, however, the struggle for productivity and the struggle 
for workers' self-management suddenly seemed to be at odds with one 
another.
Although explicit references to 'self-management 1 are compar­ 
atively rare in the discourse of the factory committee leaders, the
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concept was central to their perspectives. When workers talked 
in the spring and summer of the "democratic" factory, or later 
when they talked of taking the factory "into their own hands", they 
were talking about workers' self-management. After October this 
became an overriding concern. For in spite of the recognition on 
the part of factory committee leaders of the need for state 
regulation of the economy, they also recognised another reality, of 
which the trade union leaders and many of the Bolshevik leadership, 
including Lenin, were unaware. This was that the transfer of power 
to the Soviets^and the transfer of legal ownership of the factories 
(i.e. nationalisation), would not by themselves bring an end to 
the oppression and subordination of the workers. In a vague, in­ 
coherent way, the factory committee leaders knew that unless the 
transfer of power to workers at the level of the state was accom­ 
panied by a transfer of power to them at the level of production, 
then the emancipation of labour would remain a chimera. What 
appears to be accelarating "anarchism" in the movement for workers' 
control after October is, in large part, a confused recognition 
that the organisation and techniques of production, the hierarchical 
relations of domination and authority and the old division of labour • 
in a word, capitalist relations of production - had to be totally 
transformed if socialism were to become a reality.
Lenin never developed any concept of workers' self-management. 
Until early 1918 he constantly drove home the importance of grass­ 
roots initiatives by workers, but these were seen by him more as 
independent exercises in 'control 1 and 'accounting 1 , than as attempts
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to transform relations of production at enterprise level. As 
galloping industrial chaos overtook the soviet state, Lenin came 
increasingly to emphasise the need for strict labour discipline 
and centralisation. Shop-floor autonomy faded as a theme in his 
discourse. From March 1918 he began to call for the restoration 
of one-man management. In March, in The Current Tasks of Soviet 
Power, he wrote:
Any large-scale machine industry, and this 
is precisely the material productive source 
and foundation of socialism - calls for un­ 
conditional and strict unity of will, in 
order to coordinate the simultaneous work 
of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands 
of people...Unqualified submission to a single 
will is unconditionally necessary in the 
success of the labour processes, organised on 
the lines of large-scale machine industry. 91
The gradual and uneven restoration of one-man management during the 
Civil War never caused Lenin to question the socialist character 
of the new soviet state. For socialism was measured, he believed, 
not by the degree of power exercised by workers on the shop floor, 
but by the character of the state. It was for this reason that 
he could view the nationalisation of major branches of industry on 
28 June as bringing into being workers' management. Immediately after 
these nationalisations, Lenin declared to the Fifth Congress of 
Soviets on 4 July: "The old workers' control is now out of date, the
trade unions are now being transformed into embryonic organs of
92 management in the whole of industry".
91. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 36, p.200.
92. ibid., p.502.
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By transferring ownership to the proletarian state, workers' control 
had been transmuted, at a stroke, into workers' management of in­ 
dustry. According to Lenin, the guarantee of the transition to 
socialism lay in the authentically proletarian character of the 
state rather than in the degree of dissolution of capitalist relations 
at the point of production. Because a state defending the interests 
of workers and poor peasants now presided over Russia, it was possible 
to organise production in a manner which would guarantee maximum 
efficiency - even if this involved reviving certain features of 
capitalism.
Although the factory committee leaders had an inchoate awareness 
that socialism would remain a mere formality unless the direct 
producers - and not just the state on their behalf - took over and 
radically reconstructed relations of production within the enterprise, 
they never really formulated this awareness in theoretical terms. 
Only the Left Communist faction of the Bolshevik party - and one Left 
Communist in particular - came near to registering, at a theoretical 
level, the importance of overcoming the separation of workers from 
the means of production during the transition to socialism. V.V. 
Osinskii (V.V. Obolenskii) was chairman of V.S.N.Kh. until March 1918, 
when he resigned because of his opposition to the Treaty of Brest- 
Li tovsk. In a brilliant article in the first number of the Left 
Communist journal in April 1918, entitled 'On Socialist Construction 1 , 
Osinskii loosed a far-reaching critique of the official Bolshevik 
policy of socialist transition, central to which was the following 
insight:
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...Although the transition to socialism is 
signalled by the nationalisation of enter­ 
prises, nationalisation of itself - i.e. 
the transfer of enterprises and state-owner­ 
ship - is not, in any sense, equivalent to 
socialism. In order for nationalisation to 
have that significance, i.e. for it to be­ 
come socialisation, it is necessary a) that 
the system of management of enterprises be 
constructed along socialist lines, so that 
capital's power of command is destroyed and 
so that in the arrangement of the enterprise 
there are no longer bases on which this com­ 
mand might be restored; b) it is necessary 
that the public authority (vlasf), into 
whose hands property in the means of produc­ 
tion is transferred, is a proletarian 
authority...Is it possible for the proletarian 
elite (verkhushka), which will sit with the 
capitalists on the boards of the trusts, to 
guarantee that real proletarian power is in 
command in production? I very much doubt it, 
since the proletariat as a class will become 
a passive element, the object, rather than
the subject of the organisation of labour in 
production.
He argued that unless the proletariat were actively involved in re­ 
organising the process of production,then state capitalism, not 
socialism, would be the end-product of the government's policies. 
Although the practical proposals for workers' self-management which 
Osinskii outlined in the second part of this article were disappoint­ 
ingly sketchy, the article is still noteworthy as marking the limit- 
point to which any Bolshevik went in formally recognising the crucial 
importance of workers' self-management in a strategy of socialist 
transition. The fact that Osinskii was also chairman of V.S.N.Kh. 
is further proof that one cannot counterpose V.S.N.Kh. - the supposed 
embodiment of centralised planning - to the factory committees, the
93. Kommunist, 1, 20 April 1918, pp. 12-16; Kommunist, 2, 27 April 
1918, pp. 5-17.
429
supposed embodiment of decentralised workers' control.
One should not exaggerate the significance of Osinskii's ideas. 
The Left Communists never really posed workers' self-management 
as a central aim, their theses of April 1918 merely mention the need
for "the complete removal of capitalist and feudal survivals in the
94relations of production". The factory committees strove in prac­ 
tice to transform relations of production at enterprise level, but 
their failure to theorise this practice in an alternative economic 
strategy helped to bring about their ultimate demise and that of 
workers' control.
94. Theses of the Left Communists (1918). Critique pamphlet, 
Glasgow, 1977, p.18. This was not true of Left Communists 
internationally such as A. Pannekoek, for whom workers' self- 
management was the quintessence of socialism. See Bricianer, 
S., Pannekoek et les conseils ouvriers, Paris, 1969.
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||. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT, OCTOBER 1917 TO
JUNE 1918
From workers' control to workers 1 _se If-management
The October Revolution was a workers' revolution in the simple
sense that it transferred state power to a government which enjoyed 
the support of a majority of the working class. As an essentially 
political act, it had little immediate effect on the daily lives 
of workers. The economic crisis, rapidly getting worse, was a far 
more important influence on their position than the Bolshevik 
seizure of power. Nevertheless at the subjective level, the advent 
to power of a soviet government had a profound effect on the way 
that workers perceived the deteriorating situation in the factories.
For a brief spell of two to three months, the October 
Revolution created a climate of hope similar to that which had 
been created by the February Revolution. Just as in March the 
workers of Petrograd had been fired by the desire to create a life 
of dignity and decency, so in November they were fired by the desire 
to incar nate the power of the people. The widespread mood of 
euphoria was captured by an observer, writing of the situation in 
Vasilevskii district at the time of the Bolshevik coup:
The mood of the workers is cheerful. A deep 
faith shines through their eyes. From dawn 
to dusk the doors of the Soviet and of the 
district committee (of the Bolshevik party, 
SAS) are never closed. Everywhere is full of 
people. The phone rings endlessly, calls 
from the factories continue the whole night. 
Factory committees are constantly on duty. 
From all sides you can hear: 'How are things? 1 
'We are winning.' 'We cannot but win.' 'Life 
is on our side.' 'If the peasants, workers 
and soldiers do not win, who can?'...
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On Thursday, the 26th, at 7pm a joint 
meeting of the Soviet, the party collectives 
and factory committee representatives took 
place. It was immediately decided to send 
workers from the factories into the country­ 
side to explain to the localities why power 
has gone to the Soviets, why, without 
soviet power, the peasants will get no land, 
the workers no control and the exhausted 
nations no democratic peace. In all the 
speeches there is but one thought - to dis­ 
perse to the remotest corners of the country­ 
side, to spread light, to explain the transfer 
of power to the Soviets and the government 
of the SovietsJ
The mood of the workers can be glimpsed through their resolutions 
and demands. Women printers on 31 October expressed
our warmest welcome to the first revolutionary 
government of working men, women and peasants... 
We are ready to fight for the sacred cause of 
the workers and for our demands. Long live the 
power of the Soviets! Long live the demands 
of working women and men for bread, peace 
and landl Long live the united struggle of 
working women and men for the bright future, 
for the ideals of social ism!?
At the Obukhov works on 29 October the workers proclaimed
We do not want bloodshed or violence in 
achieving those ideals for which we have 
striven for centuries, but we declare that 
anyone who opposes the realisation of our 
demands for land, peace and a Constituent 
Assembly will be considered an enemy, not a 
friend, whom we shall fight by every avail­ 
able means .3
On 28 October tram workers declared:




A curse on those who go against the will 
of the people! Down with False Socialists! 
Workers, soldiers, peasants unite in close 
ranks to fight for a genuinely popular 
revolutionary government! Long live the 
power of the Soviets at the centre and in 
the localities! Long live the worldwide 
union of proletarians! Forward for a 
democratic peace, bread and land!4
It was the Decree on Workers' Control which most inspired the 
workers of Petrograd qua workers. Prior to October, factory 
committees had been at pains to stress that workers' control of 
production was not equivalent to the abolition of capitalism. 
Now the ease with which the Bolsheviks had toppled the Kerensky 
Government persuaded many factory militants that the time was ripe 
to follow up the political dispossession of the capitalist class 
with their economic dispossession. The inauguration of a govern­ 
ment of workers and peasants, coupled with the break-up of the 
economy, seemed to many thousands of workers to toll the death- 
knell of capitalism. The Menshevik, Maiskii, speaking to the First 
All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in January 1918, remarked:
According to my observations, the majority 
of the proletariat, particularly in Petrograd, 
look on workers' control as an entry into the 
kingdom of socialism. It's precisely this 
psychology which creates huge dangers for the 
whole socialist movement in Russia in the 
future, because...if workers' control suffers 
defeat, then the masses will become disillusioned 
with the very idea of social ism.5
4. ibid., p.569.
5 Pervyi vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soyuzov, 7-14 
yanvarya 1918g., M., 1918, p.200.—
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But most rank-and-file militants despised such jeremiads: they had 
won state power, what else was left to do except go forward to 
socialism? In the minutes of the Putilov works committee on 18 
January 1918 the Bolshevik chairman, A. Vasil'ev, wrote:
The battles is still going on, but the hour 
of final victory is already near. We need 
only to strengthen the position we have so 
tirelessly achieved...The dawn of a new life 
is bursting brightly. The fatal hour for 
the bourgeois system has come. The bright 
reign of labour is beginning.6
The effect of the Decree on Workers' Control in many pro­ 
vincial areas was to initiate workers' control for the first time, 
but in Petrograd, where workers' control was already well-established, 
it had the effect of legitimising workers' control and, above 
all, of enlarging its scope, Most factory committees now set up 
special control commissions charged with overseeing and inter­ 
vening in the running of the factory. Such commissions had already 
appeared in the summer in a few large factories, but now they 
sprang up everywhere. Not content merely to monitor stocks of fuel 
and raw materials, they checked orders, company finances, inter­ 
vened in the technical side of production. Above all, they left 
employers in no doubt that they, the control commissions, were now 
in charge. Not surprisingly, the employers hit back.
On 22 November the Society of Factory and Works Owners in 
Petrograd published the following statement:
6. Gaza, I.I., Putilovets na putyakh k oktyabryu, M.L., 1933, p.165.
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We take the position that it is necessary 
for the government to participate in the 
direction and control of industry during 
war time, and are completely confident that 
the lawful government, which will be created 
by the Constituent Assembly, will author­ 
itatively resolve all the problems of Russian 
industrial life.
We foresee that the Russian proletariat, 
being totally unprepared to direct the 
extremely complex industrial mechanism, will, 
by its decisive interference, bring this vital 
branch of the state, which is already shaken to 
its foundations, to rapid ruin...
We categorically reject non-state, class 
control by workers over the country's industrial 
life (as decreed by the government) since it 
does not, in practice, pursue national ends 
and is not recognised by the majority of the 
Russian population.7
Three days later an unofficial meeting of the biggest commercial and 
industrial organisations in Petrograd decided on a tough line: 
"In the event of demands for workers' control being put forward... 
the enterprise must be closed". It argued that "the government, 
by completely handing over management of the factories into the 
hands of the working class is erecting a barrier to the further
o
participation of capital in industrial life".
The Decree stiffened the pugnacity of individual employers. 
At the Triangle rubber works the director, Pasternak, replied to 
attempts by the factory committee to set up a control commission
as follows: "If you establish control, then I'll close the factory.
9 I cannot work under control." At the Langenzippen works the owner
7. Cited by Lozovskii, A., Rabochii KontroT, Pg., 1918, p.98.
8. Cited by Drobizhev, V.Z., Stroitel'stvo organov upravleniya 
promyshlennosti v SSSR v 1917-18gg., candidate dissertation, 
Moscow University, History Faculty, 1957, p.107.
9. Krasnyi Arkhiv, 103, 1940, pp. 124-5.
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stormed out of the factory when the control commission attempted 
to impose far-reaching control over management. The factory 
committee refused to allow the owner back and it was still in 
dispute with the metal section of V.S.N.Kh. over this as late 
as autumn 1918. At the Nevskii footwear factory, management 
politely informed the control commission:
In answer to your memorandum of December 9, 
we consider it our duty to inform you that 
nowhere in the regulations on workers' 
control is anything said about the commission 
having the right to 'direct 1 management to 
do something and we consider that such a 
form of 'direction 1 - without any appeal - 
is utterly inadmissible under a democratic 
system.''
A good insight into the industrial disputes which arose over 
attempts to institute far-reaching control can be gained by 
examining one enterprise in detail. At the Nevskii shipyard fuel 
shortages had drastically cut back production by the October 
Revolution. After the Bolsheviks seized power management waited, 
believing that the government could not hold power for long. The 
financial position in the enterprise was grave however: on 19 
November it was announced that income had been 106,964 rubles, 
but expenditure 1,569,920 rubles. Management decided that as soon 
as war orders stopped, they would have to dismiss 2476 workers. 
On 16 November, in response to the Decree on Workers' Control, 
the factory committee set about extending its sphere of influence,
10. Pankratova, A.M., Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsialisticheskuyu 
fabriku, M., 1923, pp. 245-6; Antonov, N., Dva goda diktatury 
proletariata v metallopromyshlennosti Petrograda, Pg., 1920, pp. 28-30
11. LGIA, f. 1182, op. 1, d. 96, 1.88.
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but met with strong resistance from management. A week later, it 
demanded to have two representatives with voting rights on the 
board of the company, but management refused. The factory committee 
then demanded that no payments be made without its approval. 
Management pointed out that "to recognise your demand for actual 
control over the finances of the factory would not be in accordance 
with the Decree on Workers' Control, which does not envisage the
right of workers to interfere in the management functions of the
"12 
factory administration. On 27 November the factory committee
tried to occupy the finance office. On 3 December they requested 
the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet to 
send a commission of experienced people to look into the affairs 
of the company. The next day government declared the factory under 
workers' control. On 8 December the factory committee insisted 
that all papers from management be countersigned by the factory 
committee. A few days later it announced that the present director 
of the shipyard would be replaced by the engineer, A.A. Yustitskii. 
Management then began to retreat. The board of the company were 
appointees of the government, the shipyard being a state enter­ 
prise, and therefore their personal investments were not at stake. 
On 23 December the board issued the following statement:
The company board of the Nevskii works is not 
the representative of capital, but the repre­ 
sentative of the government, appointed by it 
not to exploit the enterprise in order to 
make share-holders rich, but to see that the 
enterprise functions properly from the govern­ 
ment's point of view.
12. Payalin, N.P., Zavod im. Lenina, 1857-1918, M.L., 1933, p.405.
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An agreement was thus reached with the factory committee, whereby 
the board of the company continued to manage the shipyard, whilst 
the factory committee checked books and accounts, raw materials 
and orders, correspondence and management decisions. This sit­ 
uation more or less worked, although there was much disgruntlement 
among shop-level management, who had no desire to cooperate with 
workers. However the new system of management could do little to 
rescue the factory from insolvency once war orders had dried up. 
On 17 January the shipyard was nationalised. By the time of the 
Civil War only 400 workers were left at the enterprise, compared 
to 7,500 in 1917. 13
The newer radical style of workers' control tended to create 
conflict not only between workers and management but also between 
workers and clerical and technical staff. Most white-collar 
employees opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power and the Decree on 
Workers' control. The union of engineers, which represented senior, 
well-paid industrial engineers, at the beginning of November 
warned the new government that:
we will firmly protect the personal and 
professional dignity of our members and 
will give a firm rebuff to any attempt by 
any commissar or agent of the usurping 
government to give directions to the 
engineers, to interfere in their affairs 
or force them to do anything by threat. 14
13. ibid., pp. 401-7.
14. Tsyperovich, G., Petrogradskie profsoyuzy v oktyabre 1917g., 
M., 1927, p.48; for discussion of engineers' attitudes see 
Bailes, K.E., Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin, 
Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 22-3.
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More junior technical personnel, represented by the union of foremen 
and technicians, were also hostile to the government but to a 
lesser extent. On 17 November a delegate meeting of the Petrograd 
branch of the union declared:
We have, from the moment our union was 
founded up to the present day, always re­ 
garded ourselves as an integral part of 
the proletariat and, together with them, 
have always been interested in strengthen­ 
ing the gains of labour over capital... 
And so we call on our members in the union to 
join with the workers and support them in 
their creative work by every means, without 
yielding to their political views, and to 
be respectful towards those organisations 
in the factory which receive the sanction of 
the proletariat. In cases of insult, abuse or 
infringement of your rights, the union will 
powerfully defend you, but our best defence 
will be tact and sincere love for the pro­ 
letariat. . .Concerning the question of workers' 
control, we support the idea of workers' con­ 
trol on a broad state basis, but consider the 
Decree of the People's Commisar completely 
incompatible with present productive and 
economic relations, and, not wishing to take 
responsibility for the ruinous consequence 
of putting it into practice, we as an organ­ 
isation will fight in the central organs of 
control to change that part of the draft 
which concerns the powers of the local control 
organs, so as to coordinate the operations of 
all enterprise*.^
The All-Russian Congress of Clerical workers which met from 3-8 
December took a similar position towards workers' control:
Congress considers the immediate and urgent 
task of the moment to be the rapid organisation 
of central, regional and local organs of con­ 
trol and regulation of industrial life. Such 
organisations, invested with authority, power 
and stability, can be created only be a central, 
democratic state power enjoying the popular 
recognition of a Constituent Assembly...Employees 
are recommended to take active part in the con­ 
trol of production...only in those circumstances
Lozovskii, op. cit., pp. 93-4.
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where a purely defensive control is being
instituted for protection against possible 
sabotage.^
The distrust displayed by technical and clerical employees 
towards the Soviet government and towards the Decree on Workers' 
Control, in particular, sometimes led to battles between factory 
committees and white-collar workers. A good instance of this is 
provided by developments at the Putilov works. On 31 October 347 
office-workers voted by 315 votes to 18, with 14 abstentions, for 
the following resolution:
We protest absolutely against the violent 
seizure of power by the Bolsheviks...and 
call on all the socialist parties to unite 
and speedily form a socialist ministry in 
which all the socialist parties are equally 
represented.''
However they voted unanimously not to strike, as employees in 
government ministries were doing. A couple of days later 
draughtsmen at the factory passed an almost identical resolution, 
sharply criticising the Bolsheviks for "the shedding of fraternal
I O
blood", by 97 votes to 11, with 12 abstentions. The mainly 
Bolshevik factory committee took a dim view of these resolutions. 
The alarm of the clerical and technical staff increased when the 
Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet appointed 
a commissar to the Putilov works - Nikolai Grigoriev, a former 
worker in the turret shop. They became enraged when, on 9 November, 
Grigoriev, in league with the factory committee, sent a worker to 
supervise clerical staff at work in their offices. They demanded
16. Kontorskii Trud, 3-4, December 1917, pp. 4, 8.
17. Kontorskii Trud, 2, November 1917, p.15.
18. Popov, A.A., Oktyabr'skii perevorot, Pg., 1918, p.399
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a meeting with the factory committee, but on arriving to negotiate 
with the committee at the works theatre, found it surrounded by 
soldiers and armed Red Guards. They refused to take part in the 
meeting under these conditions and 429 white-collar employees passed 
a resolution protesting against this infringement of freedom of 
assembly, and pointing out that the Military-Revolutionary Committee
had forbidden armed persons to attend public meetings. They
19 decided to break off relations with the factory committee. Workers
from the shop committees, however, supported the factory committee's 
refusal to remove the armed guard, on the following grounds:
The factory committee, at this very anxious 
moment, is the headquarters defending the 
revolution and our comrades, the workers, are 
proud of it and loudly proclaim that from now 
on our labour organisations will go along the 
same path in defence of the oppressed, toiling 
people.
The factory committee is both an economic and a 
political organisation and so it shall remain, 
so long as it is the will of the masses who 
elected it.
The commissar of the factory was properly elected 
by the factory committee and confirmed by the 
Military-Revolutionary Committee. Refusal to 
submit to him is a refusal to submit to the 
government, and our comrades, the workers, will 
react fittingly to such insubordination.
We publicly reprimand those salaried employees -n 
who have abandoned the toiling family of workers...
Such antipathy between factory committees and white-collar 
workers was fairly widespread. Given the political hostility of 
clercial and technical staff to the Bolshevik government, it was 
difficult for factory committees to cooperate with them. Indeed
19. Kontorskii Trud, 2, p.15.
20. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets v trekh revolyutsiyakh, M., 1933, pp. 413-4
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some committees chose to treat salaried employees as straight­ 
forward class enemies - no better than the bosses. At the Robert 
Krug engineering works the committee asked technical personnel to 
sign a pledge to abide by the decisions of the workers' organisations 
and to recognise the government of People's Commisars. The technicians 
refused to sign it and the committee threatened to hand them over
to a military-revolutionary tribunal for counter-revolutionary
21 activity. The technicians resigned rather than submit. At the
Skorokhod shoe factory on 12 December the committee announced that
whoever is caught making counter-revolutionary 
propaganda against the government of the Council 
of People's Commissars and of the Soviet of 
Workers' Deputies, against any revolutionary 
organisation or against present revolutionary 
tactics, will be handed over immediately by the 
committee for trial by a revolutionary tribunal.
As the economy collapsed around them and as factory committees 
became more obstreperous, capitalists lost the will to carry on. 
Some began to run down their operations, refusing new orders (if 
there were any) and selling off stock, fuel and raw materials. 
Some began to squander their capital or transfer their assets abroad 
Others stopped paying wages, claiming that this was now the res­ 
ponsibility of the government. Frequently factory owners simply 
abandoned the sinking ship. "The owner has vanished" became a 
plaintive cry of factory committees in December 1917. At the
21. Lozovskii, op. cit., p.55.
22. Papernikov, Ya. S., Ocherk po istorii Leningradskogo soyuza 
rabochikh kozhevnikov, L., 1930, p.156.————————————
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Bromley Mill, for instance, almost all the members of the board 
fled to England. At the First Yarn Mill, when the factory committee 
announced that it would henceforth pay management their salaries,
the English directors, who had been at the factory for twenty-five
23 years, decided that it was time to pack their bags and go abroad.
The response of factory committees was to tighten their control; 
their attitude became ever more punitive and, inevitably, excesses 
occurred.
Critics of the factory committees levelled two somewhat contra­ 
dictory charges against them. On the one hand, they were accused 
of having regard only for the interests of their individual factories, 
and of being ready to team up with the employers in order to compete 
against other factories for scarce resources and government 
subsidies. On the other hand, they were accused of having no regard 
for production, and of being obsessed with expropriating the employers 
and with establishing producer communes. Some factory committees, 
particularly in the South of Russia, were no doubt guilty of these 
things, but it would be wrong to imagine that the majority were 
either narrowly self-regarding or deludedly anarchistic. In 
Petrograd most factory committees behaved in a remarkedly responsible 
fashion, in view of the severe economic difficulties.
Instances of factory committee selfishness in the capital were 
few. Occasionally, committees would refuse to share their scarce 
resources with other factories, such as when the shop stewards at
the Metal Works turned down a request for fuel from the Nevskii 
?4shipyard. In a touching act of self-criticism, the committee at
23. Lem'ngradskie tekstilya, 1927, 6-7, p.10.
24. Novyi Put', 6-8, 25 March 1918, p.2.
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the Copper-Rolling works confessed on 8 November that:
until recently the role of the committee 
has been truly lamentable. To a large 
extent, the committee has served as a 
weapon in the hands of the director... 
it went about trying to get orders, fuel, 
materials and resources. It played the 
role of intermediary between management 
and workers and remained silent when energy, 
resources and materials were wasted.25
Such avaricious particularism was rare in Petrograd—in striking 
contrast to the benevolent altruism of the committees in general. 
The tendency towards particularism of another kind, however, viz. 
towards anarchist particularism, was rather more common.
After the October Revolution anarchists began to step up their 
campaign for factory seizures. Golos Truda, the anarcho-syndicalist 
journal, ran an article on 3 November which said:
We affirm that it is not state power which 
needs to be seized, but production, because 
with the seizure of production we destroy 
both capitalism and the state at one blow and 
we will replace both of them with a genuinely 
socialist society, resting on real freedom, 
equality and brotherhood.26
At the Fifth Factory Committee Conference, from 15-16 November, at
27 which about 8% of the delegates were anarchists, the anarchist
Terentiev declared:
25. Venediktov, A.V., ed., Natsionalizatisya promyshlennosti i 
orqanizatsiya sotsialisticheskogo proizvodstva v Retrograde, 
1917-20gg., vol. 1,'L.. 1958, pp. 34-5.———————————
26. Golos Truda, 3 November 1917, p.l.
27. Kanev, S.N., Oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya i krakh anarkhizma, M., 
1974, p.165.
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We must take over both works and factories... 
control is possible only when everything is ours 
and this is impossible so long as there are 
factory owners. The first thing we must do is 
requisition the factories.28
Reven, an anarchist from the Baltic shipyard, continued in the same 
vein: "The Decree on Workers' Control is slowing down the movement.
on
To go forward we must remember that the Decree is not our idol. 1 
These notions proved attractive to some groups of workers. 
In the textile factories of Petrograd, for instance, several 
attempts were made by workers to take over the running of their 
factories. Popular anarchist militants like Troshin, a worker at 
the Kozhevnikovskaya textile mill, Kotov and Kolovich went about 
calling on workers to seize the factories for themselves. At the 
Kersten knitwear factory, where women comprised three-quarters of 
the workforce, the factory committee arrested the manager because 
of his refusal to recognise their spokesman, the mechanic Tseitlin. 
The clerical workers went on strike in protest at this. On 22 
November an anarchist proposed to a general meeting that the workers 
divide up the factory property among themselves. Aleksandra 
Kollontai, who had been sent to speak on behalf of the Bolsheviks, 
managed to dissuade the women from this, but she was unable to dis­ 
suade the committee from trying to run the factory by itself. It 
had no money and though it tried to raise capital out of wage 
deductions and received a small loan from the Vulcan works, it 
was soon forced to abandon its experiment because of financial 
difficulties. The committee called on the Ministry of Labour to
28. Cited by Drobizhev, op. cit., p.115.
29. ibid.
30. Perazich, V. s Tekstili Leningrada v 1917g., L., 1927, p.80
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sequester the factory, but at that point the textileworkers'
union intervened to bring about a reconciliation between the committee
and management, who agreed to recognise Tseitlin. 31
It is crucial not to exaggerate the influence of anarchism 
on the movement for workers' control, however. Factory seizures 
were a rarity in the capital compared to areas like the Donbass 
or Urals, where they were fairly common. According to the judicious 
calculations of V.Z. Drobizhev, only 27 factories in Petrograd 
province were taken from their owners between November and March
1918. On closer inspection, however, -Pew of these take-overs
32. 
turn out to have been inspired by an anarchist desire to be rid of the 005565.
At the Metal Works, where Bolshevik influence was
33 paramount, the October Revolution encouraged the works committee
to extend workers' control in the direction of workers' self-manage­ 
ment. On 22 November the committee set up a workers' directorate, 
consisting of nine workers elected by the workforce, to achieve 
"direct, active participation in the management of production and
of the factory, and liaison with government and private institutions
34 and personnel on an equal basis with the company directors". The
directorate was to sit on all boards in order to "supervise and 
direct" their work. Management lost no time in informing the workers' 
directorate that it would not tolerate such "interference in 
management by outsiders, not responsible for their actions", as this
31. Tkach, 2, December 1917, p.15; Leningradskie tekstilya, 6-7, p.8.
32. Drobizhev, V.Z., Glavnyi shtab sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti, 
M., 1966, p.99.
33. In new elections to the Petrograd Soviet at the beginning of 
December, in which over three-quarters of the Metal workforce 
took part, the Bolsheviks won 71% of the votes, the Left SR's 
21% and the Mensheviks 2%. Potekhin, M.N., Pervyi sovet 
proletarskoi diktatury, L., 1966, p.387.
34 Rahnchii Kontrol' v.prpmysjilennykh predpriyatii Petrograda 
I9'l7-1918gg., VOl. 1, L., 1947,Y pp. 254-5.
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would bring ruin on the firm, which was the property of the directors 
On 1 December management closed the factory, rather than submit and
the workers took over. Hi thin a week, however, the factory was
35 forced to close down: by March only 276 workers were left.
At the Robert Krug engineering works, where 190 workers were 
employed, a general meeting issued the following statement on 12 
December:
Having heard a report from the control com­ 
mission about the conflict which took place 
between the commission and management at a 
meeting on 11 December, when management 
stated clearly and unambiguously that it did 
not recognise the works committee, the control 
commission or the Instructions on Workers' 
Control, and when a management representative, 
(citizen) Lerkhe, clearly hinted at stopping 
production at the factory...the general meeting 
of workers and sluzhashchie has decided:-
1) not to allow such sabotage
2) to avert the final closure of the factory, 
and the unemployment which would ensue from 
this 36
3) to take the factory into its own hands.
This was no wild seizure, for the workers asked that the Factory 
Convention supervise the running of the factory. Self-management
could not negate economic realities, however, and on 9 March 1918
37 the factory closed. The story at the Aivaz works was rather
similar. A control commission, comprising seven workers and four 
sluzhashchie, was set up in December, to counterpose to "the 
uncontrolled, unorganised conduct of the economy by the capitalists", 
"the idea of public control, organisation and regulation of economic
35. Spisok fabrichno-zavodskikh predpriyatii Petrograda, Pg., 1918, p.20
36. Rabochii Kontrol', pp. 279, 283.
37. ibid., p.316; Spisok, p.26.
447
life in the interests of the exploited class". 38 Management refused 
to work under a control commission and on 23 December announced the 
closure of the factory. The factory committee took over the running 
of the enterprise, but closure was only deferred until March. 39
The experience of the committee at the Gofman leather factory, 
which employed about fifty workers, was rather more positive. On 
25 November the committee complained that "the boss has fled and 
left the factory and the workers to the mercy of fate, without 
money and with scarcely any management." The committee successfully 
ran the factory with the help of the district soviet. 40 As in the 
autumn, self-management proved most viable in small factories; at 
a number of small workplaces, including the Kibbel 1 lithography, the 
Kan paper mill, the Berthold press, workers removed the bosses to 
avert closure and ran production themselves. At larger factories 
self-management was a far more difficult proposition, as the examples 
of the Metal, Aivaz and Robert Krug works show. The key consideration
So much
prompting workers to take over the factories was not the desire for 
self-management, as a desire to save their jobs. In some 
cases, workers forced out the old bosses,or took over from them 
after they had abandoned their enterprises, solely in order to 
force the government to nationalise the enterprises. It is very 
important to understand the connection which was made by workers 
between self-management and nationalisation, for it suggests that 
even in cases where workers took over their factories, the pre-
38. Rabochii KontroT, pp. 230-1.
39. Spisok, p.23.
40. Rabochii Kontrol', pp. 230-1.
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dominant motive was not "anarchistic".
The factory connnittees J^J^f-^ar frorn below/
When the Bolsheviks came to power they did not intend to 
nationalise the whole of industry. Their chief aim was to nation­ 
alise the banks so as to give the government some control over the 
financial system. On 14 December the banks were nationalised by 
the simple expedient of sending commissars and Latvian riflemen 
to the 24 private banks in Petrograd and forcing the cashiers to 
hand over the keys to their desks and to the vaults. There was 
no clear policy regarding the nationalisation of industry. Lenin 
hoped that it would be possible to operate some form of 'state 
capitalism 1 , in which private capital would function under workers' 
control and the benign direction of the government, but he was 
unclear about its significance. Sometimes he talked about "state 
capitalism in our conditions as the greatest progress" (on one 
occasion going so far as to say that "even under Kerensky state 
capitalism would be a huge step forward"); at other times, he 
talked mysteriously about "teaching socialism to the organisers 
of trusts". On this question, as on many others, it was the Left 
Communists who were the more theoretically cogent. Bukharin 
demolished Lenin's notion of 'state capitalism 1 ("a nonsense, a 
half-baked idea") in an article in Kommunist, in which he argued 
that state capitalism meant the "dictatorship of finance capital" 
and that "a proletarian-peasant dictatorship which does not entail 
the expropriation of the expropriators, which does not eliminate 
the power of capital in the works and factories, can only be a
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41 temporary phenomenon". V.S.N.Kh. was something of a compromise
between these two positions: in line with Lenin's notion of state 
capitalism, it aimed to set up state-controlled trusts, on the 
boards (glavki) of which would sit government and trade-union 
representatives to oversee the operations of private and state- 
owned factories; in line with the Left Communists, it envisaged 
some provision for limited nationalisation. Nevertheless in 
December 1917, when V.S.N.Kh. was set up, there was no intention of 
moving quickly towards nationalisation. In the event, action by 
workers at the grass roots forced this on the government.
Up to October demands by workers in Petrograd for nationalisation 
were very infrequent - probably because the government already 
owned key sectors of industry. After October, industrial dislocation, 
together with acute class struggle, caused some factory committees 
to oust their managements and to demand that the government 
'sequestrate 1 (i.e. appoint a board of management) or 'nationalise' 
(i.e. take into full state ownership) their factories. A grass 
roots movement in favour of nationalisation began to develop. At 
the Sixth (and last) Conference of Petrograd Factory Committees on 
25 January, the Bolshevik, M.N. Zhivotov, reported that "a number
i
of declarations are coming from factory committees about the need 
to transfer enterprises into the hands of the workers and thus, 
unexpectedly, the practical question of nationalising production 
arises".
Milyutin observed some time later that:
41. Kommunist, 3, 16 May 1918; Carr, E.H., The Bolshevik Revolution, 
vol. 2, Pelican edn. 1966, pp. 83-88; 95-105.
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the process of nationalisation went on from 
below and the Soviet leaders could not keep 
up with it, could not take things in hand, 
in spite of the fact that many orders were 
issued which forbade local organisations to 
enact nationalisations by themselves.42
He remarked that many of these local 'nationalisations' had a 
punitive character. In order to punish factory owners for their 
contumacy, factory committees either alone, or with the help of 
a local soviet or sovnarkhoz, chose to expropriate them. Of 
836 warrants issued to dispossess factory owners between November 
and March, 77% were issued by local bodies - eloquent testimony
to the fact that the pressure towards nationalisation came from
44 below. In Petrograd these grass roots nationalisations were not
as common as in the provinces. The government agreed to nationalise 
the huge factories of the capital which were already state-controlled 
but not state-owned, such as the Nevskii shipyard, the Putilov 
works and the Franco-Russian works, but it was also forced in the 
winter and spring to nationalise a handful of small enterprises, 
which it felt were economically important. These included the 
Military-Horseshoe Factory (formerly Posse! 1 ), the Puzyrev and
Russo-Baltic automobile works, the Leman letter-foundry, the
45 Armature Works and two small engine-repair shops.
At the Sixth Conference of Factory Committees, the link 
between nationalisation and workers' self-management was expressly
42. Milyutin, V.P., Sovetskoe ekonpmicheskoe razvitie Rossii v 
diktature proletariata, M., 1918, p.85.




made. The resolution passed by the conference demanded:
all factories, works and mines whose owners 
do not recognise workers' control, who are 
overtly engaged in sabotage, who no longer 
wish to continue production in the enter­ 
prises and are not concerned to guarantee the 
conditions of production in the enterprises, 
must immediately be transferred into the 
ownership of the proletarian Republic.
Starting from the premise that "the political power (vlast 1 ) of 
the proletariat can only be real power under conditions of its 
economic rule (gospodstovo)", the resolution went on to link the 
call for nationalisation to a demand for self-management:
In view of the fact that the supreme government 
bodies have no special organs capable of 
running the enterprises transferred into owner­ 
ship of the republic, and in view of the fact 
that the government of workers, soldiers and 
peasants is strong only so long as it rests on 
the trust of the toilers and their organisations, 
in all cases of nationalisation, the workers' 
committees should be put in charge of the enterprises 
in the localities and should work under the 
direction of V.S.N.Kh.47
The resolution was passed unanimously, with six abstentions, which
48 included the six anarcho-syndicalist delegates at the conference.
V.S.N.Kh. turned down the proposal, but it was unable to stop 
factory committees from 'nationalising' their own enterprises and 
presenting the government with a fait accompli. From April on­ 
wards, the government began to face up to the fact that it must 
centrally coordinate the wave of local 'nationalisations'. On 23




June 1918 it changed gear decisively when it nationalised the
metal and metallurgical industries - followed later by textiles,
49 chemicals, electrical and leather industries.
Economic Catastrophe and the Dissolution of the Proletariat
The radicalisation of workers' control is usually considered 
to be a major cause of spiralling chaos in the economy. In fact 
it was less of a cause and more of a response to that chaos - 
which had its roots in the whole system of war capitalism. The 
crisis of Petrograd industry, which had been building up since 
summer, came to a head in December and January when the war came to 
an end. The moment the Bolsheviks sued for peace, the bottom fell 
out of the economy. Narkomtrud (the People's Commissariat of Labour) 
had begun in December to draw up plans for the orderly demobilis­ 
ation of the war industries and for the evacuation of all those 
who would lose their jobs as a consequence of the run-down of 
armaments production. It envisaged that experienced, skilled 
workers would remain as a small nucleus within the demobilised 
factories to oversee the transfer to civilian production. The 
majority of less experienced workers would be encouraged to leave 
Petrograd, the Labour Exchange paying their travelling expenses. 
In the event, nothing came of these plans. The shut-down of 
factories and the axeing of the workforce took place in a totally 
unplanned, chaotic fashion. In the New Year the plight of thousands
49. Carr, E.H., The Bolshevik Revolution, p.104.
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of workers, facing the loss of their jobs, was suddenly compounded 
by a cut in the bread ration and the prospect of a German invasion 
of Petrograd. On 27 January the bread ration was reduced to
150 grams per day, on 14 February to 100 grams and on 28 February
50 to 50 grams. Mass starvation was setting in. This, together
with the imagined horrors of a German occupation, induced panic 
in the population and an exodus from the capital. Those who had 
ties with the countryside hurried back to their native villages 
in the hope of qualifying for some of the land that was being dis­ 
tributed. Others, dismissed from their jobs, set off from the
capital in the hope of finding food. In the first six months of
51 1918 over a million people fled from the capital.
Within a matter of months the proletariat of Red Petrograd, 
renowned throughout Russia for its outstanding role in the revolution, 
was decimated. By April 1918 the factory workforce of the capital
had plummeted to about 40% of its January 1917 level, and thereafter
52 it shrank still further. The branches of industry which suffered
most were those producing directly for the war effort - metalworking 
and engineering, shipbuilding, chemicals, woodworking. In the 
metal factories of Petrograd province, which employed more than a
hundred workers, the workforce slumped from 197,686 on 1 January
53 to 57,995 on 1 May. Less severely affected were light industries,
such as textiles, food, paper and printing. Big factories suffered 
more than small factories: private metal works suffered more than
50. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, 1919, p.35.
51 Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue 1, Pg., 
1918, p.19.
52. ibid., p.18.
53. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 5, Pg., 1919, p.33.
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state-owned metal works. Those factories which had expanded most
dramatically during the war, contracted most dramatically when the
54 war ended. On 28 February 1918 the huge Triangle rubber works
closed down: within a matter of weeks only 756 of its 15,000
55 staff remained.
Soviet historians, such as Drobizhev and Vdovin, argue that it 
was the less experienced, less proletarianised workers who left 
Petrograd, leaving a nucleus of 'cadre' workers more or less in­ 
tact. The exiguous evidence does not bear this out. It is 
true that of those who applied to the Central Commission for the 
Evacuation of Petrograd (later to the City Labour Exchange) for
travelling expenses to leave the capital, no less than 53% were
57 chernorabochie. However only a small proportion of those who
left the city claimed travelling expenses and these were most 
likely to have been the worst-off workers i.e. precisely the un­ 
skilled. Women workers were actually less harshly affected by de­ 
mobilisation than male workers, since they were concentrated in 
light industry. Other evidence suggests that the process of de­ 
mobilisation was so cataclysmic, that skilled as well as unskilled 
workers were affected and that many proletarianised workers departed 
for the countryside in search of food, even though their ties to
CO
rural society were extremely attenuated. One must not forget
54. ibid., p.43.
55. Krasnyi Treugol'nik na putyakh oktyabrya, L., 1927, p.19.
56. Vdovin, A.I. and Drobizhev, V.Z., Rost rabochego klassa SSSR, 
1917-40gg., M., 1976, p.77.
57. Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, p.38.
58. This was the view of Gilbert, M.I., 'K voprosu o sostave
promyshlennykh rabochikh SSSR v gody grazhdanskoi voiny', Istoriya 
proletariata SSSR, 1934, no. 3 and 1935, no. 1; and also of the 
Left SR 1.2. Steinberg, Znamya Truda, 213, 16 May 1918, p.l.
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finally, that a large number of the most revolutionary workers 
left the factories of the capital in order to spread the gospel 
of revolution. Young workers, fired by revolutionary elan and 
without family commitments, were among the first to volunteer to 
serve in the food detachments, the Red Army9 or government and party 
agencies. Over half of those who claimed evacuation expenses were 
single men, and by April, the proportion of youths in the factory 
workforce had dropped to a third of the level of the previous year. 59
The economic chaos which was engulfing Russia, the staggering 
rise in enemployment and the dearth of food gave rise to violent 
disenchantment in sections of the working class. Calls to 'smash 1 , 
'bring down' or 'occupy 1 evoked a warm response amongst some. In 
February, for example, the government warned factory committees to 
be ready to destroy machinery in case of Germans actually invading 
Petrograd. This precipitated an orgy of machine-breaking in a few 
factories, in spite of the fact that the Germans came no nearer 
than Pskov. This destructive, negative feeling found expression 
in conflicts between employed and unemployed workers, in attacks 
on skilled workers and even in pogroms. At the Metal Works, where 
conflict between skilled and unskilled workers had been an ongoing
problem, chernorabochie beat up union delegates after mass redun-
fin 
dancies were announced. At the Siemens-Schuckert works 7,000
workers, who had been made redundant, threatened violence to those 
who had kept their jobs. On 17 April at the Obukhov works un­ 
employed workers picketed the factory to prevent workers from entering
59. Matieraly po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, issue 1, p.18 
Materialy po statistike truda, issue 6, p.36.
60. Kleinbort, L.M., Istoriya bezrabotitsy v Rossii, 1857-1919, 
M., 1925, p.288.
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A meeting of unemployed workers from Vyborg district issued a 
declaration under the signature of "the party of the unemployed", 
which proclaimed: "the people have now come to understand the dirty 
deeds of the Yids. Jews have settled on all the councils. We
c i
suggest that they leave Petrograd within three days". Parallel 
to these elemental, destructive moods went a growth of apathy in 
certain quarters. Disillusionment with politics was a phenomenon 
noted by all parties, including even the Mensheviks, whose fortunes 
in general waxed as a result of deepening economic crisis and con­ 
comitant disaffection with the Bolsheviks. In the internal 
Menshevik party newspaper a member noted:
the growth of political indifferentism, 
expressed in poor attendance at meetings 
and lectures, which is typical of all working- 
class political parties, including the 
ruling party...notwithstanding the fact 
that considerations of a careerist kind 
ought to encourage many to go along to 
Bolshevik party meetings.62
In spite of this complaint, however, Mensheviks and SR's did manage 
to benefit from the growth of discontent towards the Bolsheviks.
The right-wing socialist parties, battered but unbowed, were 
quick to exploit the many discontents which arose as a result of 
the demobilisation of the war industries. They began to agitate 
among the unemployed, but the main thrust of their work was directed 
towards getting factories to elect deputies to a city-wide body 
which they hoped would act as a counter-weight to the Petrograd 
Svoiet, and ultimately displace it. In early March, 150 delegates 
from factories in the Rozhdestvenskii district met to discuss un-
61. ibid., pp. 288-9.
62. Partiinye Izvestiya, 1-2, 5 March 1918, p.27.
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employment and the peace of Brest-Litovsk and expressed support 
for the idea of an Emergency Meeting of Deputies:
The Soviets have become diplomatic chancelleries, 
ministries, judicial courts, police departments 
for the workers' and peasants' government, but 
have ceased to be the political representatives 
of the proletariat. The state officials of the 
soviet have dug themselves in and declared 
new elections illegal.
On 7 March general meetings of workers at the Maxwell textile 
mill and Nevskii shipyard agreed to send delegates to the Emergency 
Meeting being called by the Mensheviks. The engine works of the 
Nikolaev railway elected four delegates to the meeting, and workers 
in the carriage shops of the same line agreed that "so long as 
the Bolshevik government continues, nothing can be put right". 64 
At the Pipe Works demobilisation caused the workers to call the 
Bolshevik politicians "cheats" and party members were not allowed 
to speak at factory meetings. At the Putilov works seven of the 
shops agreed to take part in the Emergency Meeting i.e. about 2,000 
out of the 13,000 workers left at the factory. N.N. Glebov's 
independent workers' group gained ground, announcing:
We declare honestly and unequivocally that 
we have lost all faith in elites (verkham) 
and believe that the salvation of the working 
class can only lie in the self-activity of 
the workers. 65
63. Den 1 , 6, 31(18) March 1918, p.7.
64. Partiinye Izvestiya, 4, 13 March 1918, p.8.
65. Krasnaya Letopis', 1928, no. 3, p.153; Den 1 , 5, 30(17) March 
1918, p.4. —— '
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On 4 April workers in Number One district of the Putilov works 
condemned attempts by the government to stop the Emergency Meetings 
from taking place and to denigrate them as 'counter-revolutionary':
We declare that there is no counter­ 
revolution in working-class circles. 
We are sufficiently mature and class- 
conscious to defend out class interests 
as toilers by our own efforts.66
On 12 April the first general meeting was held at Putilov for 
two months and a large minority castigated the works committee for 
not satisfying the demands of the workers, although they were 
constantly heckled and booed.
The Emergency Meeting of Deputies met for the first time in 
mid-March. Deputies were sent from all the largest factories, 
including the Putilov, Obukhov, Metal, Pipe, Cartridge, Okhta and 
Izhorsk works. According to Menshevik claims, some 52 factories 
sent deputies. Of 110 who answered a questionnaire, 42 were members 
of no political party, 35 were Mensheviks, 33 SR's and one a
CO
Popular Socialist. The Meetings discussed the burning economic 
issues of unemployment and food shortages, but, above all, the 
growing lack of democracy in the Soviets, factory committees and 
trade unions. Deputies complained that factory committees were 
refusing to submit to reelection, that they were behaving like the 
old managers. Others complained that the unions no longer defended 
the workers, being solely concerned with productivity. The Soviets
66. Den_^, 12, 7 April (25 March) 1918, p.4.
67. Novyi Den 1 , 20, 17(4) April 1918, p.4.
68. Den 1 , 7, 2 April (20 March) 1918, p.2.
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were denounced as bureaucratic agencies of government; the Bolsheviks 
as opportunists and careerists, who maintained their power through 
the use of bayonets rather than through popular support. 69 The 
Meetings continued through April, but the movement lost momentum in 
May. The failure of the attempt to organise a one-day strike 
against the Bolshevik government on 2 July led to the collapse 
of the Meetings. 70
The Emergency Meetings were the chief sign of growing working- 
class opposition to the Bolsehviks, which was the result of un­ 
employment, food shortages and the manipulation of popular organ­ 
isations by the party. This increasing hostility was cause for 
concern to party leaders. Kollontai bewailed the fact that:
The absorption of the most active party 
workers in government affairs of a technical- 
bureaucratic and narrowly-commissarial 
character has caused a pronounced rift between 
former party activists and the masses. The 
mass of women workers naively expected a sharp 
change in their life and situation the day after 
the October Revolution and are now losing patience. 
Those who should explain the position, who 
should support them in their hour of need, 
have been drawn into other work, setting up 
the state apparatus. And there is always hunger/
Ivan Turunen wrote from the Putilov works:
We have thrown all our best worker-revolutionaries 
to the Front and have left the partly class- 
conscious workers to the mercy of enemies of the 
revolution and opponents of soviet power.72
69. Some of the proceedings of these emergency meetings were re- 
published by A. Solzhenitsyn in Kontinent, 1975, no. 2, see 
especially pp. 389-91.
70. Vestnik professional'nykh soyuzov, 2, 15 July 1918, p.17;
Shelavin, K.I., 'Men'sheviki i revolyutsiya 1 , Krasnaya Letopis 1 2 (41) 1931, p,20. ————————c——
71. Kollontai, A., Rabotnitsa za god revolyutsii, Pg., 1918, pp. 18-19.
72. Petrogradskaya Pravda, 59, 27(14) March 1918.
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The disillusionment with the Bolsheviks expressed itself in a 
reaction against the party at elections. In late March in soviet 
elections at the Putilov forge Bolshevik candidates each received 
an average of 75 votes, compared to the SR's average of 229. 73 
At the Artillery Depot the SR's got 110 votes, the Bolsheviks
91 votes, non-party candidates 77 and Left SR's 13 votes in new
74 soviet elections. On 10 April 9,699 printers elected a new
board to the Petrograd union; the Bolsheviks got 36% of the votes
75 compared to 64% for the Menshevik/SR/Unemployed list. Not
surprisingly, in view of these results, the Bolsheviks were none 
too keen on allowing elections at this time. At the Pipe Works 
general meetings four times demanded fresh elections to the works
committees, but the committee turned down the demands. Similar
7fi 
demands at the Nobel and Old Lessner works were ignored. At
the Langenzippen works the committee refused to hold new elections 
until production was back to normal. Workers invaded the works 
committee office, but the Petrograd Soviet supported the ban on 
new elections. At the Cartridge Works the factory committee 
refused to allow a meeting to demand new elections to take place. 
The Emergency Meeting of Delegates deplored this action as sympto­ 
matic of:
73. Novyi Den 1 , 15, 11 April (29 March) 1918, p.4.
74. Novyi Den 1 , 13, 9 April (27 March) 1918, p.4.
75. Novyi Den 1 , 26, 24(11) April 1918, p.4.
76. Kontinent, 1975, 2, pp. 389-90.
77. Novaya Zhizn 1 , 60, 23 March 1918, p.4.
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the system of terror, violence and tyranny 
in which one section of the workers has 
become a tool of the service of the govern­ 
ment, bringing discord and demoralisation 
into the ranks of the working class and 
ultimately disorganising and weakening it.
One should beware of exaggerating the extent of working-class 
opposition to the Bolshevik government,and thus of the extent to 
which the Bolsheviks were compelled to rely on force rather than 
popular consent. One of the major reasons why the Mensheviks and 
SR's were able to turn economic discontent an an anti-Bolshevik 
direction was, as Kollontai and the worker Turunen both pointed 
out, because the Bolsheviks had lost most of their activists in 
the factories. In the autumn of 1917 there had been around 43,000 
members of the party in Petrograd, two-thirds of whom were workers
active at the grass roots in winning their workmates to Bolshevik
79 policies. A year later, only 3,599 people responded to a survey
of all Petrograd party members by the Central Committee. This 
suggests that the membership had plummeted to about a tenth of its 
size a year previously, owing to unemployment, the disbandment of 
the garrison and^especially^ to the exit of workers into the Red 
Army and government and party organs. The party remained, however, 
overwhelmingly proletarian: 81.5% of members in September 1918 were 
workers (55.4% of whom were metalworkers); only 18% were sluzhashchie 
or intelligentsia. 90% of members were male^and although women now
78. Novyi Den 1 , 16, 12 April (30 March) 1918, p.4.
79. Stepanov, Z.V., Rabochie Petrograda v period podgotovki i
provedeniya oktyabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniya, M.L., 1965, 
pp. 28-9:
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comprised about 40% of the industrial labour force of Petrograd, 
only 7% of worker-members were women. Almost a third of the 
membership were aged 25 or under, and 90% were under 40. Most 
were recent recruits: 47% had joined the party in 1917 and a further 
34% in 1918; 10% had joined from other political parties. A mere 
6.5% of members had secondary education and a tiny 0.8% had higher 
education. This was thus a party which had lost its experienced 
membership and which consisted overwhelmingly of young male workers 
new to politics.
Notwithstanding this stupendous loss of 'cadres', the Bolsheviks 
were never seriously threatened by the swing to the Mensheviks 
and SR's. They had built up enormous reserves of working-class 
support in 1917, which were not easily squandered. Conversely, 
the Mensheviks and SR's could not easily overcome the deep antipathy 
which they had earned because of their role in conciliating the 
Kerensky government. The swing to the moderate socialists was 
definitely a minority phenomenon, affecting, as we have seen, about 
a fifth of workers at the Putilov works. On 7 April 1918 
Bolshevik workers wrote to Petrogradskaya Pravda, describing the 
mood of workers in the different districts of the capital. A worker 
from the Vyborg district wrote:
The large factories are at a standstill... 
Many new members are enrolling in our party. 
There is a big stream of recruits into the 
Red Army. There is discontentment with the 
food difficulties and unemployment, but it 
is not directed against the soviet government.
80. Statistika Truda, 1-4, 1919, pp. 14-15.
81. Petrogradskaya Pravda, 68, 7 April 1918.
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In Moscow district a writer reported:
In individual factories there are internal 
misunderstandings of various kinds...Against 
the Soviet government as such, however, there 
is not only no hostility, but full recognition 
and direct communication.82
1.2. Steinberg, the Left SR critic of the Bolsheviks, concluded 
an article on the Emergency Meeting of Deputies by saying that 
they were not representative of the whole of the working class and
oo
that support for the soviet system was still the norm. Perhaps 
the most telling proof of the limited influence of the Mensheviks 
and SR's lay in their failure to organise a one-day strike. 
Grievances to fuel a strike were plenty, but the Bolsheviks success­ 
fully managed to mobilise working-class opinion against the proposal
The Labour Organisations and the Crisis of Labour Discipline
As unemployment and starvation pulverised the working class, 
the problem of labour discipline grew ever worse^and it was to this 
problem that the labour organisations addressed themselves in early 
1918. He saw that from their inception factory committees took 
an active interest in labour discipline and productivity. Central 
to the practice of the labour movement as a whole was a dialectic 
between democracy and discipline. After October the democratic 
impulse drove the factory committees towards self-management, whilst 
the disciplinary impulse encouraged the committees and unions towards
82. ibid.
83. Znamya Truda, 213, 16 May 1918, p.l.
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active participation in building a centralised economic apparatus 
and in raising the level of the productive forces.
It is no exaggeration to say that there was an almost total 
breakdown of work discipline by the time the Bolsheviks came to 
power. How to keep workers working was a problem which neither 
factory committees nor trade unions could ignore and it was a major 
topic of discussion at a joint conference of factory committees 
and trade unions in the metal industry which took place on 18 
November. A delegate from the small Karsak works bewailed the 
situation in the following terms:
We really need strict discipline. When you 
tell workers that the interests of industry 
are far from coinciding with the interests 
of the industrialists, but with the interests 
of the workers, the workers say: 'But what's 
in it for us? Give us a rise. The bosses are 
getting rich, so give us a decent wage. 1 Some 
of them suppose that because Lenin is in power, 
rivers of gold will begin to flow. Yet without 
the activity of the masses, it is impossible 
to resolve the crisis. The masses must show 
greater self-sacrifice.84
The delegate from the Cable works, Zolotnikov, took up this lament­ 
ation:
The masses do not want discipline and say that 
there is no freedom. At our place they work only 
two days a week and for the rest of the time 
are paid two-thirds the basic rate according to 
the tariff agreement. We (i.e. the committee) 
proposed that we use the spare time to work on 
transport, but the workers wouldn't agree, 
preferring to receive payment for stoppages. 
To our entreaties, they replied that we were in 
league with the Society of Factory and Works Owners. 
The masses demand only wage rises and do not under­ 
stand that they themselves now bear responsibility 
for the fate of the country.




Other delegates agreed with this analysis but pointed out that it 
was hunger, rather than selfishness, which was causing workers to 
refuse to work.
The conference passed the following resolution by nearly 200 
votes to 4, with 13 abstentions:
Conference considers inadmissible the arbitrary 
violation of decisions taken by the responsible 
organisations of the working class and by the 
trade unions and calls on comrades in the 
localities to firmly restrain the masses from 
all actions contradicting the decrees of the 
leading organs of the union. Every breach of 
organised discipline is a violation of the will 
of the organised workers and puts the violator 
outside the protection and defence of the 
organisation. Conference decrees that a serious 
breach of discipline will entail exclusion from 
the union and dismissal from the factory.86
An insight into how workers were breaching discipline is 
provided by the situation at the Putilov works in the winter of 
1917. The overthrow of the Kerensky government prompted the works 
committee to issue a proclamation warning the Putilovtsy against 
excesses:
Comrades, we are living through the days of a 
great proletarian-peasant revolution and this 
obliges each of us to concentrate all our men­ 
tal and physical energies on iron discipline 
in order to oppose the intrigues of our enemy. 
If in normal times organisation, solidarity 
and inner discipline are as necessary as the air 
we breathe, then in these days, powerful demo­ 
cratic principles must be strengthened tenfold.
We need discipline of mind and will-power since 
this can overcome all obstacles and will serve 
as a powerful binding force in all our organised 
work. The freedom we have won is the greatest 
blessing, but to win it is one thing and to use 
it is another. Above all, freedom obliges each 
of us to inculcate self-discipline and order in
86. ibid., p.142.
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our intellectual and emotional (volevykh) 
behaviour. Freedom and civic duty demand of 
us that whenever necessary, without wavering 
or hesitation, we subordinate our personal 
interests (which, in any case, have now lost 
all significance) to the general good of the 
people.
Regretfully, among comrades there are some 
(not many, it is true) who understand freedom 
as licence for their desires, as unruliness, 
and this always harms the general affairs of 
the working class. So it is the duty of every 
comrade to curb and prevent the emergence of 
licentiousness and unruliness.87
Alas, it was not easy to persuade workers whose lives were being 
racked by soaring inflation, unemployment and food shortages, to 
remain calm and cool. In the middle of November, the administration 
boycotted the factory in protest against the activities of the works 
committee and the engineers went on strike. Some 12,000 workers 
stayed away from work because there was nothing for them to do. 
When the works committee managed to secure sixty wagon!oads of coal 
from the Donbass through a 'pusher'^it called on the absentee-workers 
to come to the factory to unload the coal. Only two workers 
turned up for work; the rest did not bother, since they were already 
receiving two-thirds their normal pay for being laid off. The 
works committee decided to take drastic measures by sacking persistent
absentees and by cutting off the pay of skilled and semi-skilled
88 workers who refused to do unskilled jobs. Such harsh measures
could do little to attenuate the basic problem, however, which 
was that there were no orders to fulfil at the factory? even 
if there had been, there were no fuel or raw materials to carry
87. Gaza, 1.1., Putilovets na putyakh k oktyabryu, M.L., 1933,
pp. 117-18. He wrongly states that this warning was issued in 
early December; in fact it dates from 31 October 1917.
88. Gaza, Putilovets v trekh revolyutsiyakh, pp. 428-9.
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them out. Moreover the problem was not simply that workers 
were unwilling to work, but that they frequently were unable to, 
owing to their drastically deteriorating diet. Rocketing prices 
and severe food shortages made low-paid workers ever more desperate 
By December wildcat strikes and the carting-out of members of 
management had once again become widespread at Putilov.
At the beginning of December the workers' section of the 
Petrograd Soviet issued the following plea:
The working class is taking a gigantic step 
towards socialism by taking control of the 
economy into its own hands. Consequently, 
the working class bears great responsibility 
for the fate of the economy, which is in a 
catastrophic state. The proletariat must 
make every effort to overcome economic chaos 
and industrial ruin. This is possible only 
on condition that iron proletarian discipline 
is maintained, for only this will allow the 
working class to close ranks and strengthen 
the gains of the proletarian-peasant revolution 
and thus deal a shattering blow to capital and 
raise the banner of socialism.89
Labour discipline grew steadily worse in the spring of 1918, 
as factories closed their gates and trains left the capital crammed 
with workers. Bolshevik labour leaders were caught on the horns of 
a dilemma: could they restore labour discipline without resorting 
to capitalist methods? Larin argued that even the most draconian 
sanctions against workers would make little difference to falling 
labour productivity, since this was due to starvation rather than
indiscipline. He called for higher wages and greater workers'
QO control. Yet the exchequer was bankrupt and workers' control was
89. Znamya Truda, 90, 8 December 1917, p.4.
90. Lur'e, M., Trudovaya povinnost' i rabochii kontrol', Pg., 
1918, p.9.
468
tending towards atomisation of the productive system. A survey 
of 27 factories in Petrograd by the Bolshevik economist, S.G. 
Strumilin, lent support to Larin's diagnosis. He calculated that 
nearly half the fall in labour productivity was due to sheer
physical exhaustion of the workers and only 21% to the decay of
91 discipline and motivation. Most trade union leaders, however,
felt that the breakdown of labour discipline reflected a change 
for the worse in workers' attitudes.
In a speech to the CEC of the Soviets on 20 March Shlyapnikov, 
the Commissar of Labour, painted a gloomy picture of Moscow railways, 
where workers were refusing to repair or drive trains now that 
their wages were guaranteed, and of Petrograd factories, where 
efforts by factory committees to improve productivity had led to 
their being dissolved and replaced by representatives more compliant 
with the wishes of the rank-and-file. He argued that the only 
solution to the crisis of labour discipline was the abolition of 
the guaranteed wage and the revival of piece rates. This speech 
marked a turning-point, for it announced a decree which centralised 
management on the railways, restored the power of individual ad­ 
ministrators and granted 'dictatorial' powers to the Commissariat
92 of Communications. On 2 April the ARCTU declared that "one of
the major causes of the fall in labour productivity is...the lack
of any kind of production discipline". It proposed the reintroduction
of piece rates, guaranteed norms of output, bonuses and work books
91. Strumi1in, S.G., Problemy ekonomiki truda, Izbrannye jDrpizyedeniya, 
vol. 3, M., 1964, p.361.
92. Carr, E.H., The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 2, p.395.
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in which workers would record their individual productivity. 
Workers who did not fulfil output norms for three days running 
would be transferred to a lower cateogry, and if they continued
no
to work below par would be dismissed. The ARCTU also proposed 
sanctions against lateness for work and against meetings during 
working hours and called on the factory committees to enforce these.
A few weeks later the metal union spoke of "the complete indifference
94 on the part ofthe mass of workers...to the development of production".
It proposed the reintroduction of piece rates and guaranteed norms 
of output, together with the restoration of technical specialists 
and administrative personnel.
There was opposition to these proposals from Left Communists 
and from leading trade unionists such as Ryazanov, but they had the 
backing of Lenin, who was particularly keen to see the revival of 
one-man management. The early summer of 1918 saw the widespread 
implementation of guaranteed norms of outputs, bonus incentives and 
the 48-hour week. More controversially, the guaranteed wage was 
abolished, wage differentials were widened and piece rates were 
revived. The attempt to restore one-man management was begun but
took much longer to achieve. Finally, in some factories, production
95 was reorganised on Taylorist lines.
Although it was the trade unions which spearheaded the drive to 
increase labour discipline and productivity, the factory committees 
also played their part in the battle to increase output. This had 
always been a concern of the committees, but now it came to take
93. Vestnik professional'nykh soyuzov, 1, 4 May 1918, p.18.
94. Metal list, 5, 22 May 1918, p.9.
95 Vestnik professional'nykh soyuzov, 1, p.18 and no. 2, 15 July
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precedence over their other concerns. Over the summer of 1918 
the drive to transform relations of production in the enterprise 
was overtaken by the drive for greater productivity. Nationalisation 
was used as the excuse to end attempts to establish workers' power 
at the point of production. The factory committees' functions were 
redefined in terms of upholding labour discipline and of passive 
supervisory 'control'.
It is too simple to say that the movement for workers' self- 
management was crushed in an effort to raise the level of productive 
forces. From the first, the factory committees interested themselves 
in both productivity and self-management, but the conditions for 
self-management were not favourable and so the factory committees 
themselves consented to the prioritisation of productivity. 
Moreover it is too simple to see a straightforward 'bureaucrat!sation' 
of the factory committees i.e. the decay of the committees as 
democratic organs of the working class and their transformation into 
agencies of the state. From the first, 'bureaucratic' tendencies 
had coexisted within the committees alongside democratic tendencies. 
At the very time when the committees were most active in fighting 
for workers' self-management complaints could be heard that individual 
committees were behaving in a bureaucratic fashion. As early as 
autumn 1917, a woman from the Nevka cotton-spinning mill, where 
92% of the workforce were women, complained of the behaviour of the 
overwhelmingly male factory committee:
96. See, for example, the decree of the Council of Trade Unions of 
the Northern Oblast' of late 1918 (Rabochii Kontrol', pp. 457-8) 
ortheARCTU decree of August 1918 cited by Pankratova op. cit., 
pp. 268-8. It should not be assumed that the more radical style 
of control died the death in 1918. Attempts continued through 
the Civil War to establish such control, not only by the factory 
committees but by some sovnarkhozy and even trade unions. See 
Bor'yan, B., 'Rabochii Kontrol' I"yl7-21', Vestnik Truda, 1921, 
10-11, p.28.
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They (the male factory committee members - 
SAS) have done a lot to organise the dark 
mass, but now reveal a desire to concentrate 
all power in their hands. They are beginning 
to boss their backward comrades, to act with­ 
out accountability...They deal with the workers 
roughly, haughtily, using expressions like 
'To the devil's mother with you!'97
Later a leather-worker from the Osipov saddle factory wrote to the 
1eatherworkers' newspaper:
...often members of the committees gradually 
become cut off from the masses, they become 
alienated from them and lose their confidence. 
Quite often the masses blame them for becoming 
autocrats, for taking no account of the mood 
of the majority of workers, for being too 
conciliatory (soglashatel'stvo). This, it is 
true, is explained by the peculiar conditions 
of the present time, by the acerbity (ozloblennost 1 ) 
of the masses, by their low level of culture; 
but sometimes the factory committee members 
themselves provoke such a reaction by their be­ 
haviour. They get on their high horse and pay 
scant attention to the voice of the workers. 
Sometimes they show little enthusiasm or do very 
little and this causes discontent among the masses.
As we have seen, complaints about the bureaucratic behaviour 
of the committees increased in early 1918. The above quotations focus 
on the personal behaviour of factory committee members who were 
abusing their authority, but it was not the corrupting effects of 
power which was the main problem. After October the factory committees 
became less accountable to their members because they felt themselves 
to be now also accountable to the soviet state. Most factory 
committee leaders sincerely believed that the policies of the Bolshevik 
government were in the interests of the working class, but it was
97. Rabotnitsa, 11, 18 October 1917, p.15.
98. Golos Kozhevnika, 6-7, 25 January 1918, p.18.
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not always easy to persuade the workers that this was so. Efforts 
by the committees to strengthen labour discipline at a time when 
redundancies and starvation were ravaging working-class life 
proved particularly unpopular. The committees thus exploited the 
degree of autonomy of their constituents which they enjoyed, as 
representative organs, in order to resist what they regarded as 
dangerous demands from the shop-floor, threatening the security 
of the revolution. From the beginning of 1918, they began to by­ 
pass democratic practices when these seemed to conflict with higher 
goals. Thus bureaucratic impulses began to overcome democratic 
impulses, but the victory of the former was by no means guaranteed 
at the point where we break off our story.
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'CONCLUSION
We saw in chapter 1 that, contrary to the Soviet stereotype, 
the industrial working class of Petrograd constituted a complex, 
highly differentiated social group, distinct from the working class 
of other countries in its economic, political and cultural formation 
This working class came into existence extremely rapidly in con­ 
ditions of modern large-scale production. It lacked artisanal 
traditions and was recruited, in the main, direct from the peasantry, 
It possessed distinct 'peasant' characteristics and fused peasant 
grievances with working-class grievances. It was a working class 
which experienced all the horrors of early industrialisation, but 
in the particular political context of tsarist absolutism. It thus 
grew up acutely aware of the importance of the political question, 
strongly influenced by socialist ideas, largely impervious to re­ 
formist, economistic or craft ideologies. Within itself, the 
working class reflected the combined and uneven development charac­ 
teristic of Russian society as a whole. The working class was 
differentiated by degree of proletarianisation, skill, sex, age and 
education. Broadly, however, one can discern two groups in the 
labour force of Petrograd in 1917: the first consisted of fully- 
proletarianised, ski lied,male workers, who made up about 40% of 
the workforce (they were 'cadre 1 workers rather than a 'labour 
aristocracy 1 ); the second consisted of peasants, women and young
1. Zelni .k, R., 'Russian Workers and the Revolutionary Movement 1 , 
Journal of Social History, 1972-3, vol. 6, no. 2' Haimson, L., 
'The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-17', Slavic 
Review, 23, no. 4, 1964 and 24, no. 1, 1965.
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workers, who made up about 60% of the workforce. The two groups 
are symbolised by the metalworker and the textileworker, respectively, 
As early as the 1880's, contemporaries had discussed the two social 
types and speculated on the revolutionary potential of each. For 
Plekhanov, father of Russian marxism, it was the zavodskie i.e. those 
who worked in the zavody or metal works, who would provide the
basis of the revolutionary movement because of their greater pro-
o 
letarianisation, education and leisure time. For Kropotkin, the
father of Russian anarchism, the zavodskie were basically reformist, 
not revolutionary; he believed that it was the fabrichnie i.e. those
who worked in fabriki or textile mills, whose spontaneous militancy
3 would spark off the social revolution.
The experience of 1917 showed that the two groups played 
different but complementary roles. Both developed a revolutionary 
political consciousness, but each in different ways. Although the 
problem is beyond the scope of the present work, it is arguable 
that the success of the Bolsheviks lay largely in the fact that 
they, alone of the left parties, managed to relate to both groups 
in their agitation and propaganda. Certainly, we have seen that 
both groups had a different relationship to the organised labour 
movement. The latter - in the shape of the trade unions and factory 
committees - was built and staffed by skilled, proletarianised 
male workers in their twenties and thirties. Workers new to industry 
i.e. women, peasants and youths, did not automatically begin to 
organise themselves after the February Revolution. They were driven
2. Plekhanov, G., Russkii rabochii v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii, 
Geneva 1892, p.15.
3. Kropotkin, P., Memoirs of a Revolutionist, ed. Rodgers, J.A., 
New York, 1962, p.218.
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into struggle by economic developments, but their struggle tended 
to be spontaneously militant - successful in the spring, but in­ 
creasingly less so thereafter. In the later stage of this struggle, 
they developed a level of political consciousness and moved into 
the orbit of the organised labour movement. The leaders of the 
labour movement endeavoured to direct the militancy of the new 
workers into organised channels, focussing and controlling it. Much 
of the momentum of the labour movement - particularly in the battle 
for collective wage contracts, but also in the struggle for workers' 
control - was provided by the new workers, but at times their 
militancy threatened to undermine organisation and the projects of 
the labour leaders. The latter believed that it was only through 
organisation that the democratic will of all workers could be ex­ 
pressed on a durable basis, and they aspired to involve all workers 
in the activities of the factory committees and trade unions. At 
the same time, however, in controlling the militancy of the rank-and- 
file, they ran the risk of dominating them. Thus at the heart of 
the labour movement was a tension between democracy and bureaucracy. 
In late 1917, as the economic crisis reached catastrophic pro­ 
portions, poverty, unemployment and starvation bred discontents in 
the remnants of the working class which the labour leaders sought 
to control by means of manipulative and bureaucratic methods. 
Bureaucratic elements came to overshadow democratic elements and a 
process of bureaucratisation got underway whereby some of the labour 
leaders evolved into state apparatchiks. This process was only in 
its very early stages by the time the Civil War broke out, however, 
and was by no means irreversible.
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The relationship of the factory committees to the trade unions 
was a complicated one. Factory committees were undoubtedly more 
powerful than the unions in 1917, as they were closer to the mass 
of workers and represented all workers in the workplace. The trade 
unions were less popular as a result of their greater distance 
from the mass of workers, who were members of the unions but not 
actively involved in them. The factory committees were first to 
register the growing radicalisation of feeling at shop-floor level. 
It was in the committees, rather than in the Soviets or trade unions, 
that the Bolsheviks first came to enjoy majority support. The 
Petrograd trade unions and Soviets came under Bolshevik control, 
but more gradually. The Bolsheviks did not cyn&jjally use the 
committees in order to win power, and then discard them in favour 
of the unions. The Bolshevik party had no clear position on the 
role of the factory committees: the leaders of the committees, 
almost all of them Bolsheviks, argued with Bolshevik trade union 
leaders as to the respective merits of both organisations. Lenin 
was generally sympathetic to the committees, but did not take sides 
in the debate about the respective role of each organisation until 
after October. As the economic crisis worsened, he came to feel 
that the committees were not suitable vehicles for centralising 
economic activity and swung in favour of subordinating the committees 
to the unions. This was possible only because the unions adopted 
the perspective of the committees, seeing their main task as that 
of regulating the economy (with the ultimate aim of socialising 
it), rather than of defending workers' economic interests.
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We have seen that it is impossible to understand the development 
of the Russian Revolution except in the context of economic crisis. 
In this context the October Revolution appears as an important 
political turning-point, but does not signify a rupture in social 
development. Up to October the economic crisis worked in favour 
of the Bolsheviks, since it convinced the mass of workers that 
only a radical change in the form of government could effect a 
decisive betterment in their position. After October, however, 
the economic crisis continued to get worse and came to work against 
the Bolsheviks' interests - the battered state of the productive 
forces vitiating attempts at socialist reorganisation of the economy.
The initial response to the economic crisis on the part of the 
workers was to strike for higher wages to beat inflation. This 
struggle was subsequently coordinated by the trade unions into the 
campaign for collective wage contracts. By summer, however, it was 
becoming clear that wages struggles were no longer very effective 
and they were superseded by the new struggle to control production. 
The latter, far from being an experiment in syndicalism, was a 
practical response to economic crisis - an attempt to maintain pro­ 
duction and thus to preserve jobs. However the February Revolution 
had precipitated a move to democratise the factories - in reaction 
to the despotism of the tsarist enterprise - and in time this 
impulse to democratisation meshed with attempts to maintain pro­ 
duction. By October, under the impact of the Bolshevik seizure of 
power and deepening industrial turmoil, the movement led by the 
factory committees had come to pose the twin aims of nationalisation 
and workers' self-management. Self-management was never a clearly
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formulated goal of the committees, but in practice this was 
how they envisaged running the factories under a centrally-planned 
socialist economy. Although the movement for workers' control 
sometimes flowed in the direction of anarchistic factory seizures 
or factory committee parochial ism-especially in the provinces-in 
Petrograd the movement was far more organised and the few factory 
take-overs were attempts to force the government to nationalise the 
factories - something it was reluctant to do until June 1918.
For the Bolshevik government by the spring of 1918, the main 
priority seemed to be to avert total economic ruin and mass star­ 
vation. This involved rebuilding the country's productive forces, 
but they felt that attempts at self-management conflicted with this 
priority. The obvious question which arises (and which has been 
the subject of much debate on the Left in recent years) is: were 
they right? Was workers' self-management incompatible with the 
task of increasing production?
By the spring of 1918 Lenin was haunted by the fact that the 
economic infrastructure of socialism did not exist in Russia. The 
political superstructure was there in the shape of a soviet govern­ 
ment, but not the material base. This existed only in Western Europe 
above all, in Germany. This led him to observe that:
History has taken such a peculiar course that it has 
given birth to two unconnected halves of socialism, 
existing side by side like two future chickens in 
a single shell of international imperialism. In 
1918 Germany has become the most striking embodi­ 
ment of the material realisation of the economic, 
productive and socio-economic conditions for
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socialism, on the one hand, and the Russia 
the embodiment of the political conditions 
on the other.4
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signalled the fact that revolution would 
not break out immediately in Germany and thus every effort had to 
be made to build up the productive forces of Russia in the meantime. 
As Lenin argued:
The task of the day is to restore the pro­ 
ductive forces destroyed by the war and by 
bourgeois rule; to heal the wounds inflicted 
by the war and by the defeat in the war, by 
profiteering and the attempts of the bourgeoisie 
to restore the overthrown rule of the exploiters; 
to achieve economic revival; to provide reliable 
protection of elementary order. It may sound 
paradoxical, but in fact, considering the 
objective conditions mentioned, it is absolutely 
certain that at the present moment the Soviet 
system can secure Russia's transition to socialism 
only if these very elementary, extremely elementary 
problems of maintaining public life are practically 
solved. 5
This meant first and foremost raising the productivity of labour.
The Russian is a bad worker in comparison with 
the advanced nations...To learn to work is the 
task which the Soviet government must set the 
people in all its scope.6
This meant the restoration of 'iron discipline 1 in the workplace, 
through the revival of piece work, productivity deals, one-man 
management, etc.
4. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 36, 5th edn., M., 
1962, p.300. For a good discussion of Lenin's thinking at this 
time see Ranci£re, J., La 1ec.on d'Althusser, Paris, 1974, pp. 186-8,
5. Lenin, V.I., Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, vol. 36, pp. 173-4.
6. ibid., p.189.
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Implicit within the movement for workers' control was the recog­ 
nition that capitalist methods cannot be used for socialist ends. 
The factory committees in their fight to democratise the factory 
had become aware, in a necessarily partial and groping way, that 
within the enterprise, capitalist relations were continually re­ 
produced through the technical division of labour, the hierarchical 
organisation of the enterprise and the separation of mental and 
manual labour. Marx had argued that within the labour process 
labour power and the means of production are combined in various 
forms under the command of capital, but this insight had been lost 
by the theoreticians of the Second International. The factory 
committees rediscovered and deepened this insight in the course of 
their battle against capitalist control of production, coming to 
recognise that socialism must entail the transformation of pro­ 
duction processes and thereby of the social and technical division 
of labour which constitutes a basis for the reproduction of capitalist 
social relations. Yet Lenin remained blind to this insight. He was 
not alarmed by the resuscitation of capitalist methods of labour 
discipline, for he believed that the transition to socialism was 
determined by the proletarian character of the state rather than by 
self-management by the direct producers.
Maurice Brinton, the libertarian critic of Bolshevism, has 
exposed the inadequacy of his conception:
None of them (i.e. the Bolshevik leaders, SAS) 
saw the proletarian nature of the Russian re­ 
gime as primarily and crucially dependent on 
the exercise of workers' power at the point of 
production (i.e. on workers' management of
481
production). It should have been obvious to 
them as Marxists that if the working class did 
not hold economic power, its 'political' power 
would at best be insecure and would in fact 
soon degenerate. The Bolshevik leaders saw the 
capitalist organisation of production as some­ 
thing which, in itself, was socially neutral. 
It could be used indifferently for bad 
purposes (as when the bourgeoisie used it with 
the aim of promoting private accumulation) or 
good ones (as when the 'workers 11 state used 
it 'for the benefit of many'). 7
This critique is absolutely on target. There is no doubt that Lenin 
did conceive proletarian power in terms of the soviet state and 
lacked any conception of localising such power at the point of 
production.
A more far-reaching critique of Bolshevik strategy at this time 
has been developed by writers of Maoist persuasion - principally, 
the French economist Charles Bettelheim. He argues that the Bolsheviks 
were wrong to believe that the possibility of socialist advance is, 
in any sense, determined by the level of productive forces. He follows 
Mao Ze Dong in arguing that the transformation of relations of 
production clears the way for the development of productive
7. Brinton, M., The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, 1917-21,
London: Solidarity publication, 1970, p.42.Incidentally it is 
too simple to say that Lenin regarded capitalist methods of or­ 
ganising production as 'socially neutral'. He considered them 
to be 'capitalist 1 , but justified by circumstances.
8. As usual it is Trotsky who attempts to make a virtue out of this 
particular shortcoming. In Terrorism and Communism (1920) he 
argues (rather ferociously): 'It would be a most crying error 
to confuse the question of boards of workers at the head of fac­ 
tories with the question of the supremacy of the proletariat. 
The dictatorship of the proletariat is expressed in the abolition 
of private property in the means of production, in the supremacy 
over the whole Soviet mechanism of the collective will of the 
workers, and not at all in the form in which economic enterprises 
are administered 1 (my emphasis). Trotsky, L., Terrorism and 
Communism, London, 1975, p.170.
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9 forces. He contends that because the Bolsheviks - with the
heroic exception of Lenin, whom he unwarrantedly excludes from 
his strictures - erroneously believed that the level of productive 
forces dictates the possibilities of socialist advance, they 
subordinated the transformation of capitalist social relations to the 
drive to increase industrial output. The absence of a strategy for 
transforming production, political and ideological relations meant 
that output increased within a framework of capitalist rather than 
socialist relations. The capitalist division of labour and 
the ideological and political relations which are an effect of this 
division, were constantly reproduced, thus paving the way, Bettelheim 
avers, for the restoration of a 'state bourgeoisie 1 .
There is much in Bettelheim's stimulating critique with which 
one can agree. The Bolshevik strategy of transition did indeed 
centre on building the 'economic base' ("socialism equals electri­ 
fication plus soviet power"), with little attention being paid to 
transforming capitalist social relations. But in denying that the 
level of productive forces exercises a constraint on the possibilities 
of socialist advance, Bettelheim is guilty of the grossest volun­ 
tarism. The implication of his argument is that the degeneration 
of the Russian Revolution was the consequence of a theoretical error 
("economism"). Although he mentions the intractable economic and
9. Bettelheim, C., Class Struggles in the USSR: first period,
1917-23. Brighton: Harvester, 1977, p.42. Mao's argument can 
bei found in Mao Tse Tung, A Critique of Soviet Economics, 
London 1977, esp. p.51.
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social circumstances in which the Bolsheviks found themselves, they 
do not function as part of the explanation of the degeneration of 
the revolution.
A satisfactory examination of the theoretical relationship 
of forces of production to relations of production, would take us 
into rarefied spheres well outside the scope of this work. Marx 
centrally assumed that the creation of socialist relations of 
production was possible only on the basis of a certain level of 
productive forces; but his treatment of this question is by no means 
unproblematical - not least, because his concept of the 'productive 
forces' at times smacks of technological determinism. This led the 
Second International to interpret the question in a way that was 
unambiguously technological-determinist. Theoreticians such as 
Kautsky conceived the 'productive forces' as technology and the ever­ 
growing scale of production. They argued that these, being social 
in character, would come into ever-increasing conflict with the con­ 
stricting mode of appropriation based on private ownership. The 
productive forces would eventually burst the fetters of private 
ownership, but, after a socialist government came to power, would 
provide the material base for a socialist reorganisation of society. 
Lenin's thinking on economic matters was strongly influenced by this 
interpretation, in spite of his commitment to the possibility of a 
socialist revolution in backward Russia.
In Marx's writings, however, one can find an alternative con­ 
ception of 'productive forces' which does not reduce them to brute 
technology or productive capacity. This conceives the productive
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forces as embracing the whole gamut of the means of production and 
reproduction of social life. It thus includes not merely types of 
industrial and agricultural production, but modes of social cooper­ 
ation, the application of social knowledge and cultural forms. 10 
Above all, Marx sees the principal productive force as being the 
working class itself. 11 In the light of this broader conception 
it becomes possible to understand why Marx believed that socialist 
construction was possible only with a certain level of development 
of productive forces.
In the first place, and most obviously, since he considered 
socialism to be the self-emancipation of the working class, socialism 
was a theoretical impossibility unless the chief productive force 
i.e. the industrial working class itself, was fully developed. 
Secondly, he argued that if a socialist revolution were not under­ 
pinned by an adequate level of productive forces: "want is merely
made general and, with destitution, the struggle for necessities and
12 all the old filthy business is necessarily reproduced". Engels
explained that it is precisely the 'struggle for necessities' which 
is at the root of class society:
10. This is well-discussed by Corrigan, P., Ramsay, H. and Sayer,
D., Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory, London: Macmillan, 
1978, pp. 3-4, though they draw exactly opposite conclusions 
to my own and, incidentally, tend to conflate the concepts of 
'forces of production' and 'social relations of productions'. 
See too Williams, R., Marxism and Literature, Oxford University 
Press, 1977, pp. 90-94.
11. See Marx, K., Capital, vol. 1, Penguin, 1976, pp. 928-9. As 
Cutler et al. show, however, even this passage is not free of 
a certain economic determinism, Cutler, A., Hindess, B., Hirst, 
P. and Hussain, A., Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, vol. 1, 
London: Routledge, 1977, pp. 148-153.
12. Marx, K. and Engels, F., The German Ideology, ed. Arthur, C.J., 
New York: International, 1970, p.56.
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The separation of society into an exploiting 
and an exploited class, a ruling and an op­ 
pressed class was the necessary consequence 
of the deficient and restricted development 
of production in former times. So long as 
the total social labour only yields a produce 
which but slightly exceeds that barely necessary 
for all; so long, therefore, as labour engages 
all or almost all of the time of the great 
majority of the members of society - so long, 13 
of necessity, this society is divided into classes.
This was the crux of the matter for Marx and Engels: they regarded 
socialism as the entry into freedom, not a struggle for survival. 
Socialism could be built only in a society ruled directly by the 
working people, which meant a big reduction in necessary labour 
time, which was possible only with industrial and agricultural 
development, advanced modes of social cooperation, application of 
social knowledge and complex cultural forms.
With this in mind, it becomes possible to understand the 
unenviable situation in which the Bolsheviks found themselves in 
1918. The destroyed state of productive forces meant that the 
struggle for survival became the priority of the government. Efforts 
to transform relations of production conflicted with this priority 
and may even have exacerbated economic chaos. By 1918 it had 
become apparent that the twin aims of the factory committees of 
1917 - raising the level of productive forces via a centralised 
planned economy and workers' self-management - were incompatible 
in a war-torn country. Only a revolution in Germany could have 
rescued the factory committee project , but in the event ? it never
13. Engels, F., Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Marx-Engels
Selected Works, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968, ppl 424-5.
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came. Brinton and Bettelheim are correct to point out that the 
Bolsheviks underestimated the importance of consciously trans­ 
forming relations of production, but there is no evidence to suggest 
that the transformation of the relations of production could have 
brought socialism regardless of the general level of productive 
forces. The Russian experience of 1917-18 suggests that democratic 
socialism failed, not because of short-sighted policies of the 
Bolsheviks, but because the task of dragging the country out of 
poverty, ruin and squalor necessitated types of compulsion which 
proved incompatible with workers' self-management. Greater aware­ 
ness of the importance of workers' self-management on the part of 
the Bolshevik leadership might have helped it survive longer than 
it did? but workers' self-management could not survive amid hunger 
and unemployment. To that extent, the Soviet government was right 
to prioritise the raising of the productive forces. Unfortunately, 
the use of short-term capitalist methods of compulsion did under­ 
mine the long-term goal of socialism. The history of workers' 
control in Russia in the period 1917-18, therefore, seems merely 
to reaffirm a truth which was discovered by Marx and Engels viz. that 
democratic socialism, involving workers' self-management, cannot be 
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2. Archives
Leningrad State Historical Archive (LGIA)-
fond 1229 Factory Inspectorate of Petrograd guberniya
fond 1333 Company Accounts of the Cable Works
fond 1357 Petrograd Metal Works
fond 1278 Kersten knitwear factory
fond 416 Baltic works: proceedings of conciliation committee
fond 1304 Baltic works: works committee
fond 1477 1835 Gas Light Company
fond 1182 Nevskaya footwear factory
fond 1186 Pechatkin paper mill
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3. Newspapers



































Central Committee of the Jewish Bund
Menshevik paper for working women
SD Internationalists
Anarcho-syndicalists
EC of Petrograd Soviet







North-West oblast 1 bureau of Central 
Committee and Petrograd guberniya 
committee of Bolshevik party
SR (centre)
Menshevik
Central Committee of Bolshevik party
Central Committee of Menshevik party
Bolshevik paper for working women




Socialist Union of Young Workers
Petrograd oblast 1 committee of SR's
Left SR's
denotes that the paper came out under several different titles.
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Zerno pravdy 
Zhizn' farmatsevta























Predecessor to Rabochii kooperator
Rubber workers (mainly the Triangle Works)
Pharmacy employees
Bureau of All-Russian Congresses of 
Artisans
Temporary Central Committee of 
national metalworkers' union
Petrograd Council of Trade Unions
Predecessor to Nabat




Gazeta vremennogo rabochego i krest'yanskogo pravitel'stvo
Izvestiya soveta s"ezdov predstavitelei promyshlennosti i torgovli
Malen'kaya gazeta/Narodnaya gazeta (extreme right wing)
Petrogradskaya gazeta
Torgovo-promyshlennaya gazeta
Vestnik petrogradskikh obshchestva zavodchikov i fabrikantov
Vestnik vermennogo pravitel'stva
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Materialy po statistike truda Severnoi oblasti, 1-10, 1918-21. 
Narodnoe Khozyaistvo, 1918. 
Statistika truda, 1918-19. 
Trudy Ts.S.U. SSSR 
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